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Abstract
The thesis contributes to an established, but largely anecdotal, Hterature examining 
the rapid decline of the British car industry’s remaining mass producing manufacturer, 
British Leyland (BL), through the rigourous examination of three key issues raised by 
historians and contemporaries of the period in relation to the quality of British Leyland’s 
products: (1) ‘product-led’ decline; (2) losing an advertising war with incumbents, (3) 
and the imposition of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), between the UK and Japan 
in 1977 aimed at restricting the quantity of imported Japanese cars to Britain in order to 
protect domestic firms. In order to capture each of these issue, which relate to product 
quality, the thesis blends primary and secondary sources with the analysis of a substantive 
data set. The later captures every model-version sold in the UK car market from 1971- 
2002 and includes over one hundred and thirty characteristics ranging from the humble 
cupholder to traflBc navigation systems and on-board computers. This is matched to a 
complete set of firm accounts and model-level advertising expenditures.
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Chapter 1
Contextualising the Motor Industry 
in Britain’s Industrial ’Decline’
The explanation of the post-war decline of British industry has been a central question 
in historical research. In the mid-1970s scholars began to refer to the precipitous fall in 
British industrial competitiveness during the twentieth century as the ‘British disease’ 
[Allen (1979)]. The concept that British industry as a whole suffered represented the 
broadening of a pessimistic hterature that traced the declining fortunes of the troubled 
‘staple’ industries, such as textiles and coal, to encompass new sectors that had grown 
out of the technological advances of the Second Industrial Revolution. These new sectors 
included chemicals, and complex manufactured goods associated with industries as diverse 
as aerospace, cars, computing, and engineering [Dintenfass (1998)].
The declinist hterature came into its own during the 1980s with a series of texts argu­
ing that Britain’s manufacturing was in perpetual decline.^ The British disease became 
associated with a number of alternative explanations with different authors placing differ­
ing emphasis on one or more specific factors. Much of the hterature took a broad based 
approach of listing factors that were specific to the UK to justify her divergent perfor­
mance.^ The list of factors were associated to economic actors in the form of government 
institutions, technological and managerial or entrepreneurial failures, and intransigent 
workers [Allen (1979)]. Other authors emphasised specific groups of actors. For example, 
Barnett (1986) speculated that foUowing the Second World War pohcy was drawn from a 
post-War consensus that led to a marginalisation of manufacturing by the pohcy makers. 
Wiener (1985) also focused on education and considers that the ehtes’ preference for ru­
ral romanticism in the nineteenth century underlay an ambivalence about the ‘industrial
^Wiener (1985) ; Kirby (1981); Dintenfass (1998); Pollard (1984); Elbaum and Lazonick (1986); Alford (1988).
^Dintenf^ (1998); Kirby (1981); Dintenfass (1998); Pollard (1984); Alford (1988).
spirit’ of the nation. Elbaum and Lazonick (1986) on the other hand focus on institu­
tional arrangements between workers and managers and managerial choice of technology 
adoption.
The declinist literature, however, has in recent years been criticised for being ‘exces­
sively’ pessimistic. At the extreme of the revisionist view, Rubinstein (1993) argued that 
Britain never had a comparative advantage in manufacturing and that economic perfor­
mance was not captured in economic indicators. More recent work by Booth (Booth, 
2001a, 2003a,b) has also painted a rosy picture of Britain’s manufacturing performance 
by arguing that during the 1980s and 1990s Britain outperformed her competitors.^ Work 
by Broadberry (2004) aimed to provide a more balanced view of Britain’s post-war manu­
facturing performance. Broadberry takes a comparative approach focusing on the relative 
productivity rates between the UK, Germany and the US. He points out that, in terms 
of productivity, the UK made some progress by closing a productivity gap between its 
US and Germany rivals that opened up during the 1970s. It is possible therefore to con­
ceive of the UK’s industrial performance in two distinct periods: the first phase being 
one of relative decline, occurring prior to the early 1980s, and a second phase of relative 
productivity catch up thereafter.
Of the Second Industrial Revolution industries, the dramatic decline of the car industry, 
reflected in the domestically owned producers’ share of the UK car market, which fell 
from a dominant 41% in 1970 to a mere 4% in 2002, became the ultimate metaphor 
for the ‘British disease’. The industry’s pivotal role in the post-war economy, its striking 
decline, and that the indigenous industry was expected by government and contemporaries 
to take a pivotal role in the UK economy [Ministry of Supply (1948)], provide partial 
explanations for the academic attention bestowed upon it. The importance of the motor 
industry to UK manufacturing is exemplified by Rhys who noted that one third of the 
increase of industrial production in the mid-1960s can be attributed to the motor vehicle 
industry, hence “fluctuations in the activity of the motor industry have a profound effect 
on economic activity generally” [Rhys (1972, 78)]. But what has principally justified 
the many pages of text devoted to the industry is that it encapsulates the full set of 
explanations for British industrial decline by being an industry identified with industrial 
relations problems, managerial deficiencies, technological inadequacy, and government 
intervention at various levels [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995)].
Before reviewing explanations for the decline of the firm that was effectively the in­
digenous British industry from 1968 onwards, British Leyland (BL), Section 1.1 sets the
^It is recognised the more recent research that the ‘declinist’ literature in part concerns the UK economy as a whole 
rather than manufacturing [Booth (2003b)]. Since the thesis is focused on the UK car industry the Chapter reasonably 
contextualises it role and development relative to the manufacturing industry [Broadberry (2004)].
scene by examining the nature and extent of the ‘decline’ of UK manufacturers in general, 
and the motor industry in particular. A more disaggregated breakdown of how domestic 
production for the local and export markets, as well as imports into the domestic market, 
evolved through time, is then detailed. The analysis illustrates that two dramatic shifts 
in UK production occurred between 1971 and 2002: the decline of BL and the rise of 
UK based Japanese manufacturing. These two shifts are linked by government adminis­
tered industry-to-industry agreements designed to protect domestic industry in the form 
of bilateral Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs). By restraining Japanese imports to 
the UK, VERs provided the central impetus to Japanese foreign direct investment in UK 
plant. In addition. Section 1.1 provides a descriptive analysis of developments related 
to other significant manufacturers operating in the UK. While the thesis is focused on 
British Leyland, examining the production and sales trends of BL’s rivals provides impor­
tant background to later Chapters where BL’s product performance is gauged through 
juxtaposing its oflFerings with those of its rivals. Also, since the time period examined 
stretches to 2002 so Section 1.1 serves to bring recent developments in the history of the 
UK car industry up to date.
Having contextualised trends in the UK motor industry. Section 1.2 surveys a sub­
stantive literature that has attempted to explain the demise of the indigenous UK motor 
industry. To provide a conceptual framework to structure the discussion, the possible 
set of explanations are broken into two parts with factors affecting supply and demand 
being assessed separately. The distinction between demand and supply factors provides 
a neat way to critically evaluate the literature within the context of the substantial tech­
nical change that has occurred in the industry since the 1970s. As importantly, the 
supply/ demand split provides a methodological framework to analyse the determinants 
of the decline of Britain Leyland in later chapters of the thesis, as is detailed in Section 
1.3.
1.1 UK Production, Exports and the Imports
1.1.1 The Productivity and Scale of UK Manufacturing and the Motor In­
dustry
The pessimistic literature of the 1980s was not wholly founded on labour productivity as 
the prime indicator of Britain’s industrial decline. The declinist hterature also emphasised 
the fall in the absolute size of UK manufacturing, both in terms of its output and employ­
ment, what was coined ‘de-industrialisation’ [Pollard (1992, 395) and Kitson and Michie 
(2000)]. A more all encompassing means to determine whether the pessimists were right
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to commiserate over Britain’s relative manufacturing activity is to examine whether their 
case was justified on their own grounds. To do so, a comparative view is taken through 
the derivation of decade averages of the two macro aggregates capturing the economic 
size of the sector: manufacturing output and total hours worked (employment multiplied 
by the average number of hours worked per annum). The growth rates of those variables 
in the UK, France, Germany and the US are depicted in Table 1.1. Panel A in Table 1.1 
draws out the relative changes in manufacturing output and labour input. In doing so 
the analysis extends the work of Kitson and Michie (2000)}  Panel B contains analogous 
sets of data series from the motor industry.
The data used come from O’Mahony and de Boer (2002) who provide internationally 
comparative productivity estimates for the UK, France, Germany and the US between 
1964-1999. The choice of data set is determined by two factors. First, the data set 
was designed for comparative analysis. It is quite different from other databases such as 
the OECD and STAN databases which report data from the national accounts for the 
variables underlying productivity calculations. Second, comparison is facifitated since the 
data set was also used by Steve Broadberry (2004) who provides the most up to date 
account of British post-war manufacturing performance. However, while the same data 
set that is used by Broadberry (2004) is analysed, the productivity measures differ in that 
they include a third comparative country, France, and are calculated using hours worked, 
rather than by number of workers. The choice of examining the 1965 period refiects a 
desire to maximise the number of countries compared during 1971-2002 period, which this 
thesis is concerned with, while Broadberry is interested in a far longer time horizon.® The 
preference of accounting for hours worked is that there are quite substantive differences 
in work hours between the four economies and that these have changed over time. For 
example, the mean British manufacturing employee worked 10% longer than his German 
counterpart in 1973, and 15% longer by 1998. In contrast, employees in the US worked 
8% longer hours in 1979 than UK employees but worked 17% longer hours by 1998.
Table 1.1 shows that, in terms of output growth, all three of UK’s rivals out-paced the 
UK. France and the US both witnessed output growth that was double that of the UK 
while Germany’s was half again as great. Other than obtaining average annual growth 
rates that was 0.1% higher during the 1980s, and greater rates of the similar magnitude 
relative to the US in the late 1960s and Germany during the 1990s, the UK exhibited
^"Ikble 1.1 differs from Kitson and Michie (2000) in that they provide different year groupings 1973-1979, and employment 
rather than hours worked. Also those authors used 1985 as their base year rather than 1996. 1996 is used as the base year 
here to be consistent with the analysis of the productivity data below. Finally, Kitson and Michie (2000) are only interested 
in UK manufacturing in general while they do not provide data or analysis on the motor or any other industry.
^The O’Mahony and de Boer (2002) estimates of FVench productivity levels are only available from 1964 but are available 
for the UK, US, and West Germany from 1950.
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comparatively lower output growth rates during all sub-periods/
Table 1.1: 
(1965-99)
Manufacturing and Motor Industry Output and Employment: International Comparisons
Manufacturing 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 AVERAGE
UK Real Output (100=1996) 73.4 85.8 86.0 77.3 89.0 94.8 100.9 89.9
Annual Growth Rate 1.3 0.9 -0.3 -0.7 1.8 0.0 0.4 0.5
Total Hours Worked (mn) 17,319.9 15,685.5 13,860.5 10,992.6 9,681.8 8,237.0 8,080.5 11,979.7
Annual Growth Rate -1.0 -1.3 -2.3 -5.7 -0.9 ■4.0 0.3 -2.3
France Real Output (100=1996) 50.8 71.2 83.2 87.3 89.7 95.5 104.2 92.6
Annual Growth Rate 1.8 1.8 1.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 1.3 0.7
Total Hours Worked (mn) 10,136.4 5,291.7 9,495.3 8,255.0 7,191.3 6,669.6 6,089.3 8,324.8
Annual Growth Rate -0.2 0.3 -2.7 -3.3 -1.7 -2.6 -0.4 -1.5
Germany Real Output (100=1996) 61.3 77.4 84.8 87.7 94.8 103.8 100.1 94.2
Annual Growth Rate 1.6 1.1 1.0 -0.2 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.6
Total Hours Worked (mn) 18752.5 4863.0 15597.1 14537.5 13916.0 13491.3 2375.2 13843.7
Annual Growth Rate -0.4 -0.4 -2.0 -2.1 0.1 -2.5 -2.7 -1.5
US Real Output (100=1996) 53.3 59.0 66.2 66.7 79.3 82.5 110.6 91.7
Annual Growth Rate 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.0 1.4 0.7 2.5
Total Hours Worked (mn) 39,169.5 4,011.9 38,515.9 37,907.0 38,039.1 36,772.8 37,940.3 38,067.9
Annual Growth Rate 2.9 -0.6 1.2 -1.3 0.1 -0.8 0.5 0.3
Motor industry 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 AVERAGE
UK Real Output (100=1996) 132.8 148.4 142.4 110.5 119.8 93.5 101.8 121.3
Annual Growth Rate 1.8 3.3 -3.0 -3.9 2.6 ■4.2 1.2 -0.3
Total Hours Worked (mn) 960.5 959.1 854.5 593.0 480.8 380.5 428.4 665.2
Annual Growth F^te -0.4 -0.8 -2.3 -9.5 -0.4 -6.4 4.2 -2.2
France Real Output (100=1996) 53.7 95.3 111.6 100.5 97.9 96.2 118.4 96.2
Annual Growth Rate 2.6 4.0 0.7 -2.2 1.4 -1.1 4.9 1.5
Total Hours Worked (mn) 282.7 324.9 331.0 285.8 232.8 212.7 204.5 267.8
Annual Growth Rate 2.3 2.1 ■0.2 -4.6 -3.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.8
Germany Real Output (100=1996) 44.3 59.6 74.7 82.2 91.0 100.4 106.0 76.4
Annual Growth Rate 1.6 0.4 2.6 -0.1 1.1 -0.3 0.3 1.1
Total Hours Worked (mn) 1107.1 1218.6 1152.7 1181.0 1213.7 1164.1 1130.1 1035.7
Annual Growth Rate 1.9 -1.2 1.9 -1.3 1.0 -2.7 -2.8 0.0
US Real Output (100=1996) 66.5 73.5 93.9 73.2 93.5 82.5 110.6 84.8
Annual Growth Rate 2.2 0.1 2.2 -0.2 -1.0 2.4 1.2 1.0
Total Hours Worked (mn) 1734.7 1696.8 1778.3 1498.5 1665.5 1694.8 2095.6 1737.8
Annual Growth Rate 3.4 -0.4 2.6 -1.2 -1.2 3.9 2.6 1.4
Source: Derived from O'Mahony and de Boer (2002)
Notes: Employment multiplied by average annual hours worked (In millions of hours)
More dramatic than the slower rates of output growth was the poor performance of the 
sector as an employer. Growth in the number of hours worked fell in the UK, Prance and 
Germany throughout the period, and in the US in the 1980s, but the relative decline of 
UK manufacturing was more pronounced throughout. The data show that the reduction 
in employment has occurred since the late 1970s, so to some extent the fall during the 
1980s can be viewed as representing the acceleration of an established trend in manufac­
turing. Overall, reductions in labour inputs were the driving force behind improvements
^In Germany’s case the reduction in output growth in the 1990s was influenced by the efiiects of reuniflcation since the 
data incorporates East Germany from 1989.
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in labour productivity: a phenomena that was termed the ‘tail-enders’ argument, which is 
an analogy to the tail-enders of a cricket team being dropped to raise the team’s average 
[Pollard (1992)]. In effect, the proportionate fall in employment was greater than in out­
put, which raised labour productivity by definition. The 1980s have received considerable 
attention since the decade is strongly associated with the Thatcher regime’s radical shift 
in policy and legislation, designed to weaken the market power of trade unions.^ Sup­
port for that government’s labour market strategies is backed up by a number of studies 
in the economics literature that found investment levels were lower in competitive firms 
and marginally lower in non-competitive ones where unions were recognised [Denny and 
Nickell (1992)]. Furthermore, Gregg, Steve, and Metcalf (1993) show that the negative 
impact of manual union recognition halved between 1984 and 1990.
While the UK’s manufacturing sector as a whole has witnessed a decline in output 
relative to its three major competitors, the UK motor industry was unique in experiencing 
both relative and absolute de-industrialisation over the period as a whole. In employment 
terms the UK sat firmly at the foot of the table with average annual reductions of 2.2% 
in employment levels, which were almost three times greater the next closest competitor. 
Prance.
The key evidence in support of the revisionist case for UK manufacturing, described 
by Kay and Haskell (1990) as the “jewel in the crown” of 1980s economic pohcy, was 
an improvement in productivity. To frame that development over a longer time period 
Table 1.2 traces the relative productivity performance of the UK between 1965 and 1999. 
Table 1.2 illustrates that the UK’s labour productivity performance, both for aggregated 
manufacturing in general and the motor industry in particular, differed between its US 
and Continental neighbours. The upper panel shows that US manufacturing productivity 
growth was below that of the UK from 1965 to the 1980s but turned around thereafter. 
Over the period as a whole the UK was a full percentage point higher than the US. The 
motor industry’s performance followed similar trends but was less impressive, being half 
a percentage point higher than the US over the period as a whole. Compared to its two 
main Continental rivals, however, the UK’s productivity performance was unimpressive. 
French productivity rates were on average a percentage point higher, year-on-year, while 
Germany witnessed growth rates that were about half a percent higher. Like the UK, 
the growth of French and Germany productivity fell during the 1970s, but the UK’s 
productivity fell comparatively further still. Over all, the UK managed to turn around 
its relatively poor performance during the 1980s until the mid-1990s when relative labour
^Such legislation were predominantly determined ly  ever stronger provisions under the Employment Act in 1980, 1982 
and 1988, the repeal of the Fair Wages Resolution of 1891 in 1983 and the Wages Act of 1986. Riddell (1989) provides an 
excellent survey of how each of these policies were aimed to reduce union powers.
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productivity once again fell back against her Continental and US rivals.
The productivity performance of the UK motor industry in many ways mirrored ag­
gregate UK manufacturing trends. Indeed, during the 1980s the gains were identical. 
However, the inferior performance of the industry between 1965-79 and during the 1990s 
meant that the industry was an under-perfbrmer over the period as whole, even within 
the UK manufacturing context. Productivity growth in the US and Germany was also 
lower than manufacturing as a whole. Indeed, Germany’s productivity was identical to 
the UK over the 1970-99 period, but there was some catch up to the US. The French mo­
tor industry was the standout performer with productivity performance that was higher 
than her competitors over nearly aU the sub-periods depicted in Table 1.2 and was by far 
the most successful performer during the 1990s.
Table 1.2: Labour Productivity Growth in Manufacturing and the Motor Industry: International Com­
parisons of Five Year Average Growth Rates (1965-99)
Manufecturing
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
UK 4.7 4.6 1.8 4.4 5.0 4.3 0.5
France 7.6 5.0 5.8 3.0 4.1 2.5 3.1
Germany 7.0 5.7 4.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.8
USA 2.0 2.6 1.5 1.5 3.4 2.5 4.4
Motor Industry
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
UK 3.2 6.7 -1.0 4.4 5.0 0.0 -1.1
France 7.7 7.7 1.8 0.6 6.6 -0.4 9.3
Germany 5.7 3.0 5.9 1.2 1.6 3.1 -0.3
USA 4.3 2.2 3.6 2.4 -0.9 2.1 -0.2
Note: Five year average growth rates in productivity (deflated value added divided by hours worked) 
were derived using data compiled by O'Mahony de Boer (2002).
The productivity growth of the 1980s has received attention by economic historians, 
being widely attributed to the policy settings put in place during the Thatcher years. 
Broadberry (2004), (Crafts, 1991, 1996) and Eltis (1996) all cite the productivity rise of 
the 1980s and early 1990s as providing evidence that the Thatcher government had been 
successful in leading to that productivity recovery. More up to date data provided here 
do not support a view that Britain has been in terminal dechne from the mid-1970s. Nor 
does the data suggest that there has been a succœs story either, given the relative decline 
of productivity since the late 1990s. These findings are in a way not a complete surprise 
given previous findings that there were once-and-for-all gains associated with the 1979-84 
and 1988-89 periods [Gregg, Steve, and Metcalf (1993); Machin and Stewart (1996)].
While the data contained in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 are suggestive there are a number of
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reasons why the industry data in particular should be regarded with caution. First, the 
data relate to the ‘motor industry’ rather than car manufacturers per se, and hence include 
component manufacturers as well as manufacturers of trucks and other vehicles. Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, labour productivity, while an important component of 
productivity was by no means the only factor driving the industry’s competitiveness. 
Indeed, given the increasingly capital intensive nature of the car industry, comparative 
labour productivity can only be viewed as being a rough guide to overall productive 
performance.® A third limitation with using the O’Mahony and de Boer (2002) data is 
that it provides quite a limited coverage both of car producing nations and time periods.
One means to partially overcome the aggregation and coverage issues is to use industry 
production data. Church (1994) and Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995) have 
taken the same approach, and also compare aggregate international production levels for 
a similar set of car producing countries albeit over different time periods. Specifically, 
Church (1994, Figure 3, 45) illustrates production levels from 1945 until 1989, while 
Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995) cover 1945 to 1978, although neither in­
clude Spanish production. Unfortunately the measures of employment needed to construct 
country-level labour productivity indices are not available.® Figure 1.1 illustrates that the 
shifting fortunes of UK production occurred in three phases. The first, and predominant, 
phase was one of relative decline with respect to Continental car markers who system­
atically succeeded in eclipsing Britain’s early lead as Europe’s dominant manufacturer 
between 1956 and 1973 - Germany (1956); France (1967), and Italy (1973). The second 
phase reflected an absolute decline in production from 1970 to 1984 that saw the relative 
late comer to European mass production, Spain, surpass the UK in 1983. While all pro­
ducers witnessed a decline in output in 1973 the shde in production differed in that in the 
UK it was sustained. In 1972 the UK accounted for 8.8% of the total production of major 
car manufacturing nations, but by 1984 it only accounted for 3.7%, which also represented 
more than a halving of production in absolute terms. The third phase reflected a more 
subtle rise in production levels relative to the same basket of international producers to 
reach 6.3% in 2002. What is noteworthy in comparing the output and production data is 
that they tell quite divergent stories for the 1990s. While the macro output data suggests 
that there was a decline in real output over the 1990s the production data sees a 72%
^Data limitations disallow an analysis of total factor productivity trends over the periods since data on French TFP is 
not available for the motor industry and German data is only available since the unification in the O’Mahony and de Boer 
(2002) data set. That TFP and capital stock differences may be important factors is reflected in the substantive level 
differences between the countries. For example FVance had a capital stock per hour worked that was three times greater 
than the UK for motor vehicles in 1999.
^The complication being that employee data available firom company accounts record global staffing rather than em­
ployment by geographic region. These data cannot therefore be used at the national level to generate country comparisons 
provided above. The reason being that the majority of firms operating in the global car market have production in many 
locations their accounts data is typically only available at the firm (consolidated) level.
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rise. Putting these growth rates in a comparative context, the expansion in production 
of 3.4% per annum  during the 1990s was joint equal to that of Spain’s in obtaining the 
highest production levels of the major car manufacturers. It is difficult to conceive that 
the output from Japanese firms’ UK plants was at low levels of productivity as these 
plants were reputed to be the most efficient in Europe and amongst the most efficient 
in the world [The Economist (3/10/1992)]. The imphcation is that lower productivity 
rates in the non-car manufacturing components of the ‘motor industry’ drove the lower 
productivity rates in the industry from the mid-1990s.
Figure 1.1: Car Production of Major Car Manufacturing Countries
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SOURCES: France (Comte des Constructeurs Français d'Automobites),' Germany (Vertwnd der AutomoMindustrie); /ta/y (ANFIA) ; Japan (JAMA); Spain 
(Agrupaclon Nacional de Fabicantes des Automobiles y Carrions); USA (American Automobile ktinufacture's Assoc.); UK (Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders)
Taking the period as a whole however, with the exception of Italy whose domestic cham­
pion Fiat suffered from severe financial difficulties during the 1970s and 1990s [Volpato 
(1996)], Britain was unable to match the production level of its continental neighbours. 
Nor has any nation been able to match the production levels of the stand out performer, 
Japan, who opened up a significant gap with the US from 1987 even with Japanese trans­
plant production in the US and the UK being excluded from Figure 1.1. Despite suffering 
a more pronounced reduction in production during the recession of the early 1990s, Japan
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still maintained a level of production that was five times that of the UK’s and more than 
50% higher than that of its largest rival, the US, in 2002.
1.1.2 C h a n g in g  Market Structure and the Decline and Rise of the British 
Car Industry
In order to get a better gauge of the activity of firms underlying the UK’s aggregate car 
production levels. Table 1.3 summarises production by UK car manufacturers over the 
1970 to 2002 period that were marketed in the domestic and export markets. At the 
beginning of the 1970s production for the domestic market was predominantly located 
in the UK. UK production was dominated by a group of three multinational operations. 
Ford UK, GM Vauxhall, Chrysler UK, and the last remaining UK mass producer, British 
Leyland, with sales being roughly split between these two groupings. FYom a production 
perspective, British-owned industry effectively was British Leyland with residual sales by 
UK niche producers making up less than 1% of sales in their home market throughout 
the period. Indeed, before Rover was purchased by a British firm, Phoenix Consortium, 
in 2001 the only British owned car manufacturer in the year 2000 was Morgan whose 
sales never exceeded 400 units in the UK car market any given year. Understanding 
the forces underlying the shifting production trends summarised in Table 1.3 requires an 
examination of the production history of the UK domestic industry and key multi-national 
producers operating in the UK.
The consohdation of the domestic UK car industry occurred in two stages. The first 
pre-dates the sample period and involved the formation of two major manufacturing 
consortia, in the form of Chrysler UK and BL, in the late 1960s. Table 1.4 details the 
mergers that formed BL during the 1960s until its subsequent consolidation by 2002, and a 
breakdown of merger activity relating to all firms operating in the UK market is provided 
in Appendix B for reference purposes. Church (1994, 84-92) argues that the 1967 merger 
ultimately reflected the interests of shareholders in the participating companies. However 
the government through the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) promoted the 
merger with the Minister of Technology, Tony Benn and the two company chairman Stokes 
[Leyland Motor Corporation (LMC)] and H a .T rim a .T i [British Motor Corporation (BMC)] 
in 1966. The rationales were given as the achievement of scale and scope, the protection of 
exports and employment, and the assurance that a significant proportion of the industry 
remained in British han d s .T h e  creation of British Leyland represented the merging of 
the relatively smaller LMC, which was predominantly a truck maker, but had acquired
^^Concem that the industry was being overtaken by overseas interests was heightened following the acquisition of Bootes 
by Chrysler in previous year [\^lks (1984)].
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Table 1.3: Total Sales in the UK and Ebqport Car Markets Market (1971-2002)
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
UK BL 48.7 48.7 41.5 41.4 31.6 27.3 14.9 17.6
Jaguar 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.5 5.2
Land Rover 0.5 1.6 3.9 6.1 6.5
German BMW 6.1
US GM Vauxhall 14.0 11.5 7.9 18.1 26.0 17.4 19.4 11.6
Ford UK 23.3 31.0 44.8 36.1 33.4 30.0 17.8 2.2
France/US Chrysler UK/PSA 13.5 12.6 5.4 2.4 3.7 6.5 13.6 15.6
Japan Nissan 1.8 6.9 13.0 15.5
Honda 3.5 5.5 11.1
Toyota 2.7 5.7 7.6
TOTAL mOOs) 1.027.5 937.9 571.4 840.3 889.8 787.5 578.5 582.3
Export
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
UK BL 54.0 54.1 45.1 49.5 33.5 20.4 8.3 4.3
Jaguar 14.6 7.9 3.5 7.0 8.9
Land Rover 4.8 8.1 9.2 11.7 11.2
German BMW 11.9
US GM Vauxhall 7.7 4.8 2.8 0.1 6.2 16.8 16.8 6.7
Ford UK 17.8 15.6 24.4 6.9 8.0 5.0 4.9 0.0
France/US Chrysler UK/PSA 20.1 24.2 27.1 22.8 20.6 3.6 10.1 10.2
Japan Nissan 14.7 21.7 23.8 19.8
Honda 8.5 4.0 10.8
Toyota 9.1 13.0 16.0
TOTAL (000s) 714.5 596.2 349.6 207.7 405.8 744.6 1062.9 1047.7
Proportion Exported (%) 41.0 38.9 38.0 19.8 31.3 48.6 64.8 64.3
GRAND TOTAL 1741.9 1534.1 921.0 1048.0 1295.6 1532.1 1641.5 1629.9
Notes: Jaguar and Land Rover's sates are incorporated Into British Leyiand's sales until 1982. 
Source: SMMT, Motor Industry of Great Britain (World Automotive Statistics): various years.
the niche manufacturers Standard-Triumph, in 1961, and Rover, in 1967, with British 
Motor Company (which incorporated all Britain’s mass producing brands and who had 
acquired Jaguar Group in 1966). While the smaller of the two firms, LMC had proved 
relatively the more successful [Turner (1971), Rhys (1972)]. The IRC considered that the 
successful LMC would be able to inject managerial strength into the under-performing 
BMC. Following the merger the IRC’s commitment to the merger was made clear by a 
£25 milhon loan for retooling [Turner (1971)].
As a result of the merger the company was restructured into a multi-divisional firm 
comprised of the Specialist Car Division, comprising Jaguar, Rover and Triumph, and a 
second that included Austin-Morris, representing the two volume producers, and strangely, 
the specialist MG sports cars. Gradualism was the prescribed strategy prior to the com­
pany’s nationalisation in 1975 with Stokes, the erstwhile Chairman of the firm, arguing 
the market was sufficiently large to accommodate model-overlap “for some time” [Wood
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Table 1.4: Evolution of Market Structure (British Leyland and its Subsequent Incarnations)
Mergers and splits of British Leyiand’
1961 Leyiand merge Standard and Triumph
1967 Leyiand merge Rover and Land Rover
1968 Leyland merge BMC  ^[Austin-Morris; Jaguar]
renamed British Leyiand (1968) then Austin Rover (1979)
1986 British Leyiand divested Jaguar
1988 British Aerospace acquired British Leyland
1991 British Aerospace divested Ford (PMG) acquired Jaguar
1994 British Aerospace divested BMW acquired Austin-Rover
2000 BMW split Pheonix Consortium acquired Rover Group
2001 BMW split Ford (PMG) acquired Land Rover
[1] names are the firm name after the merger or split.
[2] British Motor Company incorporated the Austin-Mealy, MG, Nuffield, Riley and Wolesley marques. 
Sources: See Appendix A.
(1988)]. Indeed, British Leyland maintained aU four of its the major mass producing 
marques (Austin, Morris, Triumph, and Rover) until the mid-1980s (with Morris and 
Triumph exiting the market in 1984 and 1985 respectively). The lower sales brands that 
were mass market segment producers (VanPlas; Rehant, and Wolseley) who remained in 
the market for eight, fifteen and nineteen years respectively, after the formation of BL.
The merger was not a success with the firm recording low profits levels until 1974 
when it shpped into the red, which necessitated a request for state aid.^  ^ The request 
for aid prompted three independent official reports. The first was prepared by the Ryder 
Committee, set up by the Labour government as a preliminary for deciding on a pohcy 
for the domestically owned industry [National Enterprise Board (1977)]. The second 
was that of the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the House of Commons (HC) 
which conducted its investigation by interviewing numerous witnesses from the industry 
[Expenditure Committee (1975)]. The third was produced by a government ‘think-tank’ 
the Central Pohcy Review Staff (CPRS) [Central Pohcy Review Staff (1975)]. Each 
of the reports agreed that poor industrial relations and outdated plant and machinery 
contributed to the low productivity of the firm compared to its rivals. The CPRS and the 
HC also considered that the firm had failed to respond to consumer demand in various 
respects.
Of the three sets of recommendations the Ryder Report was most influential securing 
cabinet approval for a massive pubhc investment in order to renew plant and restructure 
the firm. The firm was effectively nationalised with the IRC overseeing subsidies and
Source: Company accounts collated ly  the author (1968-2002).
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monitoring the firms’ activities. That the Ryder plan was accepted was not uncontrover- 
sial. The Expenditure Committee (1975) accused the Ryder committee of formulating its 
strategy to suit the government’s political and economic ideology rather than the corpo­
ration’s underlying problems. Regardless of whether this was the case the plan justified 
the need for expanding production and no redundancies. The government was unwilling 
to allow the firm to exit due to its substantive export earnings, in a period where the bal­
ance of payments problems were high on the agenda, but principally because the industry 
was a substantial employer. These factors were reflected in the Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, not wishing to be responsible for the scrapping of an “essential part of the United 
Kingdom economic base.” [Wilson (1979, 137-9)]. The Trade and Industry Subcommittee 
commented that Ryder’s strategy was
“to a remarkable degree... the type if not the scale of changes that British Ley­
land Motor Company themselves were planning to make” [Expenditure Com­
mittee (1975, vol.XXV, para. 235)].
The gradualist firm product strategy was maintained following Stokes’s departure, hav­
ing been removed because of his role in the poor management of BL [Wood (1988, 179)]. 
Alec Park, BL’s former finance director assumed the role of Chairman with model de­
velopment emphasising the development of a new Mini model as it had prior to Stokes’s 
departure [Church (1994, 100)]. The formerly autonomous firms, who made up separate 
divisions tied to the original brands, remained profit centres answering to the divisional 
chiefs overseen by a board of directors and a managing director [Salmon (1975, 60)]. As 
such the lack of co-ordination between the different entities making up British Leyland 
maintained a degree of independence. For example, there was no centralised engineer­
ing and design oflice or a definitive corporate product strategy, thus raising problems of 
product overlap as separate development programs competed against each other. Deci­
sions were often delayed or reversed as the cental staff frequently received contradictory 
information from several different sources, Salmon (1975, 60-1) pointed out that “no one
- certainly not in the factories - felt responsible for anything.”
The appointment of Michael Edwardes in 1977 was followed by a new internal policy
- the Radical Corporate and Shopfloor Restructuring (CORE). This was implemented 
from 1979, and represented a substantive departure from the Ryder recovery strategy 
[Edwardes (1983)]. Edwardes’ aim was to generate a ‘product-led recovery’ by 1986 
through severely rationalising the BL range and concentrating resources on the production 
of a narrower range of models based on two brands encapsulated in the renamed Austin
^^The industty employed 501.7 thousand employees, or 6.5% of manufacturing workers in 1974 [source: Annual Census 
of Production, based on SIC 381 - Source: Central Statistical Office (1981)].
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Rover (AR). Where the Ryder plan allowed the firm to maintain employment levels and 
had implemented co-operative ‘work-place democracy’ Edwardes’ goal was to “restructure, 
de-man, modernise and drive through a production plan.” [Edwardes (1983, 41-2)]. In 
rationalising the firm by culling both the number of employees and the product range 
Edwardes was largely successful.
A second important facet of Edwardes’s strategy was that it provided an impetus to 
form a strategic alliance with a Honda. An aUiance was need in order to for the firm to 
fill the gaps in its product range that had resulted from a lack of product development 
[Edwardes (1983)].^ .^ The willingness of Honda to enter into the agreement refiected 
their constrained sales in the market following the implementation of Voluntary Export 
Restraints in 1977. The model designs, and expertise to produce those products, were 
to become crucial to BL survival since it was Honda designed cars, rather then those 
produced by BL’s own design team as part of the CORE strategy, that were relatively 
successful in the market place. More generally, those agreements were to have a profound 
impact on UK production from the mid-1980s when another Japanese manufacture, Nis­
san, made the UK its central location for European production with Toyota following suit 
in 1994.^ 4
The rationalisation strategy was continued after Edwardes departed BL by Sir Austin 
Bind (1982-86) and Graham Day (1986-1988).^® The only subsidiaries not affected by the 
restructuring were the specialist Land Rover and Daimler-Jaguar marques with Jaguar 
being fioated as a private company in 1984 prior to being acquired by Ford in 1991.
British Aerospace (BAe) purchased AR in 1988. The change of ownership did not lead 
to a change in corporate direction, with the product range being expanded only through 
production of Honda based models [Mair (1994, 238-39)]. The takeover by BAe of AR 
was conditional on a pledge that AR would not be sold during the following five years 
[Thatcher (1993)]. By that time the CORE strategy’s three models, which had been 
envisaged as the saviour of AR, had effectively been superseded by models derived from 
the HondarAR collaborative projects. Facing losses in its core business, BAe moved to 
divest its interest in AR as soon as the contractually obligated time period elapsed. After a 
failed attempt to sell the firm to Honda, BMW made a successful offer purchasing the firm 
in January 1993 [The Economist (03/03/1994)]. Table 1.3 shows that the AR was able 
to maintain its production levels, expand export sales, and stabilise its productive share 
of the domestic market for only a short period during the late 1980s. AR’s export share
^^Honda was not Eklwardes first port of call. But after Edwardes’ failing to come to agreements with European manu­
facturers Honda became the most viable candidate [Edwardes (1983)] 
detailed appraisal of the trade policy is conducted in Chapter 6.
Edwardes stepped down from the BL chairmanship in September 1982. Edwardes’s original three-year secondment from 
Chloride having was then extended, at the government’s request, by a further two years [Wood (1988, 235)].
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peaked in 1987 with the short term success based on the launching of CORE models, but 
production volumes never reached their 1979 levels. Certainly production level projections 
of 950,000 units per year were not met, sales peaking at 450,852 units in 1985.^ ®
The decline of the mass producer Rover continued under BMW. An inability to provide 
viable new models meant that the elusive ‘product-led recovery’ did not occur. Falling 
production levels, with BMW’s UK subsidiary contributing only 12.5% of UK produc­
tion by 1999, coupled with continuing losses, led BMW to question the viability of the 
non-niche component of its UK subsidiary [The Guardian (09/05/2000)]. In May 2000 
BMW threatened to close Rover but a new buyer was found in the form of Phoenix Con­
sortium. Significantly BMW retained ownership of the Land Rover subsidiary and the 
plant in Oxford destined to produce the new Mini, which BMW maintained the rights to 
manufacture, with the model being launched in 2001. Indeed, during BMW’s period of 
ownership of Rover Group, the Land Rover subsidiary had been the success story with 
production levels of the three 4-by-4 models doubling and attaining output levels that 
were not dissimilar to the mass market oriented Rover brand. With the launch of its own 
4-by-4 luxury competitor to Land Rover, the X5, BMW swiftly divested its ownership of 
Land Rover in October 2000 to Ford [BBC (17/03/2002a)].
Table 1.3 shows that output continued to fall at Rover under Phoenix Consortium’s 
management, despite an expansion of the product range to incorporate the re-launching of 
the MG marque in 2001. Both BMW’s Mini and Land Rover achieved production levels 
that were greater than the combined production of the Rover and MG brands. When 
Phoenix Consortium returned the volume car remnants of the former BL to UK ownership 
the firm’s sales accounted for only 4% of the UK market in 2002. To some degree the 
reduction in market share reflected the stripping of the two most successful features of the 
firm by BMW. Unlike the Rover Group sales of its former specialised subsidiaries were 
focused on export markets with over four of every five Mini cars and Land Rover 4-by-4s 
produced being exported, while less than half of Phoenix Corporation’s output were sold 
in export markets. The failure in export markets however was not a recent trend. Indeed 
BL performance in the domestic market, despite being poor, was still better than in the 
international market place with the firm accounting for less than 5% of UK car exports 
by 2002.
The two other principal firms operating in the UK were Ford and GM Vauxhall. Ford 
had a long history of production in the UK operating its first assembly plant in Mandi- 
ester in 1911. It was not until 1929 that Ford’s production facihty at Dagenham was set 
up [TolHday (2003b, 153—166)]. Ford UK’s role in European production declined from
^®Quoted from an employee communication from the company director, Opt cit, Willman (1992).
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the early 1970s, reflecting a shift from the firm’s “two fishing line” approach, of building 
models specifically for the German and UK markets, towards Continental European pro­
duction. The autonomy of Ford UK was eroded with the formation of Ford Europe in 1967 
[ToUiday (2003b, 194-201)]. These developments led to a reduction in Ford’s exports from 
the UK which were concentrated on EFTA markets, while its exports to EEC countries 
were derived mainly from its German and Belgian subsidiaries. These developments had 
two effects on the sales of Ford UK cars. First, its subsidiary’s exports, fell substantively 
from an average 24.1% of UK exports between 1976 and 1982, to a mere 1.2% in 1989. 
Domestic sales were also compromised since the UK market became increasingly supplied 
from Ford’s continental European operations. Ford’s strategic investment in Europe fo­
cused on the development of major new facilities in Germany (Saarlouis in 1968) and 
Spain (Valencia in 1974) and the expansion of capacity in Ford’s Belgian plant located 
in Genk. Initially Ford’s models were principally developed in the UK. For example, the 
Escort was designed in the UK, being launched in 1968, with little German input and 
was successful in both markets. The Capri was designed in the UK and launched in 1969 
with production being spfit between UK and German plants until 1976 when the model’s 
production was permanently shifted to Germany. [Tolliday (2003a, Ch.2)j. The move 
from Dagenham to Cologne “as the centre of the Ford Europe universe” was also reflected 
in all large Ford models being produced in Germany with design and R&D being con­
centrated in Ford’s German subsidiary from 1976.^  ^ In addition, Ford’s ecpansion into 
the ‘small family’ segment with the Fiesta in 1977 was predominantly supphed to Europe 
from its Spanish plant in Valencia, with tied imports also emanating from Germany after 
1980. Ford UK’s exports and production effectively ended in 2002, when the new Fiesta’s 
production was sourced exclusively from Valencia and Cologne, with Dagenham ceasing 
to be a car assembler after over ninety years of Ford assembling cars in the UK [BBC 
(17/03/2002b)j. Despite Ford’s retreat from manufacturing ‘Ford’ branded models in the 
UK the firm continued to make a substantial contribution to UK production, remaining 
the second largest UK producer in 2002, through the development of the Premier Motor 
Group (PMG). The PMG encompassed four specialist Ford subsidiaries three of whom 
were formerly UK owned brands (Aston Martin, Jaguar, Land Rover) and Volvo. The 
development of the PMG reflected Ford’s appreciation of the need to be represented in all 
segments of the product spectrum in an increasingly fragmented mature market place. As 
wiU be developed more fully below the fragmentation of demand has been an important 
feature of car markets in developed countries.
The first tentative step in the formation of the PMG occurred via the acquisition of the
'^^Burgess-Wise, Ford at Dagenham, pl80, opt cit Tolliday (2003a, 200).
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elite sports car manufacturer Aston Martin in 1986. The second, more substantive, move 
occurred when Ford purchased Jaguar in preference of Saab in 1991 [Tolliday (2003a, 
88-90)]. Ford had wanted to access the executive and luxury markets but had had httle 
success with either its executive model, the Granada, or with its predecessor, the Scorpio, 
Ford’s chairman of Jaguar, Hayden, quickly discovered that Jaguar was a troubled firm 
suffering from run down production facilities, and more importantly lacking new product 
development. When Hayden arrived the only model in the design phase was a sports 
model, the F-Type, which he canceled development of due to its high fuel costs and lack 
of mass sales appeal. Ironically, the sales success built on the XJ6 and the Sovereign 
models between 1986 and 1988 was credited to Jaguar’s former chairman, Egan [Whyte 
(1996)]. Ford wanted to redirect the company towards a mass luxury saloon market 
raising sales from below 50,000 to 150,000 units and to compete head on with BMW 
[Wemle (2/06/2003)]. Ford committed substantive investment to Jaguar whose sales 
rebounded from a trough in of 20,006 units 1992 to reach 122,000 cars in 2002. However, 
sales of the brand did not reach Ford’s sales target [Automotive News Europe (2003)]. 
Ford has initiated a substantive investment expansion reflected in the development of the 
new Land Rover models and a £200 million investment in its Halewood plant [Reuters 
(2004)]. However, it is too early to assess the effect of Ford’s ownership of the fourth 
member of the PMG group. Land Rover.
General Motors was initially represented in the UK market by two brands: GM Vaux- 
haU and GM Opel. GM had been active in the European market since the interwar period 
when it acquired its UK subsidiary, Vauxhall, in 1926, and its German subsidiary in 1929 
\http : / / WW W.gm.com/company/corpinfo/gmhisl920.html]. GM’s UK production op­
erated from a single production facility in Luton, which commenced production in 1925 
before a second plant at Ellesmere Port was built with assembly beginning in 1962. GM’s 
products were marketed under both the Vauxhall and Opel brands in the UK until the 
1980s when Opel branded models where phased out. Like Ford, GM expanded its Euro­
pean production locations through the establishment of a plant in Zaragoza (Spain) that 
became the exclusive location for production of the Corsa model. The peak of GM’s UK 
production occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s with production of the highly 
successful Cavalier and the commencement of production of IBC, GM’s 4rby-4 production 
subsidiary, in 1987 that manufactured the Frontera for the European market. Unlike other 
GM models the Cavalier and Frontera UK production was centred in the UK which led 
to a substantive rise in GM’s share of UK exports from an average of less than 1% during 
the 1980s to 16.3% between 1990 and 2000. The announced closure of the Luton facility 
that produced the Astra and Vectra models led to a reduction in GM’s production and
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exports with Vauxhall’s domestic production making up 8.5% of total UK production in 
2002 from its peak of 24.7% in 1992 [The Times (09/04/2001)].
The only firm to eclipse British Leyland’s poor performance was Chrysler’s European 
operations. Chrysler was the last of the US multinational producers to obtain plants in 
Europe. Chrysler gained entry into European production through its acquisition of its 
French subsidiary, Simca, in 1963, and through its gradual takeover of the foundering 
Rootes Motor Company in the UK between 1964 and 1967 [Young and Hood (1977, 58- 
67)]. Of the two companies Simca had the greater assets, and Chrysler (France) enlarged 
and updated Simca’s model range. Bootes had completed its horizontal growth in 1955 
when it acquired the failing Singer Motor Company to add to the Hillman, Humber, Sun­
beam and Talbot brands. Little rationalisation of brand or model ranges occurred during 
either Chrysler’s or Bootes’s ownership of the conglomerate [Young and Hood (1977,11)]. 
In 1974 the Wilson government approached Chrysler about rumours that it wished to 
withdraw from UK production [Wilks (1984, Ch.9)]. Chrysler’s threat to abandon the 
UK led to a bail out package, similar to that received by BL the same year, but differed in 
that the government took a detailed monitoring role in Chrysler UK’s activities without 
taking over the subsidiary.^® Chrysler Corporation’s financial difllculties were not only 
related to the poor performance of its European subsidiaries, however, with the US parent 
firm recording a $232 million loss in 1975.^ ® On the brink of bankruptcy, Chrysler US 
received considerable financial assistance from the US government in 1979, and the new 
Managing Director, laccona, moved quickly to rebuild the company’s beleaguered prod­
uct line in the US, exiting the European market and selling Chrysler Europe to the PSA 
group.^° PSA initially maintained the production of the Chrysler UK range launching the 
Talbot Solara in 1980. However, from 1986 Peugeot rationalised its UK production and 
from that time manufactured a single Peugeot model in the UK. PSA’s UK output was 
thereafter tied to the success of each respective model with production also being located 
in France. Since 1998, however, Peugeot has concentrated its production of the 206 solely 
in the UK and the sales success of that car has substantively expanded the firm’s sales, 
which accounted for 12.1% of total UK production in 2002.^ ^
Three Japanese firms entered into production in the UK. Nissan became the first 
Japanese firm to set up a plant in Europe in 1986, building what was reputed to be the 
most efficient production plant in Europe and amongst the most efficient in the world
^^The correspondence between an anxious government, and the financially distressed associated with Chrysler UK, was 
documented by Granada Television (1976), ‘Chrysler and the Cabinet; How the Deal was Done’, Transcript of the Pro­
gramme Transmitted 9 Feb. 1976. The transcripts are available at the British Library of Political and Economic Science 
at the London School of Economics.
Company profit and loss statements collated by the author.
^°For more background see JeSerys (1986).
^^Information collated from SMMT new registrations data.
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[The Economist (3/10/1992, 70-72)]. Nissan’s opportunity for direct investment reflected 
an altered government strategy of reducing assistance to nationalised industries, in favour 
of private investment promotion. By comparison, the links Honda forged with British 
industry were a means to have a presence in a quantity constrained European market. 
Toyota became the third Japanese car maker to enter into the UK with the construction 
of facilities in Derbyshire, Southern Wales, in 1989 and production beginning in 1993.
Table 1.5 showrs that from the late 1980s the arrival of Japanese manufacturers was the 
most important single development in the UK. From initially accounting for under five 
percent of production in 1987, from Nissan’s Sunderland plant, the total combined market 
share of Japanese manufacturers reached a quarter of the UK’s domestic total in 1995. 
By 2002 Japanese manufacturers accounted for over 40% of total UK production. The 
expansion reflected the development of a second plant by Honda in Swindon in March 2001 
[BBC (10/04/2000)], and Toyota’s plant expansion in 2001 [BBC (4/01/2001)]. Table 1.5 
also illustrates that Japanese production was strongly export oriented with over 70% of 
production being destined for European markets.
Table 1.5: Location of Production of Car Sold in the UK Car Market (1971-2002)
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
UK 80.5 64.6 50.9 39.2 43.3 38.4 25.9 23.5
Belgium* 0.9 1.8 4.9 6.1 3.2 2.9
France 7.7 9.4 9.7 8.5 11.4 15.8 19.0 21.0
West Germany 4.5 7.6 13.0 22.8 17.6 16.4 22.7 272
Italy 3.0 4.8 3.8 3.7 2.8 3.6 5.0 3.5
Spain* 4.6 6.3 3.6 6.7 7.4 8.9
Sweden 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.5
Japan 1.3 9.5 12.1 11.6 10.3 6.1 8.2 6.9
Republic of Korea** 0.3 0.2 1.6 3.0 1.6
others*** 0.3 1J2 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.2
No. of new cars fOOO 1.036 1.117 1.497 1.705 1.936 1.923 2.285 2.462
* Suppy from Belgium and Spain starts In 1977 
** Supply from Korea starts In 1982
*** USA, Poland, Czacfi Republic, East Germany, USSR, Australia, Malaysia, Yugoslavia, South Africa 
Source; SMMT data
A further salient feature of the market that accompanied BL’s decline, as Table 1.5 
demonstrates, was the significant growth of imports. In 1971 over 80% of cars sold 
in the UK were also produced in the UK. By 2002 the location of production of cars 
sold in the UK had radically altered. Less than one quarter of market sales stemmed 
from local production, with sales of cars emanating from West Germany eclipsing those 
in the UK, and the fraction of sales from France following close behind. The reduced 
domestic production share in sales also reflected an expansion in market share by Asian 
manufacturers, initially via a rapid expansion in sales by Japanese manufacturers prior to
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the formalisation of VER agreements in 1977, but also to a lesser extent due to the entry 
of Korean producers from the 1980s onwards.
The overall result of these changes was that the UK’s expansion in production became 
increasingly export focused. The export led expansion in production was dominated by 
Japanese firm’s sales in other constrained European countries, and to lesser extent due to 
the export oriented production of PSA and BMW, by 2002.
A second feature of the sales break-down is that it illustrates the increasingly multinar 
tional structure of industry over the period. Indeed, sales of transplants from two countries 
without domestically-owned car production at the beginning of the period, accounted for 
about 12% of total sales by 2002. While the internationalisation of car production is a 
feature of other European countries it is most apparent in the UK who has played host 
to US and Japanese manufacturers.
1.2 Production Methods, Costs and Demand
A large body of explanations for the decline of UK manufacturing have their roots in 
the production process, concentrating on factors affecting production costs rather than 
on the demand-side. Ceteris parihus  ^ reductions in a firm’s cost structure for a product 
can be translated into equivalent unit profits. Such cost affecting factors include labour, 
plant set-up and investment costs, marketing expenditure, and the potential benefits of 
scale economies. In actuality firms with greatly differing cost structures survive and are 
profitable in the market place if they are able to command high enough prices for their 
products. The ability for firms to derive higher unit price mark-ups over cost, even in the 
hypothetical case that they have the same cost structures, is determined on the demand- 
side. Demand-side factors influencing the ability of firms to charge higher unit mark-ups 
include successful product location and differentiation, and the ability to persuade or 
inform consumers of the virtues of their products through advertising. Clearly firms 
that are able to achieve both a lower cost structure and to successfully differentiate their 
product ranges are able to perform best.
To put some structure on the issues identified as factors of British Leyland’s perfor­
mance the discussion is divided between factors affecting supply and those influencing 
demand. The supply-side discussion separately evaluates both strands of an important 
argument by Lewchuck (1986) through examining the modes of production and the scope 
of benefits associated with economies of scale and industrial relations separately. Other 
potentially important factors affecting BL’s relative costs, in the form of the British ac­
cession to the EEC, Voluntary Export Restraints between the UK and Japan, regional
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policy, and own and rival firm advertising are subsequently examined. On the demand- 
side, the reasons for and extent to whidi demand patterns have shifted, and how such 
changes have influenced the strategies of British Leyland and other firms operating in the 
market are assessed.
1.2.1 Supply-side Factors
Modes of Production and Economies of Scale
Since cost side arguments have been rooted in the production process a logical anar 
lytical starting point to place these arguments is within the central theory that has been 
developed to understand the evolution of technologically progressive products from birth 
to maturity, popularly termed the Product-Life-Cycle model (PLC). The PLC model 
conventionally divides the life cycle of products into distinct phases allocating disparate 
industries into diflFering phases as they evolve from ‘new’ to ‘mature’ and eventually ‘de­
clining’ products.^^ According to the PLC view, as products mature a firm’s success is 
determined by its ability to standardise products and reduce costs in the production pro­
cess. Since reducing production costs is central to profitability the crucial mechanism to 
achieving that end is via developing cost reducing, or process, innovations whose benefits 
are then magnified through the economies of scales associated with product standardis­
ation. According to the PLC, the outcomes of the standardisation process are that the 
number of producers decfines steadily as entry becomes rare and exit continues, growth 
in the market share of the largest firms decline, and leadership in the industry stabilises 
[Klepper (1996)].
The clear implication of the PLC theory for British Leyland is that it should have 
adopted the definitive standardisation strategy and invested in developing cost reducing 
technologies. The most obvious manifestation of such a strategy, which is synonymous 
with the car industry, is ‘Fordism’. Indeed, the failure to adopt ‘Fordism’ was a central pi­
lar of influential work by Lewchuck (1986) in his attempt to explain the poor performance 
of BL.
While the PLC model is silent on how technologies are implemented ‘Fordism’ provides 
a model of how standardised production can be organised. In the ‘Fordist’ model cost 
reductions are achieved by continuous flow on a production line using product specific 
technologies, such as automatic transfer machines, that allow plants to exploit economies 
of scale (EOS). A prerequisite allowing ‘Fordist’ methods to realise low costs is that 
management must be able to maintain a high degree of control over the labour force, 
which is achieved through wages being determined by time in motion studies, linking
^^See Klepper (1996). Chapter 3 for details and associated references.
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output to effort. Lewchuck argues that what was required in British manufacturing was 
for the ‘production institutions’ to be in line with technology. British Leyland failed to 
benefit not just because it did not adopt US ‘Fordist’ style volume production until it was 
too late, but fundamentally because BL œuld not successfully adopt ‘Fordism’ since its 
management did not possess the management structures to effectively induce and monitor 
effort. When BL attempted to graft the traditional ‘Fordist’ payment institution of the 
standardised Measured Day Work (MDW) to link effort with productivity it was unable 
to do so, and that failure according to Lewchuck proved permanently debfiitating in the 
1970s.
The PLC view, and Lewchuck’s institutional variant, however, are not without their 
critics. Criticism has been voiced at a number of levels questioning the key assumption 
that standardisation is the driving force of firm success. Perhaps the most fierce critique 
of the PLC model comes from Abernathy (1978) who takes issue with the deterministic 
nature of the maturity stage of the PLC and the notion that there is an irreversible 
tendency of products to become standardised over time. He argues that it is possible for 
reversals to occur, what he termed ‘dematurity’, whereby established industries are able 
to revive themselves through technological competition arising from the development and 
adoption of new product technologies. As the clearest manifestation of standardisation, 
the failure of ‘Fordism’ has been a central thread in the business literature that has 
emphasised the development of ‘Flexible Production’ methods [Womack, Jones, and Roos 
(1990); Juergen, Malsch, and Knuth (1993)]. While Abernathy (1978) emphasised product 
innovation, the Flexible Production literature argues that fiexible production innovations, 
associated with the incorporation of micro processors and robotics, enabled more efficient 
production of multiple products on the same production line hence reducing the minimum 
efficient scale of production.Between the late 1960s and 1980s Fordism’s namesake 
firm, and other mass manufacturers, underwent a radical restructuring process in order 
to obtain more flexible corporate structures associated with, and in response to, the rapid 
success of Japanese manufacturers [ToUiday and Zeitlin (1992)]. The Uterature points to 
‘Fordism’ reaching is apex in the 1960s from which point it was in decline. Lewchuck’s 
argument that ‘Fordism’ should have been adopted by BL is therefore undermined by the 
flexible production Uterature in terms of its timing.
A potentiaUy crucial issue in the Uterature is whether the dichotomy between US style 
mass production techniques and Flexible Specialisation (FS), that was seen as charac­
terising European production prior to the development of mass production methods, as
^^MES is defined by Ministry of Supply (1948, para. 16, 11) as the “point at which further mass production ceases to 
give economies on cost.”
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emphasised by Lewchuck (1986) and Piore and Sahel (1984), can be seen as a useful 
conceptual divide.Williams, Cutler, Williams, and Haslam (1987) argued that it could 
not since production systems typically encompass aspects of both forms of production 
and that some production technologies, such as hydrauHc body presses could be used to 
produce different body types, were ‘flexible’ but were used by all car manufacturers. As 
further example of similarity in production methods. Booth (2003b, 19-23) argues au­
tomation, through the use of automatic transfer machines, was adopted on both sides of 
the Atlantic implying that “the most striking aspect was the similarity between British 
and American developments” [Booth (2003b, 22)]. While the argument that production 
methods in industries have some similar technologies and methods in different production 
locations no doubt has some truth in all mature industries, taking the other extreme that 
the dichotomy between ‘Fordism’ and FS is analytically devoid of value shifts the debate 
to a more extreme end of the spectrum. It may well be the case that the dichotomy is 
only useful in explaining developments in a minority of industries, but is clearly over­
stated in the UK car industry’s case where there is agreement that BL exhibited two 
features associated with flexible technology. Speciflcally, the model range provided by 
indigenous flrms was more highly differentiated and the capital expenditure on machinery 
was considerably lower than other car manufacturers [Booth (2003b, 21)]. Indeed, given 
that UK producers had maintained a more flexible form of production than was the case 
under ‘Fordism’, it is unclear that the British system provided a competitive disadvan­
tage. Furthermore, since the partial adoption of ‘Fordism’ in the 1970s coincided with the 
period it became outdated it would be perhaps more reasonable to argue that the adop­
tion of ‘Fordism’ exasperated BL’s decline. Such a view, however, would be misleading. 
The analogy between craft and flexible production is based on the skill levels of workers, 
since both require more skilled workers than under Fordist production, who are capable 
of performing multiple tasks. The types of skills required under British craft production 
and FPM are however quite different. The beneflt of craft skills in the UK car industry 
were associated with being able to compensate for lower levels of capital intensity in the 
production process [Tolliday (1991)]. In contrast, flexible production raises the amount 
of complex machinery employed reducing labour requirements thereby requiring workers 
to perform multiple tasks [Juergen, Malsch, and Knuth (1993, 314)]. It is far from obvi­
ous therefore that British employees would be at any advantage when adopting flexible 
production technologies.
^Flexible specialisation refers to the use of new techniques and technologies that produce a new production paradigm. 
‘Flexability’ can stem from various sources such as versatile labour, the use of flexible capital which is able to perform a 
variety of tasks, such as robotics and computer aided design. The approach has been most strongly related to the influential 
work of Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) who associate Flexible Specialisation with Just-in-Time technology (see Footnote 
26 below).
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An important feature of standardisation is its ability to exact economies of scale asso­
ciated with the mass production of standardised goods. The significance of economies of 
scale has been a consistent thread in the literature, first advocated in the late 1940s by 
National Advisory Council and the Ministry of Supply (1948), and later by Maxcy and 
Silberston (1959, 198) who pointed to UK manufacturers producing too many models 
and thereby denying the benefits of scale economies. The late 1960s and 1970s saw a 
considerable number of studies attempting to gauge the importance of scale economies 
via the derivation of estimates of miniTmim eflBcient scale. It was argued that techno­
logical change over the 1950s and 1960s greatly increased the optimal efficient scale with 
the area where scale economies were most apparent being ‘body pressing’ [Maxcy and 
Silberston (1959, 198)]. Assessments were taken by a number of authors on the basis of 
engineering estimates and normally pertain to the pressing process. However, because 
each phase in the production process has differing Tninimnm efficient scale associated to 
it, estimates were also made for the foundry and forging, engine and transmission, and 
final assembly production processes. A summary of minimum efficient scale estimates 
by Maxcy and Silberston (1959), Menje (1968), Edwardes (1965), Pratten (1971), White 
(1971), Euro-Economics (1975), Boyle (1975) and McGee (1979) is provided in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Estimates of Minimum Efficient Scale (000s)
Source o f 
Estimate
Date Foundry and 
Forqe
Pressing Engine and Finai 
Transmission Assembly
Maxcy and Siberston 1954 1,000 100
Menje (1968) 1960 1,500
Edwards (1965) 1965 400
Pratten (1971) 1971 1,000 500 250 300
Rhys (1972) 1972 2,000 2,000 1,000 200
White (1971) 1971 400 260 200
McGee (1979) 1973 4,000
Euro Economics (1975) 1975 2,000 2,000 1,000 250
Boyle (1975) 1975 250
Sources: See references.
Table 1.6 has three noteworthy features. First, the minimum efficient scale estimates 
for any given process differ markedly between authors. For example, Pratten’s 1971 
estimates, which have seen considerable use in the economics literature, point to one 
million units being the optimal level in 1971, while Rhys’s estimates, which pertain to 
the following year, come up with a figure of two miUion.^ ® Second, there are substantive
^^Examples of work using Pattern’s MES estimates include Venables and Smith (1991) and Smith (1994).
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divergences in MSE estimates across the relatively narrow set of different manufacturing 
processes with some processes having relatively low EOS advantages. Final assembly level 
for example were estimated at 100,000 in the 1950s by Maxcy and Silberston (1959) but 
increased markedly to 200,000 by the 1970s according to the estimate of Rhys (1972), and 
250,000 according to Boyle (1975). Overall there is some indication that MES increased 
from the 1950 in pressing, but the extreme variation in the MES estimates makes drawing 
any concrete conclusion problematic.
Other than the high deviation between estimates within and between aspects of the 
car production process there are a number of reasons to be cautious in interpreting them. 
First, estimates of EOS assume that full capacity utilisation occurs while in practice it is 
agreed that 70 to 80% is the norm [Rhys (1972, 268)]. Second, these data pertain to a 
‘basic model type', which typically refers to a mass segment vehicle, while there are, even 
within mass segments, quite different types of models manufactured. A third limitation 
relates to how MES estimates are derived. Ideally one would wish to use cost estimates for 
a series of plants in deriving MES estimates. However, no systematic information across 
producers is available at the plant level, which is no doubt due in large part to ffrms being 
reluctant to provide commercially sensitive cost information. MES estimates are derived 
from engineers’ estimates or cost accounts with information being typically from a single 
plant being used to infer industry scale economies [e.g. Pratten (1971)]. Since efficiency 
in scale economies pertain to plants, and in addition no doubt have important model 
and model version specific components, the estimates are bound to be crude. Each of 
these factors provides an explanation for the substantial variation associated with those 
estimates.
The third notable aspect of Table 1.6 is that the desire of researchers to estimate MES 
died out in the early 1980s.^ ® It is unclear why this should have been the case, however 
there are two potential explanations. First, there is considerable scepticism about the 
accuracy of MSE estimates for the reason listed above. Second, and related to the earlier 
discussion, the introduction of fiexible mechanisation in the production phase combined 
with the use of Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) is 
seen to have reduced the relevance of EOS. The business and business history literatures 
point out that these developments reduced dependence on high-volume production by 
lowering minimum efficient scale in each stage of the manufacturing process [Tolliday and 
Zeitlin (1992)].
Other than pointing to lower scale levels at BL relative to its competitors a few studies 
that incorporate the UK into their work found mixed evidence that EOS are an important
^^The lack of such estimates is reflected in work during the 1990s continuing to use Patten’s estimates [e.g. Smith (1994)].
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factor. In early work Davis and Caves (1987, 64-70) found that large British manufacturers 
suffered from diseconomies of scale relative to the US of between 10 and 14% as median 
plant size rose. Those authors noted that there was high variabihty in their data and 
results. In addition, the use of establishment size as a proxy for economies of scale is 
quite crude as firm size could capture any number of other factors. Macro evidence does 
not provide great support for there being increasing returns to scale to physical capital 
either [Oulton and O’Mahony (1993)]. Also, an indication that scale economies were no 
longer a crucial factor in the car industry by the 1980s is found in more recent work 
by Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Usiug European model sales Goldberg and Verboven 
found that scale effects made or no significant contribution to the price of cars and the 
effects were small over the 1980-92 period for a sample of five European car markets that 
included the UK.^^
Caveats aside the literature does point to systematic differences in the productive per­
formance of BL relative to its UK based MNE rivals, which suggests, to the extent that 
EOS was a factor in reducing production costs, BL was penalised by relatively low pro­
duction levels. Further evidence was provided by the Expenditure Committee (1975) that 
pointed out that capacity utilisation rates in the UK were lowest at British Leyland and 
Chrysler UK. Thus even if British firm were operating at optimal levels their actual ca­
pacity utilisation fell well short of planned utilisation rates. In addition, the fall in British 
Leyland’s sales from the early 1970s meant the firm had a reduced ability to exact EOS.
Industrial Relations
Mirroring the declinist literature, industrial relations problems have been the most 
popularly cited explanation for the decline of UK car manufacturing and have generated 
a substantive literature that has been surveyed in general texts such as Church (1994) and 
Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995, Ch.5). That said. Young and Hood (1977, 
225), Rhys (1974) and Williams, Williams, and Thomas (1983) argue that industrial 
relations problems were exaggerated. Those authors argue that BL’s management used 
industrial relations to justify poor results, and that the industrial relations hterature has 
incorrectly taken management’s claims at face value. Before delving into explanations for 
the poor labour record it is instructive to try to get some notion of whether strike activity 
in the UK was artypical compared to other European car manufacturing nations. Figure
1.2 graphs days lost due to industrial unrest as a proportion of employed workers [ILO 
(Various years)]. The graph shows that during the 1970s and 1980s the UK was third in
^^Unfortunately no systematic data on the model sales that are used by Goldberg and Verboven (2001) is available for 
the 1970s.
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terms of days lost behind Italy and Spain who both incurred, on average, 80% and 20% 
more days lost respectively. It is of note that the Spanish data does not include political 
strikes until 1975 and therefore underestimates the degree of strike activity. Comparing 
the number of days lost due to strikes over the 1975-1989 period in Spain to that in the 
UK the relative amount of days lost is 60% higher in Spain. The numbers of days lost by 
the French industry were about one quarter of those in the UK over the 1970s. However, 
this is likely to be an overestimate as the French data does not include workers in the 
public service. Germany was the stand out performer having only one tenth of the UK’s 
number of days lost due to strikes. A second feature of Figure 1.2 is that strike days lost 
declined, by varying degrees, across all five economies from the 1980s onward. This is 
perhaps not surprising since the shift in bargaining strength and the rise of unionisation 
in all Western economies during the ‘Golden Age’, which augured in a demand boom for 
car and other workers, was reversed during the 1980s [Eichengreen (1995, 62-63)].
There are two caveats in comparing industrial unrest between the UK and Conti­
nental countries due to days lost however. First, Figure 1.2 does not account for the 
markedly lower turnover and absenteeism amongst British manufacturing workers [Dur- 
can and Redman (1983)] with car manufacturers being lower still [Motor Manufactuing 
Economic Develoment Council (1976)]. Second, it ü  well knoym that industrial disputes 
in the UK tended to be ‘formal’, and hence are captured in Figure 1.2, while such con­
flicts in European countries tended to be ‘informal’ and hence are not captured in the 
data [Bardou, Chanaron, Fridenson, and Laux (1982)]. Direct comparison is therefore
difficult, and as Church (1994, 68) points out
“without more systematic quantitative comparisons... it remains difficult to as­
sess the relative importance of their [industrial disputes] effect on the industry.”
Greater absenteeism and labour turnover, and more ‘informal’ strikes all induce a 
downward bias on the impact of industrial relations disputes for the Continental the data 
in Figure 1.2 and so may provide an upper bound to the degree that industrial relations 
damaged the UK industry. Overall comparisons between other European industries sug­
gest, with the exceptions of Germany, and perhaps France, that British industry was not 
exceptional in the degree of labour problems it faced. Given the magnitude of the differ­
ential between Germany and the UK, it seems implausible that these can be explained by 
‘informal’ industrial action or lower turnover and absenteeism.
That there were industrial disputes is however not in question. The relevant question 
from the perspective of the declinist thesis was their effects on output and wages. Evidence 
on the effects of strikes on output varies considerably. At one extreme Turner, Clark, and
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Figure 1.2: Number of Days Lost due to Strikes for Car Manufacturing Countries (1970-2002)
-à—  France 
■■ -ttaly
« UK
■4 Germany
Source: ILO data.
Note: Number of days lost for each country are normalised by number of employees.
Roberts (1967) and Williams, Williams, and Thomas (1983) argue that strikes occurred 
when output dechned. In the highly cychcal car industry, strikes enabled British Leyland 
to reduce it’s wage bills and hence had a positive effect on profit margins. In addition, 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) argue, of working days lost 
only 1.5-2.5% of days lost could be attributed to disputes. But at the other end of the 
spectrum, the Department of Employment concluded that in the late 1960s industrial 
disputes accounted for 50% of lost output [Expenditure Committee (1975, 18-19)]. The 
extreme divergence between these figures makes an assessment of the effects of strikes 
difficult to achieve. An indirect method to assess the effects of industrial activities is 
through the investment and production location decisions of MNEs operating in the UK. 
As was pointed out in Section 1.1 Ford shifted its production focus to Continental Europe, 
but GM Vauxhall expanded its production in the UK during the 1980s. It is unclear 
whether Ford’s continental strategy was based on industrial relations problems in the UK, 
or as a means to concentrate its production within the EEC and to take advantage of 
‘special treatment’ in Spain [ToUiday (2003a)]. Alternative evidence comes from Foreman-
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Peck (1986) who, using a gravity equation framework, found that MNEs opted to shift 
engine production outside the UK. At the mean a 10% difference in strike activity was 
associated with a 4% difference in exports between 1966-70. However, Foreman-Peck
(1986) acknowledges that the 2-digit trade data he employs includes marine and other 
engines and so is not entirely representative. In addition, the plausibility of his findings are 
undermined by sample sizes that range between 23 and 28 observations, a strike variable 
that relates to the country of origin and not to motor engine manufacturers, and his not 
taking account of endogeniety issues that have been shown to bias estimate coeflBcients 
in gravity equation based estimation [e.g. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995)]. That MNEs 
continued to invest in British plants and production does not suggest that poor industrial 
relations at these firm’s plants was a formidable concern.
As has been pointed out, Lewchuck (1986) argued that what was needed was for the 
‘production institutions’ to be put in line with technological developments. However, 
British Leyland failed not just because it did not adopt US ‘Fordist’ style volume produc­
tion, but also because it was unable to successfully adopt Fordism because its manage­
ment did not possess the management structures to effectively induce and monitor effort. 
Whether it was appropriate to adopt ‘Fordist’ mass production technology in the 1970s 
at all has been questioned above, now the second part of Lewchuck’s argument, based the 
‘production institutions’, of which labour-management relations was the key element is 
assessed.
Up until 1979 management at British Leyland was represented by its subsidiary brands 
who participated in district employer associations linked to the Engineering Employers 
Federation (EEF). Negotiations were two tiered with regional agreements between employ­
ers and employees, and unresolved disputes were passed to national union and employer 
representatives’ Central Conference. At each stage the employer presided and no proce­
dure for independent arbitration was provided. The EEF repeatedly refused to set up a 
national forum for negotiations, or to negotiate on matters, other than wages and hours, 
with unions for fear of limiting managerial autonomy [Turner (1971); Durcan and Redman 
(1983)]. The structure was highly decentralised in allowing firms the ability to negotiate 
directly with employee representatives.
Employees were represented by multiple unions but also through shop stewards. From 
the 1940s unionisation rates expanded considerably with the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union (AEU) and Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) being the dominant 
unions accounting for 65% of employees at British Leyland in 1965-66. In theory federated 
car firms could be required to negotiate with any one of the 31 unions affliated to the 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Union. As a result BL’s subsidiaries negotiated with about
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120 individual bargaining units. A complex bargaining structure was the norm in the 
UK. Even Ford, the firm with the staunchest labour control system, dealt with over 20 
individual unions [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995)]. In BL’s case unions 
were however formally divorced from the union brandi and the workplace with shop 
stewards filling the void. Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995) argue that the ad 
hoc nature of bargaining meant that a coherent union strategy and collective bargaining 
were not options. Without a coherent union structure much of the rise in bargaining 
power associated with the success of the industry in the 1950 and 1960s was placed in the 
hands of shop stewards whose numbers doubled during the 1960s and 1970s.
Fragmentation within unions due to multiple unionism is argued to have exacerbated 
industrial relations problems. The existence of multiple unions led to inter-union com­
petition for members, principally between the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the 
Transport and General Workers Union. Clayden (1987, 321) argues that an indirect man­
agerial approach through piece rates and fragmented union factions made bargaining and 
organised control overly complex in the interwar period, and by implication in the post­
war period where the status quo was largely maintained. Workers tended to be loyal to 
the firm at the gang level, but less so at the plant level, with influence of the centralised 
union structure being weak [Adeney (1988)].
Lewchuck’s emphasis however was not on the bargaining process per se but rather 
on the piece rate incentive payment system with which workers were able to decouple 
performance from pay. Young and Hood (1977, 225), agree considering that,
“Labour relations have often been handled by low-status ill-trained executives 
who have tended to place greater emphasis on financial incentives than on 
managerial-worker considerations.”
In contrast, ToUiday (1991) maintains that piecework was not as coercive as day work, 
and that both direct control and piecework could operate as tight or slack systems, leav­
ing scope for different forms of piecework with different outcomes. Anecdotal evidence 
submitted to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions provides some support to ToUiday’s 
argument in that it revealed that in BL’s largest plant at Longbridge shop stewards were 
expected not only to avoid disputes and strikes but were also called upon to coordmate 
production at the shop floor level. Indeed, shop stewards played a key role in operating 
the piece rate by chasing up materials so that earnings would not drop [Foreman-Peck, 
Bowden, and McKinlay (1995, 173)]. In addition, a former manager at BL Cowley plant, 
Eric Lord, did not consider the abolition of piece rates necessary [WiUiams, WiUiams, 
Johal, and Aldcroft (1994)]. That said, Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995)
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point out that the payment system led to pay inequalities since firms provided wage in­
centives to employees that were affected by changes in production thereby introducing 
additional complexities and anomalies between plants. They argue that the rise of shop 
steward bargaining led to piecework rates being less related to rewarding employee effort 
and productivity as stewards were able to identify small changes in the production struc­
ture and use this information as a means to renegotiate wage and bonus calculations. 
The shift to a direct control labour system of Measured Day Work in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, that had earfier been adopted by GM Vauxhall and Chrysler UK, was viewed 
as a means to reduce the number of disputes and limit the infiuence of shop stewards 
[Lewchuck (1986, 152)].^ ® The desire to change BL’s payment system no doubt reflected 
the recruitment of Ford’s executive staff in the late 1970s [Williams, Williams, and Haslam
(1987)]. In the absence of a tight supervisory system to ensure that a measured day’s 
work could be quantified, let alone enforced, management was to a great extent reliant on 
shop stewards to ensure production went smoothly. There was an expansion in supervi­
sory employees from one foreman for 50-60 employees under piece rates to one for every 
20-25 workers by the mid-1970s [Expenditure Committee (1975, 78)]. The company did 
make a commitment to centralising the institutional structure with company bargaining 
replacing plant-level approaches and attempts weremiade to Incorporate senior shop-fioor 
union representatives into a bargaining framework.
Ironically while other firms were shifting towards MDW Ford was moving more toward 
an incentive control structure. It has been often asserted that the shift from piece rates 
to measured pay from 1971 was a disaster [e.g. Lewchuck (1986) and Church (1994)]. If 
it was the case that the MDW payment system reduced the work incentives of employees 
this should be reflected in labour productivity rates. However, there is little evidence to 
support that the change in payment system had a marked effect. Indeed, the number 
of cars produced averaged 4.9 per worker in 1970 and rose to 5.7 in 1973 [BL Company 
accounts data collated by the author].
The second strand of the Lewchuck (1986) argument, was that labour market relations 
provided a constraint on the introduction of automation or flexible technologies. Streeck 
(1986) and Willman (1986, Ch7 and Ch8) however demonstrated that shopfioor bargain­
ing was co-operative where new technologies were concerned and thus posed no major 
constraints. In effect therefore, these authors establish that bringing labour ‘production 
institutions’ into line with technology had an immanent logic [Tolliday (1991, Opt cit 
pl08)]. Furthermore, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) argue that the implementation of flex-
^^The shift was incremental being finalised in 1971 when the corporation introduced MPW to the remaining 134,000 of 
its employees who were on piece rates [Wood (1988, 179)].
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ible specialisation was largely success at Rover, but that this was not the case in Ford’s 
UK plants. Those authors argue that the willingness workforce accepted changes at Rover 
was as a means to alleviate job insecurity following the substantial drop in sales the firm 
was experiencing.
Government Interventions
A third, if less cited, set of factors influencing the decline of BL concern the effects of 
government interventions both directly through regional pohcy and the nationalisation of 
BL, and indirectly by influencing and the supply of engineers and affecting cost of rival 
overseas producers through trade barriers.
The nationalisation of British Leyland in 1975 and the direct subsidy to Chrysler UK, 
which represented the high watermark of direct government intervention in the market, 
and has already been discussed in Section 1.1. In addition to those substantive subsi­
dies, successive governments between 1959 and 1971 enacted regional policies that used 
a mixture of financial incentives and location regulations to attract investment to under 
developed regions. Regional policy operated through Industrial Development Certificate 
control and restricted the expansion established sites and prohibited the development of 
new plants in the South East [Adeney (1988, 229)]. It is unclear in the literature that 
regional policy had a negative effect on the industry although it did raise the costs of trans­
porting cars and components between factories, and potentially reduced scale economies. 
Ford acknowledged that it benefited from reduced distribution costs from its Halewood 
plant which outweighed the cost of transporting cars and parts by train to the plant. 
Chrysler UK was a clear winner in receiving £1.1 million to establish the Linwood plant 
in Scotland in 1971 [Keeble (1976, 181-191)]. BL also obtained ‘investment assistance’ 
in developing its Speke car assembly plant equivalent to that obtained by the US MNEs, 
with regional policy have a greater impact on the non-car sides of BL’s business at its 
plants in Glasgow and Bathgate [Owen (1983)].
In the 1980s the three Japanese flrms who located their European production in the 
UK were also beneficiaries of investment assistance. In one case, the subsidies were the 
matter of some controversy with the amount provided to Toyota leading to a European 
Commission investigation of hidden subsidies, and unfair competition [Mair (1994, 347)]. 
The benefits that accrued to Japanese companies were independent of the costs of trans­
porting parts or cars between factories since each of the firms operated self sufficient plant 
with suppliers being located at hand as part of their use of just-in-time production.^®
^^The just-in-time inventory system provides deliveries of components required for production within time periods elimi­
nating excess stocks. JIT is synonymous with lean production and is an example of Flexible Specialisation [Womack, Jones, 
and Roos (1990)].
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A further issue pointed to in the hterature was that the development of BL’s technolog­
ical capabihty set may have been constrained by a slow down in the number of engineering 
graduates in the UK. The reduced supply of skilled engineers has in turn been viewed as 
reflecting a failure in the UK education system. A number of authors consider that the 
lack of engineering graduates posed a problem for British industry from the late 1960s 
[Church (1994); Wood (1988); Turner (1971)]. In contrast, Edgerton (1996) showed that 
the stock of engineers and scientists m Britain was greater than for every country except 
the US. However, the shift of Ford and GM to developing products on the Continent from 
the mid-1970s does suggest that engineering capabilities were greater there than in the 
UK [Motor Business (07/1975, 20-25)]. Indeed, British Leyland complained of a lack of 
experienced graduates when trying to expand staflmg. The willingness of potential em­
ployees to work at BL is indicated in the 50% withdrawal of apphcations prior to review. 
Although information was not collated on the reason for withdrawal it was no doubt 
was influenced by wage rates being 15% lower than rivals, the well publicised declining 
fortunes of the firm, and the apprenticeship based system, that management admitted 
graduates disliked [Specialist Car Division Advisory Board (27/04/1973)].
Two trade related pohcy shifts, in the form of Britain’s accession into the EEC and 
bilateral VERs with the Japanese manufacturers, also affected the supply-side of the 
market by lowering the costs to rivals from the late 1970s. The shift from the use of tariff 
based protection to a form of quota was in itself a reversal of an earfier post-war trend 
away from quotas applied in the 1950s and early 1960s.^° The differing nature of two 
forms of trade protection mean that they had rather different effects. Tariff reduction 
influences the cost structure of firms facing the import tax. In contrast, VERs effect the 
relative costs of unconstrained manufacturers. In affect, Japanese manufacturers have the 
incentive to sell the fewer products they could sell in the market in the absence of VERs 
at the highest possible price, relaxing price competition for other firms operating in the 
market, but also has effects on the demand-side of the market that will be extrapolated 
upon in Section 1.2.2.
Prior to the advent of VERs, the government’s preference for the use of tariff mea­
sures was expounded as early as 1954 by Peter Thomeycroft, the President of the Board of 
Trade, “protection was entirely the function of the tariff” [Ministry of Supply (23/03/1954)]. 
The shift away from quota protection toward the tariff also reflected international super­
vised efforts undertaken by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 
However, it was not until 1960 that international pressure and the Board of Trade predilec­
tion for the tariff was finally actualised with the liberalisation of quotas [EIU (1/1965)].
^^See Milward and Brennan (1996) for an examination of the post-war quota system.
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Figure 1.3 suggests that the quota removal did lead to deepening import penetration. 
However, it is more plausible that the impact of potentially joining the Common Market in 
1960-2 on the market was a cause of significant investments in sales and service networks 
by Renault and Volkswagen at that time [Ministry of Supply (23/03/1954)]. Also, as 
Milward and Brennan (1996, 266) emphasise, Britain’s relation with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) led to a rise in imports from the only car producing nation in 
that trade block, Sweden. Swedish producers, however, represented less than 1% of new 
registrations in the UK in 1965 so this argument is of hmited empirical importance. As 
Table 1.7 illustrates the removal of quotas left a considerable protective wall surrounding 
British manufacturers in the form of tariff barriers of 30% or more.
Figure 1.3: Import Penetration of the UK Car Market (1971-2002)
80 -
70
50
40
30
20
10
Ennumsrated by author from data
Britain was ushered into the EEC on the 1st January 1973, culminating the end of 
successful negotiations after twelve years of on-again off-again attempts, with tariff reduc­
tions of 25% of the original tariff rates occurring annually thereafter. As Figure 1.3 shows 
import penetration rose substantively from 1971, two years prior to Britain’s accession. 
This begs the question why did the surge in imports occur prior to the actual date of 
accession? There are two possible explanations. First, as Table 1.7 illustrates, tariff rates 
had already fallen substantively from 1967 on a multilateral basis following the successful 
completion of the ‘Kennedy Round’ of the GATT (1964-67) so the expansion may have
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Table 1.7: Domestic Tax Adjusted Tariff Rates on Cars (1960-1978)
W orld Tariff European Tariff EFTA Tariff
1960 30.0 30.0 30.0
1961 30.0 30.0 21.0
1962 34.7 34.7 15.0
1963 34.7 34.7 15.0
1964 33.1 33.1 12.0
1965 31.5 31.5 9.0
1966 32.1 32.1 6.0
1967 34.5 34.5 0
1968 24.0 24.0 0
1969 20.6 20.6 0
1970 18.7 18.7 0
1971 16.9 16.9 0
1972 13.8 13.8 0
1973 13.8 10.3 0
1974 13.8 6.9 0
1975 13.8 3.4 0
1976 13.8 0 0
1977 13.8 0 0
1978 13.8 0 0
Sources: Taiiff figures come fix>m HM. Customs and Excise Tariff and Statistical Office. HM. Customs and External Taiifi) 
(1960-78) and HM Customs and Excise Taiiff and Statistical OfBce. HM. Amendments to the Taiiff During 1973 (and 
subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1975). Domestic taxes are obtained from the SMMT, The Motor Industry of Great 
Britain, (Various Years). The tariff rates are adjusted to account for differences in purchase tax through multiplying the tariff 
rate by paid by the degree of purchase tax.
reflected these reductions. Alternatively, it is likely, as Winters (1984) argues, that pro­
ducers, being aware of the likely success of negotiations in 1970 and increasingly so in 
1971 and 1972, became more aggressive in their attempts to secure UK market share. 
Like all major durable goods market share is an important determinant of future market 
success. To wait for the actual date of accession would be myopic on the part of European 
exporters who would be risking future access to what was still a large, proximate, and 
not fully exploited market for imports for cars.^  ^ Figure 1.3 also illustrates that preemp­
tive expansion in anticipation of British accession is also consistent with the historical 
record, with attempts by some European car producers to gather market share when the 
possibility of a successful accession existed in 1960-62.^  ^ That a dramatic rise in import 
penetration occurred following the reduction in trade restrictions provides evidence that
^^That the UK market was not fully exploited is reflected in European firms accounting for 8.3% of domestic sales in the 
UK in 1968 compared with over 20% in both France and Germany \Sourcea: Germany (Verband der Automobilindustrie); 
FVance (Comité des Constructeurs Français d’Automobile); UK (SMMT)].
^^See Ludlow (1999) for an interesting and more detailed explication on the failed accession negotiations.
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BL, and other firms producing and selling products in the UK, benefited from hiding 
behind the tariff wall. The impfication being that protection had forestalled competition 
in the UK market, and the arrival of more intense competition from technologically more 
capable overseas manufacturers. Given that GM and Ford were in active production and 
competition in European markets the lack of exposure to competition pertained mainly to 
the increasingly domestically sales dependent British Leyland. Indeed, imports came to 
dominate the UK car market from the early 1970s with import penetration rising steeply 
until the early 1980s when there was a rise in domestically produced sales driven by 
Vauxhall UK’s success and the switching from imports to local production of Japanese 
manufacturers. Prom mid-1990s import penetration in the market has once again deep­
ened.
Own and Rival Advertising
A fiufl.1 potentially important factor affecting firm costs was expanding advertising 
expenditure. Between 1957-1968 motor companies’ advertising in Britain adopted a ‘rule 
of thumb’ to spend a certain proportion of sales revenue on advertising [Cubbin and 
Cowling (1972)]. Furthermore, Henry (1986) points to an agreement between the four 
major players. Ford UK, GM Vauxhall, Chrysler UK and BL, not to utilise TV advertising. 
Cubbin and Cowling (1972) explained that the rationale for creating a level playing field, 
where advertising expenditures were concerned, reflected an appreciation that increased 
advertising was likely to be at least matdied by rivals. Their explanation is confirmed 
in their resulting analysis. The expansion in import penetration from 1971 augured in 
a dramatic and sustained rise in advertising expenditure in the market. Adjusted for 
inflation the advertising expenditures in the UK market experienced an eleven-fold rise 
between 1970 and 2002.^  ^ While there is an acknowledgement in the literature that 
advertising assisted importers’ in their assault on the UK market [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, 
and McKinlay (1995, 227)], the extent to which BL’s advertising costs affected their profit 
margins is left unaccounted for, as is the degree to which advertising costs affected BL’s 
rivals. The extent to which advertising expenditures were able to be translated into 
greater sales depended both a firm’s own advertising returns but also on the ability of 
rivals to induce switching in order to affect demand and will be discussed below.
^^Nominal advertising data was derived by MEAL (1970-1996) and ACNielsen Media Research (1997-2002). The adver­
tising deflator was derived by the UK Advertising Association. More details on these data sources is found in Chapter 
5.
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1.2.2 Product Differentiation and Demand
According to recent work concerning the PLC a firm’s success is determined by its ability 
to standardise its product and reduce costs through process innovation. The business 
history literature has pointed to a shift in the centre of gravity of the car industry from 
the 1970s as the ability of the industry to reduce the cost of producing differentiated model 
types was influenced by fiexible product technologies [e.g. Maxton and Wormald (1995); 
Tolliday and Zeitlin (1992)]. Tolliday and Zeitlin (1992) acknowledged however that it 
was not only the availability of fiexible production technologies that challenged ‘Fordism’ 
but also that demand influences were of primary importance. Three factors contributed 
to the shift in demand patterns in European markets: the oil crises of the 1970s; increased 
consumer awareness associated with “consumerism” and informative advertising; and a 
permanent shift in demand patterns as European markets matured.
The 1973 and 1979 oil crises are seen to have accelerated the shift to flexible tech­
nologies because they shifted demand to smaller units and split the market more evenly 
between market segments. Figure 1.4 illustrates the shift during the period. The segment 
share trends over the 1970s, and early 1980s suggest that there was a downward shift 
from small family, medium and executive sales towards cars in the mini segment. These 
shifts are reflected in negative and highly significant pair-wise correlations between the 
mini and the small, medium and executive car segments. A further feature of Figure 1.4 
is the growth of the new (4-by-4) and personal carrier segments. The effects of the growth 
on BL sales only took significance from 1989 when Land Rover expanded its presence in 
the 4-by-4 market since the firm never developed a Personal Carrier.
Added impetus to these sales trends were provided by shifts in public policies. A key 
example was the US Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations which set mandatory 
fuel-consumption targets for domestic producers that were set on a weighted average of 
their product ranges and encouraged them to move to greater production of smaller cars 
[Porter (1999, 44)]. The renewed policy focus towards smaller more fuel efficient models 
represented a trend in US initiated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) and NHTSA (1966) Acts legislated by the US government. As importantly, the 
success of Japanese firms in penetrating car markets worldwide during the recessionary 
1970s, illustrated in Figure 1.1, to become the world’s largest car producer in 1982 put 
the spotlight on their manufacturing methods [Cusumano (1991)]. While the oil crises 
and shifts in regulatory frameworks surely had a role to play in accelerating the move to 
more fragmented allocation of sales in car markets, broader permanent trends in consumer 
awareness and shifts in the global car market were also becoming apparent.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of New Registrations in the UK Car Market by Segment (1971-2002
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The 1970s witnessed a substantive increase in information on products in the UK with 
the rise of “consumerism” and through a sustained advertising war.^ "^  The spearhead 
of consumerism was the Consumer Association (CA) through its magazine, Which?. 
The first edition of Motoring Which?, a supplement of Which?, first appeared in 1965 
and differed from specialist car magazines in that it was focused on a wider consumer 
audience rather than car enthusiasts.^® The stated aim of CA was to provide, as far as 
possible, objective assessments of consumer durables, to report these to its members, and 
to highlight one brand that it considered the ‘Best Buy’, i.e. to improve the shopper’s 
ability to make value for money purchasing decisions [Hilton (2002)]. Prior to 1971 the
^Material related to the formation of Which? magazine are baaed on Hilton (2002) while information on the publication’s 
motoring supplement are based on the author’s research.
was formed by a young American graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science and was based 
on existing consumer groups in Sweden and the US. The first edition of Which? appeared in 1957.
^®That is not to say that alternative publications did not participate in the information dispersion in the UK car market, 
only that Which? was the most conspicuous.
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coverage of Motoring Which? was quite limited as reviewers built up their expertise 
and attained the resources needed to cover the available offerings in the UK car market. 
An important shift occurred in 1971 when the pubUcation began surveying its members 
on the rehability of car models at a detailed level. The impact of the magazine can be 
gauged partially through the expansion in readership with membership levels reaching 
half a miUion by the early 1970s, and the one million mark by 1987.
While Which? was the most important consumerist conduit, complementary develop­
ments in consumer information occurred in the form of new consumer focused legislation, 
such as the Trade Description Act of 1968, the setting up of government bodies focused on 
information provision via the Office for Fair Trading (1973), and through the formation 
of the National Consumer Council (1975).^  ^ In addition, as was mentioned in Section 1.1, 
the UK witnessed a prolonged advertising war that followed the assault on the market 
by European and Japanese car makers from 1971. While advertising is a cost to the firm 
ultimately its purpose is to raise sales by influencing demand. Advertising provides a 
means for firms to inform or persuade consumers that their products would suit them 
best. Given greater fragmentation in the market portraying a product image that appeals 
to a niche of consumers is in itself a form of differentiation, as is informing customers 
leam about the ‘virtues’ of specific products. Prior to 1968 advertising expenditures were 
kept low by agreement between the market’s dominant players, which would partly have 
offset any sales their advertising generated, so they held their expenditures below levels 
that would have been profitable for a monopolist [Bhaskar (1979, 340)]. Escalating ad­
vertising costs in a slow growing mature market implies that firms used advertising to 
induce consumers to switch their products rather than to shift the demand curve out­
ward, since there was little scope to do so. In effect the costs of advertising need to be 
weighed against the ability of those expenditures to induce sales from rival firms. To 
date there has been a dearth of researdi on either the cost or demand-sides of advertising 
in the history literature, while research by economists suggests that advertising prior to 
1968 was lower than the monopoly level indicating that the dominant ohgopoly effectively 
restrained expenditures [Cubbin and Cowling (1975)].
A third important factor in raising the importance of demand in European markets 
is associated market maturity. Table 1.8 illustrates the slowing in demand, as reflected 
in new registrations, in the four largest European car markets since 1950. That reduced 
growth reflected a more general shift towards market maturity. While recovery from the 
Second World War and the growth of the ‘Golden Age’ led to an expansion of the stock
^^See the Department for Trade and Industry’s, h ttp //www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topicl/guide/tdal968.pdf, for an outline of 
the Trade Description Act and h tlp //www.oft.gov.uk for background to the Office for Fair Trading.
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of cars, the growth in new registrations slowed and became more cyclical from the 1960s 
in the UK and the 1970s in Prance, Germany and Italy.
Table 1.8: Rate of Growth of Vehicle Registrations 1950-2002
UK Germany France Italy
1950-59 19.8 20.0 13.9 16.9
1960-69 3.1 8.0 7.3 13.5
1970-79 2.9 1.4 3.7 1.1
1980-89 2.8 2.2 2.0 4.0
1990-99 2.4 2.3 1.6 0.9
2000-02 2.1 2.0 1.0 0.7
Sources: Before -1990 France (Comité des Constructeurs Français d'Automobiles) 
Italy (ANFIA); Gemnany (Verband der Automobilindustrie); UK (SMMT).
From 1990 - All data taken from the Europen Manufacturing Association (ACEA).
Rather than becoming more standardised casual empiricism has pointed to car markets 
becoming more fragmented with product development playing a dominant role from the 
1970s [Bhaskar (1979); Volpato (1992); Maxton and Wormald (2004)]. As Volpato (1992, 
193) puts it,
“The problem for car companies has been to improve product technology and 
enlarge the range of cars produced. The philosophy can be seen in the prepa­
ration of numerous versions of a single model and many different engine types 
(petrol, diesel, fuel injection and turbo) and the creation of new highly spe­
cialised models such as the mini-vans.”
While flexible process innovation reduced the cost of production of new models and 
versions the ability to sell different types of the same products is dependent on flrms 
ability to differentiate their product ranges in ways that are valued by consumers. The 
business and business history literatures allude to new product technologies and market 
fragmentation being important factors but these phenomena have not been systematically 
investigated. The only partial attempt to document or examine their effects in the market 
place comes from Williams, Williams, Johal, and Aldcroft (1994) who point to the reduced 
proportion of the market held by the top ten models marketed in the UK which declined 
from 70% in 1965 to 50% by 1975. Alluding to and providing cursory evidence for such 
changes is one thing, providing empirical validity to their importance in recent history of 
car markets is quite another.
Increased fragmentation suggests that differentiation matters, but does not provide
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a concrete conceptual definition of how firms can become the beneficiaries, or losers, 
from the change in market structure. In the context of the thesis’s focus on British 
Leyland, determining the extent to which the product strategies based on model and 
model version proliferation axe of special interest since, as was pointed out in Section 1.1, 
under Edwardes’s CORE strategy the firm’s mass market model range was rationalised 
and one of the firm’s specialist segment car maker. Jaguar, was sold off.
It would be too simplistic to argue that providing numerous versions of a wide range 
models is the guarantee to success. A more rigourous definition of ‘product-led success’ 
or ‘decline’ that can be empirically operationalised is required. Such a definition is found 
in the hterature directly pertaining to BL in the form of what the Central Policy Review 
Staff (1975) termed ‘product-led decline’ (PLD). The PLD concept neatly encapsulated 
three distinct dimensions of market driven failure. The first dimension was that BL’s 
cars were over-priced relative to imports and cars produced by overseas based MNEs with 
respect to the “product package” they provided. Second, that BL’s manufactures were 
unable to fill the domestic market place with a range of products refiective of consumers’ 
tastes and demand patterns. In particular, the range of BL manufactured cars tended 
to dominate the larger car market leaving mass-product segments in the small family 
and mini car markets under-populated with British products [Rhys (1972)]. Third, that 
BL’s cars were outdated and that BL, unlike its foreign owned counterparts, neglected 
to regularly upgrade its product ranges to embody new technological advances [Central 
Policy Review Staff (1975, 67-68)].
Underlying the ability of a firm to differentiate its products is its technological ca­
pability set. In a technologically progressive industry technological capabifities are built 
through purposeful research as emphasised by endogenous growth theory [Barro and Sala- 
i-Martin (2003) provide a recent survey of that literature]. One of the aims in forming BL 
was to provide an integrated firm that would be able to benefit from the cross-pollination 
of resources to expand the firm’s capabifities [Church (1994)]. In particular, the bringing 
together of a large number of overlapping firms with differing design and development 
abilities offered the potential for an integrated firm to concentrate its resources on devel­
oping a well differentiated product fine with a presence in all segments of the market. The 
structure of research at BL was not however designed to encourage collaboration and it 
was a stated policy of the firm to maintain rivalry in engineering systems, methods and 
products in order to preserved the separate ‘identities’ of the its brands [Wood (1988)].
The features and style of models and model versions is determined in the design and 
development phases through the interaction of design, engineering, and marketing de­
partments of a car firm with oversight and resources directed by management, while the
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on-going quality of products themselves is determined on the shop floor and is overseen 
by quality auditing and control methods. Certainly manual labour has no role to play in 
determining the design and marketing of each car. The analysis has shown that a design 
team equipped to develop new competitive products or upgrade existing products, and 
as was pointed out in Section 1.1 the flrm became largely reflant on imported Japanese 
technologies by the early 1990s. The third alleged culprit, government, can also not be 
held responsible for the design and development aspects of the firm since it was unin­
volved in the day-to-day decision making. Indeed, there is httle evidence of government 
intervening in the running of the flrm as can be seen through the comments of successive 
heads of the organisation. For example, Stokes, Chairman between 1967-1975 pointed 
out that when “running the business we had very httle pressure from government” [Wood 
(1988, 175)]. Similarly, Edwardes, Chairman and CEO between 1977-1983, took on the 
role on the condition that he have complete autonomy [Edwardes (1983)]. With both 
government and non-specialised workers being uninvolved in product design and develop­
ment the responsibihty for product design rests squarely on management judgement and 
coordination of marketing and engineering.
While direct government involvement was not a factor influencing daily decision making 
it can been seen as having a direct effect on the UK car market through demand manage­
ment, or ‘Stop-go’ pohcies until the mid-1970s. Contemporary poHticians, on both sides 
of the House, consistently criticised demand management as being synonymous with ‘old’ 
Labour.^® Certainly, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders argued strongly 
on behalf of its members that Stop-go pohcies, which were speciflcahy targeted at the 
car industry through manipulating taxes and hire purchase (H.P.) agreements to affect 
demand during the business cycle, created considerable uncertainty in the market thus 
making it difficult for manufacturers to plan [Bowden and Turner (1998)].
While contemporary pohticians and the industry itself are unified in their view that 
Stop-go pohcies were damaging to the UK economy, economic historians have shown some 
scepticism that the pohcies led to large swings in the business cycle. Crafts (1994) points 
out that Britain’s business cycle was less erratic than the majority of European countries. 
While aggregate data show that Britain may have been ranked low among countries in 
the magnitude of fluctuations in gross national product, Matthews (1971, 28-29) pointed 
out that the magnitude of fluctuations amongst consumer durables was high relative to 
other OECD countries. More relevant to this work, Prais (1981) found the opposite to be 
the case by showing that the American and German car industries had much the same
^^For example, the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown, has accused the Conservative government of Mrs Thatcher 
of being guilty of Stop-go policies applying a radical austerity program [BBC (5/6/2001)]. See Booth (2001b) for the 
most recent scholarly addition to a complex debate as to the motives underlying the macro policy process.
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variability around the trend as British industry.
Unlike the macro-economic hterature some micro-economic empirical work assessing 
Stop-go pohcies in the car industry during the 1960s found that they had an impact on 
sales. An early study, by the National Institute (1961) found that over the period 1948-60 
neither prices nor H.P controls were of much significance in changing the stock of cars. 
On the other hand, Cuthbertson and Motley (1962) using data from a H.P. provider 
(an insurance company) to assess the impact of the pohcy conclude that the maximum 
length of H.P. contracts were an important factor not to immediate sales, but rather the 
sales occurring after expiration of the current H.P. contracts. Minimum deposit rates 
were deemed to be ineffective. Silberston (1963) reassessed Cuthbertson and Motley’s 
analysis and found that their point about the t iming of H.P. completions was not of 
great importance. In contrast, Silberston found that changes to the minimum level of 
the H.P. rate did have an impact on sales. Finally, Ali (1965) re-evaluated Silberston’s 
work, pointing to problems with his data. Ali obtained results that were qualitatively 
similar to those of Silberton although the effects were quite small. There are no studies 
analysing Stop-go policies from their réintroduction in December 1973 to their abohtion in 
July 1982 which makœ gauging the importance of their effects difficult. It is worth noting 
however that, unlike the many changes in minimum deposit rate and maximum repayment 
period that occurred during earlier decades, there was no ‘tinkering’ to regulate demand. 
From 1973 both the minimum deposit rate and maximum repayment period remained 
unchanged until their removal. To the extent that consumers and manufacturers in the 
UK conceived that these rates were fixed they cannot be credited with raising uncertainty 
or providing planning difficulties.
Government through its willingness to allow industry-to-industry protection of the UK 
market via the VER also affected the UK car market. VERs affect the supply-side via 
reducing relative competition but unlike traditional tariff barriers they also affect market 
demand patterns. Demand patterns are infiuenced because the quantity constrained party 
has the incentive to maximise its unit profits on its reduced sales and are therefore syn­
onymous with “quality upgrading” , where firms market higher quality products in order 
to obtain greater unit mark-ups.^® The ability of Japanese manufacturers to alter their 
product offerings is supported by the commonly held view that Japanese firms had devel­
oped strong technological capabilities that allowed them to compete and open up a variety 
of specialist market niches [Tolliday and Zeitlin (1992, 15)]. The success of the policy as a 
means to protect UK industry, and the (then) recently nationalised BL in particular, was 
dependent on the unconstrained firm’s ability not only to acquire profitable market share,
detailed discussion of theoretical and empirical work related to VER is located in Chapter 6.
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which would have been taken by Japanese products had they not been constrained, but 
also on their ability to protect profitable products and market segments from Japanese 
manufacturers as they adjusted their product-mix. To date the historical literature has 
paid scant attention to the VER issue being satisfied to assert that the VER was largely 
responsible for Japanese production in the UK but not considering the impact on market 
participants. For example, of the standard texts on the UK car industry; Church (1994) 
does not mention VERs and Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995) devotes only 
a couple of lines to them.
1.3 Summary and Research Agenda
The purpose of this chapter was two-fold. First, it informed the ‘declinist’ debate by 
examining the evolution of size and productivity performance in UK manufacturing and 
the motor industry relative to car producing competitors. The aggregate analysis showed 
that assessing the ‘declinist’ debate, both for UK manufacturing in general and the motor 
industry in particular, depends on the criteria used to adjudge ‘decline’. From a produc­
tivity perspective the UK’s performance does not support the more pessimistic version 
of the ‘declinist’ thesis, nor does it provide wholesale support for the ‘optimists’ either 
as productivity growth has dwindled from the mid-1990s. From an employment perspec­
tive UK manufacturing was a poor performer throughout the 1965-1999 period, with the 
motor industry performing poorer still. During the 1970s the motor industry witnessed 
an absolute decline in output between 1972, by 1984 it halved. Central to that decline 
was the collapse of British Leyland and, to a lesser extent, a realignment of production 
by Ford towards Continental Europe. Since 1984 however the industry has witnessed a 
resurgence in production that represented a substantial turnaround after over a decade 
of absolute decfine. The disaggregated production data pinpoint the renaissance in UK 
production to have been determined by the rapid expansion in UK-based Japanese firms 
and to a lesser degree through the UK being the site for production of a small range of 
products targeted for global sales by niche brands owned by multinational concerns.
The analysis of developments in the market was followed by a survey of the potential 
explanations of BL’s decline within the context of shifts in the wider UK market where 
the firm competed. The literature has taken two approaches [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and 
McKinlay (1995, 89)]. The first is to list all the plausible ‘factors’ that have infiuenced 
the industry and in some cases to attribute causal relations to them. The second is to 
take a more ambitious line of picking a single explanation and gathering a selection of 
evidence consistent with it. The second method is limited however in that the scope of
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the explanation is constrained to the particular facet of the hterature. Prom an empirical 
perspective this hterature provides a series of anecdotally derived conjectures which a 
priori are quite compelling but, as has been shown in Section 1.2, are difficult to assess.
In order to provide some structure on the list of plausible ‘factors’ Section 1.2 set out 
to distinguish between supply and demand-side influences. The conceptual spht can be 
used to highlight the information required to test hypotheses concerning the demise of 
BL, as weh as the effects on BL of Japanese FDI developments in the UK. The approach 
of the thesis is therefore to take a third path of examining a constrained set of arguments 
while attempting to control for alternative factors that have shaped the nature of UK 
industry.
The supply-side review concentrated on the two lynch-pins of an influential contribu­
tion by Lewchuck (1986), in the form of modes of productive technology and industrial 
relations. The review found that the available evidence concerning the effects of industrial 
relations and economies of scale is too diverse to make concrete inferences. The list of 
candidates was then widened to encompass government pohcies and advertising. It was 
found that there also appears to be Httle evidence that regional poHcy harmed the UK 
industry in general, indeed car manufacturers appear to have beneflted from regional pol­
icy, and that the effect of education pohcy on staff of skihed engineers did not constrain 
British Leyland greatly. Cost reductions linked to tariff reductions appear to have had a 
substantive impact in the UK market, and the insulation of the economy prior to those 
reductions may have led to complacency in the development of a competitive capabihty 
set at BL. Finally, the cost effects of advertising were identifled, but given the paucity 
of available studies concerning their effects, it was not possible to make any substantive 
commentary.
Ideally, one would wish to under take the most ambitious approach of testing the fuU 
set of supply-side determinants individually using highly detailed information rather than 
being rehant on conjectures derived from anecdotes or by using econometric modeling 
techniques to control for unobserved factors. Even within a weh deflned market place, 
such as the UK car market, the data required to fulfil such a research agenda is formidable. 
In particular, information on costs, even at the flrm level, is highly limited and a definitive 
micro-economic analysis would require detailed data on elements of plant costs related to 
specific models and model versions. For example, the heterogeneity between wage rates 
and industrial relation disputes between plants would make for an interesting assessment 
of elements that the cost side hterature has emphasised. Alas such information is not avail­
able for BL or any other firms operating in the UK car market. Indeed, such information 
is rarely made available to researchers since firms are naturally cautious about providing
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information that would be highly valued by competitors. Even if detailed supply-side 
data were available for the most important firms operating in the UK market in the early 
1970s the use of such information would provide a biased sample for the later period since 
the UK market, as has been shown in Section 1.1, was characterised by the growth of a 
second-tier of car manufacturers from Continental Europe and Japan.
The demand-side analysis examined an important debate as to the relevance of stan­
dardisation within the mature phase PLC in an increasingly driven global car market. 
The business hterature suggests that from the 1970s the market may have shifted to be­
come demand, rather than supply, orientated. That shift was initially driven by the oil 
crises, but ultimately reflected enhanced consumer awareness (through both consumerist 
information and informative advertising) and market maturity that led to market frag­
mentation, rather than standardisation. These shifts in market trends towards greater 
differentiation benefited firms with strong product technology capabifities who were best 
able to meet consumer requirements. The implications of the debate have important 
consequences for analysing BL since the anecdotal evidence provided strongly suggests 
that BL had weak technological capabifities and actively pursued a policy to reduce its 
product diversity.
The data requirements to examine demand-side influences are also formidable. Analysing 
product differentiation on the demand-side requires the researcher to incorporate a set of 
product specific attributes that can discern between consumers’ preferences for the mul­
tifaceted notion of ‘quality’. Quality in complex goods is notoriously difficult to capture 
in technologically progressive markets [Raff and Trajtenberg (1997)]. Given the focus of 
the thesis on the effect of product quality on the decfine of British Leyland in a period 
when the dominant form of quality’s influence on consumer purchasing decisions has been 
related to non-technical attributes, a  narrow focus on “quality” would be uninformative 
and potentially highly misleading [Requenas-Silvente and Walker (2005)]. To overcome 
this limitation a substantive data set was collated capturing the prices and sales of all new 
model versions marketed in the UK car market between 1971 and 2002, and incorporat­
ing over one hundred and thirty, predominantly non-performance product characteristics 
ranging from the humble cup holder to the traffic navigation system and on-board com­
puter. The construction of that data set makes it possible to focus of on a series of 
important issues on the demand-side concerning UK industry and the car market oper­
ating within it, and thus to make some definitive head way on both understanding forces 
shaping the market and British Leyland’s role within it.
In effect, breaking down the arguments into those affecting demand and supply provides 
a different approach to those that have been taken by the literature to date. This alterna-
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tive approach combines a rigourous qualitative and quantitative examination of specific 
issues: econometric methods are used to control for other plausible ‘factors’ either di­
rectly, or via a plausible set of product characteristics and control variables, partitioning 
out supply-side influences affecting costs, via the use of discrete choice techniques.
The thesis examines three substantial issues in the form of ‘product-led decline’ [Chap­
ters 4], advertising rivalry [Chapter 5] and the effects of VERs [Chapter 6] to test whether 
these factors influenced BL’s performance. However, before doing so two recurring issues 
highlighted in this Chapter are assessed: whether BL had low capabilities relative to its 
rivals at the beginning of the period analysed, and whether the standardisation based 
PLC model or the alternative ‘dematurity’ view provide a valid approximation of how the 
market developed.
Chapter 2 quantifies shifts m the ‘capabilities’ of firms operating in the UK car mar­
ket. Quantifying capabilities is not a straightforward task since the strategic management 
literature argues that firm behaviour is also determined by resource differences as distinct 
from firm capabilities, while the economics literature provides a further alternative that 
product location decisions are determined by managers’ decisions and make no appeal to 
the capabilities concept. Two factors highlighted in the historiography, in the form of the 
insulation of the market prior to accession into the EEC and the potentially destabilising 
influence of Stop-go policies, provide exogenous forces that limited BL’s technological de­
velopment. Data limitations do not allow an examination of whether or not these or other 
unidentified factors influenced BL’s capacity set prior to 1971. Separating out altemar 
tive resource and strategic location effects allows for the construction of flrm capabilities 
indices, to show whether BL’s capabilities were substantially lower than key rivals in 
the market at the beginning of the period and whether the flrm was able to build on it 
capabifities over the 1971-2002 period.
To tackle the second of these issues a set of stylised facts associated with the PLC 
model, summarised in Klepper (1996), are tested against the alternative hypothesis of 
market ‘dematurity’ in Chapter 3. Doing so provides an important first step in evaluating 
whether supply-side forces finked to standardisation have dominated product innovation 
induced market fragmentation in a rigourous fashion rather than relying on cursory evi­
dence. More importantly in terms of the thesis, the analysis also provides important clues 
as to whether the inability of BL to provide an increasingly differentiated product range 
indicated a low technological capacity at the firm which was to play a vital role in the 
firms’ severe retrenchment.
Chapter 3 rejects the PLC model as being applicable to the car industry. As has been 
pointed out in Section 1.2 some authors argue that the firms that were to form BL were
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already falling behind the competition during the 1960s.
Informed by the finding in Chapters 2 and 3 that British Leyland was not an innovator 
and had a low technological capability set relative to market rivals the substantive issue of 
whether ‘product-led decline’ lay at the heart of BL’s decline is addressed. To do so two 
different methodologies are applied to quantify the three aspects of ‘product-led decline’ 
defined by the Central Pohcy Review Staff (1975) in Chapter 4. The first dimension was 
that BL cars were over-priced relative to imports and cars produced by overseas based 
MNEs in the “product package” they provided and this is examined in Chapter 4. Since 
whether BL cars were “overpriced” or not is independent of supply and demand consider­
ations simple hedonic techniques can be used to determine the validity of the hypothesis. 
The abihty of the firm to fill the domestic market place with a range of products differ­
entiated in ways that were able to capture consumers’ taste and demand patterns, or to 
upgrade its product ranges to embody new technological advances requires segmenting 
out cost effects in order to determine whether demand played a role in infiuencing the 
survival of BL’s products. Each facet of the PLD hypothesis is shown to be a valid factor 
influence in BL’s decline.
Finally, two potentially important issues identified in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 in the 
form of advertising and Voluntary Export Restraints are analysed. As has been stressed 
previously both issues have received cursory attention in the economic history hterature 
to date. Indeed, historical research on the impact of either advertising or VERs are highly 
underdeveloped with these issues being tacked onto lists of all the plausible ‘factors’ that 
have infiuenced the industry. In order to fill these gaps in the hterature both topics make 
up substantive thesis chapters.
Advertising is seen as a force which enhanced entry into the market from the early 1970s 
but the degree to which this occurred, or whether BL benefited through its own advertising 
remain unexplored issues that are taken up in Chapter 5. It is shown that overall, unhke 
its rivals, BL failed to benefit from either of these potentially profit enhancing factors. 
To preview findings, the positive expansion in British Leyland’s sales through its own 
advertising were canceled out by the rival advertising. Since advertising represented 
a substantial cost to the firm (£118mn) over the 1971-2002 period these expenditures 
translated directly into financial losses.
The historical literature recognises that VERs were a means to protect domestic in­
dustry and presumably encouraged Japanese investment in plant in the UK but makes 
no assertion as to whether the policy was a success in aiding British Leyland. Previous 
theoretical and empirical work on VERs in other markets have found that the imposition 
of VERs is likely to have dislocated rivals as Japanese firms “upgraded” their products
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into more profitable product niche. The ability of firms to take up the slack left through 
the sales constraint depends on the abihty of those unconstrained rival firms to provide 
products to fill the void left by Japanese manufacturers. While Chapter 6, which exam­
ines VERs in the UK is primarily focused on the policy’s eflFects on BL, an important 
by-product of the diapter is that it also quantifies the effects on other manufacturers and 
also on UK consumers. A further contribution of the chapter is to draw attention to a 
pohcy which was effective in promoting Japanese direct foreign investment and reviving 
the UK car industry.
The analysis of the UK car industry has important imphcations for the optimist vs. 
declinist debate. The review suggests that the long run verdict on the Thatcher experi­
ment is stiU out. De-industrialisation was an inherent part of the process of raising the 
productivity rate by improving the appropriation of returns in the 1980s, but the slow 
down in manufacturing during the late 1990s, which occurred earher in the car industry, 
suggests that such gains may have only amounted to a one-off level shift. Without pro­
viding sustainable means to increase productivity the declinists’ view may yet become the 
prevailing view in the UK manufacturing.
Reviewing the factors influencing BL’s terminal decline highlighted problems that were 
unrelated to labour issues, and thus may provide clues to the sort of factors that could 
have lead to a sustainable revival had they been duely emphasised by BL. The review 
argued that an inabflity to produce new products or versions of goods was a central 
factor underlying the indigenous firm’s decline. Ultimately the ability to produce a range 
of innovative products to meet market requirements rests on technical capabilities and 
engineering expertise being nurtured and directed to manufacture products for profitable 
product locations through a measured marketing and managerial strategies that show 
foresight. The emphasis on the inadequate capabilities of product design and engineering, 
and on product innovation runs parallel to the ‘new’ growth literature’s emphasis on 
broader concepts of ‘human capital’ and purposeful innovation being the driving forces 
behind long run success. However, being a predominately macroeconomic hterature there 
is httle focus on the potentially positive or negative impacts of marketing and managerial 
strategies. The thesis argues that BL failed on both counts, which provides the intriguing 
possibihty that had the firm been able raise its capabifities and provided an appropriate 
marketing strategy it may have stood a chance of attaining an ever anticipated, but never 
achieved, product-led recovery in a ‘dematuring’ global market place. The imphcation 
of a successful ‘product-led recovery’ being that the extreme amount of labour shedding 
would not have been necessary. Indeed, a successful provision of widened range quahty 
products would have required a greater labour pool to draw upon.
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Chapter 2
Investigating Firm Capabilities in 
the UK Car Market
British Leyland’s decline in market share and profitability dates from the early 1970s, 
however Chapter 1 identified a number of factors that may have retarded the firm’s ca­
pabilities prior to and immediately following its formation. A plausible list of candidates 
includes external factors such as tariff barriers and stop-go policies as well as internal fac­
tors related to the management of the company. Casual empiricism and academic research 
provides some indication that those factors infiuenced the firm. But the fact that tariff 
barriers were important is indicated by the market being under-exploited by European 
manufacturers prior to Britain’s accession in the EEC and by a surge in imports from 
continental manufacturers that gathered strength from the early 1970s. Furthermore, the 
expansion in imports is consistent with an earfier preemptive expansion in anticipation of 
British accession in 1960-62. Where stop-go policies are concerned Chapter 1 sununarises 
the related literature providing evidence that those polices influenced demand and thus 
may have led to uncertainty as claimed by the industry participants. As well as forces 
that were exogenous to British Leyland, three government commissioned reports into the 
state of the firm prior to nationalisation all argued that the mergers that had formed the 
firm in the late 1960s had been unsuccessful and questioned the adequacy of the firm’s 
management [National Enterprise Board (1977); Expenditure Committee (1975); Central 
Policy Review Staff (1975)]. It is plausible then, that factors both external and internal to 
the firm had had a detrimental impact on the technological capabilities of the firm prior 
to 1971. Accessing whether or the extent that British Leyland’s capabilities were below 
those of its competitors is complicated as prior to 1971 by a lack of micro data. Given 
that data constraints deny the possibility of testing the evolution of BL and other mar­
ket participants capabilities prior to 1971, this chapter takes the next best available step
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of accessing the capability of the firm in that initial year and tracing its evolution until 
2002. More generally, the chapter extends work by Thomas and Weigelt (2000) (TW here­
after) in the strategic management hterature by providing a substantially refined means 
to measure the importance of capabifities as a determinant of firm behaviour.
While the importance of firm capabifities as a concept is ubiquitous in the business 
literature, it is most strongly associated with the strategic management literature where 
capabifities are conceived as having the primary role in shaping managerial decisions. 
The economic history literature is also profoundly interested in how the heterogenous 
firms behave to changes in the market environment over time, and whether there is an 
intrinsic aspect to firms that makes it difficult for them to adjust to changes. Influential 
work by economic historians, influenced by ?, such as Mokyr (1990), have emphasised 
technological development has an important path dependent component. While economic 
historians have acknowledged a path dependent component associated to the capability 
set of firms, products, and industries they also acknowledge that changes in fortune can 
occur. Mokyr (1990) argues that development of embodied product innovations (or in 
Mokyr’s parlance ‘macro’ inventions) can lead to substantial deviations in technological 
trajectories. Mokyr’s work is concerned with the more dramatic setting of industrialisation 
rather than with on-going developments of a mature industry, however the thrust of his 
argument is engendered in the car industry since it has experienced continuous product 
innovation potentially bestowing technological advantages and market success on firms 
best able to embody such innovations. Examining the evolution of firm capabifities over 
a thirty-two year period thus provides an opportunity to test a subtle variant of Mokyr’s 
view - whether relatively minor macro-inventions, which are of course not minor to the 
industry per se, but are not ‘radical’ in the Mokyrian sense - led to a shift in the long-run 
capabifities of market participants.
WTiile an important historical literature exists, the strategic management literature 
has provided the richest set of quantitative attempts to access their existence and em­
pirical importance. The findings of these works has not been overwhelmin^y positive 
[exceptions being Helfat (1997) and Henderson and Cockbum (2002)]. A recent paper, 
TW (2000) provides an important exception both in terms of the results they obtain, and 
more importantly in providing a potential means to overcome traditional difficulties in 
empirically operationalising capabifities. TW exploit the intuitive notion that if resources 
and capabifities can explain firm performance then they should also affect the new prod­
uct decisions of managers. Newly launch products, or in my case the quality of those 
products, should be more similar to the firm’s existing products, determined within a 
manager’s capability set, than those of rivals with differing capabifities. Their work cen-
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très on a case study of the US automobile market over the period 1981 to 1993, however 
since product characteristics are often available to academic researchers and management 
practitioners, mapping new product qualities provides a ready means to test for the extent 
that capabihties influence a wide variety of industries.
My research builds on the work of TW in a number of non-trivial respects. To facil­
itate comparison with TW’s work I examine the same industry. However, unlike TW, 
who examined the US market, I analyse the UK car market. First, a key identification 
problem essential to their findings is pointed out and accounted for. Specifically, TW’s 
results hinge on being able to distinguish between two aspects of the managerial decision 
making process: one emphasised by management strategists (heterogeneous firm capac­
ities) and the other emphasised by economists (spatial competition). Since theories of 
spatial competition are able to provide equivalent predictions to capability theory in the 
short-run, identification of “capabilities” is not possible within the TW framework. To 
do so, an alternative means to identify managerial capacities is developed, which exploits 
the fact that capabihties are essentially long-run features embodied in firms that are not 
easily changed. The abihty to determine the relative similarities between heterogeneous 
products reflects the development of a set of over 130 embodied product characteristics for 
a complete panel of new car models and model versions between 1971-2002. Second, capa­
bihties theory imphes that the nature and quahty of products that a firm develops wifi be 
closely ahgned to their heterogenous capabihties. The theory does not make predictions 
as to what determines manager’s decisions to launch a new product per se. So rather 
than modeling the model entry decisions of managers I take the more direct approach of 
analysing the impact of capabihties on product quahty. Third, I distinguish between firm 
resource effects and firm capabihties. Fourth, rather than comparing whether versions 
of models, which are by definition highly similar, I provide a more appropriate unit of 
observation in the form of new ‘named’ models. Fifth, I am able to derive firm and strate­
gic group specific capabihty indices and evaluate their evolution. Specifically, I ihustrate 
the capabihties of the once dominant British manufacturer British Leyland were below 
that of other manufacturing groups.^ Finally, I control also for factors associated with 
the industry environment where firms operate in the form of competitive forces, and the 
segmented nature of market structure associated with car markets.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as foUows. Section 2.1 briefly surveys the 
theoretical and empirical hterature, develops definitions of spatial competition and capar 
bihties, and set out the hypotheses to be tested. Section 2.2 addresses data issues and
 ^Rover Group filed for bankruptcy in April 2005 [See BBC (31/05/2005) for background to the breakup of the firm and 
its assets.]
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quantifies quality. Section 2.3 tests the hypothesis posited in Section 2.1. Finally, Section 
2.4 contains a discussion of the findings.
2.1 Theory and Hypotheses
Both economists and management strategists make claims on how managers decide to 
locate their products on the product spectrum. Key contributions from the strategic 
management hterature are provided in the text above, but it is noteworthy that a sub­
stantial economics hterature exists focusing on the location decision of managers which in 
turn is dependent on the nature of the product and the extent of price competition. Two 
types of differentiated products are identified in the hterature: homogeneous products, 
which are differentiable horizontally, and products that are differentiable in terms of their 
quahty (vertically-differentiated products). Where products are horizontally differenti­
ated, and where there is httle price competition, then the best response for managers to 
maximise profits is to locate their product next to that of competing firm(s) so as to divide 
up the market, engaging in minimal product differentiation [Hotelling (1929); de Palma, 
Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985)]. Hence, firms wih not pursue product dif­
ferentiation. At the other extreme, where products are differentiated by quahty, in the 
presence of price competition managers have the incentive to locate products far from one 
another to avoid the brunt of (potential) price competition [(Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 
1983)]. That is, they wih pursue a strategy of product differentiation. The predictions of 
these models are determined not only on price competition but also on the distribution 
of demand within the product space, and on the order of entry.
The theoretical economic hterature on spatial product location provides no clear predic­
tions as to where managers of incumbent firms choose to locate their products. Managers 
may either: (1) Attempt to segment the market locating their products close to each 
other suggesting that their products wih be more similar to each other [Eaton and Lipsey 
(1984); Schmalensee (1978)] or, (2) preempt the market by locating their products far 
away from each other to avoid cannibalising their products by occupying empty market 
niche thus implying managers wih launch products that are different to each other [Bran- 
der and Eaton (1984); Bonanno (1981); Economides (1984); Spence (1976)].  ^ Without a 
clear theoretical guide determining which of these effects dominates is an empirical issue.
To date, there has been limited empirical research on the entry or the product location 
decisions of managers in either the strategic management or the economics hteratures.
^Indeed, recent work by Johnson and Myatt (2003) using a duopoly model with a continuum of quality types (from high 
and low) nests both possibilities in fin d in g  that high-quality incumbent firms may either operate in the high, or in both the 
high and low quality, segments of the market, depending on the structure of demand.
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The paper of Thomas and Weigelt is the only example in the strategic management 
hterature. In the economic hterature two papers, Stavins (1995) and Harchaoui and 
Hamdad (2000), examine the product location decision in the U.S. personal computer 
and French classical music markets respectively. While all three papers employ a similar 
two-step methodology, which first involves employing hedonic estimation to derive quahty 
distance metrics before analysing these in the second step via discrete choice modeling, 
they differ in significant respects. First, and most importantly, the dependent variable 
analysed in the two economic papers is the distance quahty metric which is explained 
via whether firms are incumbents or entrants. In contrast, TW estimated the opposite 
relationship - where entry (the dependent variable) is explained by the location decision 
of managers. Capabihties theory does not make predictions about whether managers 
wih choose to launch new products, but rather that the nature of those products will 
be aligned to capabihties of each firm. Thus examining the determinants of entry, as 
Thomas and Weigelt (2000) do, can at best be seen as an indirect approach to examining 
firm capabihties. Stavins (1995) and Harchaoui and Hamdad (2000) on the other hand 
attempt to measure firm capabihties. Second, in keeping with the fact that entry decisions 
occur prior to products being launched, Stavins (1995) and Harchaoui and Hamdsid (2000) 
model the decision of where to place a new product on the product spectrum while TW 
estimate a model of entry where entry and location are determined contemporaneously. 
Third, there are differences in the way the quahty metrics used to quantify ‘quahty’ are 
calculated, which wih be elaborated upon in Section 2.2.
TW found that new models launched tend to be more similar with respect to their own 
offerings, but differ significantly with respect to rivals, and that entrants (proxied foreign 
manufacturers) differ from rivals but do not play to their capabihties. Stavins found that 
the products of new entrant firms tend to locate in more crowded market spaces and 
that within model dispersion is greater for incumbents than for entrants. In contrast, 
Harchaoui and Hamdad (2000) found that smaher incumbents (independents) tend to 
locate their products in ‘empty’ product spaces and that larger firms had more disperse 
product location choices. As Stavins points out, her findings are consistent with the 
predictions of economic models [such as Brander and Eaton (1984); Economides (1984)] 
where incumbents have the incentive to pre-empt entrants by filling an empty niche in 
the product space. Harchaoui and Hamdad obtained the antithetical result, which they 
argue to be consistent with the alternative set of economic models [i.e. Eaton and Lipsey 
(1984); Schmalensee (1978)]. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that the new models 
firms launch may be either more similar, or more different to their own previous offerings 
relative to rivals products. So, while it is quite possible that both factors are at work.
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within the straight-jacket of the methodology employed it is not possible to distinguish 
between firm capacities and optimal spacial location decisions. What is required is a 
sharper test.^
Theoretical work in the strategic management hterature provides the clue for how to 
proceed in distinguishing between spatial competition and capabihties. Resource theory 
is a diffuse one but at it core it requires that three conditions are fulfilled: (1). firms are 
heterogeneous in nature; (2). that the factors determining these heterogeneities must not 
be erodible by their purchase in factor markets at a marginal value, and (3). they must 
be difficult or costly to rephcate [Peteraf (1993)]. Taken together these ingredients define 
a unique capabihty set that are embedded aspects of a firm which are difficult to change, 
are therefore quite stable within firms, and a source of enduring competitive advantage 
[Porter (1980)]. Hence, in contrast to the embedded character of capabihties, managerial 
product locations decisions may be varied strategically in the short-run. However the 
range over which managers are able to alter the location of products on the quahty 
spectrum is restricted to be within the technological ‘capabihty set’ the firm encompasses. 
Furthermore, theoretical research in the strategic management hterature has found that 
incumbents tend to build on their existing set of capabihties, but are at a disadvantage in 
developing ‘radical’ innovations [Leonard-Barton (1992); Hannah and Freeman (1984)].
In a mature industry the capabihties of a firm may develop slowly over long periods. 
Indeed, the market analysed is a mature one, with firms participating in the industry in 
1998 being on average about 65 years old, and the growth in demand is low, being pre­
dominantly based on product renewal.^ In the absence of perfect foresight, a manager is 
unlikely to make a decision to develop a particular model to be located in a specific space 
in the product spectrum many years prior to when the product is designed. Given the in­
dustry is characterised by quite rapid innovation levels, perfect foresight is an implausible 
assumption.®
Where managers build on the embedded sources of long term competitive advantage 
associated with technological capacities then it is expected that the quahty of the new 
products launched wih be more similar to models released many periods before compared 
to rivals’ offerings. These considerations lead to the fohowing general hypothesis.
^This paper tests for the presence of firm capabilities father than examining both capabilities and spacial location theory.
^In the UK the growth in new automobile registrations grew at an average rate of 2.7% over the 1970-2002 period.
^Ehridence of rapid innovation is apparent from three empirical sources. First, this paper details the on-going introduction 
of 130 embodied attributes over the 1971-2002 period. Second, from the input to the innovation side the industry made 
a substantive contribution to R&D expenditure over the 1973-1996 period taking fifteen percent share of total OECD 
manufacturing R&D [The data used to derive this figure was the OECD (ANBERD). Steve Machin is thanked for allowing 
access to the data used to maltt» these calculations]. Finally, taking patents as a measure of the outputs of innovation, some 
350,000 patent applications made by automobile manufacturers over the period are examined [5ounce;-European Patent 
Office’s in-house patent databases].
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Hypothesis 1: Firms build on existing capacities, and their models (quality) are there­
fore more sim ilar to each other over time than to their rivals.
Three additional dimensions along which capabihties can be tested are also examined:
(1) systematic differences in the diaracteristics of particular producer groups; (2) changes 
in capabihties through merger, and (3) whether within firm capabihties dominate sub- 
markets differences.
TW appeal to two of these hypotheses, motivated by anecdotal work by Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991) who, based on field research, characterise the differing capabihties of 
managers in the global automobile market along two dimensions: segmentation and pro­
duction location.® In particular, Clark and Fujimoto argue that Japanese manufacturers 
were the leading innovators in terms of the embodiment of product innovations; that Eu­
ropean manufacturers concentrated more on performance characteristics, but that U.S. 
manufacturers sat in the middle of the two groups. Those authors argue that luxury and 
niche cars segments were more rehant on “brand image” while mass produced models are 
more likely to introduce product innovations. Rather than taking this anecdotal evidence 
at face value the rich available data enable the nature of segment and group location 
capabihties to be pinned down, allowing for a more precise analysis.^
To reasonably capture technological innovation and profits associated with “quahty 
upgrading” for a product as complex and multi-dimensional as the automobile requires 
the recording of a wide selection of innovations that occurred over the extended snap shot 
examined. Table 2.1 provides a time line of innovations over 125 embodied attributes, 
as weh as the brand that first included each new attribute as “standard” in at least one 
of its model variants. Technological innovation has clearly been an on-going feature of 
the automobile industry as it has evolved over the post-war period. Table 2.1 shows that 
technological leadership was limited to a small sub-set of firms. European firms accounted 
for over 75 per cent of product innovation introductions, with the four top innovating 
firms being BMW, Mercedes, Rolls Royce and Jaguar, who accounted for 35 per cent of 
introductions. Japanese firms comprise 16 per cent and US-based firms for 8 per cent 
of introductions, respectively. While European firms dominate innovation introduction,
^TW motivate their analysis through Clark and Fujimoto (1991) research. However, they do not directly examine the 
distinctions between the three producer groups that Clark and Fujimoto identify. Instead, TW make a distinctions between 
imports, which they argue behave like entrants, and US firms, who are taken to be incumbents. Such a dichotomy is 
questionable in the UK market as the UK domestic champion, British L^land, and a number of European and Japanese 
firms do not have marginal market shares either in the UK or global automobile markets.
^It is common for firms operating in automobile markets to market very different products in different sub-markets. 
Since the paper uses product similarity as a means to measure firm capabilities it is critical to compare products in like 
segments of the market place. For example, Daimler-Chrysler markets a mini segment model, the Smart car, as well as the 
SLK Mercedes sports model which should be expected to embody disparate product characteristic due to their segment 
location.
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as Table 2.1 demonstrates, there is a considerable shift between the UK and continental 
producers over the period. Prior to 1970, UK manufacturers introduced 60 per cent of 
the new innovations in the sample, but this proportion fell steadily from the 1970s to 13 
per cent in the 1990s. By contrast, European producers introduced 18 per cent of new 
product innovations prior to 1970 but accounted for 80 per cent of the total in the 1990s.®
Innovations were predominantly found not in the mass market segments (mini/super­
m in i, small family and medium cars) that account for 39 per cent of the total. Rather new 
attributes typically first appear in the “niche” segments (executive, luxury, sports, 4-by-4 
and MPV) that accounted for 61 per cent of innovation introductions.® Furthermore, 
in all cases new technologies were included first in the most luxurious model version. 
The initial concentration of innovation in niche models, or at least the most expensive 
versions, reasonably suggests that firms attempt to differentiate their models through 
product innovations.
It is also of note that, other than Jaguar and Land Rover, the brands that made up BL 
were rarely the first to incorporate new product technologies, providing some indication 
that the technological capabilities of BL’s mass producing brands were limited. Since the 
technological expertise at Land Rover was specific to 4-by-4 vehicles. Jaguar was the only 
viable candidate to obtain technological insights from. Indeed, John Barber, Vice Chair 
of BL in 1973 recognised that:
“If you look at what we were good at in those days, our volume-cars were not 
up to world standards. If we could have capitalised on Jaguar we could have 
done something” [Opt. cite Wood (1988, 176)].
The structure of research at BL was, however, not designed to encourage collaboration. 
It was a stated pohcy of the firm to maintain rivalry in engineering systems, methods and 
products in order to preserve the separate ‘identities’ of its brands. Whipp and Clark 
(1986), who provide the most detailed study of the firm’s product innovation process, 
argue management’s unrealistic market expectations and the firms’ isolated planning, 
production, and design activities added to problems with the firms’ inadequate engineering 
capabihties. A dramatic example of the lack of encouragement to undertake rigourous
^The reader will note that there are two turbo introductions - one for turbo in petrol cars and another when turbo 
is introduced into a diesel model. The rationale for this is that there are technical difficulties and differing benefits of 
embodying turbo charging in petrol and diesels because with diesel cars, being relatively underpowered for the same engine 
size of petrol fueled model versions, benefit more from turbo charging than equivalent petrol model versions.
^Clark and R^imoto take a somewhat different approach of segmenting the market by brand, with Mercedes, BMW, 
Audi, Porsche, Jaguar, Volvo and Saab being categorised as high-end specialists, and others being mass producers. If 
segments are defined in this fashion the resulting proportions increase to about 70 per cent since a significant number 
of innovating models in the dominant mass-product ion segment, the medium segment, were first marketed ly  high-end 
specialist firms.
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Table 2.1: Time Line of Product Innovations
Bafor* 1945 Centra Arm Rest Front 1977 Removable Hard Top Rat
Centre Arm Rest Rear Remote Boot Release Nissan, Subaru, Toyota
Chrome Trim Remote Petrol Cap Release Nissan, Subaru, Toyota
Chrome Grille
Cigarette Lighter 1978 Turtx) Saab; Porshe
Cloth Trim Electric Height Adjusting Drivers Seat Porsche
Drivera seat Lumtrar Support Heated Front Seats Volvo
Exterior Side Moulding» Part Time 4 Wheel Drive Suzuki
Front Fog lamps fitted Sunroof (Factory Fitted) Volvo
Front Head Rest
Front Spoiler 1979 Rear Load Cover Mazda
Height Adjustatile Drivera Seat Deadlocks BMW
Height Adjustable Seat Belts Removable Soft Top Aston Martin
Independent Suspension T-BarRoof Nissan
Leather Upholstery Roof Ralls Mazda
Leather Coated Steering Wheel
Limited Slip Differential 1980 Pra-tansioned Seat Belts (front) Jaguar
Rear Seat Belts Anfllock Braking System' BMW
Rear Spoiler Trip Computer BMW
Rev Counter
Sports Front Seats 1982 On Board Computer BMW
Sunroof Electric Memory Seats BMW
Trip Counter Rear Sun Blind (electric) GMOpel
Time Clock Radio Cass (remote) Volvo
Vinyl Trim
Walnut Trim 1983 Half Leather Trim Rat
Side Impact Protection Mitsubishi
-1945 DIffLock Land Rover (1946) Free Wheel Front Hutrs Suzuki
■ Full Time 4 Wheel Drive Land Rover (1948) Cup holders GM Jeep
2 Speed Tranafer Box Land Rover (1948) Twin Sun Roots Nissan
1950s Air Conditioning RoOs Royce (1957) 1984 Automatic Stability Control BMW
Power Assisted Steering Rolls Royce (1957)
Electric Windows (front) Rolls Rc^ ice (1958) 1985 Three Rear 3 Point Seat Belts BMW
Electric Windows (front & rear) Rolls Royce (1958) Alamn Ford
Fuel Injection Mercedes (1957) High level brake Light Volvo
External Temperature Gauge BMW
1960s Pop-up Headlights Lotus (1982) Heated Front Wirxiscreen Ford
Redo fitted Jaguar (1962)
Adjustable Steering Column Triumph (1963) 1986 Electric Power Hood Rolls Royce
Disc Brake (front) Jaguar (1963)
Disc Brakes (front & rear) Jaguar (1963) 1987 Pollen Fitter BMW
Front Door Bins Mini (1965) Rear Reading Lights BMW
Intermittent Wash Wipe Ford. GMVeuxhan (1968)
Radio Cassette Rons Royce (1968) 1988 Drivers Airbag Mercedes
Heated Rear Window Renault (1968) Active Suspension Alta Romeo
Halogen Head Lights Ford, GMVauxhall (1988) Catalytic Converter PSA Peugeot
Remote Central Locking Mercedes
1970 Ajustable Mirrors Bentley (1970) Side Steps Fitted Toyota
Central Locking Bentley (1970)
Velour trim VW 1989 Voice Synthesizer Austln-Rover
Tinted Windows Alta Romeo; Meroedes; Radio CD Player Rolls Royoe
Nissan; Rover; Toyota Multiplay CD GMOpel
Child Seat Renault
1971 locking Wheel Nuts Volvo Front Twin Airbags Porsche
Headlamp Wash Mercedes Engine Immobiliser Porsche, PSA Peugeot
Child krcto Citroen; Toyota
1990 Compact Disc Player Aston Martin
1972 Electric Aerial Jaguar Electro Chromatic Rear Mrror Rolls Rcryce
Rear Sun Blind Fitted Jaguar Traction Control VWAudi
Head Rests (front & rear) Aston Martin
Alloy Wheels Aston Martin 1991 Visible Identification Number BMW
1973 Spilt rear seats Fiat 1992 Electric Front Seat Belts VWAudi; BMW
Heated Minors Renault Front Side Air Bags Mercedes
Height Adjustable Headlight Aim BMW GSM Mobile VWAudi
Colour Coded Bumpers Mercedes Xenon Headlights VWAudi
Colour Coded Mirrors Mercedes
Diesel Engine VWAudI 1994 Electric Operated Soft Top Rat
1974 Rear Wash Wipe BMW 1995 Courtesy Light Delay Mercedes
Electric Folding Mirrors PSA Peugeot
1975 Digital Odometer Mercedes Revolving Front Seats PSA Citroen; Renault
Sunroof (eiedric) Memedes
Headlamp Wash Wipe Volvo 1996 Traffic Navigation System Renault
4 Wheel Steering GM VauxhaM
1997 Climate Control Saab
1970 Cruise Control Rolls Royce 12 V Accessory Power Point Honda
Electric Minors Rolls Royce
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design and engineering was found in a commendation of the Managing Director of MG, 
John Thomley, of his chief engineer’s use of
“a book he had drawn from the local library...published before the turn of the 
century and its subject was the suspension of railway locomotives. He had found 
the basic principals for which he sought “unclouded by all the high-falutin clap­
trap modem designers write” [Thomley (13/12/69)].
There is also evidence that BL’s brands were hostile to collaboration. The engineer­
ing director at Jaguar stated that he “used to fight with cars” in his desire to maintain 
engineering independence from other BL manufacturers [Porter (1987, 47)]. A concrete 
example of the lack of collaboration is found in the production of Rover’s most the am­
bitious project, the P6BS, which was developed independently of Jaguar, being shelved 
six months prior to its launch in 1972 due to pressure from Jaguar’s management [Wood 
(1988,182)].
Further direct evidence that BL’s technical capabihties were lagging is found in the 
firm’s inabihty to keep pace with emissions and safety standards that were the focus of 
considerable legislation in overseas markets, particularly the US. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) 1975 exhaust standards are an interesting case in point. The 
rise in EPA requirements was announced in July 1973, but represented a trend in the 
US initiated by the US National Highway Traffic Safety Adm in istra tion  (NHTSA) and 
NHTSA (1966) Acts. Lacking the institutional experience of making cars cleaner and 
safer, British designers could not tum to existing apphed research programmes, since 
these did not exist. Leyland-Triumph’s Chief Engineer, Harry Webster, acknowledged 
that there were grave difficulties in modifying sports-car engines to meet the established 
standards, and after incurring the cost of preparing substitute engines in case of test 
failure, the origmal units narrowly received US EPA certification [Specialist Car Division 
Advisory Board (10/02/1966)]. Prior to announcing the changes in standards in 1973 
the EPA conducted its own study of the world’s motor manufacturers to determine if 
the requirements for the 1975 exhaust deadline were realistic. The results of the study 
were pubficised in advance of the proposed 1975 exhaust standards requirements. One 
US firm. International Harvester, Italy’s Alfa Romeo, and BL were singled out as having 
inadequate capabihties to meet the requirements within the two year time frame {The 
Times, 21 Feb. 1973). BL pubficly disputed the findings, but privately admitted that it 
was not confident that the engineers could solve the problem. Technological difficulties 
were however not restricted to emission and safety issues with the National Enterprise 
Board pointing to the continued release of inaccurate drawings and unremitting design
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flaws in new products and components, where correction required ‘months not weeks’ 
[Nicolas Collection (1977)].
The results of Clark and Fujimoto are antithetical to those illustrated here, in terms of 
both the segment and location of production dimensions. My findings, which are based 
on a considerably richer data source over a more extensive time-frame, axe of interest in 
themselves. However, for the purpose of investigating firm capabilities all that matters 
is that there are systematic differences between strategic groups in order to pin-point 
distinctly observable capability sets. In this case, four producer groups (British Leyland; 
Western European; Japanese; and U.S.) differ systematically, allowing for the following 
hypothesis to be posed and tested from the data:
Hypothesis 2. Models launched by firms in different producer groups will he more sim­
ilar to each other, but more different from competing producer groups, over time.
Management strategists emphasise that capabilities are difficult to change. However 
when an established brand is acquired there is scope for the transfer of technological and 
managerial structures affecting the capabilities of the acquired firm. Where such changes 
occur these allow alterations in capabilities to be discerned as the products become closer 
in terms of their observable quality. Mergers have been an increasingly prominent feature 
of the global automobile industry. The industry has evolved into a tighter ofigopoly 
during the 1990s with the number of firms exiting continuing while entry has slowed as is 
illustrated in Table 2.2. While firm exit has dominated entry during the industry’s recent 
history, the number of brands operating in the market has not fallen. An important 
feature of mergers in the industry is that they have been increasingly used as a means for 
firms to expand their presence into new segments in the marketplace by acquiring brands 
and building on already active brands in those areas. This strategy is reflected in the fact 
that since 1986 only one of the brands of an acquired firm had subsequently exited the 
market by 2002. Over the period examined 23 mergers, encompassing 29 brands, occurred. 
Since the transfer of technologies and the establishment of management structures is not 
an immediate process I excluded brands, which were acquired less then five years prior, or 
where resources data is unavailable. This leaves seven merger observations in the analysis 
that follows.^ ®
^°The mergers being Tklbot/PSA; Alfa Romeo/Fiat; Seat/VAG; Jaguar/Ford; Saab/GM; Austin-Rover/BMW; 
Mazda/Ford. Finn resource data was not available for Aston Martin, Lotus and Skoda over the full period while the 
other mergers are excluded due to the five year lag period (DAF/Volvo; FSO/Daewoo; Daihatsu/Toyota; Daihatsu/Toyota; 
Daewoo/GM; Mercedes/Chrysler and Volvo/Ford).I also note that there is a case for including joint-ventures as part of 
the capacity transfer argument. However, it is not always clear the extent that joint ventures afiect the structure of firm 
activities and doing so would require a considerable research effort.
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Table 2.2: Entry, Exit and Mergers
Year Entrant Exiter Merged brand 
(Aquirlna Firm)
Year Entrant Exiter Merged brand 
(Aqulring Firm)
1971 Singer (CUK) 1990 Lexus (Toyota)
1972 Wartberg Austin-Healey (BL) 1991 Sao Jaguar (Ford)
1974 Mitsubishi NSU (VAG) Skoda (VAG)
1975 FSO Wolesley (BL) DAF (Volvo) 1992 Zavasta Saab (GM)
1976 Lada Jenson Sao
Humber (CUK) 1993 Reliant (BL)
Wartberg 1994 Austin-Rover (BMW)
Moskovich 1995 Kia Lancia (Fiat) FSO (Daewoo)
1977 Subaru Citreon-Peugeot (PSA) Ssyangyong
1996 FSO (Daewoo) Mazda (Ford)
1979 Daihatsu Hillman (PSA) Hillman (PSA); Simca (PSA) Lotus (Proton)
Suzuki Simca (PSA) Sunbeam (PSA); Ta/bof (PSA) 1997 Peruoda Lada
1980 VanPlas 1998 Daihatsu (Toyota)
1981 Zavasta MG (BL) Daewoo (GM)
1982 Hyundai Princess (BL) Mercedes-Chrysier
Sunbeam (PSA) Roiis Royce (VAG)
1984 Morris (BL) Ssangyong (Daewoo)
Triumph (BL) 1999 Volvo (Ford)
1985 Seat Kia (Hyundai)
1986 isuzu Talbot (PSA) Alfa Romeo (Fiat) 2000 Phoenix (Rover)
Seat (VAG) Land Rover (Ford)
1987 Aston Martin (Ford) 2001 MG (Rover)
1989 Proton
Notes: 1. Brands that survive until the end of the period are highlighted in italics. 2.Sources are collated by the author.
Hypothesis 3: Firms who do not merge with other firms build on existing capacities, 
while firms that merge benefit from an enlarged technical capability set
A further means to examine the degree that a firm’s models are more similar to each 
other, with respect to own and rival products, is by examining the degree of similarity of 
the products that firms market in different segments. There is considerable evidence that 
different segments have very different consumer bases and technological requirements, 
which is why industry observers and participants define different sub-markets/segment 
in the first place - a fact that has been a widely exploited feature in the analysis of car 
markets [e.g. Goldberg (1995); Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995)].^  ^ Indeed, not controlling 
for segmentation in the analysis, would result in a conflation of the fact that segments 
operate as distinct sub-markets, which need to be controlled for, with the importance of 
firm capabilities, whose relevance is the subject of this research. Thus are two divergent 
effects that can be examined by analysing the similarity of firms products between seg­
ments relative to their similarity to all models within the same segment. Where firms
is uncommon for firms to expand into new segments in a particular year, it is common for firms to be represented 
in more than one segment as well as having a number of models within each specific segment at any one point in time. 
Indeed, the probability of entering a new segment embodied in the data is about 2% in any given year, emphasising the 
determinacy of firm market segment locations.
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have developed particular capabilities they are able to translate these into the different 
models in their model ranges across segments. However, since the demand characteristics 
of buyers in different segments are not the same as those in others, it is reasonable to 
expect that firms need to tailor their products to meet consumer demands. These two 
effects have confiicting implications on whether firms wiU utilise their capabilities across 
segments and so provides a stringent test for the theory. Hence,
Hypothesis 4- Models launched by the same firm but in different segments will be more 
sim ilar to each other than models produced by rival firms which are launched in the same 
segment over time.
2.2 Data and the Quantification of Quality
2.2.1 Data
The method of testing for the presence of capabilities applied here rests on the ability 
to capture the degree to whidi firms’ own products are similar and rivals’ products 
are different over time. Thus the required data source must be one that is capable 
of distinguishing between quality differences between products. Compared to previous 
research, the data set is well suited to the task. Other than the discrete binary attributes, 
which are contained in Table 2.1 in Chapter 3, the data set also includes time varying 
attributes including a set of continuous variables: cubic centimetres of the engine (cc); 
maximum speed (in miles per hour, mph); acceleration (0 to 60 mph); fuel consumption, 
measured in terms of miles per pound at 56 mph; weight; brake horse power (BHP); and 
size (length times width). Information on the type of fuel (diesel or petrol) and the fuel 
grade (4rStar, Unleaded and Ultra Unleaded) is incorporated when calculating miles per 
pound for each car to account for differences in fuel prices. Fuel price data was obtained 
from the Department of Trade and Industry: Energy Division (Various Years), while fuel 
type and grade was enumerated from aforementioned trade pubfications. More detail on 
these and the other time variant and the other variables used is located in Appendix B.
Matched to these attributed data is sales and price data. List prices being taken from 
two trade publications - The Motorist’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1971-93) 
and Parker’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1993-2002).^^ Version level sales data 
were collated by the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The sales data 
were originally compiled by Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, was provided
^^IVansaction prices are not available over the full period examined in this study.
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by Renault UK, for the 1971-80 period, and Global Insight Inc., between 1980-2002.^  ^
Attribute data recording when an attribute is introduced as standard in a model versions 
for the more than one hundred and thirty attributes for each model version in the sample 
were matched to the sales data.^^ A proportion of these attribute data were obtained by 
Augur Tech Ltd. (an internet design consultancy for the motor industry) whose data is 
provided directly from all car manufacturers operating in the UK. Attributes recorded 
by Augur Tech are also recorded in the major trade publications. However, there are 
significant gaps in the Augur Tech data set which is complete only for the 1990s. Two 
trade pubfications. The Motorist’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1971-93) and 
Parker’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1993-2002), were used to complete the data 
set.^ ®
Models are produced in a number of versions that may differ substantially from other 
models but being marketed under the same name. This raises the question of how to 
define a car model. TW define an entrant model as being ‘new’ if “it bears a name that 
did not appear in previous years or if its wheelbase, width, length and horse power change 
by more than 10%”, expanding from Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Effectively if a 
firm releases a new version of a base model that differs in any of these dimensions, then it 
is defined a ‘new’ model. This definition is conceptually problematic when examining the 
product entry decision of firms. A new version of a particular model, being an upgraded 
version of its previous incarnation, whether it has a new engine, a wider wheel base etc., 
is extremely likely to be more similar to its ‘named’ predecessor than to rival models. 
The inherent similarity of individual model versions has the effect of biasing the results 
towards a finding that capabifities are important, so it is not a sharp test of the capacity 
view. A more natural aggregation unit, which is adopted here, is to use the ‘named’ 
model as the unit of analysis accounting. While the model is a natural unit of account a 
feature of car models, and other products in differing markets, is that they are marketed 
in differing forms, or model versions. As has been shown in previous work these versions 
differ, often substantially, in the characteristics they embody and the prices both at single 
points in time and across time [Requenas-Silvente and Walker (2005)]. The bias of not 
accounting for new generations of products is widely acknowledged in the literature on
^^Society of Motor Manufactures and leaders data was provided by Renault UK (1979-80), and Global Insight Ltd. 
(1980-2002). Nigel Griffith at Global Insight Ltd., and FVaser Davidson at Renault UK for maldng the data available are 
thanked.
^ I^t is possible for a feature to exist in a model as an optional extra (that must be separately paid for by the consumer) 
but this is not recorded in the data set. For example a number of manufacturers offered ‘limited slip differential’ at the 
beginning of the period but the feature is only included where it is standard to the price. The reason for not including 
optional extras is that there is no way of knowing whether a purchaser paid for the extra item (or not).
more detailed examination of the sources and data developed for this research is contained in a data appendix which 
is available on request. Samples of the data can be found at http://www.vkcar.com. Augur Tech Ltd. are thanked for 
providing access to the data.
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quality-adjusted pricing [e.g. Gordon and Griliches (1997)]. The evolving quality of a 
model is captured through the evolving (quantity weighted mean) value of its underlying 
product variants as these are launched or upgraded overtime.
While the data set contains a vast array of model versions the full set of “named” model 
versions (such as L, GL, GLX) is not used in the analysis. The definition of a model version 
is a model type that differs from other versions of a model by having a differing engine size 
(measured via cubic centimetres of the versions engine); if it has the same engine size but 
has either 1. a different fuel type (petrol or diesel), incorporates fuel injection or turbo 
charging, or where the version includes more then five differing other embodied attributes 
(i.e. the attributes contained in Table 2.1), and where there are differences in price. There 
are two related reasons for using a more stringent definition of a model version than the 
“named” version of the model in this work. The first rationale is a conceptual one. The 
interest is in considering only types of models which are significantly different. Typically 
manufacturers offer models that differ only in their level of trim, typically interior and 
exterior colour, but otherwise embody an identical selection of product characteristics, 
and are sold at the same price. Product differentiation along these cosmetic lines is not 
likely to be a compelling factor in consumer purchase decisions, particular since such 
options are available for almost all brands. The second rationale for using model versions 
as the unit of aggregation is a practical one. Since the price-quality relationship is of key 
interest introducing models versions, which are observably identical, statistical estimation 
is made untenable.^®
There is an important caveat associated in examining firm capabilities using the hy­
potheses stated above in that firms may be able to determine competitive advantage by 
the ‘resources’ they hold (as is emphasised by the Resource View), rather than by the 
routines and other institutional factors deterniining how those resources are managed 
(the Capabihty View) [Amit and Shoemaker (1993)].^  ^ Distinguishing firm capabihties 
from firm resources effects requires a means of empirically partitioning out their distinct 
impacts. While the hterature is clear that capabihties reflect a firm’s abihty to organise 
resources, identifying and quantifying a fuh set of firm resources can be only achieved 
imperfectly. For that purpose, a detailed set of accounts data were cohated. Since firms 
operating in the UK automobile market are global concerns. So, the firm’s global ac­
counts are taken as the unit of analysis since the industry’s major manufacturers operate 
in ah substantial markets, the UK being one of them. The use of domestic sales data,
^^Technically, the introduction of identical observations leads to serious multi-coUinearity problems which either make 
estimation impossible, or leads to large estimated variance.
^^Organisational practices of managers are not identified directly. I assume that underlying firm capabilities are ultimately 
related to products firms produce.
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rather than the global measures, potentially introduces considerable bias into the analysis 
where the resources of firms are not well captured by the sales and performance of firms 
in the specific market analysed. This is a problem in all countries where there are do­
mestic producers since such firms obtain disproportional sales in their domestic markets. 
A phenomena is often termed in the trade literature the ‘home bias effect’ [McCallam 
(1995)]. In the UK this is particularly true with British Leyland, a marginal player by 
global standards, having a disproportionally high share in the UK market, while Japanese 
manufacturers who were constrained by Voluntary Export Restraints between 1977 and 
December 1999, had low market shares relative to their global market presence.
The firm accounts data set contains information for all substantive (in terms of their 
share of global sales) players excluding only information for firms operating in the former 
Eastern European countries, and for number of small specialist firms. Also, the data for 
Toyota between 1971-73 were unavailable. The combined sales by these firms never ac­
counted for more than one percent of total market sales in the UK automobile market in 
any given year examined. While company accounts data are in the public domain obtain­
ing such information prior to the mid-1980s is problematic since the national repositories 
of company accounts data do not share information with each other. Accounts data were 
obtained from two sources. First, the 1992-2002 accounts were provided by AW Knowl- 
ege (2001).^ ® For the period prior to 1992 original accounts documents were obtained 
from the archive of the central office of European automobile manufacturers. Comité des 
Constructeurs Français d’Automobile (CCFA).^®
The accounts data is used to proxy for a number of firms for specific resources. Four 
types of resource effects are identified in Table 2.3 reflecting the financial strength, prof­
itability, size and scale, and human resources of automobile makers. As Table 2.3 illus­
trates, a number of proxies are available for each variable. Reassuringly, many of these 
measures of heterogenous resources are highly correlated within each specific resource 
group. For example, long-run financial capabilities reflected in debt and debt-to-equity 
ratios (0.4), firm size proxies such as revenues, sales, and number of employees have corre­
lation coefficients of between 0.5 and 0.75. Due to these high correlation rates, introducing 
multiple resource variables proxying for the same resource type in the same estimation 
would introduce multi-collinearity so after experimenting with each of the measures only 
one per resource function is used in the analysis that follows.
^^The accounts contained in AW Knowlege (2001) which is a publication that can be obtained from AWKnowledge. 
Jonathan Storey is thanked for producing the data for strictly academic use. The key advantages of the data set is that 
it provides a high quality data source to check for transposition errors in the manually entered data and that it allows 
international comparison.
^^Thanks is given the librarians at the CCFA for their patience collating the information. In addition, thanks expressed 
to Giuliano Maielli, Vichi Rattanachane, Corinna Elsenbroish, and Francisco Hequena-Silvente who assisted in translating 
the accounts of Italian, FVench, German and Spanish manufacturers respectively.
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In addition to the effects of resource differences I also control for salient features of the 
environment in which firms compete - such as market structure and infiuence of competi­
tive forces on strategic decision making. The importance of market segmentation has been 
discussed above but a further potentially important environmental factor is competitive 
from rivals that has been shown to influence product entry in the empirical literature on 
entry [Stavins (1995); Harchaoui and Hamdad (2000)], and also on research concerning 
the related topic of product survival [de Figueiredo and Kyle (2004) and Greenstein and 
Wade (1998)].^° Competition is captured via a firm-level Herfindahl index derived at the 
segment level where competition is most fierce.^  ^ To control for the cyclical trends affect­
ing demand and competitive conditions, and potentially influencing the product quality 
decisions of firms, a complete set of year dummies is incorporated into the analysis. Fi­
nally, in order to capture firm specific cost effects, average costs from firm accounts are 
derived as well as a proxy for fixed costs, which is the measured by global sales divided 
by the number of products marketed by each firm [Salop (1979)]. The list of variables 
associated with each firms’ internal resources and the set of additional control variables 
and their predicted signs is sununarised below in Table 2.3. For the resource variables it 
is reasonable to consider that firms with greater resources, or lower debt levels, are able 
to produce higher quality products, since the upgrad ing  of product quality is a resource 
intensive process. The canonical forces of competition provide impetus for firms to raise 
the quality of their product ranges in order to avoid being leap frogged by competitors 
[Gruber (1992)]. Therefore, a positive sign is anticipated for model count variable, while 
a negative sign is expected for the Herfindahl Index as the lower values index indicates 
greater levels of competition. The signs of the cost variables are less clear. Where firms 
are able to distribute sunk costs across successful products we should expect this to aid in 
maintaining product quality. Nevertheless it may well be the case that firms are maintain­
ing high sunk costs in order to maintain their product quality. It is also unclear that firms 
operating with low variable costs will have higher or lower quality products. Some low 
cost firms may prefer to operate in the lower end of the market and compete in prices and 
thus maintain products that are lower quality and price to facilitate sales, while others 
may choose to take advantage of their low cost structure to build higher quality products.
^^Thomaa and Weigelt (2000) provide no variable to account for rival competition in their analysis.
Formally, H ft =  where the firm level Herfindahl index Hft ,  îb the sum of squares of the market shares
of the market participants. The Herfindahl index is preferred to other concentration measures due to its more satisfactory 
properties that are summarised in Leslie and Kay (1977) and Curry and George (1983). The aforementioned papers on 
examining entry and exit decisions use simple count measures rather then the Herfindahl index.
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"Table 2.3: Finn Specific Resources and Control Variables
Variable Definition Predicted Sign
RESOURCES
Financial 
- Longnin borrowing capacity debt
debt/equity ratio
negative
negative
-Short run working capital ratio 
add ratio 
inventory on hand 
cash on hand
cument assets divided by current liabilities 
quick current assets (cash plus net current assets) 
at end of finandal year
postitive
postitive
postitive
postitive
Profit Profit / loss (before tax) 
Net profit (after tax)
Exdudes extra ordinary items 
Indudes extra ordinary items
postitive
postitive
Firms size Revenues 
Sales/ production 
Fixed assets 
No. of employees
sales 
unit sales
total fixed (tangible) assets
postitive
postitive
postitive
postitive
Human resources 
Efficiency
revenue per worker 
revenue to fixed assets ratio
revenue/number of employees 
revenue/tanglible assets
postitive
postitive
MARKET
STRUCURE
Segments 9 submarkets dummy variables (mini; small femily, 
medium, executive,luxury, sports, 4-by-4, MPV)
segment
specific
COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT
Competition
Canibalisation
Year
No. of rival models per segment 
Herfindal Index
No. of own models per segment 
year dummy variables
postitive 
postitive 
negative 
year spedfic
COSTS Fixed costs 
Average wage
global sales/number of models 
labour cost/number of employees
negative
negative
Notes: 1. Resource variables were collated from two sources: (I) CCFA library in Paris (1970-1992); (II) AW Knowledge (200: 
2. Labour costs were deflated by the CPI.
2.2.2 Quantifying Quality: Hedonic Analysis
Comparing vertically differentiated products requires accounting for product heterogene­
ity in multiple dimensions. A common method for determining the value of attributes, 
which has seen considerable application in car markets, is the use of hedonic estimation. 
Following TW [2000], Stavins (1995) and Harchaoui and Hamdad (2000) a uni-dimensional 
index of quality is derived using hedonic methods. A weighted least squares (WLS) es­
timator, each variable being weighted by the square root of sales, is used to calculate 
quality indices for each model version in the sample. The importance of weighting has 
been emphasised by a number of authors [Silver and Heravi (2003); Gordon (1990)].^  ^
The use of the hedonic methodology seeks to address a fundamental difficulty that
23t w  take the unusual step of including sales in their hedonic estimation requiring them to instrument that endogenous 
variable, but they do not use sales weighting. Since weighting has been shown to have a significant impact on the attribute 
coefficients in hedonic estimations, it is preferred. Compared to the OLS estimates, quite different results were obtained 
using WLS. To test whether the WLS estimates are preferable, the R-squared associated with each estimation were compared 
and it was found that the WLS estimates provide a universally better fit. A table illustrating the goodness-of-fit of the 
WLS relative to the OLS estimates is available on request.
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has beset all studies of the car industry since the seminal work of Court (1939) has 
been identifying a set of attributes that can be taken as the most important factors 
affecting the consumer’s purchase decision.^  ^ Any quality adjustment method requires a 
set of variables that link directly to the consumer’s utihty function. Table 2.1 details the 
variables employed by previous researchers in the car industry.
Table 2.1 illustrates that researchers typically use a set of performance characteristics 
to accomplish the task of explaining car prices and this study is no exception. The ex­
planatory success of these variables in a host of previous work provides an indication that 
consumer’s place value on them in making their purchasing decisions. Non-performance 
features are captured, if at all, through crude counts of the total number of luxury fear 
tures, and in more recent works, through the inclusion of country and brand dummies. 
However, there is a common appreciation among researchers, and consumer advocate 
groups, trade publications, and manufacturers themselves, as is revealed in the emphasis 
on non-performance attributes during their advertising campaigns, that other attributes 
embodied in cars are also likely to be of value to consumers. As Raff and Trajtenberg 
(1997, 11) point out
“bias towards the inclusion of performance characteristics... reflecting the fact 
that engineering attributes are much easier to measure [than other non-technical 
features]; but they are certainly further removed from the quality dimensions 
perceived by consumers.”
In contrast to this rather limited set of options, the data set contains a far richer set of 
observable characteristics including over one hundred and twenty attributes, the majority 
of which are not solely performance related.
To simplify the presentation of the descriptive statistics associated to the large set of 
variables contained in the data set the attributes are subdivided into two groups: (1) 
time variant attributes, that include a set of continuous variables [cc, maximum speed, 
acceleration, weight, brake horse power (BHP), miles per pound (MPP) and size], and 
discrete non-binary features (the number of doors, cyUnders, and the total number of 
valves, and (2) binary attributes. The majority of the time version variables have been 
conunonly applied in the aforementioned studies so the majority of these are retained 
in estimation variable list and attention is focused on methods to reduce the number of
Court (1939) represents the first published work employing hedonic regressions. Court’s work represents an interesting 
story since it was used by GM to show following criticism that the firm was abusing its monopoly power with the U.S. 
Bureau of Labour Statistics f in d in g  that the firm had raised its prices by 45% at a time when there was considerable public 
debate suggesting that GM should be forced to vary its prices to help stabilise production and employment levels. Court’s 
dramatic finding that prices had actually fallen by about 55% provided the centre piece for GM to argue that price decreases 
were unwarranted and that, given the industry’s financial situation was poor, potentially damaging to it. However, Court’s 
work was not the first to apply a hedonic regression. Waugh (1929) estimated the price of asparagus fin d in g  that “Boston 
wants green asparagus” [Waugh (1928, IBS)]
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Figure 2.1: Selective Summary of Variables Used in Car Market(s) Analyses
Location UK Europe
Author RequenesS Cowling and Muney and Goldberg and Verboven
Waiker(2005) Cubbin (1972) Sarantis (1999) Vertioven (2001)' (2001)’
Period examined 1971-1998 1958-1968 1977-1991 1980-1993 1990-1995
Time Variant Attrltxites yes yes yes
Cylinders yes . no
Total No. of Valves yes
BMP' yes yes yes yes yes
Weight' yes yes yes yes
Maximum Speed yes
Acceleration yes
Braking distance no yes
Revolutions per Minute no yes
Axis Ratio yes
MP$/Euro yes yes yes yes yes
Doors yes no
Size (Length*Width) yes yes yes yes
Size (Interior) yes yes
Turning Circle yes
Binary Attribues Fuel Injection yes yes
Turtro yes yes
Air conditioning yes
Transmission yes no
Power Assisted Steering yes yes no
Interior Trim yes yes no
No. ofLuxeryteatures yes yes
Aggregation dummies Model dummies yes
Brarxl dummies no
Finn dummies yw yes yes
Segment dummies yea yes yes
Time dummies yw yes yes
Location US
Author BLP Feemtra Goldberg Thomas and
(1995,1999) (1988y (1995/ Weigelt (2000)
Period examined 1971-1990 1980-85 198&87
Time Variant Attributes cc no yes
Cylindera no yes
Total No. of Valves no
BMP' yes yes yes
Weight* yes yes
Wheel Base yes
Maximum Speed
Acceleration
Braking distance
Revolutions per Minute
Axle Ratio
MliesperDoliar yes yes yes yes
Doora no
Size (Length*Width) yes yes yes no
Size (Interior) no
Turning Circle
Binary Attribues Fuel Injection no
Turbo no
Air conditioning yes yes yes no
Transmission no yes yes no
Power Assisted Steering no yes yes no
Interior Trim no no no
No. of Luxery features no no rw
Aggregation dummies Model dummies
Brand dummies
Rnn dummies yes*
Segment dummies part yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes'
' Includes a selecüon of models In the Belgian, French, German, Kalian, and UK car markets.
' These vartat)les are conventionally combined as a meeaure of power (i.e. BHP/Welght); ' Dummies for some Japanese producers only. 
* BLP refers to Berry, Lavlnsohn and Pakes; “ Include a time trend.
binary variables while maintaining as much of the information they convey about demand 
patterns as possible. Information on the type of fuel (diesel or petrol) and the grade of
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fuel (4-Star, Unleaded and Ultra Unleaded) is utilised to account for the difference in the 
prices of fuels when calculating miles per pound for each car. Fuel price data came from 
the Department of Trade and Industry. See Appendix D for details). In addition, the 
number of cylinders is excluded in preference of total valves (cylinders multiphed by values 
per cylinder), and maximum speed over acceleration (to 60mph) due to multi-coUinearity 
between these variables. Similarly, the data set includes fuel consumption at three speeds 
There is a high correlation between these consumption rates which considerably reduces 
the significance of the variables when more than one is used in estimation [with pair-wise 
correlations of between 90% and 95%], which leads us to use the fuel consumption at 
56mph [the other speeds being at urban and h i^  speeds (75mph)j. It is also noteworthy 
that the number of doors, which is strongly related to the segment of cars and the shift 
towards hatchback cars, has not been employed in previous studies.
Comparing the variables used in this study with recent studies outside the UK, the 
data set contains all the variables included in recent studies with the exception of engine 
transmission.
Of the studies listed in Table 2.1, the Murray and Sarantis (1999) study of the UK car 
market contains the most comprehensive collection of variables (other than in this study) 
including five variables not contained in the data set, namely: revolutions per minute 
(RPM); axel ratio; turning circle; interior size [also used by Cubbin and Cowling (1972) 
in their study], and braking distance. There are no consistent sources at either the model 
or the model variant level for these variables available, however the data set does contain 
a number of variables that proxy for the variables that had some explanatory success 
in the work of Murray and Sarantis (1999) [revolutions per minute, and axis ratio were 
rarely significant in their study].
First, the turning circle of the car is, as those authors point out, highly correlated 
with the size and segment of the vehicle, and both of these variables are included in the 
analysis that follows. Second, consistent information on the interior size of the vehicle is 
unavailable, which is seen by the authors as a proxy for comfort. The study does include 
the physical size of the vehicle, and in addition incorporates a host of what can be viewed 
as comfort features (which are defined below), the number of doors, the height of the 
car, the boot capacity of a car with its back seats down. Third, while data on the brake 
distance of vehicles is unavailable the data set does contain data on the type of brakes 
employed by cars: i.e. whether or not a car has front or rear, or both front and rear, 
and/or Automatic Braking System.^
^During discussions with technicians at the Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA) it was pointed out that the 
nature of the braking system and the weight of the car are the most important determinants of braking distance. Both of 
these attributes are included in the data set.
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The illuminating feature of Table 2.1 is that features that are not related to engine 
performance or size are captured, if at all, though crude counts of the total number 
of luxury features, and in more recent work through the inclusion of country and firm 
dummies. There is a common appreciation among researchers that other factors (such as 
safety, comfort and luxury) are valued by consumers. In contrast to this rather limited 
set of options, the data set contains a far richer set of observable characteristics including 
over 120 binary attributes 90 of which are reduced to 28 functional features, which along 
with the unclassified attributes and performance characteristics are used in the analysis 
(see Appendix C for details of the classification process).
Finally, as previously described, the analysis is conducted at the lowest possible prod­
uct level aggregation, the model version, with model versions being grouped into model, 
brand, and group of brands associated with each firm. In addition, as will be established 
in Chapter 4.3, consumers’ valuations between models, and particularly model versions, 
differ over the model-life-cycle, and how regularly upgrading occurs. To control for these 
effects, the introduction date and age of both model and model versions is incorporated 
into the analysis. Bemdt and Grihches (1993) have emphasised the importance of control­
ling for the age of models in markets where quality adjusted prices do not instantaneously 
adjust with the appearance of new models, and in this case, also new model versions. For 
example, Pakes (2004) reports sharp falls in personal computer prices over the product 
life-cycle while Grihches and Cockbum (1994) obtained the opposite result in their study 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, to account for the unbalanced nature of the BL 
range a variable that counts the number of versions in each segment by a firm is included 
[a more sophisticated analysis of product overlap is found in Chapter 4].
The use of model versions as the unit of calculation is unique to this research. The 
advantages being that the use of model versions provides cross-section variation between 
differentiated versions of the same model to be captured, also the upgrading of models over 
time is incorporated through the adoption of new model versions embodying vertically 
differentiated product innovations. The equation to be estimated is:
hi Pvmt =  o: +  PijZjv -f ^ T t  +  (3^Agem +  +  PbSegm +  ^mt (2.1)
where prices (P) are expressed in real terms (in 2002 pounds), a is the intercept, T  
is set of time dummies and e an i.i.d. error term. In addition to the attribute based 
variables, model and version age dummies [Agem] Age^] to capture product-life-cycle 
effects, and a set of binary segment variables are also included. In order to compare the 
positions of models in product space two distance metrics were constructed using the
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quality measures derived via the hedonic estimations. By examining whether the firm’s 
product launched tend to be more similar to the products it marketed before the more 
short-term decision of where specifically to locate the product (i.e. the spaeial location 
decision), capabihties are distinguished. In the automobile industry the process of model 
design, testing, and manufacturing is quite lengthy, typically taking three to four years 
over the period analysed [Clark and Fujimoto (1991); Williams, Cutler, WiUiams, and 
Haslam (1987)].
The quality of each model version, v, is determined by the weighted sum of its at­
tributes, (J):
j
Qvmt ~   ^  ^^ j^ jv m  (^ '^ )
i = i
The index is a valid approximation of quality if the product characteristics are sep­
arable, i.e. if the change in one characteristic does not affect the impact of the other 
characteristics on quality.^ ®
To examine capabilities, the similarity between models marketed by a firm five years 
before is derived.^® The similarity metric measures the distance from each model with 
respect to its own models range five years prior by deriving a within-firm distance measure 
relative to models the firm marketed in the segment summarised by.
TV
where Qifs{t-5) is a model i of firm /  in segment s at time t — 5 (five years before the 
new models introduction), and N  is the number of firms’ models in the corresponding 
segment.
The rivalry metric is constructed in a similar fashion but measures the distance relative 
to other rivals’ models in the segment (excluding the firms own models).
Y lk = l ,k ^ f  Qkajt-S))"
N t - 5
(2.4)
where qmfat- 5  is rivals’ model k in segment s at time t  — 5, and N  is the number 
of rival models. The vast majority of manufacturers were active and competing with
more detailed discussion of the hedonic approach is contained in Chapter 4 since that Chapter is focused on the 
method rather then adopting it as a first step to analysing further as is done here in the case of firm capabilities and in 
Chapter 5 in analysing advertising.
^^Differing lag periods (six and seven years) were experimented with but the results did not qualitatively changed. Five 
years seems liVe a reasonable period to identify capabilities in the automobile industry, and avoids the loss of sample implied 
by lengthening the lag structure.
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each other prior to the start of the sample period implying that they will have already 
developed capabilities distinct to their rivals and so will be more different to competing 
firms. The measure is similar to that proposed by Stavins but differs in that both within 
(own model) and rival relative measures rather the entry process is modeled - as was 
the case in Thomas and Weigelt work. Stavins’s measure is preferred since: (1) It fully 
utilises annual cross-sections data in deriving the relative location of launched products;
(2) it corrects for the number of models in each segment in the market, and is particularly 
important where there was considerable model proliferation by firms as is an important 
feature market analysed.^^ It is of note that there are a number of alternative distance 
metrics suggested in the literature.^® Given the extent of the data employed in this study 
and that the index used captures consider substantial variation in product dispersion and 
differentiation so little is sacrificed in exchange for simplicity.
It is argued that the quality of firms products should be closer to their existing offer­
ings relative to those of rival competitors. A relative distance derived distance metric is 
generated as the distance between the own and rival firms’ quality indices,
ic a p a b ility  __  ^ v a l a  j o w n  f n  r \
5) 5) 5)
where is the relative capability metric.
2.3 Testing Capabilities Theory
The distance measures developed above are used to test the validity of the four hypotheses 
concerning the capabilities of firms.
To test Hypothesis 1 a relationship is posited between the quality of the product of 
firm’s (/) ‘new’ automobile model m in a given year t, is related to the quality of its own 
products, reflected by its proximity to the firm’s nearest own existing product, dÿ, and the 
distance between a firm’s model and its nearest rival, represented by dir- The dependent 
variable, the quality of the product launch, can be denoted by Qmft and is calculated as 
the mean quality index of the new product when that is launched or zero otherwise. As 
previously mentioned, since the interest is on the nature of a new product that managers
^^The business literature highlights that such variant proliferation based on product technology is a strategy employed 
by automobile manufacturers to maintain their products in the market [Volpato (1992); Maxton and Wormald (2004)].
^ I^n particular, Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) also use a model level approach in there cross-sectional analysis of the U.S. 
automobile market in 1987 to calculate multi-dimensional quality-price indices. A further alternative is the use of random 
coefficient models such as those used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) for the US automobile market, and Petrin 
(2002) in his analysis of personal carriers in the US market. The focus of these alternative papers is on estimating markups 
and market conduct thus necessitating considerably more computationally intensive approaches. Since the interest lies in 
estimating equilibrium points that capture the value of each attribute, it is unnecessary to discriminate between demand 
and supply factors, the relatively greater burden in calculation associated with these approaches is avoidable.
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decide to launch, and that decision is made prior the launch of the product, a five year 
lag is taken to capture capability effects.
Qmft =  A +  +  ^mft (2-6)
The key variable of interest is the capability measure. In order to distinguish firm caper 
bilities from alternative factors, a series of control variables, denoted Xt_3 , that are lagged 
by three periods, are incorporated into the analysis. The three year lag structure reflects 
the mean time taken to design and build a new automobile version prior to its launch 
on the market.^® Controls are incorporated into the estimations to capture: 1. market 
structure; 2. the competitive conditions as they evolved over the period of interest (firm 
competition and year effects to capture the highly cychcal nature of the automotive indus­
try); 3. heterogenous firm resources, and 4. differences in cost structure. Specification 1 
shows that with the exception of the short-run stabUity measure, inventory-on-hand, each 
of the resource proxies is signed predictably and three are statistically well determined. 
The resulting estimates, presented in Table 2.3, show that both distance metrics work 
well.
The results also show that quality of new entrants in the luxury, and to a lesser extent 
sports and MPVs, models are of higher quality relative to products in the medium segment 
(the reference group). In MPV’s case this likely reflects the expansion in the ‘new’ segment 
where consumers demand high degrees of quality and comfort, and that consumers in the 
elitist luxury and sports market segments are highly concerned with the quality of new 
products. Year effects (not reported), which are included to capture the highly cychcal 
nature of the automobile industry, are often significant and are always jointly significant 
across specifications.^^ Three of the five resource variables are well determined indicating 
that long-run financial health (debt-toequity ratio), profitability (after tax profit) and 
firm size (sales) contribute to the nature of the products that firms decide to launch. 
However, short-run financial stabifity (inventory on hand) and human resource efficiency 
(revenue for worker) do not have a well determined effect. Furthermore, competition has 
a positive effect on the quality of new models launched. The final set of controls are 
designed to capture differences in cost structure of firms. The results suggest high fixed 
costs are associated with higher quality products, but that there is not a well established 
relationship between variable costs and the quality of newly launch models.
Specification 2 turns to testing Hypothesis 2, which raises the question as to whether 
models launched by firms in different producer groups will be more similar to each other
^^The key f in rfinga are ineensitive to the choice of lag period.
specification that including a trend variable as well as year dummies was estimated but found the trend variable was 
insignificant when year dummies are included.
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Table 2.4: Hypothesis Testing (Logit Model of New Product Introductions)
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
Simiarlitv/Differenoe Producer Groucs Mercers !Secments
CAPABILITIES
CapbabllitieSmKt-s) 2.89 (8,19)
Strategic CapbabilltlesmMW) (British Leyland) 1.95 (2.77)
Groups CapbabllltieSmKM) (Western Europe) 
CapbabilitieSmKM) (US) 
CapbabliltleSmNW) (Japan)
3.42
2.01
3,05
(8.61)
(3.16)
(2.50)
Mergers CapbabllltleSmKW) * Merger 1.89 (3,01)
Segment CapbabllltleSmKw) * Segment 1.997 (1.78)
MARKET Mini 0.61 (1.86) 0.72 (1.25) 0.85 (0.61) 0.91 (0.35)
STRUCURE Small Family 1.15 (0.68) 1.24 (1.04) 1,19 (0.86) 1.23 (1.01)
(reference Is Executive 1,24 (2.93) 1.29 (2.07) 1.58 (2,03) 1.64 (2.18)
medium) Luxury 1.36 (2.54) 1.58 (2.43) 1,90 (2.03) 1.99 (2.14)
Sports 1.13 (0.44) 1.27 (0.86) 1.96 (0,83) 2,02 (0.97)
4 ^ -4 1.20 (0.48) 1,12 (0.31) 1.78 (1.62) 1,61 (1.32)
Personal Carrier 2,30 (5.06) 2.46 (5,01) 2.44 (5.20) 2.52 (5,25)
COMPETITIVE Competition (herfindal) 0.01 (2.54) 0.01 (2,17) 0.01 (1,99) 0.01 (2.28)
ENVIRONMENT
RESOURCES Inventory 0,00 (0.37) 0,00 (0,13) 0,00 (0,09) 0,00 (0,04)
debt-to-equity ratio -0.01 (0.40) -0.01 (0,45) 0.01 (0,03) 0.03 (0.03)
Acid ratio 0.75 (3.36) 1.12 (3,32) 1.12 (2.35) 1.07 (2,39)
Profit (aftertax) 0.00 (2.15) 0.00 (2,24) 0.00 (2.38) 0.00 (2.14)
Sales 0.00 (2,83) 0.00 (2.43) 0.00 (2,33) 0.00 (2,53)
Revenue per worker 0.00 (0.29) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0,94) 0.00 (0,94)
COSTS Average wage 0.06 (0.12) 0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (2,86) 0.05 (2.86)
Fixed costs 0.38 (2.17) 0,50 (2.55) 0,48 (2,56) 0,50 (2.01)
No. obs 3.324 3.324 3.324 3.324
No. of positive obs. 847 847 847 847
Degrees of freedom 3.324 3.324 3.324 3.324
Pseudo R2 0.10 0,12 0.07 0.05
Loq likelihood -880 -879 -948 -979
A/ofes; 1. t-staOstics in parentheses; 2. All regressions contain a  full set of year dummies. 3. The distance metric is that found in Equation 2.5 is 
termed "Capabiiities" in this Table for ease of interepretation.
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but differ from competitors over time. Section 2.1 illustrated that firms located in different 
geographic locations differed in their degree of technological innovation. To test the 
hypothesis that capacity differences between groups exist a series of group interactions 
with the capability measures are derived, where the firm group variable is referenced by 
fc, where k={British Leyland; Western European, US and Japanese) . T o  capture this 
Equation 2.6 is expanded to incorporate strategic groups, G, gives,
K
Qmft = A + A ^ 2  ^  * ^ (^t-5  ^+ A^f-3 + £ m f t (2-7)
fc=l
The results, contained in the second column of Table 2.4, indicate that capabihties are 
a (statistically) weU determined feature across all producer groups. Plausibly, the results 
show that similarity and differences of British Leyland’s products compared to its own 
and to rival products, had the greatest impact of all the producer groups. Given an ap­
preciation that BL’s similarity and difference indices were both below the market average 
these findings refiect the on-going inertia in the firm’s capabihties that changing man­
agement regimes were unable to address. US manufacturers also tend towards their core 
capabihties while Japanese and Western European automobile makers are more diverse 
new offerings of the manufacturing groups.
If mergers affect firm capabihties they should lead to the products of either, or both, 
merging firms to become more similar as the firms integrate and cross-pohinate each 
other’s technical and organisational capabihties. Since it takes some time for the managers 
of merged firms to effectively integrate acquired firms only mergers that have occurred five 
years before the end of the sample period are incorporated into the merger variable. The 
effect of the five year lag combined with a lack of information of small niche firm resources 
reduces the number of merger cases to seven. To examine as to whether mergers lead to 
the merged firms influence on the firms involved, a mutual similarity index is derived. To 
do so the average similarity indices for the acquired brands and purchasing firm at the 
segment level is first calculated then the difference of these indices is taken.^^ FormaUy, 
the measure is the absolute difference between the acquired firm’s distance metric, daj 
and that of the company acquiring it dg, i.e \dcj — dcj\, multiphed by a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 five years after the merger occurs, and zero otherwise. Dropping
^^The firms that axe included in each group are: British Leyland; European: PSA, Citroën, Renault, BMW, Mercedes, 
Porsche, VAG, Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Seat, Saab, Volvo, Daimler-Chiysler; US: Ford, Chrysler, General Motors; Japan: Nissan, 
Daihatsu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Honda, Subaru, Isuzu, Toyota. Note that the Other UK and Other firm categories 
are not included as matching firm level data was unavailable for these firms.
Making segment level comparisons has the benefit of raising the comparative sample size given the relatively small 
number of mergers analysed. More importantly if one were not to do so this would mean that the evolution of disparate 
models, such as the Ford Fiesta and the Jaguar XK8, would be compared which would not be likely to be particularly 
revealing.
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the subscripts related to the merger variable gives
Qmft =  A  + A ^C^-5^ * Mergert-5 +  A-^t-3 +  ^mft (2-8)
The results of estimating Equation 2.8 are provided in Column 3 of Table 2.4. This 
provides clear evidence that mergers lead to newly launched models being more similar 
between merging brands over time. In addition, the robust result on the différence in­
dicates that the merged corporate entity was successful in maintaining their degree of 
differentiation from rivals.
To test whether firms’ offerings are more similar to each other between segments than 
to offerings of rivals {Hypothesis 4)^ two additional variables are derived: an own-firm 
cross-segment similarity measure and an across segment difference measure. This gives
Qmft = A + ^ ^ ^ t - %  * S ^ 9 t - b  + A-^ i-3 + £m/t (2-9)
As was noted earlier there are two opposing arguments in testing Hypothesis 4- While 
it may be expected that firms do provide similar products, it is also the case that seg­
mentation by definition implies that firms need to tailor their products to consumers with 
segment specific requirements. The test is therefore a stringent one. The resulting coef­
ficients of interest, while correctly signed, are significant only at the 10% level and the 
coeflacients are close to one indicating that while there was some similarity between firm 
products across segments these differences were small.
2.4 Concluding Discussion
The capabilities of British Leyland, and other participants in the UK car market, are 
quantified and analysed over the 1971-2002 period. Three key results are obtained. First, 
it is illustrated that capabilities played a statistically well defined role in determining 
the products managers marketed. Second, the results suggest that BL operated with a 
less well developed capability set than its competitors at the beginning of the period. 
That British Leyland was lagging in 1971 indicates that factors such as the insulation of 
the market via tariff barriers prior to Britain’s accession to the EEC and the potentially 
debihtating effects of Stop-go policies may have had a negative impact on the firm’s 
capabihty set prior to 1971. In itself this finding provides justification for future research 
on the early post-war period. Third, it is shown that while BL did have some success in 
catching up with its rivals these attempts proved insufiScient, with the firms capabilities 
being below those of its key rivals and the market average over the full period analysed.
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In order to arrive at these conclusions the Chapter makes a number of methodological 
contributions in quantifying heterogenous firm capabilities within the UK car market. I 
build on an insight made by Thomas and Weigelt (2000) that if resources and capabilities 
can explain firm performance, then they should also affect the new product decisions of 
managers. Specifically, new products should be more similar to firms existing products 
determined within a manager’s capability set than those of rivals with capabilities that 
differ. Thomas and Weight’s work is taken as a starting point, a number of conceptual 
problems which cast some doubt on the methods they used to assess the role of capabilities 
are identified. A substantive conceptual problem in distinguishing firm capabihties from 
spacial location decisions, and their not taking a reasonable account of firm resource 
differences. An alternative means to identify capabihties is proposed that is related to the 
embedded character of capabihties relative product locations decisions that managers can 
vary in the short-run. A number of fundamental concerns ranging from the definition of 
the unit of observation and the importance of controlling for a number of four additional 
factors affecting the product launch decisions of managers (market structure, competition, 
heterogenous firm resources and cost structures) that could potentially confiate the core 
findings are set out and accounted for. A set of four hypotheses that allow us to examine 
firm capabihties are determined and tested. I find that all three of hypotheses are precisely 
vahdated, while the fourth is not precisely characterised. Overall, the findings strongly 
support for the view that capabihties matter.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating the M ature Phase of the 
Product-Life-Cycle: Why Does the 
Car Industry Not Fit?
This thesis aims to provide some answers to the question of why British Leyland failed to 
achieve a recovery often avowed by the firm’s senior management.^ Few would disagree 
that firm success is, to an extent, determined by the market environment that partici­
pants inhabit. The ability of firms to understand and adapt to changes in the market 
place therefore critically influences their success and survival. Hence, in order to judge 
whether BL adopted product strategies that were conducive to success within an altering 
market environment, it is first necessary to have a concrete notion of whether there was 
a fundamental shift in the market that necessitated a strategic change. Second, if such a 
shift occurred, it is necessary to understand how that change affected the optimal product 
strategy of firms operating in the market.
To provide an analytical framework, key theories concerning the operating environment 
that firms inhabit are examined. In doing so, I assess whether the principal model derived 
to understand the underlying behaviour of firms over the life cycle of a product, the 
product-life-cycle model, held sway against an alternative discontinuity hypothesis that 
Flexible Specialisation (FS) and differentiated demand led to an alteration in the nature 
of the market. Since the car industry is both the industry where the term “Fordism” 
was spawned and is also the industry most closely associated with the adoption of FS it 
provides a natural and fertile testing ground. By analysing elements of the market within 
this framework the chapter seeks to find clues as to whether British Leyland’s management 
chose a strategic path that conflicted with the changing nature of the market and hence
 ^A systematic analysis of the senior managers of the firm’s opinions is provided in Chapter 4.
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undermined its potential for recovery.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The predictions of the product- 
life-cycle hypothesis (PLC) are spelt out in Section 3.1. The more disparate ‘discontinuity’ 
literature is then examined in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 identifies the data required to 
evaluate whether the PLC provides a reasonable characterisation of the industry against 
the alternative ‘discontinuity’ hypothesis. Section 3.4 examines the results and Section 
3.5 provides a concluding discussion.
3.1 The Product-Life-Cycle and the Continuity Literature
Within the firms that populate industries generations of products are created and evolve 
or die, with new products replacing them. The success of firms in generating, upgrad­
ing and eventually renewing old product lines is crucial to their success and survival in 
the market place. The centrality of understanding the evolution of technologically pro­
gressive products from birth to maturity, popularly termed the product-life-cycle model, 
is refiected by an on-going academic interest that crosses the disciplinary boundaries of 
business and marketing [e.g. Polli and Cook (1969); Porter (1983)], the economics of in­
dustrial organisation [e.g. Klepper (1996)] and economic history [e.g. Rosenberg (1963); 
Hekman (1980)].
The PLC model conventionally divides the life cycle of products into distinct phases 
allocating disparate industries into each phase as they evolve from ‘new’ to ‘mature’ and 
eventually ‘declining’ products. For example, an early and influential work by Forester 
(1963) divided the process into four phases: product introduction, market growth (also 
termed the shake-out or adolescent phase), market maturity, and decline. These phases 
are able to refiect a convex non-monotonic function of product development over time that 
flattens during the mature phase of the cycle.  ^ Numerous authors have contributed to the 
analysis of the evolution of goods and industries with research efforts being initially based 
on case studies, which were then followed by a growing number of quantitative analyses 
[See Klepper (1992) for a selective summary of the substantive older case study based 
literature]. The considerable work to date that has been directly associated with the 
PLC has overwhelmingly taken the ‘product class’, or industry, as the unit of aggregation 
focusing its attention on what has been more accurately termed the Industry-Life-Cycle 
[Geroski and Mazzucato (2001b)]. Methodologically, work on the PLC has involved aggre­
gating products within an industry, or choosing a representative product, and analysing
^Different authors have provided alternative schemas classifying the stages of the model, for example Klepper and Grady 
(1990) provide a five-stage typology. Forester (1963) is used since all stage schemas contain the m in im u m  of four stages he 
evaluates.
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it as the unit(s) of interest through its relationship to the evolution of each industry’s 
underlying firm population. Three types of studies are commonly found. The first are 
long run studies that examine the complete evolution of selected industries over their full 
life cycle [e.g. Gort and Klepper (1984)]. A second literature focuses on different phases 
of the life cycle, with the ‘shake-out’ phase of the industry life cycle generating most 
attention in the hterature [e.g. Klepper and Miller (1995); Klepper and Simons (2000) 
and Klepper and Simons (2005)]. Furthermore, there have been numerous papers that 
examine the entry and exit at the firm and plant levels [Chen (2002); Dunne, Roberts, 
and Samuelson (1989)].
In addition to research that has attempted to chart the evolution of industries, a 
large body of literature has developed in an attempt to explain singular phases of the 
PLC in the “new goods” and “declining industries” literatures. Indeed, there has been 
a dramatic expansion in the literature on “new” goods, which acknowledges the relative 
paucity of empirical work concerning product innovation compared to process innovations 
despite the widely held view that the development and diffusion of product innovations is a 
crucial determinant of economic development [Bresnahan and Gorden (1997); Trajtenberg 
(1989)]. As Rosenberg (1982, 19) eloquently put it “Although the availabihty of a name 
and a date may simplify the writings of elementary histories, they add very little to our 
appreciation of the economic consequences of an invention. From the point of view of 
their economic impact, it is the diffusion process that is central.”
Renewed interest in new product innovation by economists has also reflected the devel­
opment of new tools for examining differentiated products in a static setting [as surveyed 
in Nevo (2001)]. Empirical work on the ‘new goods’ literature differs from research on 
other stages of the PLC in that it has concentrated on the product, as opposed to the 
industry. Unfortunately, the static nature of those models does not make them readily 
apphcable for examining inherently dynamic phenomena such as the PLC. In addition, 
there is also a more limited literature on exit and de-industrialisation [see Ghemawat and 
Nalebuff (1984) and references therein].
In contrast, the mature phase of the PLC has seen little systematic empirical scrutiny 
in the literature [an exception being McGahan and Silverman (2001) summarised below]. 
This is particularly surprising given that mature industries account for the lions’ share 
of economic activity, both in terms of their productive output and innovative expendi­
ture. Indeed, there is little evidence that mature industries have seen a reduction in the 
share of expenditure on innovation. For example, motor vehicles maintained a constant 
fifteen percent share of research and development expenditure in OECD countries be­
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tween 1973 and 1996 [OECD (ANBERD)].^ Furthermore, there is also a considerable 
amount of research at both the micro and macro levels, which finds that the productive 
impact of new industries, when taken at the economy wide level of aggregation, is quite 
small prior to reaching maturity. Much of that literature has developed in response to 
the ‘Solow Productivity Paradox’ where ‘You can see the computer age everywhere but 
in the productivity statistics” [Solow (1987)]. Recent research has shown that the advent 
of computing had little impact on productivity growth until the mid-1990s [Oliner and 
Sichel (2000)]. That even the most substantive innovation in modem history did not have 
a large impact on productivity growth in the short to medium-run is not however unique 
to recent historical episodes. Indeed, it is accepted that the contribution of total factor 
productivity during the industrial revolution was modest [Crafts and Harley (1992)], as 
was the impact of steam [Crafts (2004)]. While it is possible that the results of these 
studies have underestimated the role of the computer industry and other ‘new goods’, 
due perhaps to complex spill-over effects, the results of such research suggest that indus­
tries that are in either the ‘new good’ and ‘take off’ phases of the PLC account for a 
small proportion of output due to substantial delays in the effects of such technologies on 
aggregate economic activity.
Research on the nature of PLC, summarised by Klepper (1996), argues that there are a 
number of statistical regularities concerning the mature phase of the product-life-cycle in 
tedmologically progressive industries. In particular, Klepper identifies four stylised facts 
relevant to this work.^
(SFl). the number of producers declines steadily as entry becomes rare and exit contin­
ues;
(SF2). the growth in the market shares of the largest firms decline and leadership in the 
industry stabilises;
(SF3). process innovation dominates product innovation, and
(SF4). the diversity of competing products falls over time as products become ‘standard­
ised’.
The mature phase of the PLC is one where continuity occurs in a deterministic way as 
products are standardised. Each of the four stylised facts can be linked to PLC’s assertion 
that as products mature, a firm’s success is determined by its ability to standardise 
products and thus reduce costs in the production process. Since reducing production
 ^Steve Machin is thanked for providing the data used to make these calculations.
^Klepper (1996) outlines six stylised facts however two of these solely concern non-mature industries and hence are 
outside the scope of this work.
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costs is central to the firm’s profitability, the crucial mechanism to achieving that end 
is via the development of cost reducing, or process, innovations [SF3] whose benefits are 
then magnified through the economies of scales associated with product standardisation. 
And since only a few firms have the capabihties to effectively reduce costs for a lower 
number of ever more standardised products [SF4] high cost competitors are driven out 
of the market reducing the number of firms operating in the market [SFl]. Fewer firms 
win survive in the market place but since each of these firms is relatively competitive the 
market shares of those leading firms stabilises as the potential for innovation is exhausted 
and cost structures stabilise [SF2].
Through its deterministic nature, the theory can be viewed as being linked to the infiu- 
ential evolutionary theory of economic change developed by ?. However, while the PLC 
is concerned with product standardisation and costs through process innovation, evolu­
tionary theory is more general in being concerned with the standardisation of practices 
and standardisation of knowledge through the development of routines. By viewing the 
undertaking of process innovation as being one set of the sets routines undertaken within 
a firm, the cost reduction force underlying the PLC can be viewed as a subset of evolu­
tionary theory. (??) argue that firms which do not implement cost reduction routines 
are destined to be selected out of the market. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the work of 
Nelson and Winters is inherent to, and has been influential in, work that has provided 
the theoretical underpinning of PLC model by Jovanovic (1982) and Klepper (1996).
3.2 The Discontinuity Literature
While the PLC model has become the dominant paradigm used to explain the dynam­
ics of industry development across a range of academic disciplines it is not without its 
critics. In particular, criticism has been voiced against the PLC model’s deterministic 
and a-historical nature. During the period analysed in this paper, a fundamental shift in 
production methods, the so-called Third Industrial Revolution, occurred. A wide body 
of literature has imphcitly argued that this shift created a break in the PLC. The htera­
ture on the Third Industrial Revolution, variously termed “post-Fordism” and “Flexible 
Specialisation”, was initially concentrated in the business hterature, but has also influ­
enced a wider spectrum of academic disciplines ranging from the economics of production 
management to urban sociology and industrial relations, that date a transition from one 
distinct form of capitalism to another from the late 1960s [ see Amin (1995) for a re­
view] .In addition, the post-Fordist debate has also been used to speculate on the future of 
global capitalism. Although the chronological prefix “post” preceding the word Fordism
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implies a major discontinuity occurred, as Jessop (1992, 46-69) emphasises, the hterature 
falls short of demonstrating that the discontinuity had a profound impact on the economic 
environment. Given the vast Uteratures associated with these topics it is surprising then 
that, while a significant discontinuity has been popularly conceived, and the hterature on 
the PLC effectively ignored, there is no hard evidence iUustrating whether there has been 
a quantitative impact on the economic environment.
The discontinuity thesis can be viewed occurring on the demand-side of the market, 
but also on the supply-side via firm’s theoretically enhanced abihty to react to changes 
in market conditions given the greater ‘flexibihty’ of production technology.
The cost side of the discontinuity thesis is rooted in the Flexible Speciahsation [FS] 
hterature that was pioneered in France in the early 1970s by the ‘regulatory’ school and 
was further developed by Coriat (1990).® Coriat argued in favour of a discontinuous ap­
proach to transition, by suggesting that from the late 1960s onwards, industrial societies 
have been witnessing a melding of traditional mass production and fiexibihty enhancing 
technologies. These new technologies, which included robotics, computer-aided design 
and changes in manufacturing systems are charged with dramatically transforming pro­
duction. Flexibihty of the production system potentially allows management to effectively 
exploit opportunities in differentiated markets, where shares change continuously, calling 
for continuous adjustments of total output and output mixes. Discontinuity, therefore, 
emerges in the way management has to deal with competitive strategies and product 
development. In order to achieve fiexibihty, the supply-oriented Fordist system of mass 
production has to be over-ruled. The same message has subsequently been a recurrent 
theme of influential work in the business hterature [e.g. Altshuler, Anderson, Jones, Roos, 
and Womack (1984)] and by industry commentators [e.g. Jones (1985)].
Flexible technology is meant to minimise spare capacity and intermediate buffers in 
production. Since the product-mix is determined by inputs received from the marketing 
department, the whole organisation of production is determined by a random variable 
(the demand for specific products) to which production has to adapt. By contrast, in 
the Fordist system production is a function of a pre-determined plan aimed to maximise 
plant output levels. Within flexible manufacturing, the standardisation of the production 
process is neither the focus of effort nor the centre of the decision-making. On the contrary, 
products are developed continuously in order to foUow and, when possible, to change the 
taste of consumers. The product mix shifts according to the shifts in opportunity from
^The work of the regulatory school was most influential within political economics and industrial relations debates. At 
the heart of the regulation approach, there is a recognition of the paradox inherent within the capitalist system. That 
is, the tendency towards instability and cyclical change to be combined with a relative stability of the institutional set of 
regulations supporting the production system.
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one segment of demand to another, regardless of the direction this opportunity might 
take.
There is some disagreement that FS lead to a fundamental shift in the production 
process since many production processes encompass aspects of both FS and Fordist forms 
of production. For example hydraulic body presses could be used to produce different body 
types, and were therefore a ‘flexible’ technology but were used by all car manufacturers 
before the advent of FS [Williams, Cutler, Wilhams, and Haslam (1987)]. That said, those 
authors agree that technologies associated with the Third Industrial Revolution have had 
a substantive effect on many aspects of the car assembly process. Indeed, as Williams et 
al [1987)] also point out, 50% of all industrial robots installed in the UK during the 1980s 
were installed into car factories. Where FS has been an important factor in the industry 
this would imply that the four stylised facts associated with the PLC would no longer 
be the predicted outcomes. This is the case because the underlying premise of the PLC, 
standardisation, is no longer the optimal strategy for determining manufacturing success.
The imphcations for stylised facts summarised by Klepper (1996) are as follows. First 
new innovations could encourage entry into the market for flrms to provide batch pro­
duction (SFl) or allow for adjustments sales potentially leading to changes in market 
leadership (SF2). Indeed, this was the conjecture of Piore and Sabel (1984) in their influ­
ential work. However, it is not clear that the entry costs are lowered through FS. Given 
that the technologies are labour saving and capital intensive it is more likely that higher 
sunk costs would reduce the potential for entry. Indeed, what systematic evidence that 
does exist suggests that the cost of implementing flexible technologies is high both in 
terms of sunk costs and its human capital requirements, since small flrms usually lack 
the necessary in-house expertise to develop and run sophisticated custom built systems 
[United Nations (1986)]. A key benefit of FS is that it allows multiple products to be 
produced on the same production line thereby enabling smaller batches of cars to be pro­
duced more cheaply. Hence, it is possible that entrants or smaller incumbent firms who 
could access the necessary capital could obtain greater market share. Such benefits may 
be outweighed by substantive entry costs. Given that sunk costs in car manufacturing are 
high it would seem more plausible that industries with lower sunk costs, such as textiles, 
and smaller flrms would be more likely to benefit from FS.
An alternative view was articulated by Abernathy, Clark, and Kant row (1983). They 
argue that it is possible for reversals to occur, what they term “de-maturity”, whereby 
established industries are able to revive themselves through competition arising from the 
adoption of new technologies. Thus unlike Piore and Sabel (1984) these authors do not 
suggest that there will be a renewal of entry in the market (SFl). The work of Abernathy,
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Clark, and Kantrow (1983) pertains to the US car industry and its ability to reinvigorate 
itself in the face of competition, particularly from Japanese manufacturers during the 
1970s. Their argument is not related to the possibility of small batch producing firms 
gathering market share. Rather that established, but wanning, incumbents can reassert 
themselves, and differs from, the FS hterature in that they consider that firms’ abihty 
to generate both process and product innovations allow "de-maturity” to occur. The 
development of product technologies confers an abihty for firms to expand their share 
of the market by enabling them to capture consumers with different tastes. Indeed, by 
the 1980s business historians leant further toward product, rather than process, innova­
tions. Authors have observed that the emphasis of car manufacturers has been focused on 
improving product technology to enlarge their product ranges [Bhaskar (1979); Volpato 
(1992)]. In large part, these trends refiected shifts in demand patterns, associated with 
greater consumer awareness through consumerist information and a spectacular expan­
sion in advertising.® These trends provide a definition of the industry being ‘mature’ but 
they do not imply that demand patterns tend towards standardised preferences for cars. 
Instead, they imply that increasingly fragmented demand patterns will develop as con­
sumers become more choosy about the products they wish to replace the current model 
with.^
While there is no compelling reason to consider that the number of products a firm 
will produce will fall, in the absence of firm capabihties that allow products to be differ­
entiated in ways that induce different consumers to purchase different models and model 
versions there is no reason that they should rise either (SF4). A precondition to a firm 
being able to expand the diversity of its product range is being able to differentiate these 
products through product innovations. Consistent with the PLC hypothesis, however, FS 
is by definition a process innovation so it would be expected that continuous process inno­
vations, developing and honing the new technologies, would dominate product innovation 
in line with the prediction of the PLC (SF3). Nor do Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow 
(1983) claim that product technology will dominate process innovation (SF3), only that 
firms which are best able to harness these technologies will be successful in the market 
place. Finally since the cost of producing a model is reduced along with the benefits of
^Advertising by car makers exhibited an eleven-fold rise over the period analysed here. Indeed, while no car manufacturer 
was in the top twenty UK advertisers in 1970 four of the top ten spots were taken by car manufacturers in 1998 [Advertising 
Association (2003)].
^By definition, the market for cars reaches the maturity stage when replacement demand outweighs new demand. New 
demand means the portion of demand that exceeds scrapping, whereas replacement means the portion of demand that 
equals scrapping. New demand, therefore, makes the entire stock of cars increase. In theory, markets reach saturation when 
new registrations equal scrapping, although in practice saturation, and hence maturity in a literal sense, is never reached. 
A more workable definition of 'maturity' is taken here where the growth of new registrations is low, being principally 
determined by the cyclical demand influences which dominates growth rates. Markets for cars reach maturity at a level of 
car density of between 400 and 600 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. In the case of the US, this density was reached in the early 
1960s, while in Europe it was reached between the early 1970s and the early 1980s.
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scale economies there is no reason for the diversity of products competing to fall over time 
(SF4). Indeed, Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow (1983) consider that the market shares of 
the largest firms rise as well as fall depending on their abihty to harness new product and 
process technologies, and that (SF4) technological competition would raise the diversity 
of competing products.
While the arguments of Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow (1983) were centred on the 
car industry Porter (1983) points out that they are apphcable to other industries whose 
products are highly differentiated by quahty, and where he considers for which the PLC 
model does not appear “to fit”. Indeed, as Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow (1983) and 
Porter (1983) both point out the product-hfe-cycle is only relevant to industries whose 
products are differentiated by quahty (i.e. vertically differentiated), rather than by differ­
ences m individual tastes (horizontally differentiated products).® The rationale being that 
in industries, which are dominated by horizontal differentiation, firms have the abihty to 
proliferate products stylistically to appeal to heterogenous consumer tastes and so avoid 
the standardisation inherent to the PLC model.®
3.3 Testing the PLC: Data and Methodology
While the business hterature provides an alternative view to the PLC, the evidence pro­
vided is anecdotal. Given the vast PLC and FS hteratures, and the significant imphcations 
for firm strategy, the lack of systematic evidence concerning their empirical importance 
is surprising. A more rigourous empirical basis is provided here via an evaluation of 
the extent to which each of the aforementioned four statistical regularities, or stylised 
facts, held. Examining each of all four stylised facts within a single market has stringent 
data requirements. Ideally a data set should contain the entry and exit rates of firms 
{Stylised fact 1: SFl), their market shares (SF2), a rich record of innovations (SFS) 
and disaggregated data on the products themselves {SF4)- While entry and exit data is 
commonly available across a wide number of industries, disaggregated sales information is 
less conunon. Furthermore, data allowing the degree of product innovation and product 
diversity to determined is rare. Such data requirements provide an explanation for why 
previous empirical work has concentrated on detailing individual stylised facts rather than 
examining them collectively within the context of a single industry or market.
The data set, that has been developed for this thesis, matdbes these requirements by 
incorporating firm entry and exit, sales, and the embodiment of over one hundred and
^Tirole (1997) provides a more detail discussion of concepts of product differentiation.
BExamples being the ready-to-eat cereal and beer industries. Between 1980 and 1992 some 190 brands of ready-to-eat 
cereal were launched in the US [Hausman (1997)], while Asplund and Sandin (1999) report over 199 new beer products 
being launched on the Swedish market between 1989 and 1995.
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twenty five product innovations for all models and model versions (over 15,000 car model 
versions in total) of all firms marketing cars in the UK between 1971 and 2002. °^ Firm 
entry and exit were determined though sales data for new cars for the period with entry 
occurring when sales of a firm first occurred in the market. Exit is taken to occur when 
either: 1. a firm’s sales cease in a given year, or alternatively 2. where sales fall to 10% of 
the sales in the year prior. The reason for adopting the 10% rule of thumb is to account 
for the fact that the manufacturer will have ceased producing the model but there still 
marginal sales as showrooms clear out their stock.
These data are supplemented by patenting activity data for firms operating in the UK 
car market, in order to obtain a notion of the relative attention firms bestow to product, 
as opposed to process technologies [SouTœ: European Patent Office’s In-House Patent 
Databases].
3.4 Evaluating the PLC’s Stylised Pacts
/ /  Stylised fact SFl: the number of producers declines steadily as entry becomes rare and 
exit continues.
Figure 3.1 plots the stock of firms and brands over the period determined by firm and 
brand entry and exit. SFl suggests that there should be a decline in the stock of firms as 
entry declines while exit continues. Figure 3.1 shows clear recent downward trend with 
the number of firms falling from a peak of 31 in 1989 to 19 firms operating in the market 
between 2000-2002. Examining the entry and exit levels, represented by deviations from 
the stock of cars operating in the market, where the upward line reflects entry and the 
lower line exit. The expansion from the late 1970s was driven by new entrants, while the 
reduction of firms operating in the market from the early 1990s reflected entry becoming 
rare and exit continuing. Hence, taking only the second period would provide support 
for SFl, however, since the industry was in its mature phase throughout the period 
the findings do not provide clear support either for or against the PLC.^  ^ Such sharp 
reductions in the number of firms operating in a market is typical of industry ‘shake out’ 
phase of the PLC that is outside the scope of this research (examples of papers examining 
industry ‘shake outs’ are provided in Section 3.1).
Certainly there was not a substantial rise in new batch producing firms as predicted 
by Piore and Sabel (1984). As argued earlier, this indicates that the sunk costs of car
full list of data sources is contained in Appendix A of the thesis for ease of reference.
^^The data and accompanying documentation is available at http://gb.eapacenet.com/.
Compared to earlier historical periods in another car market, the US market, these reductions are modest. In particular, 
Geroski and Mazzucato (2001b) showed that of the more than 250 domestic manufacturers operating in early 1920s less 
than 50 survived by the commencement of World War Two. Unfortunately, I am not aware of work that record the entry 
and exit of firms in the UK car market to make a within market comparison.
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production are not outweighed by the lower cost of niche batch production enabling entry 
in the industry. In fact the industry has seen a reduction in independent niche producers 
who have been acquired by larger firms in order to expand their presence across market 
segments. This is refiected by the number of brands remaining roughly similar at the end 
of the period while the number of firms declined.
Figure 3.1: Stock of Firms Operating in the UK Car Market (1971-2002)
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There are a number of important differences between the firm and brands entry, exit 
and stocks depicted in Figure 3.1. Details of the brands and firms entering exiting and 
merging in the market is located in Table 2.2. The 1970s witnessed the arrival of a number 
of single brand firms principally from Japan and Eastern Europe, while exit was driven 
largely by the consohdation of British Leyland’s brands and PSA’s elimination of mar­
ques previously marketed by Chrysler Europe following its exit from the European market 
place. While firm entry and exit continued during the period, merger activity did not lead 
to the exit of acquired brands.Instead , acquiring firms purchased brands as a means 
to expand their coverage of the product spectrum to capture higher segments, as with 
Ford’s formation of the Premier Motor Group (Aston Martin, Jaguar, Volvo and Land 
Rover) and GM’s acquisition of Saab providing examples, or to expand into the lower end 
of the market, as with VAG’s purchases of Seat and Skoda. A second manifestation of
^^Of the eighteen mergers that occurred between 1986 and 2002 only in one case, FSO, did the brand exit the market.
96
the quest by large multinational players to widen their coverage of the market came in 
the form of the re-establishment of brands in the UK market such as Chrysler’s auto and 
4-by-4 models (the Jeep range), GM’s Cadillac, BL/Rover’s MG, and in two cases the 
creation of new brands by existing firms: Toyota’s Lexus and Daimler-Chrysler’s MRC 
Smart. The result of these branding activities being that the number of brands active in 
the market has increased slightly over the full period, and certainly has not mirrored the 
consolidation of firms since the early 1990s.^^
Stylised fact SF2: the growth of market shares of the largest firms decline and leader­
ship in the industry stabilises.
Table 3.1 examines the market shares of participants whose sales accounted for more 
than five percent of the market in a given year. Version level registrations data were 
aggregated to the firm level to obtain the firm market shares. Since disaggregated sales 
are only available in the UK from 1971 more aggregate data from an earlier publication 
by the same data provider was used for the 1967-1970 period [Society of and Motor and 
Manufacturers and Traders (1965-73)].^® It is apparent that while the number of firms 
in the market saw some variation over the period the relative sales success of market par­
ticipants altered considerably. At the beginning of the period the market was dominated 
by four market leaders whose production was based in the UK. Three of the four firms 
were multinational concerns (Ford, Chrysler UK and GM Vauxhall) with the other being 
the domestically-owned British Leyland. Between 1967 and 1970, before micro-data at 
the model/model variant level was recorded, the market shares remained quite stable. 
However, from 1971 onwards there was a fundamental shift in the distribution of sales in 
the market with British Leyland and Chrysler UK, which exited in 1978, seeing dramatic 
reductions in their respective shares of the markets. The other market leaders in 1971, 
Ford UK and GM, witnessed fluctuations in their relative fortunes over the period but 
maintained their dominant status in the market throughout.
The major gainers were predominantly the large continental European manufacturers 
VAG, PSA, and Renault, and one Japanese firm, Nissan, all of whom were able to break 
the five percent threshold. The timing of the expansion which can be dated from 1970 in 
PSA (then comprising only of the Peugeot brand) and Nissan’s cases, with Fiat, Renault 
and VAG each having a minor presence in the market prior to this. The market penetra­
tion of these second-tier firms gathered momentum over the 1970s. The expansion can
^^Refer back to Chapter 2 Table 2.2 for a break down of firm entry, exit and merger activity.
^^Those data, from the Society of and Motor and Manufacturers and Traders (1965-73), are housed at the National 
Library of Scotland in Ekiinburgh.
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Table 3.1: Market Shares of Select Manufacturers (1967-2002)
British Leyiand^ Ford GM Chrysier UK PSA Renauit VAG Fiat Nissan
1967 42.9 26.6 13.9 7.8
1968 42.4 28.5 13.8 6.6
1969 41.7 28.3 12.1 7.1 0.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 0.0
1970 38.3 26.6 10.0 10.5 0.6 3.3 2.5 2.5 0.2
1971 41.0 22.6 13.4 14.7 0.6 3.7 2.9 2.8 0.7
1972 36.6 20.6 11.0 12.6 0.9 4.5 2.9 2.4 2.3
1973 33.9 19.9 9.6 12.2 1.0 4.4 3.7 3.2 4.6
1974 33.5 21.8 8.1 11.1 1.0 4.6 3.2 4.1 4.8
1975 32.1 19.1 8.6 8.3 1.3 5.1 4.5 4.1 6.0
1976 28.5 22.5 11.7 6.2 3.0 4.5 3.6 4.2 5.6
1977 26.2 21.0 10.7 6.0 3.6 4.5 3.8 5.7 6.6
1978 23.5 23.6 9.8 1.9 8.8 4.5 5.0 5.3 6.5
1979 19.1 29.0 8.2 1.7 8.5 5.7 5.2 4.8 6.2
1980 22.1 23.8 9.4 7.9 6.2 5.5 3.7 6.5
1981 20.2 25.3 9.3 8.1 5.3 5.9 4.6 6.5
1982 20.7 21.0 13.1 6.9 4.7 6.9 3.7 6.8
1983 20.9 24.4 15.3 5.7 3.5 5.5 2.7 5.7
1984 20.1 26.3 16.1 5.4 3.4 5.5 2.9 5.9
1985 15.0 26.3 17.7 5.9 4.1 6.0 3.4 6.0
1986 13.0 27.5 16.1 6.8 4.0 6.2 3.7 6.2
1987 12.8 28.5 14.1 7.8 4.2 6.1 4.1 6.0
1988 12.7 26.4 14.3 9.2 4.1 6.3 4.1 6.5
1989 11.6 26.7 16.0 9.3 4.0 6.3 3.4 6.3
1990 13.1 25.5 16.7 9.5 3.5 6.4 3.0 5.4
1991 14.3 24.6 15.9 11.1 4.1 6.2 2.5 4.1
1992 13.6 22.5 16.9 12.7 4.9 6.2 2.1 4.6
1993 13.5 21.6 18.2 12.8 5.6 5.7 2.6 5.1
1994 12.6 22.2 16.7 12.3 6.0 6.5 3.1 4.9
1995 12.5 23.5 15.6 11.7 6.1 6.8 3.8 4.7
1996 10.9 22.5 14.7 11.7 6.5 8.5 4.6 4.7
1997 9.6 20.3 14.5 11.8 7.2 8.4 4.4 4.6
1998 8.4 21.2 13.4 11.8 7.7 8.8 4.4 4.5
1999 6.8 22.2 10.3 7.9 9.7 4.1 4.2
2000 6.4 21.0 11.5 8.3 10.7 4.9 4.0
2001 6.2 20.2 13.1 8.3 11.7 4.3 3.6
2002 7.0 20.0 12.8 8.5 12.2 3.5 3.2
Notes: 1. Includes British Leyland (1971-1987); British Aerospace (1986-1993); BMW UK (1994-2000) 
and Phoenix Corp. (2000-)
be dated to the years immediately preceding and following Britain’s accession into the 
EEC in 1973. There is Uttle doubt that the expansion in sales activity partially reflect 
the anticipation of the removal of trade barriers. In Peugeot’s case a rapid expansion in 
Peugeot’s sales also reflect the formation of PSA through a merger between Peugeot and 
Citroën in 1975, and later the acquisition of Chrysler Europe in 1978. With the exception 
of Fiat, who ran into financial difficulties during the 1980s, and Nissan whose aggressive 
expansion in sales was constrained by informal Voluntary Export Restraints from 1977, 
the other large European manufacturers were able to expand their share of the market
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with imports accounting for 73% of sales in the UK market by 2002.
Overall, rather than being a period where leadership stability was apparent, the market 
witnessed the rise of second-tier firms taking significant, but not dominant roles and the 
demise of two of the four dominant firms. Neither of these market features support Stylised 
fact F2.
While Table 3.1 is indicative of the major trends in the market’s most substantive 
players, in order to fully capture the distribution of sales we require a more encompassing 
measure. Rather than use simple count measures, the unit sales data allow a Herfindahl 
index to be derived in order to summarise the unequal distribution of firms. Formally, the 
firm level Herfindahl index, IT/t, is the sum of squares of the market shares of the mar­
ket participants (i.e. Hft = The Herfindahl index is preferred to other
concentration measures due to its more satisfactory properties that are smnmarised in 
Leshe and Kay (1977) and Curry and George (1983). A summary of the trend in market 
structure for the period is contained in Figure 3.2 which graphs the firm-level Herfindahl 
index over time. Over the period the index feU to about 70% of it initial level by 2002, 
however this reduction is fully explained by the reduced contribution of British Leyland 
to the index. This suggests that the shift in market structure has refiected the reallo­
cation of BL’s market share. In addition, the rise in the Herfindahl index that excludes 
BL reflects the growing importance of the substantive, but not dominant, players in the 
market whose fortunes were detailed above. British Leyland’s contribution to the index 
fell by 0.13 between 1971 and 1998, while the market as a whole fell by 0.11. In other 
words there was a small increase in concentration in the market when BL’s contribution 
is excluded from the calculation.
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Figure 3.2: Firm Herfindahl Indices (Incl. and Excl. British Leyland)
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Source: Derived by the author using SMMT data.
Stylised fact SF3: Over time producers devote increasing effort to process innovation 
in relation to product innovation.
The PLC literature argues that process, or cost reducing innovation, characterises 
products in the mature phase of the cycle. The underlying intuition behind this is that 
technological innovation related to the product is seen to dwindle as it becomes standard­
ised. Where standardisation is reached there is Uttle incentive for firms to alter products 
by embodying new technologies since the preferred product has been effectively deter­
mined. The only strategy for firm success is to compete by producing products at the 
lowest possible cost by developing cost innovations.
If this was indeed the case it should be expected that there was Uttle product innovation 
occurring in mature industries such as the car industry. However, as was iUustrated in 
Table 2.1, technological innovation in the car industry has clearly been an on-going feature 
of the industry as it has evolved over the post-war period. Furthermore, in aU cases new 
technologies were included first in the most luxurious variant. The initial concentration
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of innovation in niche models or at least the most expensive variants suggests that firms 
attempted to differentiate their models through product innovations.
While charting the development in product innovations shows that they have been 
an important feature of the car industry, it only provides a rough guide to the relative 
degree of product to process innovation. Examining the relative roles of each form of 
innovation is complicated because it is only possible to proxy to their importance. A 
common method of assessment is to examine the innovative output of the firm, in the 
form of those inventions that firms patent. However such measures are recognised to be 
imperfect correlates of innovativeness as was pointed out in Chapter 2.
To examine patenting activity of automotive manufacturers an extensive global patent­
ing data set was collated from the in-house patent databases provided by the European 
Patent Oflice. The data-base includes all car producing countries with the exception of 
those firms with head-quarters in Eastern European countries, recording the over 350,000 
patents applications by firms that operated in the UK car market over the 1971-98 period. 
There are, however, two complications with the data. First, the data set does not have 
complete coverage for patenting until 1976 when the Japanese patenting datarbase was in­
tegrated into the EPO’s data-base. Patents in other countries are however available from 
1970. Second, there are some difllculties in comparing patenting levels between countries 
due to institutional differences in the way patenting applications are framed. The most 
substantive being that in two of the Asian car producing nations [Japan and Republic of 
Korean (ROK)] applicants are required to patent each new aspect of an invention, which 
is not the case in Europe and the US where a number of innovations relating to a par­
ticular invention may be considered as part of one application. The result being that the 
number of patent applications in Japan and the ROK are higher than in European and 
US locations. Ordover (1991) provides an excellent sununary of institutional differences 
in patent application between Japan, the US and Europe. He points out the accepted 
method to adjust for the larger number of Asia patents is to divide by three. Having col­
lated the full data set a sample of firms was chosen. The sub-sample encompasses a major 
firm from each country’s production location with a market share of more the one percent 
of the UK market. Prom each of these firms a random one percent sample of patents was 
taken. The reason for sampling refiects the time taken to download and examine each 
individual patent given that the sample of patents encompasses over 350,000 appfications. 
Since the central interest of the paper is in approximating the general dichotomy between 
product and process innovations, rather than fully characterising patenting activity in the
^^The patents where chosen randomly via deriving random numbers associated with each patent in each given year. In 
many cases whether a patent concerns a product or a process innovation is identified as part of the patent, and the detail 
nature of patent applications make it clear whether a innovation is cost reducing or product based.
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industry, this relatively expedient, if still time consuming, approach is not unreasonable.
Table 3.2 contains the results and illustrates two points. First, and of primary interest, 
there is no evidence that process innovation has dominated product innovation. Indeed 
the opposite is found to have been the case. These findings are consistent with work by 
McGahan and Silverman (2001), who analysed US publicly listed firms over the early 
1980s to mid-1990. Second, Table 3.2 shows that larger companies such as GM, Ford and 
Toyota heavily employ the patenting system. Once again the key exception being British 
Leyland whose patenting activity is far below those of its rivals and appears to have a 
greater emphasis on process innovations, although in keeping with the industry trend 
product innovations dominate. In order to highlight the differing level of patent applica­
tions between differing ownership of the company both the total product/ process split for 
British Leyland is provided (including when it was incorporated in British Aerospace be­
tween 1988 and 1992) and the period when BMW assumed ownership renaming the firm 
Rover. It is clear that the number of patents per year rose substantively only when BMW 
assumed ownership indicating that a lack of innovation may have been an important factor 
in determining the fate of the recently deceased firm.^^
Table 3.2: Product and Process Innovation in the Car Industry (1970-2001)
Total No. of 
Patents
No. of Patent 
Sampled
Process
(%)
Product
(%)
Peugeot Automobiles 11,052 276 22 78
Volvo 7,587 190 16 84
Chrysler 16,725 418 14 86
General Motors 45,601 1,140 14 86
Ford Motor Co. 22,517 563 19 81
Toyota Motor Co. 77,791 1,945 20 80
Nissan Motor 76,644 1,916 23 77
Honda Motor 62,948 1,574 18 82
Audi Auto 6,678 167 16 84
Renault 15,819 395 20 80
Rover 1.974 49 26 74
British Leyiand 893 22 17 83
Proton 216 5 24 76
Flat 4,569 114 21 79
Hyundai 21,592 540 29 71
353,967 8,849 18.7 75.1
Notes: 1. Patent sample generated randomly via a  random number generator; 2. Data located at 
http://gb.espacenet.com/. 3. Rover pertains to the period following BMW's acquisition of the firm in 1992. 
4. Proton and Hyundai were not In the market for the complete 1970 to 2001 period. Patent data for Proton 
Is available between 1996 and 2001 while data for Hyundai stretched between 1986 and 2001.
^^Rover group went into receivership in 2005 .
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Stylised fact F4: The diversity of competing products and product versions falls over 
time as products become ‘standardised^
Examining whether or not standardisation occurs in a market calls for an examina­
tion of the most disaggregated manifestations of the overall product class. In the case 
of cars, which are predominantly vertically (quality) differentiated products, standardisa­
tion imphes that the number of different models, and versions those models, should fall in 
number over time. Second, the distribution of sales of models and the versions of models 
marketed should become more concentrated as the more successfully standardised models 
and model versions become increasingly dominant. The business Uterature suggests that 
the opposite occurred and highlights variant proliferation based on product technology 
as a strategy employed by car manufacturers to maintain their products in the market 
[Volpato (1992); Maxton and Wormald (2004)]. However, neither study systematically 
examined the long run period that is examined in this paper. Indeed, Volpato (1992) 
simply considers variant proliferation as an important phenomena but provides no empir­
ical evidence to support his claim while Maxton and Wormald (2004) give evidence that 
the number of variants per brand has increased over the 1994-2002 period. To provide 
a more systematic long run analysis of the validity of these claims the number and sales 
of model and model versions is characterised in turn. It worth noting that it would be 
possible for the number of underlying products (in this case car models) and/or versions 
of those products (model versions) to rise though horizontally differentiating products (for 
example by expanding the number of colours product is marketed in for example). This 
possibihty is not accounted for in the data set which classiffes model and model versions 
that differ along measurable quality dimensions.
In order to assess the validity of the first of these claims Figure 3.3 charts the number 
of competing models in the market. The upper line illustrates the expansion in models, 
whose numbers roughly double between 1971 and 2002. While the trend is clearly upward, 
the trend over the full period is punctuated by two falls, the first between 1977 and 
1979 and the second in the late 1980s. The most rapid expansion occurs between 1971 
until 1975 primarily led an by expansion of product offered by European and Japanese 
manufacturers.
The upward trend from 1982 coincides with a diversification of competing products 
through the rejuvenation of two segments within the market: 4rby-4s and the personal 
carriers (PCs). Neither segment can be classed as new segments per se. The establishment 
of 4-by-4s as a recognised segment, rather than a residual of the market, reflected the 
reincarnation of an established product; PC represented the re-development of an obsolete
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concept.^® Prior to 1981 the 4-by-4 market hari been monopolised by Land Rover since 
its entry into production in 1948. Land Rover’s products were targeted toward consumers 
with off-road requirements and hence did not have a mass appeal. The arrival of Suzuki 
in 1981 preempted a rapid expansion of sales and competition in the segment with seven 
brands competing in the segment in 1983. The concept of the personal carrier, also termed 
minivan or multi-purpose vehicle (MPV), was not new, with the Volkswagen Microbus, 
introduced in 1949, being an early example. However, in common with other early PCs 
the Microbus was a rear wheel drive vehicle, so the weight of the engine was contained 
at the back of the vehicle, with the power of the engine going directly to the back wheels 
which is not a virtue in a vehicle with a long plate. In addition, the Microbus did not 
have independent suspension to absorb bumps. Both the weight distribution and poor 
suspension meant that the early Microbus was far from being a comfortable drive. Thus, 
the re-emergence of the PC required the overcoming of technical difficulties associated 
with poor suspension and weight distribution [Yates (1996)]. Following their entry into 
the UK car market in 1983, PC sales saw considerable growth over the 1990s.
As depicted in Figure 3.3 the impact on the product offerings provides a complete 
explanation of the rise in the diversity of car models offered in the market after 1983. 
Indeed, excluding the ‘new’ segments, the number of models offered in the market since 
1986 has remained quite stable. It can be concluded that the increased diversity apparent 
in the car markets was determined by the industry’s ability to expand the diversity of 
sub-product class segments in ways that consumers value.
While examining the proliferation of underlying models provides some indication of 
trends in the diversity of cars it is not a sufficiently disaggregated level to access trends in 
product standardisation. The relevant definition of diversity is at the level that products 
are marketed to consumers: in the case of the car market, model variants or versions. Fig­
ure 3.4 illustrates the dramatic expansion in model versions, that expand by a multiple of 
six, in the thirty-two years analysed. WHiile firms, brands and models are intuitively iden­
tified by “name” the definition of a model variant differs from the vast array of “named” 
model variants (such as L, GL and GLX). A model variant for the purposes of this work is 
defined as a model type with differing cc, fuel type, fuel injection, turbo charging, 4^wheel 
drive or having a large set (greater than ten) of other embodied attributes. Since the pri­
mary interest is in examining the diversity of the relationship between models and model 
versions, including versions which are observably identical in the study would drastically 
expand the dimensions of an already sizeable data set, without adding useful additional
publications and the official allocations of the Department of Trade and Industry define the following segment 
classifications: mini/super-mini, small family, medium, executive, luxury, sports, 4-by-4 and PCs.
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Figure 3.3: Models Marketed in the UK Car Market: New vs. Established Segments
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information about the diversity in product quality. As was the case at the model level, 
it is possible that the expanded offerings of ‘new’ products have refiected the expansion 
the proportion of variants. To examine whether this was the case ‘new’ product versions 
are excluded from the analysis but as is evident in Figure 3.4 the number of new model 
variants continues to rise albeit at a slower rate than for the full sample. This may plau­
sibly indicate that the ‘new’ segments have witnessed a greater pace of expansion. Hence, 
rather than becoming standaTdised cars have become a more differentiated product. Since 
the definition of model diversity is based on quality differentiation, this finding is consis­
tent with the finding already highhghted that product innovation is a substantive force 
in the industry. Indeed it is the changing nature of the product itself that provides a 
firm with a means to expand the variety of products and product versions offered in the 
market.
While market participants expanded their product lines from 1971 British Leyland 
was in a rather different position. The firm was comprised of ten brands marketing 
some thirty-five models in 1971 compared to an average of about four for the market 
as a whole. The dispersed nature of the firm refiected its development into the single
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Figure 3.4: Models Versions Marketed in the UK Car Market: New vs. Established Segments
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domestically owned UK mass production car maker in a series of mergers. The nature 
and causes of the consohdation of non-specialist British car producers into British Leyland 
were examined in Chapter 1, however, for the purposes of this research they are significant 
in that they did not lead to a coherent product strategy. Part of the rationale for the 
integration of British manufacturers lay in the benefits of rationalising the range of models 
marketed, and benefiting from vertical synergies between merging firms. However, Stokes, 
the Chairman of the firm between 1968 and 1975, insisted on maintaining BL’s inherited 
wide range of brands. Even though the company was restructured into a multi-divisional 
firm, the independence of the firms research units reduced the ability of the firm to behave 
as an integrated entity [See Chapter 1].
Gradualism was the prescribed strategy prior to the company’s nationalisation in 1975 
with Stokes arguing that the market was sufficiently large to accommodate model-overlap 
‘for some time’. The Ryder Report strategy which was to become the firms strategy 
for the following two years, pointed to the lack of parts co-ordination between brands 
in suggesting a strategy where the product range should have ‘sufiacient distinction’ to 
provide a ‘competitive edge’ in the mass market [National Enterprise Board (1977, para
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12.2)]. Criticism was widespread.Indeed, British Leyland maintained all four of its 
major mass producing marques, Austin, Morris, Triumph, and Rover, until the mid- 
1980s, with Morris and Triumph exiting the market in 1984 and 1985, respectively. Of 
the lower sales brands the three were non-specialist producers (VanPlas; Rehant, and 
Wolseley) who remained in the market for eight, fifteen and nineteen years, respectively, 
after the formation of British Leyland Group.
Edwardes did severely consolidate the firm’s product range from 1979 onwards [Ed- 
wardes (1983)]. The aim was to generate a ‘product-led recovery’ by 1986 through ratio­
nalising the BL range and concentrating resources on the production of a narrow range 
of models. BL’s consohdation in effect used an approach similar to that undertaken by 
BL’s traditional adversary Ford in the early 1970s. In effect, the CORE plan meant that 
BL was reducing its offerings at a time when other market participants were expanding 
their ranges.
Figure 3.5: Model and Model Version Level Product Marketed by British Leyland
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Figure 3.5 records the number of model and model versions marketed by British Ley­
land. The graphic illustrates the product level strategy of BL from the gradualist phase 
to Edwardes’ rationahsation of the firms product range. Relative to the market trend
^®Such criticism was voiced by industry analysts [EIU (1975a)], from within Government [Trade and Industry and Sub­
committee (1974-75, para. 236)] and, perhaps less surprisingly, from BL’s ousted management [Interviews with Stokes and 
Barber, opt cit Wood (1988)]
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of increased cannibalisation, reflected in the greater number of model and model version 
offerings per firm, BL was the definitive outlier. BL had a highly cannibalised range, in 
a period when cannibalisation was uncommon, and then moved diametrically against the 
market trend of internalising competition.
As pointed out earlier, an alternative means to measure ‘diversity’ is by capturing the 
degree of concentration of the models in the market. To examine the robustness of the 
model-level finHings Herfindahl indices are calculated for the model and model versions 
operating in the market including and excluding the ‘new’ goods. The model and model 
version level Herfindahl indices is computed in a similar manner to the market level index 
[i.e. at the model level Hmt =  where the model-level Herfindahl index Hmu
is the sum of squares of the market shares of the models sold in the market. Similarly the 
version level where the model level Herfindahl index is the sum
of squares of the market shares of model versions sold in the market]. Unsurprisingly, the 
version level concentration is considerably lower than model-level index so, in order to 
compare the trends in the indices, the raw indices are analysed in terms of their growth 
rates (with 1971 being the base year). Since the Herfindahl indices measure the degree 
of fragmentation of the market - if the index equals one the market is monopolised by a 
single model (complete standardisation occurs) and as the index tends to zero this implies 
the market is becoming more fragmented and competitive - and this has become more 
prevalent over time, as indicated by negative trend in the growth rates relative to the 
1971 base year. The degree of version-level fragmentation has been greater than at the 
model-level with the (preferred) version-level measure being 68% lower in 2002 while the 
model-level Herfindahl was 58% lower than it was in 1971. Regardless of which index is 
used the results show that the distribution of model and version level sales has fallen over 
time indicating that the market has become more fragmented over time.
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Figure 3.6: Model and Model Version Herfindahl Concentration Indices (Growth Rates)
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Source: Derived by the author using data.
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3.5 Concluding Discussion
The UK car market is used as a testing ground for fundamental issues associated to the 
product-life-cycle model of differentiated products in mature industries that dominate 
global economic activity. Specifically, the chapter analyses whether the predictions of 
four stylised facts associated to firms during the mature phase of the PLC applied to BL, 
and other market participants.
I find that only one stylised fact is unequivocally supported: that there has indeed been 
limited entry and exit in the market. The market shares of only two of the four dominant 
firms at the beginning of the period stabilised with the most pronounced feature in the 
market being a growth in sales of second-tier car manufacturers from Europe and Japan. 
It is shown that there is little evidence supporting a substantive shift towards process in­
novation and positive evidence that the market became increasingly fragmented and more 
differentiated rather than more standardised. The last finding is particularly significant 
since standardisation is the mechanism that drives a shift in market structure towards 
dominant firms who are best able to reduce costs through process innovation and meet 
consumers’ standardised product preference. Given the greater diversity in the market 
illustrated in this chapter it is less surprising that there has been a fragmenting of the 
market at the firm, brand, model and model version levels of aggregation. The unequiv­
ocal finding that product innovation has remained an important feature of cars does not 
suggest that developments on the production side, in the form of fiexible specialisation, 
are the only factor. Indeed, patent data indicate that product innovation has remained 
the dominant form of innovation in the industry.
While reluctant to generalise the results across other markets and industries there 
appears no compelling reason why the mechanisms quantified should not be apparent 
in other mature, technologically progressive, vertically differentiated product industries. 
Certainly it is the case that the analysis supports a less restrictive view “that innova­
tion between industries varies with industry development and must have its aim not a 
single pattern” [Abernathy and Utterback (1978), 46] rather than the simple arhistorical 
predictions of the PLC model.
Finally, the analysis also provides important clues as to whether the inability of BL to 
provide an increasingly differentiated product range indicated a low technological capacity 
at the firm which was to play a vital role in the firm’s severe retrenchment. In particular, 
it is shown that BL did not join in the expansion in differentiation during the period. 
Subsequent chapters will expand upon this point.
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Chapter 4
British Lemons? The Role of the 
Product-led Decline in the British 
Car Industry
4.1 Introduction to  Product-Led Decline
Leonard Lord, the chairman of British Motor Company stated that if “you make proper 
bloody products, then they will sell themselves” [Turner (1971, 90)]. Lord was not alone 
in his view that product quality was an issue central to the success of British car manufac­
turers. As will be detailed below, British Leyland Motor Company’s (BL) chief executives 
and government appointed commissions which attempted to diagnose and provide solu­
tions to the sharp decline of Britain’s flagship industry made the same point, albeit not 
always in as colourful a manner.
As was established in Chapter 1, the explanation of the post-war decline of British 
industry has been a central question and stimulant to historical research. Considerable 
contemporary analyses were undertaken on the car industry both by government agencies 
and by contemporary researchers with each of these studies emphasising that a key failing 
of the domestic industry’s flagship, BL, was its inability to provide an adequate “product 
package” that led to what the Central Policy Review Staff (1975) termed a ‘product-led 
decline’.^
This concept of ‘product-led decline’ defined by Central Policy Review Staff (1975), 
encapsulated three distinct dimensions and was widely cross-referenced in the aforemen-
 ^Contemporary analyses were undertaken on the car industry both by government agencies [Central Policy Review Staff 
(1975), National Enterprise Board (1977) and National Enterprise and Board (1977) and National Enterprise Board (1978)], 
and by contemporary researchers [Rhys (1972), Williams, Williams, and Thomas (1983), Williams, Williams, and Haslam 
(1987)].
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tioned contemporary studies. The first dimension was that BL cars were over-priced 
relative to imports and cars produced by overseas based MNEs in the “product package” 
they provided. Second, that BL was unable to fill the domestic market place with a 
range of products reflective of consumers' taste and demand patterns. In particular, the 
range of BL manufactured cars tended to dominate the larger car market leaving mass- 
product segments in the small family and mini car markets under-populated by British 
products [Rhys (1972)]. Third, that BL’s cars were outdated and that BL, unlike its 
foreign owned counterparts, neglected to regularly upgrade its product ranges to embody 
new technological advances [Central Policy Review Staff (1975, 67-68)].
While there was clear consensus amongst a sub-set of the literature that poor product 
quality played an important role in the declining domestic share of the UK car market 
in the work of contemporary analysts, the historical literature has paid limited attention 
to the products themselves. At best the historical literature makes ad hoc assertions 
based on the failed sales success of particular British models by focusing on a wide range 
of alternative factors. However, product led decline is only one of a wide selection of 
proposed candidates responsible for British Leyland’s decline. A poor industrial relations 
record; the relatively small scale and peculiarities of industrial organisation in the industry 
including managerial; and government intervention in the industry have also be targeted in 
the literature. The only systematic empirical work in the UK literature that we are aware 
of focuses on the distinctly separate issue of calculating quality-adjusted price indices for 
the industry as a whole using hedonic regression analysis [Cubbin and Cowling (1972); 
Murray and Sarantis (1999)]. Being interested in determining industry wide price indices 
neither of these studies examine the effects of underpricing at the firm or brand level, nor 
does that literature examine issues related to the second two aspects of PLD.
In contrast, this chapter analyses the UK car market between 1971-1998 quantifying 
the relevance of ‘product-led decline’ within a systematic framework.^ This work utilises 
a subset of the data set outlined in Chapter 2 which covers the 1971-1998 period that is 
rich enou^ to provide a plausible analysis of the evolution, of what is a highly quality 
differentiated product market.^
^Unlike other chapters in this Thesis which examine the 1971-2002 period, the analysis of PLD is constrained until 
1998. The interest of the study is on the earlier 1971-88 period with the later period being used to juxtapose those results. 
However, the full sample results suggest that PLD was an important feature of the market between 1999 and 2002, hence 
the analysis was constrained to the 1971 to 1998 time frame.
 ^Since analogous data on alternative markets is not available the UK car market is taken as being a ‘typical’ market in 
the sense that the products provided in it represent the ‘typical’ qualily of domestic and foreign products marketed. As 
is characteristic of car producing nations, a large proportion of locally produced cars are sold in the domestic market. In 
addition, there are also some advantages of examining a single market, particularly given that a significant role is placed on 
the availability and nature of model variants, in contrast to other work examining the car industry that aggregates to the base 
model as the unit of analysis [Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Verboven (1999), and Goldberg and Verboven (2001)]. 
By examining multiple markets it would not be possible to match variants between countries, since as Verboven (1996) 
points out that the same model of cars differ in terms of its embodied characteristics between the UK and neighbouring 
European markets. In addition, the consumers of particular markets are likely to have differed in the nature of the cars
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The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part, Section 4, examines the first 
aspect of the PLD hypothesis - whether BL’s products were overpriced - using hedonic 
methods. The second part, Section 4.3, turns to the testing of the second and third 
aspects of the PLD hypothesis which are analysed in the context of product survival. 
The approach taken in Section 4.3 is to examine how competitive forces have shaped the 
strategies of firms operating in the market. Of key interest is whether British Leyland’s 
strategies were able to react to these forces in an increasingly competitive environment. 
Specifically, I ask how did management at British Leyland respond to these changing 
conditions relative to competitors?
In order to address these issues, I apply two empirical methodologies used predom­
inantly by industrial organisation economists. The first, comes from the discrete liter­
ature that is used to determine each product attribute’s cost and markup in order to 
calculate spatial quality metrics. Calculating the markup and cost associated with each 
attribute is necessary in order to distinguish between arguments that affect production 
costs (for example due to labour disputes), and the higher profit margins associated with 
the incorporation products quality attributes determined on the demand side. The sec­
ond methodological tool kit used is duration analysis which is employed to examine the 
dynamics of PLD on the survival of products in the market.
In using duration analysis to determine the survival of products my work is method­
ologically related to four papers by Greenstein and Wade (1998), Asplund and Sandin 
(1999), de Figueiredo and Kyle (2000) and de Figueiredo and Kyle (2004). While the first 
two of those papers allow for the assessment of the dynamic aspect of model survival, they 
fail to relate product quality to the survival of products and deal with rather different top­
ics. Greenstein and Wade (1998) examine the effects of changing market structure on the 
product-life-cycle of an adolescent industry (the US mainframe computer market between 
1968-82), while Asplund and Sandin (1999) study a mature horizontally differentiated 
product with fittle technological innovation (the beer market in Sweden in the 1989-95 
period). Neither of these studies examines the differing nature of the products marketed 
and in the latter, authors argue that at the sub-market levels they analyse (lager and 
dark beer) the product has no quality (vertical) differentiated component, while Green­
stein and Wade (1998) exclude product characteristics due to a lack of consistent product 
attribute information, (de Figueiredo and Kyle, 2000, 2004) examine product survival 
in the desk-top laser printer (DTLP) industry. Their work is more closely finked to my 
research in that they do consider innovation. However, their work differs in four crucial 
respects. The first three substantive differences relate to the nature of competition in
demanded. By concentrating oh a single market such complicating dimensions are avoided.
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DTLP markets. First, a key finding in their research is that the DTLP industry can be 
segmented along two product dimensions: printer speed and resolution. This is not the 
case in the car industry where all products are differentiated and upgraded over time 
along a multitude of dimensions implying that a far richer set of product attributes need 
to be accounted for. Second, in the DTLP market firms do not change products after they 
have been introduced, rather they introduce a new product. In contrast differentiation 
within products that are already established in the market both across the product spec­
trum and through time is the norm in the car industry with successful products radically 
altering over their life times. Third, competition in the DTLP industry only occurs within 
market segments between firms, that typically market few products within segments over 
time. In stark contrast, as will be shown, there has been a proliferation of models in 
all market segments of the car market. The implication being that competition within 
multi-product car manufacturers in the same market segment, also known as cannibalisar 
tion is of great importance in analysing car markets. Fourth, while the authors speculate 
that product survival is related to the profitability of products, they do not distinguish 
between cost and profits either directly, since cost data is unavailable, or indirectly, via 
discrete choice modeling as is done in this paper, because they lack the complete set of 
sales data necessary to do so. The authors recommend the use of structural models such 
as those employed in this study. However, the simpler approach taken by de Figueiredo 
and Kyle is not an option in my case, since discerning between supply and demand factors 
is necessary in order to distinguish between the alternative causes of the retrenchment 
of British Leyland that are emphasised in the historical literature and that motivate this 
research.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Sub-section 4.2.1 examines the issue 
of product quality from both the demand perspective, via an analysis of the perceptions of 
consumer groups and of consumer oriented publications, and the supply side response of 
management to product quality deficiencies. Section 4.2.2 analyses the data comparing the 
quality characteristics of domestic British firms, MNEs operating in Britain, and foreign 
imported models. Section 4.3 goes beyond analysing price-quality relations to consider the 
impacts of spatial location and product upgrading. Sub-section 4.3.1, develops concepts 
of spatial competition from the economics fiterature to pin down the notion of product-led 
decline formally, thereby, allowing a series of testable hypotheses concerning the nature of 
competition, and the strategies available to firms to obviate its effects, to be developed. 
Sub-section 4.3.2 introduces the data and derives quality metrics that are used to test 
the role of product-led decline on the survival of models in Sub-section 4.3.5. Finally, 
Sub-section 4.4 contains the concluding discussion.
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4.2 British Lemons? The Role of the Quality and Price in the 
British Car Industry
4.2.1 Perceptions of Quality and the Corporate Response
Perceptions of Quality
In 1971 the Consumer Association, the publisher of Motoring Which? in Britain, 
released the results of a three-year investigation into the reasons why car buyers in Britain 
purchased a particular model. More than 92 per cent of the 30,000 peopled surveyed 
regarded product quality “a very important point” in their purchase choice [Consumer 
Association (01/1971)]. Four years later, the head of the Consumer Association’s car- 
testing unit confirmed the findings in testimony before the Trade and Industry Trade 
Subcommittee. He stated that car buyers considered price, styling, and quality were major 
factors influencing consumers’ purchasing decisions [National Enterprise Board (1977)].
Consumerist and motoring journals routinely criticised the build quality, spartan level 
of embodied car attributes, and dependability of domestic models, ranking these at below 
average levels. This was exacerbated in the early 1970s when the increasing number of high 
quality imports raised the comparative quality standard and shifted buyer expectations 
of quality in the British car market. The results of the 1971 Motoring Which? survey 
of owner satisfaction, summarised in Figure 4.1, show that Rover was the only BL brand 
placed in the top ten, r anking tenth, with nine of the lowest fifteen ranked brands being 
manufactured by BL. Only Bootes/ Chrysler UK and Vauxhall (GM) fared worse with 
less than 40% of owners being willing to purchase a car of the same make. Ford’s score 
was lower than that of European producers but was marginally higher than BL’s mass 
produced brands.
The clear message to domestic car manufacturers was that they would need to produce 
more compelling products in order to compete against European competition and the 
small but rapidly growing Japanese presence in the market.
The survey results, which are consistent with the views expounded by Motoring Which? 
in their reviews of motoring products were by no means isolated. The other significant 
UK reviewers and price guides [The Motorist’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1971- 
93), Parker’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1993-2002), Autocar/Motor^ and EIU 
(1/1965) (the Economist Intelligence Unit car industry report)] also agreed that the im­
port sales success stemmed firom models that offered car attributes that were equivalent 
or higher than domestically manufactured cars.
In order to obtain a view of consumer recommendations of the full period of the study a 
survey was made of Motoring Which? to gauge which makes and models were considered
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of Consumers Who Would Buy the Same Make?
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Renault 
Mercedes 
Rolls Royce
100
S o u rc e : Motoring W hich?, January 1971 . Information is provided on 
31 brands which account for 98.2% of responses to the survey 
(n=30,00)
‘Best Buys’ in the mini, small family, medium and executive market segments. Table
4.1 summarises the results for the period 1964 to 1979.  ^ The period prior to 1971 is 
examined, when the data set used in this study commences, in order to capture the 
longer run trends.® Of the four UK located manufacturers, Chrysler UK models achieved 
the ‘Best Buy’ mantle only seven times, with four of these awards [BMC 1100, the Hillman 
Imp (1966, 1967, and 1969) and the Hillman Hunter (1965)] occurring prior to 1970. The 
only UK produced Chrysler model to be named ‘Best Buy’ in the 1970s was the Hillman 
Avenger, in 1975 and 1976, with a model from Chrysler’s French subsidiary, Simca, also 
being awarded the recommendation in 1974. Chrysler UK exited the UK car market 
in 1979, while BL was prominent in the market for the full period, albeit under various 
ownership and management regimes. However, despite its longevity prior to 1981 BL only
^The alternative trade publications, such as Motor and Autocar, have generally similar selections and are omitted to 
reduce space. The segments being Mini/Super-mini, Small R&mily, Medium, Executive, Luxury, Sports, 4WD, and Personal 
Carriers, with the segmentation being taken from trade publications, and the Department of Transport. Recommendations 
on the sports and luxury product segments are not reported in Table 4.1 since systematic annual reviews were not conducted.
®To obtain an overview of the rich history of merger activity and limited entry of producers making cars in the UK car 
market over the period examined please refer to Appendix B.
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received four annual ‘Best Buy’ ratings, three for the Mini (1964-65, 1976) and once for 
the Austin 1800/2200 in 1973.
Table 4.1: Motoring Which? Best Buys (1964-1979)
Mini Small Family Medium Executive
Make Model Make Model Make Model Make Model
1964 BMC Mini Ford 
Vaxhall (GM)
Cortina 1200 
Victor
1965 BMC
Flat
Mini
8508
Ford Cortina 1200 Hillman (CUK) Super Minx
1966 Hillman (CUK) Imp Ford Cortina Vauxhall (GM) Cresta DL
1967 Hillman (CUK) Imp Ford Escort Rover 2000
1968 BMC 1100 Font Cortina Ford 
Vauxhall (GM)
Corsair
Viscount
1969 Hillman (CUK) Imp Ford 
Vauxhall (GM)
Escort
Viva Ford
16TS
Cortina
NSU Ro80
1970 DAF Toyota Corona Saab
VW
96
1600T
NSU
Audi
Ro80
100
1971 Renault 4 Renault 12 Renault
Rover
Saab
16
2000
99
Volvo
Jaguar
Volvo
144S
XJ6
144
1973 Renault 4 Rover
AR
3500
1800/2200
Ford
Peugot
Granada
504
1974 Simca (CFR) 1100 Renault 12 VW Passat Audi
Jaguar
Vovio
100
XJ6/XJ12
144/164
1975 Citroen Dyane Alfa Romeo Atfastud Renault 16 Volvo 240
Honda Civic Cttreon GS Ford Cortina Audi 100
Renault 5 Ford 
Hfllman (CUK)
Escort
Avenger
1976 VW Polo Nissan Sunny Aife Romeo AMastud Volvo 240
Renault 4 Toyota Cordis CItreon GS BL Princess
BLMC Mini 1000 VW Beetle
Chmen Dyane Ford 
Hillman (CUK)
Escort
Avenger
Vauxhall (GM) 
Ford
Cavalller
Cortina
1977 Citroen Dyane Vauxhall (GM) Chevette Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Volvo 244
Renault 4 Simca 1100 Ford Cortina Saab 99
Datsun Cherry Ford Escort Alfe Romeo Aifastud Audi 100
Honda CMC CItreon GS Rover 3500
Peugeot 104 Honda Accord Jaguar XJ
Renault 5GTL Renault 14
Ford Fiesta
VW Pdo
1978 VW Pdo Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Vdvo 244
Ford Fiesta Honda Accord Saab 99
1979 VW Pdo BL Allegro Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Vdvo 244
Ford Fiesta Ford Escort Honda Accord Saab 99
Vauxhall (GM) Chevette Vauxhall (GM) 
VW
Chevette
Golf
Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Audi 
Renault 
Vauxhall (GM)
100
20TS
Calton
NotM:'*1972 April 1«t Beat Buy cited. Beet buy* In earllor yearn done by «canning review*. 'PCa fiat mentioned In 1986 the Beet Buy 
being the Nisaan "Prairie'. 4WD Beat Buy haa been the Land Rover "Range Rover* (1964-1990), and the Land Rover "Dtacovery" in 1990
Table 4.2 shows that BL’s most successful model in the 1980s, the Metro, was the 
only model to be placed amongst the top selling cars in the market after 1981. As 
was pointed out in Chapter 1, and will be detailed below, the 1980s saw a significant
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Table 4.2: Motoring Which? Best Buys (1980-1990)
Mini Small Family Medium Executive
Make Model Make Model Make Modal Make Modal
1879 VW Polo BL Allegro Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Volvo 244
Ford Fiesta Ford Escort Horxla Accord. Saab 99
Vauxhall (GM) Chevette Vauxhall (GM) 
VW
Chevette
Golf
Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Audi 
Renault 
Vauxhall (GM)
100
20TS
Calton
1980 VW Polo Peugeot 305GL Honda
Ford
Accord
Grande
Ford 
Vauxhall (GM) 
Volvo
Grande
Calton
244
1981 VW Polo VW Golf Nissan Bluebird Ford Granada
Cttreon Visa Opel Kadett Vauxhall (GM) Calton
Ford Fiesta Peugeot 305GL Volvo 244
Honda Civic Mazda 626 BMW 316
BL Metro Honda 
Vauxhall (GM) 
Opel
Accord
Cavalier
Ascona
1982 VW Polo VW
Vauhall
Golf
Astra
Vauhall
Honda
Cavalier
Accord
Volvo 244
1983 VW Polo VW Golf Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier Volvo 240
Vauhall Astra Honda Accord Audi 100
1984 VW Polo VW Golf Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier BMW 3 Series
Citroen Visa Vauxhall (GM) Astra Honda Accord BMW 5 Series
Flat Uno Nissan Sunny Peugot 305 Frxd Grands
BL Metro Toyota Corolla Mazda 626 Vauxhall (GM) Carlton
Vauxhall (GM) Nova
Ford Fiesta
1985 Citroen Visa Nissan Sunny Audi 80 Audi 100
Flat Uno Vauxhall (GM) Astra Horxla Accord Volvo 200
VW Polo Toyota Corolla Toyota Carina
Nissan MIcra VW Golf Vauxhall (GM) Cavalier
Vauxhall (GM) Nova
1986 Citroen 2CV Nissan Sunny Audi 80 Audi 100
Austin Mini Toyota Corolla Honda Accord Volvo 200
Flat Uno Toyota Carina
VW Polo
Nissan MIcra
Vauxhall (GM) Nova
1987 Nissan 
Peugeot 
Toyota 
Vauxhall (GM)
MIcra
205
Starlet
Nova
Toyota Corolla Honda
Mazda
Citroen
Volvo
Accord
626
BX
200
Audi 100
1988 Nissan MIcra Toyota Corolla Honda Accord Audi 100
Peugeot 205 Nissan
Citroen
Bluebird
BX
Audi
Volvo
80
200
1989 Nissan MIcra Toyota Corolla Honda Accord Saab 90001
Peugeot 205 VW Golf Toyota Carina
Toyota Starlet Nissan Sunny
Vauxhall (GM) Nova
1990 Peugeot 205 Toyota
Nissan
Corolla
Sunny
Toyota Carina Audi
BMW
Mercedes
100 
500 Series 
190
No##: '*1972 April lit Beet Buy cried. Beet txjy# In eerileryeer# done by ecennlng reviewi. ’PCe tint mentioned In 1B86 the Beet Buy 
being the Nieeen'Prairie'. 4WD Beet Buy has been the Land Rover'Range Roveri (1964-1990), and the Lend Rover Dlecaveiy'In 1990
firm consolidation, that saw BL rename itself Austin Rover (AR) and reduce its brand 
range from eight to two brands, comprising three core models. The success of the three-
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model rationalisation policy according to consumer magazines was short lived. Motonng 
Which?^8 comparative review for the Metro in 1988 revealed the continuing characteristic 
and image disadvantage of AR. The journal noted that the “one time great hope of British 
Leyland has never convinced the public of its superiority’’. Testers found the Metro to be 
a "fairly comfortable car” with good handling, but that it suffered from average engine 
performance, inferior space, and a lower range of features. Testers rated the Peugeot 205, 
Ford Fiesta, and Vauxhall Nova as superior “buys” [Consumer Association (04/1988)].
Reviews of AR’s Maestro also were initially quite promising with Which? initially 
considering the Maestro ‘a car to be reckoned with’. Compared to the leading competitors 
in the small fam ily segment. Ford’s Escort and Vauxhall’s Astra, the Maestro had more 
comfort and acceleration than its competitors. Three years later the journal noted that 
the model had lost it interior and comfort advantages to revised versions (the Astra) and 
models (Ford’s Orion). Motoring Which? discovered an “appalling” number of defects in 
AR’s other CORE model the Montego, and argued that the traditional mass producers. 
Ford and Vauxhall, had a “better overall package.” [Which?, Jan. 1988].
From the BL/AR perspective, the clearest finding to come from Table 4.1 is the absence 
of models classified as ‘Best Buys’. In contrast to BL, between 1964^1990, Ford and 
Vauxhall (GM) had 22 and 27 model recommendations, respectively. Examining the 
timing of the awards it is noteworthy that both Ford and Vauxhall models are absent from 
the ‘Best Buy’ listing between 1970 and 1974, the period when European and Japanese 
producers began their bids to obtain a slice of the UK market, with Ford being the first 
of the two firms to re-emerge in 1975, and Vauxhall GM reappearing the following year.
While the Consumer Association studies revealed consumers’ preference for high qual­
ity products there is also considerable additional anecdotal evidence that domestically 
owned British manufactured cars were of a lower quality than other manufacturers. Con­
sumer complaints concerning the quality of British produced cars had been apparent 
throughout the post-World War II period, but were muted in an effectively insulated UK 
car market. Evidence that British cars were considered substandard in overseas markets 
abound. An early example comes from the Commercial Officer in the British Embassy 
in Washington in 1950 who reported that British cars had earned a reputation of being 
“liable to obscure faults”, and as a consequence, US buyers routinely searched for defects 
on new British cars “on the assumption that something must be wrong” [Ministry of 
Supply (July, 1950)]. The 1970s saw British cars being downgraded by US surveys filling 
the lowest spots on consumer rankings with BL models residing in the ‘poor’ and ‘not 
recommended’ categories [Consumer Association (1965-)]. Perhaps the most sensational 
evidence of the low quality of BL products came from the West German Automobile Club
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who awarded its ‘Silver Lemon’ award for the car with the most faults to BL’s Triumph 
Spitfire in 1975. The tested Spitfire required two door locks, two engines, a new gearbox, 
a new differential, and the fire brigade (to extinguish a burning engine) in a single year 
requiring it to spend four months off the road [The Times (25/9/76, 3)].
Corporate Response?
Senior management of BL were aware of the substandard quality of the firm’s products 
as was reflected in repeated calls to raise quality [Motor, (1/12/73)]. Prior to this senior 
managers had been concerned with competition from UK subsidiaries of US MNEs. Other 
than Lord’s rather direct appraisal of product quality quoted earlier, there are a number 
of other supporting statements from firm boardroom accounts. Donald Stokes, the BL 
Chair and Managing Director, argued for the need to raise quality standards. His call for 
raised standards was echoed in other subsidiaries of the corporation, however, it appears 
these statements were no more than mere lip service to the issue since they did not result 
in any systematic quality appraisal throughout the development, testing, and ultimately 
the production of new models. A case in point is found in William Davis’, Triumph’s 
Managing Director, response to Stokes’s order to raise quality levels to the level of foreign 
competitors in 1970. In a stunning example of a short-termist response, Davis’s suggested 
that ‘applying wax all over’ as a means to reduce the number of vehicles leaving the factory 
with body corrosion [SODA: MSS 226/ST/1/11/16 (11/07/1970)].
While it is clear that BL’s management were aware of product deficiencies it is less 
clear that the extent of the problem was known before the early 1970s. In an attempt to 
assess the nature of the problem, central staff instituted a computer analysis of warranty 
trends and costs in 1971. Not surprisingly, the report confirmed the anecdotal evidence 
of a high incident of warranty claims. The result being that the Specialist Car Division 
Advisory Board (SCDAB) of BL hired more inspectors in 1972, only to scrap the scheme 
two years later. SCDAB called for a method to forecast future problems to be instigated, 
but this was postponed due to a shortage of funds. That year, two years after his initial 
call to raise standards, Stokes restated his complaint about product quality to the SCDAB 
- that the poor standard of the firm’s cars in general, and the specialist car division in 
particular, prevented sales from achieving profitable levels.® Once again, while there was 
an agreement that quality issues were of major concern, the corporation did not appear 
willing to take action by developing new interventions to address the problem [Edwardes
^Documentation associated with the SCDAB provides a considerable record of product quality issues facing BL. In 
part this is due to the substantive problems besetting the division as reflected in the spectacular failure of the British 
manufacturers in a segment that it had formally dominated in the 1950s to the early 1970s. These documents are housed 
in Warwick at the Modem Records Centre.
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(1983)].
In 1975, with BL facing a severe decline in market share, which had fallen from 41% to 
32%, amounting to £26 million pounds during the 1975-76 financial year, the government 
assumed ownership of the troubled firm.  ^ Government ownership allowed direct pressure 
for the remedies to raise quality levels suggested in the investigations of the Cabinet 
appointed analysis unit, which had resulted in British Leyland: The Next Decade (1975), 
informally called the Ryder Report after the Committee’s chairman (Donald Ryder), to 
be apphed [National Enterprise Board (1977)]. Unlike the previous muted attempts to 
raise quality levels the Joint Management Council took an assertive step by instigating a 
study examining alternative approaches to quality control applied by other firms in the 
industry. The result was a study by BL engineers of Japanese quality control methods 
culminating in a visit to Nissan, Mitsubishi, Honda and Kansai Paint in June and July of 
1975. The resulting report catalogued the institutional virtues and advanced productivity 
of the Japanese plants relative to their British counterparts, and was disseminated along 
with specific recommendations to various British Leyland departments [British Leyland 
(06-07/1975)].
Subsequent evaluations of these reforms suggest that they met with, at best, partial 
success. An assessment by the National Enterprise Board (NEB) in 1977 tactfully argued
that there had been “considerable progress but [the firm] has not achieved as much
we would have liked” [National Enterprise Board (1978)] Nine-month quality audits at 
the E&T Tysley and Birmingham facilities were less diplomatic, reporting that significant 
flaws in products existed, and that products that appeared sound based on visual inspec­
tion often failed during routine fabrication [British Leyland: MSS 309/BL/3/34 (02/1977, 
10/1977, 11/1977, 02/1978)].
An appreciation of the rather lacklustre success of the 1975 reforms to affect the qual­
ity process, led BL’s newly appointed chairman, Edwardes, and the NEB to undertake 
a second set of reforms in 1977 more in line with the engineers’ recommendations fol­
lowing the 1975 visit to Japan. The programme, known as ‘Quality Awareness 77’, set 
the goal of “planning quality into a vehicle at all stages”. In effect, the aim was to 
achieve a system of quality assurance that had been common practice for Japanese and 
European manufacturers for more than a decade. The comprehensive set of improve­
ments included: metrology units to sample materials and components and the compiling 
of real-time fault reports, and new product timing and planning procedures and design 
systems that were incorporated into engineering systems. In addition, customer com-
^Market share data derived by the author from SMMT data. Profit data taken from BL’s annual accounts that were 
also compiled by the author [see Appendix A for the sources and providers].
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plaint surveys and quality cost-benefit analyses to assist engineering and final-inspection 
work, and a formal communication system between design offices and the factory floor 
were to be implemented. Finally, Quality Circles (QCs), and Joint Management Councils 
(JMC), whereby sub-committees of workers and employees collaborated in providing rec­
ommendations to improve quality in the production process were to be set up [ToUiday 
(1991)].
The NEB envisioned that the system would be fully operative by 1980. Their hopes 
proved only to be partially realised, with the majority of the recommendations being 
adopted in a confused manner and the QC and JMC system, that had provided a central 
means of quality assessment at Toyota, collapsing in 1980. The approach to QCs was 
motivated by Toyota who had operated the system since 1963. [Cusumano (1991)]. BL’s 
approach to QC differed considerably to that of Toyota. By 1980, 99% of Toyota’s workers 
were involved in the process. In contrast, BL’s QCs were made up of small groups of 
representatives. It is not clear whether or not QCs role was considered by management 
to be anything more than cosmetic and was constrained to “improving existing practices 
rather then new innovations” [British Leyland: MSS 309/BL/3/34 (02/1977, 10/1977, 
11/1977, 02/1978)].
Edwardes, like his predecessors, acknowledged that the “cars and production had to 
be right” for his plans to raise the profitability of the corporation. Unlike his predecessors 
however, the corporate strategy he was to push through was a significant departure from 
the Ryder recovery strategy in the form of the CORE product rationalisation program 
[Edwardes (1983)] BL’s consolidation in effect used an approach similar to that undertaken 
by BL’s traditional adversary Ford [Edwardes (1983)]. The only divisions to be exempt 
from the rationalisation were the niche Daimler-Jaguar and the Land Rover marques 
since these had well defined products that were distinct from the mass marketable model 
segments.®
While Edwardes’ CORE strategy aimed to reduce the number of models marketed and 
revise the product range, AR faced development problems in meeting the new require­
ments envisaged by the CORE strategy without exiting production in their established 
small family and medium mass-market segments. With the exception of the Metro, which 
was launched in 1980, the two other models envisioned as part of the CORE strategy, 
the Maestro and the Montego, were still in the design phase and would not be able to 
enter the market until the mid-1980s. A compromise was found through maintaining the 
production of established models and through fining the gaps in the AR product range by
B Daimler-Jaguar waa floated as a private company in 1984 prior to being acquired by Pbrd, as part of its Premier 
Motoring Group, in 1991.
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using designs purchased from Honda with whom AR had signed an informal agreement 
in 1979. The agreement between Honda and Austin Rover followed initial attempts to 
negotiate similar co-operating deals with GM Opel and Renault which foundered. The 
willingness of Honda to enter into discussions no doubt reflects limitations placed on the 
market access of it and other Japanese firms through the enforcement of Voluntary Export 
Restrictions in 1977. The first model to result from the union was the Triumph Acclaim, 
the AR version of the Honda Ballade, which was launched in 1980, with the updated ver­
sion of the model entitled the Rover 200 Series being marketed from 1984 [The Motorist’s 
Guide to New and Used Car Prices (06/1984)]. The successes of the program led to a 
collaborative development of the XX  project (the Rover 800 Series) based on the Honda 
Legend [Mair (1994, 231-33)].
The CORE strategy, which was continued by Sir Austin Bind (1982-86) and Thatcher’s 
personally appointed Graham Day (1986-1988) until AR was acquired by British Aerospace 
(BAe) in 1988, succeeded in rationalising the number of models produced by the firm from 
seventeen (in 1979) to six by 1987. In order to get the programs under way, a subsidy of 
£900 million for the project, £300nm of which was devoted to design and development 
in order to develop two new mass-market models termed the LC series (the Montego 
and Maestro), was extracted from the government [Thatcher (1993, 439-440)]. However, 
both programs were undermined by traditional design and development problems. An 
example of these problems was that engineers failed to complete the new transmission 
required for the Maestro, which slowed down pilot production of the model, and forced 
AR to make modifications in order to utilise a Volkswagen gearbox [Edwardes (1983, 
174)]. The problems associated with the Montego were more serious, with management 
deciding after the completion of the Maestro that the models were too similar leading 
to costly changes. Difllculties also stemmed from the new automated production process 
which compounded the problem and which led AR to form ties with the University of 
Warwick in 1988 in order to resolve its problems with designing and operating computer 
manufacturing technologies [The Times (06/03/88)].
British Aerospace (BAe) purchased AR in 1988 under a complex deal whereby AR’s 
debts were written off and a £469 million subsidy was provided by the government to 
BAe. The shift meant a change of ownership but not a change in corporate direction, 
with the product range being expanded only through the Rover 400 Series based on a 
Honda Concerto in 1990, and the Rover 600 Series based on the Synchro in 1993 [Mair 
(1994, 238-39)]. BAe divested its interest in AR in 1993 selling the firm to BMW [The 
Economist (03/03/1994)]. By this time the CORE three strategy models, which had been 
envisaged as the saviour of AR had effectively been replaced by models derived from the
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HondarAR collaborative projects that accounted for 92% of newly registered Rovers in 
1993.9
In order to place BL/AR’s muted corporate response to the sharp upturn in import 
penetration in the UK car market prior to radical CORE reforms in perspective, the 
responses of other UK based manufacturers summarised are below. Three US based MNEs 
had manufacturing subsidiary plants located in the UK in 1971; Ford (UK), Vauxhall 
(GM) and Chrysler UK (CUK). CUK, which incorporated the Hillman, Humber, Singer 
and Sunbeam brands, was the most recent entrant of the three. By contrast, both Ford 
and GM had a long term commitment to producing cars in the UK, with Ford creating its 
UK subsidiary in 1911, while GM inaugurated its UK production through the purchase of 
its UK subsidiary, Vauxhall, in 1926. °^ Both Ford and GM had failed to make significant 
in-roads into the market share of indigenous producers between 1965 and 1970, and the 
influx of imported cars clearly posed as significant a threat to these US based MNEs as 
it did to domestically owned producers.
Ford adopted an initial strategy of modifying its existing model variants in 1972, before 
replacing its entire product variant range between 1974 and 1977.^  ^ Rather than market­
ing new models. Ford chose to maintain its existing model range but significantly modified 
their attributes and, as Motoring Which? pointed out, “the Ford Cortina of today is com­
pletely unrecognisable compared to the Ford Cortina of even five years ago” [Consumer 
Association (01/1975)]. As Table 4.3 shows, the strategy proved to be successful with 
Ford producing the most popular models in the UK over the complete 1971-1998 period. 
Furthermore, Ford was the only US based firm manufacturing in the UK to expand its 
share of the UK car market over the period.
In contrast to Ford, Vauxhall (GM) introduced a series of new models in 1971 (Firenza), 
and updated its version of its larger Victor models (re-badging them the Victor FE Series). 
Consumer and trade reviews of the Vauxhall GM range had not been flattering, as reflected 
by the absence of a Vauxhall model being considered a ‘Best Buy’ in any of the pubfications 
surveyed that year. Furthermore, as Figure 4.1 illustrates, the Vauxhall owners who stated 
that they would be willing to repurchase models under the Vauxhall marque ranked only 
above Chrysler UK’s Singer and Sunbeam as brands whose owners were least willing to 
repurchase. These modifications proved insufficient to maintain GM’s market share as 
Table 3.1 illustrated earlier. At that time GM was in the process of developing a new
^Author’s calculations using SMMT data.
also sold cars produced ty  its German subsidiary, Opel, which it acquired in 1929, while Ford also sold cars 
produced in West Germany (1972), Belgium (1977), Spain (1977) and the US (1994) in the UK car market (the years in 
brackets representing the first year when transplants were sold in the UK).
^^Ford’s market share hovered between 24% and 26%, Rootes/Chrysler between 5-7% emd Vauxhall between 10-12% 
between 1965 and 1970 [Society of and Motor and Manufacturers and TVaders (1965-73)].
Other than the quote from Motoring Which? these upgrades are evident in the data set used in this study.
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Table 4.3: Highest Selling Model (1971-1998)
Year Brand Model Sales Year Brand Model Sales
1971 Ford Cortina 101,492 1985 Ford Fiesta 124,132
1972 Ford Cortina 187,210 1986 Ford Fiesta 143,701
1973 Ford Cortina 188,995 1987 Ford Fiesta 153,451
1974 Ford Cortina 140,317 1988 Ford Sierra 160,242
1975 Ford Cortina 104,149 1989 Ford Sierra 173,168
1976 Ford Escort 127,169 1990 Ford Fiesta 151,381
1977 Ford Cortina 120,601 1991 Ford Fiesta 116,463
1978 Ford Cortina 189,014 1992 Ford Escort 117,222
1979 Ford Cortina 254,558 1993 Ford Fiesta 110,379
1980 Ford Cortina 177,698 1994 Ford Escort 135,386
1981 Ford Cortina 165,101 1995 Ford Escort 132,206
1982 Ford Escort 151,759 1996 Ford Fiesta 139,206
1983 Ford Escort 175,559 1997 Ford Fiesta 118,684
1984 Ford Escort 134,125 1998 Ford Fiesta 116,110
Source SMMT'. Note thmt our fignret mre genented from the New RegistntioDi micro data 
and are mot exactly equivalent to lunmaiy figures presented in SMMT yearbooks due to 
our cleanmg procedure and due to our inchisioo of Ford's subsidiaiy campenies.
product range that was to be introduced in 1975 in the form of the Chevette and the 
Cavalier. Reviews of the Chevette were positive if not outstanding, but the Cavalier was 
considered by all consumer magazines and trade reviews examined to be an outstanding 
car being hailed as the ‘Best Car’ in its segment by Motoring Which? six times between 
1976 and 1985. Vauxhall succeeded in building on the Cavalier’s success in the medium 
segment with the Vauxhall’s replacement to the Chevette, the Nova, in 1983.
Chrysler was the last of the US multinational producers to obtain plants in Europe 
gaining entry into production through its acquisition of its French subsidiary, Simca, in 
1963, and the foundering Rootes Motor Company in the UK through a gradual takeover 
between 1964 and 1967 [Young and Hood (1977, 58-67)]. Rootes’ key investment in the 
early 1960s was the development of the Imp, which it marketed under both the Sunbeam 
and Hillman brands. The Imp proved to be a success both in terms of its sales and 
its ratings by consumer journals (see Table 4.1) being rated a ‘Best Buy’ in the mini 
segment between 1966-69. However, commentators agreed that there was a need for 
considerable rationalisation at CUK, with significant plant and model development and 
corporate restructuring being required for the firm to be able to regain the foothold it 
held in the market in the 1950s [Consumer Association (1962-); Young and Hood (1977, 
Ch.9)j. Chrysler’s response was cautious with mild investment rates that ensured that 
CUK had one of the lowest fixed assets to employment ratios among European producers 
[EIU (1975a, 14^23)].
A rationalisation of CUK’s operations finally occurred in 1970, with the first step 
towards renewal of the model range being the Avenger released that year. However,
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despite the success of the model, CUK still lost £10 miUion that year [Young and Hood 
(1977, 137-40)]. In 1971, the remainder of CUK’s models were an average of 10 years old 
(compared to an average of 5 years for imports), with the variant update of established 
models being four years (compared to the average imported car rates being three years). 
The only firm to have an older product range was Ford, with an average of thirteen 
years. However, as was pointed out. Ford’s strategy involved model variant, rather than 
model updating. Chrysler phased out its older products over the early 1970s, but their 
development of new products or enhancement of the newer models in their existing range, 
aside from the case of the Avenger, was not substantive [The Motorist’s Guide to New 
and Used Car Prices (1972, 7)].
The unwillingness of Chrysler UK’s US parent to make the necessary upgrades to the 
CUK product range was no doubt a reflection of the ailing fortunes of the company in 
the US market. Chrysler US faced considerable losses during the 1970s, and given the 
poor performance of CUK, which achieved the lowest operating profits of any UK car 
manufacturer between 1965 and 1974 [Young and Hood (1977)], it is not surprising that 
Chrysler US was unwilling to devote the considerable resources necessary to revive its UK 
subsidiary. In part this reflected a differing approach to its overseas subsidiaries than Ford 
and GM by treating them as self sufficient divisions which limited the scope for investment 
in the loss making UK operation [EIU (1975a, 14^25)]. However, the ailing fortunes of the 
parent firm reduced the ability of the firm to acquire funds for investment in new product 
lines. Chrysler was planning to abandon UK production which was not an acceptable 
situation for the Wilson government who responded by providing a bail out package, 
similar to that received by BL the same year but different in that the government took 
a detailed monitoring role without taking over the subsidiary. However, the package 
was not used for extensive development of new products, rather, there was a renewed 
impetus to upgrade existing products which proved insufficient to stem CUK market 
share decline. The arrival of laconcca as managing director of Chrysler led to the firm 
selling off its European operations to the PSA group in order to concentrate on rebuilding 
the company’s beleaguered product line in the US [Yates (1996)].
In summary, the review of the product history both from the perspectives of consumer 
groups and publications, and from the corporate history of Britain’s flagship motor com­
pany, BL, suggests that the company’s fortunes over the period can be viewed as a tale in 
two parts represented in the BL phase (1968-1979) and the AR phase from 1979 onwards.
^^The life of models come from the model and variant age variaibles derived by the author.
^^The correspondence between an anxious government and the financial distressed Chrysler have been documented in 
Granada Television (1976), ‘Chrysler and the Cabinet: How the Deal was Done’, TVanscript of the Programme Transmitted 
9 Feb. 1976.
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Prior to collaboration with Honda and the rationalisation instigated under the CORE 
reforms, the survey indicates BL’s products were not sufficiently competitive to allow the 
firm to maintain market share. In that period, the opening of the domestic market to 
freer trade brought the internationally low standard of British products into sharp fo­
cus to both British manufacturing executives and, more importantly, to car buyers. BL 
was ill equipped to compete effectively in a market characterised by increased levels of 
competition.
The analysis of Chrysler UK suggests it suffered a similar fate as BL during its pre­
consolidation phase, with attempts to revamp the structure of the moribund remnants 
of Rootes Motor Company being stymied by a lack of new product development. By 
contrast. Ford and GM made clear efforts to raise the quality of their products and 
existing product ranges by developing and releasing revamped model variant ranges to 
stem the effects of import penetration on their UK sales. Ford took a conservative strategy 
of concentrating on upgrading the quality of its exiting product range and expanding the 
available variants. The success of the strategy was based on maintaining dominance in 
mass produced segments the success of which was reflected in the sales of the Escort and 
Cortina models during the 1970s, that allowed Ford UK to be the only domestic producer 
to remain profitable and maintain its market share over that period. The Escort for 
example saw major upgrades in 1972, 1975, and 1980 with a number of minor revisions 
between these years [The Motorist’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (10/1980)].
4.2.2 Analysis of Price-QusJity Relations 
Hedonic Analysis
To shed light on the relative price-quality relations of domestic manufactured vehicles, 
UK based MNE manufacturers, and imported competitors, hedonic modeling techniques 
are used. A correctly estimated hedonic function provides an a priori method to dis­
tinguish the value placed on attribute features of cars, and a means to establish the 
importance of brand premiums effects and of the value of attributes contributing to the 
value of each model version. The specification adopted is identical to that used in Chapter 
2 in terms of its functional form, quantity weighting and characteristics employed except 
for the inclusion of model specific random effects. The model being,
i
InPvmbt =  O!o +  ^  CHAR -\-Tt+ 'ysXCHk +  Pm +  v^mbjt (4.1)
i=l
where the price of model, m, with versions, u, marketed under brand, b, at time t, 
is determined by the characteristics {CHAR) of each version, z, a set of time dummies
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(Tt), bilateral exchange rates, set relative to the pound that are indexed by the country of 
production (EXCH), A, and a constant, ao- The error term, Emvju is assumed to be inde­
pendent, and identically distributed. The coefficients associated with attributes, 1__ %,
represent the marginal value that consumers and producers place on the ith attribute. 
The characteristics set differs from that employed in other chapters of the paper in that 
the functional classification method is adopted to simplify the number of variables. The 
reason for adopting the functional classification method in this Chapter is a practical one 
in that it was found to provide more precise estimates of the brand dummy coefficients 
of interest.^^
While the data set is considerably richer than others used in the literature, and there­
fore provides confidence that important observable characteristics have not been omitted 
between different model versions, it is less clear that features inherent to particular models 
are captured. Motoring publications and consumers typically refer to the importance of 
stylistic features, a second aspect of quality, refiability (that the discussion of BL high­
lighted as a deficiency), as well as other factors idiosyncratic to each model that are 
not readily quantifiable and are unobserved in the data set. Directly recorded reliabilify 
measures, such as those provided by Consumer Association (1965-) in the UK or the US 
Consumer publications, are not used in the analysis since these publications rank relia­
bility along with a number of other factors relative to price. Since price is the dependent 
variable including such rankings would be problematic. Instead, reliability and other 
unobserved characteristics are measured indirectly via the use of random-effects panel 
estimation. An example is found in observer’s reactions to the controversial styling of the 
Allegro and Maxi. While BL eventually replaced the Allegro’s square steering wheel with 
a conventional version, it did little to enhance the ‘bubble’ body-shell shape [Autocar 
(17/05/1973); Motor, (2/12/1978)]. While aspects of the size of the vehicle are directly 
incorporated as an observable characteristic, stylistic aspects related to the shape of each 
car are not observed in the data set. There are a number of cars, which have extremely 
similar dimensions to the Allegro but have a distinctly different shape. Given the degree 
of product differentiation appfied by different manufacturers, it is quite plausible that 
there are unobserved stylistic differences valued by consumers between each and every 
car model in the data set. To control for such effects the panel nature of the data set is 
exploited by the inclusion of model specific random effects (represented by fim Equation 
4.1). Verboven (1999) also uses car versions, but his definition of a car version is purely on 
the basis of engine size, while our definition is more encompassing, and unlike Verboven
^^The reader can be reassured that the results relating to other thesis chapters were not affected by the whether the 
functional or individual attribute were emplqyed. As such, the re-estimation utilising the functional classification scheme 
can be seen as a form of robustness check on the results of those chapters.
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utilises panel techniques. In contrast, some previous work [Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1995); Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999); Goldberg and Verboven (2001)], has used 
car ‘brands’ as the fixed-effect in some of their work. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) 
point out that the use of brand dummies is arbitrary and reflects data availability. Since 
the key variable of interest is in examining the quality-price relations between brands mar­
keted by flirms in the UK car market, the use of brand fixed-effect, which by construction 
disallow the possibility of recovering brand-effects, would not allow the central variables 
of interest to be examined.^®
The analysis of BL/AR suggests that the firm underwent two phases: pre- and post- the 
CORE rationalisation. Dating the end of these phases is complicated by the time taken 
to complete the CORE strategy. The first effects on the market of the CORE occur in 
1980 with the release of the Metro, however, it is clear that the CORE was not completed 
until the release of the Montego in April 1984. A third possible date is in 1988 when 
AR was sold to BAe, since it was not until this time that the older generation of models 
(pre-CORE/Honda alliance) had exited the market, and taking 1988 as the appropriate 
time-frame allows BL to have overcome the teething problems with the earlier released 
CORE models. The analysis implies three hypotheses. First, it is expected that the mass- 
segment brands of BL and CUK performed badly, perhaps with the exception of Rover, 
compared to Vauxhall, Ford and imports between 1971-1979. Second, it is expected AR 
cars to be relatively more highly valued from the 1980s due to product improvements. 
Third, over the full period, the performance of the surviving brand. Rover, should improve 
reflecting quality improvements through the period.
The results for the full period and two periods (1971-79 and 1980-88) are presented 
in Table 4.4. Rather then dividing the periods in two, the analysis of the second phase 
(1980-88) uses the fuU 1971-1988 data with differences between the periods being appar­
ent in the estimated coefllcients.^  ^ Key variables of interest in testing these hypotheses 
are the brand dummies associated with key manufacturers having controlled for the mul­
titude of conditional attributes and aforementioned factors. The validity of estimated 
brand effects are however conditioned on the ability to accurately model the effects on 
price of the products attributes over time. So, before discussing the central findings the 
estimated attributes are examined. Since the resulting estimates are qualitatively similar 
between sub-periods they can be discussed together. The attributes, where significant, 
are generally positive with the exception of miles per pound, which is expected to be
addition, fixed effects models were also experimented. The Hausman specification test accepted the null of no 
difference between the estimates indicating that the explanatory variables are independent of the fixed-effects which would 
otherwise cause the resulting estimates to be inconsistently estimated where random effects are adopted.
^^Pooling the 1971-88 period has the singular advantage of providing more precise estimates. However, when the 1980-88 
sub-sample is used in isolation the same qualitative findings were obtained. Those results are available on request.
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negatively related to price. In addition, attributes that were used successfully in previous 
work - air conditioning, ABS, turbo and fuel injection - are robustly determined. The 
attributes with the greatest impact on the marginal value of the sample are the maximum 
speed and the dimensions of the car, while other variables (in particular the binary fac­
tors) have a small impact individually, but taken together these features add significantly 
to the value of a vehicle. It is also of note that the marginal values of most attributes fall 
between subperiods (i.e. over time), suggesting consumer valuations of cars have became 
more multi-dimensional, with traditionally important factors such as size and performance 
being weighted lower by consumers over time.
Table 4.4: Hedonic Regression: Product Attributes (Random Effects Specifications)
1971-1979 1971-1988 1971-1998
Attributes Power 0.004 (27.30) 0.004 (29.50) 0.004 (30.30)
Doors -0.02 (3.39) 0.00 (029) 0.01 (6.88)
Miles Per Gallon (at 56 mph) -0.08 (2.60) -0.04 (2.88) -0.01 (2.16)
Diesel w/ turbo 0.148 (16.06) 0.128 (14.06)
Diesel w/o turtx) 0.145 (21.38) 0.144 (22.58)
Fuel Injection 0.06 (5.08) 0.05 (7.53) 0.04 (9.70)
log[Max-mph] 0.19 (2.49) 0.19 (4.51) 0.19 (5.85)
Valves 0.01 (3.66) 0.01 (7.79) 0.00 (11.61)
log [Size (Length*Wldth*Helght)] 0.45 (6.37) 0.35 (11.32) 0.19 (8.72)
Interior Climate 0.19 (6.79) 0.09 (6.74) 0.03 (5.43)
Music 0.03 (6.25) 0.02 (8.34) 0.01 (5.48)
Locking 0.02 (1.24) 0.02 (2.60) 0.02 (4.86)
Electric Windows 0.01 (1.05) 0.01 (2.13) 0.01 (4.02)
Heated Windows 0.03 (2.95) 0.01 (1.15) 0.01 (2.35)
Roof 0.01 (0.89) 0.01 (3.42) 0.01 (5.43)
Traction (Non-Low Speed) 0.07 (0.96) 0.00 (0.08) 0.03 (3.73)
Split rear seats 0.05 (1.57) 0.02 (2.75) 0.00 (0.95)
Alarm 0.05 (1.11) 0.03 (4.63)
ABS 0.05 (0.58) 0.05 (3.48) 0.03 (5.60)
Small -0.05 (1.58) -0.05 (225) -0.01 (0.64)
Segments Medium -0.01 (0.16) -0.01 (022) 0.04 (2.12)
(mini reference Luxury 021 (3.74) 0.15 (3.75) 0.27 (8.44)
group) Executive 0.03 (0.81) 0.02 (0.81) 0.09 (3.99)
Sports 0.08 (2.00) 0.09 (3.50) 0.19 (8.46)
4-by-4 0.22 (4.65) 0.16(5.18)
PC 0.09 (1.21) 0.09 (2.44)
N 2,942 6,240 11,864
99.6 99.7 99.9
Notes: 1. Regression are corrected for hetroscedadty using conventional White-Humber methods. 2. t-statlstics are in parentheses;
3. All specifications include year dummies; a time trend; version and model age effects; and the majority of functional features and brand 
dummies (72 in all) that are omitted for clarity.
The key hypotheses of interest are now tested. The results shown in Table 4.5 are 
set relative to Fiat as the reference group. Fiat is chosen since other work has done so.
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Table 4.5: Hedonic Regression; Brand Effects (Random Effects Specifications)
Groups Brands 1971-1979 1971-1988 1971-1998
UK Aston Marl 0,97 (10,79) 0,99 (13.22) 1.14 (18,58)
(niche) Jaguar 0,03 (0,03) 0,12 (1.69) 0.21 (3.39)
Jensen 0,32 (3.95) 0,35 (5.01) 0.31 (4.48)
Lotus 0,50 (6.48) 0,53 (8.48) 0.51 (9.22)
Morgan 0,05 (0.50) 0,19 (2.08) 0.21 (2.28)
BLMC Reliant 0,01 (1.48) 0,02 (2.59) 0,02 (2.40)
Mini 0,00 (0.01) 0.04 (0.91) 0,03 (0.85)
Austin -0,10 (2.84) 0,03 (1.81) -0,03 (2.78)
Morris -0,06 (1,06) 0,01 (0.18) 0.01 (0.28)
Austin Hes -0,21 (1.38) 0.17 (1.21) -0,25 (1.63)
Rover 0,03 (0,42) 0,04 (0.81) 0.03 (0.72)
MG -0,15 (1.70) 0.10 (1.31) -0,13 (1.80)
Princess -0,14 (1.09) 0.08 (0.70) -0,07 (0.52)
Woisley -0,03 (0.33) 0.03 (0.27) -0.05 (0,51)
Truimph -0,09 (1.49) 0,08 (1.31) -0,09 (2,00)
Ford Ford 0,07 (2.54) 0,15 (2.42) 0,08 (2,47)
GM Vauxhall 0,05 (2.23) 0.03 (2.30) 0,04 (1.98)
Opel 0,00 (0.02) 0,00 (0.08) -0,02 (0.53)
Chrysler Hillman -0,12 (1.80) 0.09 (1.51) -0,14 (2.78)
Singer -0,18 (1.04) 0.14 (0.88) -0.13 (0.79)
Sunt)eam -0,09 (1.35) 0,10 (1.78) -0,15 (2,82)
Humt)er 0,08 (0.57) 0.08 (0.85) 0,08 (0,42)
Other Renault 0,08 (1.22) 0.09 (2.21) 0,08 (2,13)
Mercedes 0,31 (4.89) 0,33 (7.67) 0,38 (10,44)
Porsche 0,42 (4.88) 0,47 (6.78) 0,47 (7.79)
Audi 0,15 (1.86) 0,34 (7.04) 0,28 (6.88)
Alfa 0,14 (3.37) 0.14 (3.28) 0,11 (2.40)
Volvo 0,12 (2,08) 0,15 (3.28) 0.11 (3.02)
Skoda -0,38 (4.82) -0.37 (5.71) -0.32 (5.98)
Lada -0,27 (2,08) 0.35 (5.07) -0.39 (5.71)
Honda -0,01 (0,05) 0.01 (0.21) 0.03 (0.75)
A/ofes; See previous figure.
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albeit for differing periods [Verboven (1999)], and Fiat is found to be discounted relative 
to rivals, hence it should be expected that higher quality brands models will receive a pos­
itive premium compared to that firm. Relative to Fiat the resulting brand coefficients are 
consistent with each of these hypotheses. Chrysler UK’s Singer, Sunbeam, Humber, and 
Hillman brands either have well determined negative values or are not rated significantly 
better than Fiat’s 1970s range. Ford and Vauxhall are appreciably more valued compared 
to all bar Rover’s models that have a significant brand advantage. Furthermore, even 
after controlling for segment effects exclusive brands, such as Mercedes, show a positive 
premium. In addition to the key brands of interest, the results of a selection of additional 
brands are reported, omitting the majority for space reasons, to testify to the plausibil­
ity of the results and place them in a wider context. Table 4.4 shows that Italian cars 
sold by Fiat Group’s more up-market subsidiary, Alfa Romeo, are valued between 11-14% 
higher than Fiat branded cars. Luxury cars such as Mercedes, and sports models such 
as Aston Martin are valued considerably higher than Fiat, and less prestigious brands 
such as Skoda were valued between 32-37% lower. BL brands, with the exceptions of the 
niche Jaguar and the Rover marque, have a negative brand effect on prices.^ ® Comparing 
the results of Sub-periods I and II it is clear that the coefficients fell suggesting that 
there was some improvement in the quality of products between periods but across each 
specification the message that British Leyland’s products were discounted in the market 
is constant. Comparing the full sample results for the Rover brand suggests that there 
was little improvement in the valuation of those models over time. Indeed, comparing 
the 1971-88 and full period results, the co-efficient on Rover products falls marginally. 
However, that finding should be taken with some caution as the coefficient for Rover over 
the 1971-88 sub-period is not well defined, being significant at the 10% level.
4.3 British Leyland N ot Keeping Up with the Jones’: Compe­
tition and Survived in the UK Car Market (1971-1998)
4.3.1 Defining ‘^ Product-led decline”
Before taking the PLD concept into a testable empirical setting, sharper definitions of its 
key facets are needed. From these definitions a set of testable hypotheses can then be 
established concerning each of the three dimensions of product-led decline, and associated 
means to obviate its effects, that can then be used as a benchmark to gauge British
i^The Mini and Reliant combined brands account for less than 5% of BL’s sales in 1981.
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Leyland’s performance.
The first dimension was that BL’s cars were uncompetitive relative to rival manufactur­
ers in the “product package” they provided. Spatially, a means to gauge rivalry between 
BL and its competitors is needed to establish the extent of product space ‘crowding’ oc­
curring in the market. The organisational ecology literature [Hannan and Freeman (1989); 
Umakunnas and Topi (1999)] posits a causal relationship between competition (number 
of models) and exit rates. Hence,
Hypothesis la: Competition though rivals ‘crowding^ the product spectrum will reduce 
the life of an existing model. But British Leyland’s lack of competitiveness meant that 
rivalry had a more pronounced impact on that firm.
The second component of the PLD argues that BL products were not well differen­
tiated in ways that reflected consumers’ taste and demand patterns. Theoretical work 
shows that, in markets characterised by quality (vertical) product differentiation, firms 
will attempt to avoid the thrust of price competition by strategically differentiating their 
products along the product spectrum [(Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983)]. The direct im­
plication is that there is an inverse relationship between competition and the degree of 
product differentiation since greater competition from rival models induces firms to strate­
gically locate their products away from rivals when competition within a product market 
intensifies. In effect, successful product differentiation provides a means to obviate the 
direct effects of competition. However the GPRS view was that BL was unable to do so. 
Hence,
Hypothesis lb: Product differentiation by mitigating the degree of competition, will pro­
long the life of a model, but that BL failed to successfully differentiate its products.
furthermore, given the degree of variant proliferation associated with the market.
Hypothesis Ic: The extent of differentiation (variant dispersion), relative to rivals, by 
mitigating the degree of competition, will prolong the expected life of a model. However, a 
failure to disperse its products meant that the life of British Leyland’s products was reduced.
An added complexity in multi-product markets is that firms can internalise compe­
tition by determining where to locate their multiple products on the product spectrum. 
Cannibalisation occurs when a firm launches more than one product in the same market
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whose qualities or styles overlap. The benefits of product proliferation depend on a firm’s 
ability to differentiate and disperse their models from each other along the product spec­
trum. By choosing to cannibalise its products, a firm trades-off the loss of market share 
to its incumbent model against an expansion in the combined sales associated with mar­
keting more than one model. Determining the optimal spatial location of models within 
a multi-product firm is potentially influenced by a similar set Of spatial considerations 
to those associated to inter-firm rivalry. Product line rivalry has seen some academic 
scrutiny, with the most cited paper in that literature being that of Brander and Eaton 
(1984). Those authors analysed a sequential duopoly game where firms market up to 
two products each and find that there are multiple equilibria in the location structure. 
Next they examined the conditions under which a segmented structure (where firms locate 
their products side-by-side on the product spectrum), or an interlaced structure (where 
firms take alternate locations on the product spectrum), are the most likely equilibrium. 
They found that, depending on the parameterisations of the model, both options were 
feasible. Eaton and Lipsey (1984) and Schmalensee (1978) provide alternative models 
where segmentation is the most likely configuration. Finally, recent work by Johnson and 
Myatt (2003) using a duopoly model with a continuum of quality types (from high and 
low) found that high-quality incumbent firms may either operate in the high, or in both 
the high and low quality, segments of the market, depending on the structure of demand. 
These considerations give rise to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Cannibalisation reduces the survival of models due to within-firm com­
petition.
Hypothesis 2b: The degree of within-firm differentiation enhances model survival by 
allowing multiple offerings to remain profitable. However, the degree of differentiation of 
British Leyland’s products within its product range was low, and hence product overlap 
high, leading to reduced profits and exit.
Hypothesis 2c: The extent of differentiation (dispersion) of the set of firms’ models 
extends model survival by allowing multiple offerings to remain profitable, but that BL’s 
product range was not well dispersed.
The third aspect of PLD was that BL’s cars did not keep pace with rival quality 
upgrading, which meant that their models quickly became outdated. While product dif­
ferentiation and dispersion offers some respite to competition, in industries characterised
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by technological progress any relaxation of competition is regularly undermined. Main­
taining an unaltered product in the market in the presence of rival product upgrading 
is not a commercially viable strategy. To maintain their place in the market firms are 
faced with two choices; (1) to change the nature of the product to maintain/expand its 
position in the market, or (2) to replace old product lines with new products embodying 
features that consumers value. Where firms are profit maximisers these two choice are 
determined by the marginal benefits and costs associated with product renewal. If the 
costs of upgrading a product become too high, relative to the benefits associated with 
manipulating an established product, the firm will opt for launching a new model. Indeed, 
in the absence of sunk costs, upgrading and launching new products are equivalent since 
firms can launch products at will. However, this is far from the case in the car industry 
where product development times are lengthy and the sunk costs are substantial.
The third competitive mechanism, product upgrading, refiects the dynamic nature 
of technologically progressive markets. As was shown earlier, technological innovation 
in the car industry has been an on-going feature in the market. A substantive body 
of literature has been developed dealing with the evolution of innovation. The early 
innovation literature focused on process innovations, initially in the context of a single 
innovation [Reinganum (1981)], before being extended to multiple process innovations in 
a sequential setting [Reinganum (1985), Vickers (1986)]. Building on these constructs, a 
number of papers have also examined product innovation [Heath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph 
(1987); and Gruber (1992); Symeonidis (2003)]. Of these works, the paper most applicable 
to this research is that of Gruber (1992), who extends the vertical product differentiation 
paradigm [(Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983)] from two to three firms before integrating 
the model into a dynamic setting following Reinganum (1981).
Gruber establishes three results relevant to the analysis of upgrading and product sur­
vival. First, the available qualities are bound by the lowest quality firm’s product that 
has a positive market share. Hence products that fall below this quality threshold are 
obsolescent and must exit. Second, leadership exhibits considerable persistence so a firm 
that is not able to replicate the least innovative product within the first period makes 
losses and is forced to exit unless it is able to make a “radical” shift by developing a 
new product capable of meeting the minimal quality requirements of the market in a sub­
sequent period. Third, firms supply distinct qualities, but those firms providing higher 
qualities also receive higher profits. Each of the three results supports upgrading as a 
means to prolong product survival by allowing products to: (1) continue to exist in the 
market; (2) maintain a persistent leadership role, and (3) raise profits via higher quality 
products. Hence:
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Hypothesis 3: By raising the profitability of products quality upgrading prolongs the life 
of products. But British Leyland did not upgrade its models sufficiently to benefit fully 
from quality upgrading.
4.3.2 Deriving Quality Adjusted Markup Indices 
Data
The product data set used in the analysis is the same as that used in Chapter 4 and 
incorporates a complete sample of new registrations, new car prices, and the attributes 
of model and model variants in the UK car market between 1971 and 1998. In addition a 
second model-level advertising expenditure data set that are recorded by industry for the 
UK by MEAL, and from 1997 by AC Nielsen Media Research following their acquisition 
of MEAL is also u t i l i sed .L ike  product attributes, advertising can be viewed as a 
means of differentiating products either through persuading or inform ing consumers of 
the virtues of a manufacturer’s products. Advertising is costly and these changes in cost 
are captured through an advertising price index derived from the Advertising Association 
(Various Years). More details on the advertising data and its deflation into real terms is 
provided in Appendix 5.7.
4.3.3 Measuring Quality
Any quality adjustment method requires a set of variables that link directly to the con­
sumer’s utility function. There are conventional methods for determining the utility of 
attributes via the use of discrete choice modelling. An alternative approach is to derive a 
uni-dimensional index of quality using hedonic methods to reduce the dimensions of the 
product space of each version as was done in Chapter 2. A limitation of hedonic work is 
that it is unable to distinguish between demand and supply dimensions [Pakes (2004)]. 
This constraint is telling for this research where distinguishing between factors affecting 
the supply and demand sides is crucial to the analysis. More speciflcally, to derive the 
profltability of each model version and the attributes associated with these a discrete 
choice random utility framework developed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes (1995), which has seen considerable application in the economics literature, is anal-
^^The data is not publicly available and Philip Spike at the British Advertising Association is gratefully thanked for 
allowing access to hard copies of the data to be used for strictly academic research. The data for the motor industry 
was recorded identically by MEAL and subsequently by AC Nielsen so there are no consistency problems between the two 
sources.
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ysed [e.g. Verboven (1996), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), and Chapter 6].^ ° The model 
has a number of features whidi are appealing in analysing car markets. On the demand 
side the model provides estimates of the attribute parameters of key interest without the 
researcher having to employ observable cost information of the product. Since the data 
used in this research are highly disaggregated product data, direct information on costs 
at the model-version is unavailable. Indeed, it is not clear that such information was 
available to management at British Leyland either. As BL’s Chairman and CEO between 
1977-1983, Michael Edwardes, pointed out that when he asked for costings of models pro­
duced at BL upon his arrival at the firm he found they did not exist [Edwardes (1983)]. 
In general, for confidentiality reasons, cost data is rarely available to the researcher.
Demand
The structure of the car demand system is based on the discrete choice random utility 
framework outlined in Berry (1994). This framework enables estimates of demand for 
a differentiated product using product-level data on sales, prices, market segment and 
product attributes, without observing the purchases made by individual consumers. Con­
sumers (households) have a choice of purchasing either one of several cars or an outside 
good, in this case no purchase. Utility from the outside good is normalised to zero. The 
total potential market therefore consists of all households in a given year.
Each car version is modeled as a bundle of characteristics that consumers value. These 
characteristics include price, power, size, fuel consumption efficiency, and the set of em­
bodied attributes. The framework also allows the consumers to value car features that are 
not directly observed. Household i ’s utility of purchasing product Uy, can be expressed 
as a linear function of car j ’s characteristics and tastes that are idiosyncratic to household 
i'.
Uij =  Xjp -  apj +  (j +  Tij (4.2)
where Xj is a vector of product f s  attributes, and Pj is the car’s price. Çj represents car 
j ’s characteristics that the household values and Tij captures household z’s specific taste 
for car j ,  both of which are not observed by the econometrician. The mean utility level 
that product j  yields to households is denoted by dÿ, so that Sij =  Xj^-apj-{-^j-\-Tij. Note 
that all variation in the valuation of cars across consumers stems from the unobserved
While additional generality in the structure of the demand structures is possible [e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1995)] the specification provides a compromise between functional form and computational tractability. The later point is 
of great importance due to the considerable dimensions of the data set and the need to test the appropriateness of the results 
against differing specifications (for example under different conduct assumptions). Goldberg and Verboven (2001) take a 
similar approach despite their considerably smaller dimensions (in terms of both observations and explanatory variables) of 
their cross-country analysis of European auto markets.
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additive taste term Tij.
Consumer-specific tastes are correlated across products with similar characteristics by 
using a nested logit demand model. Cars are grouped into the eight aforementioned 
market segments g: mini, small, medium, executive, luxury, sport, jeep and personal 
carrier (MPV). The consumer taste parameter Tij is Tij = Vig{o-)-\-(l—CT)£ij. The Sij terms 
reflect consumer tastes that are identically and independently distributed across products 
and consumers according to the extreme value distribution. The Vig term captures the 
common taste that household i has for all cars in market segment
The conunon taste depends on the distribution parameter, o’(0 ^  c X 1), which indi­
cates the degree of substitutabihty between products within a market segment. When o’ 
is zero, consumer tastes are independent across all cars and there is no market segmenta­
tion. The higher the value of o’, the more correlated the consumer tastes are for products 
within the same market segment and the competition among products is stronger within 
market segments than across market segments.
For the set of available cars, households select the car that gives them the highest utility, 
i.e. consumer i will choose car j  if Ujj > V&. Given the distributional assumptions
on consumer tastes and functional form for utility, aggregation over individual consumer 
purchases allows the predicted aggregate market share msj of car j  to be obtained,
a)  =  (^ -3)
where Dg — The first term in this expression is car model j ’s market
share in its market segment, while the second term is the market share of a market segment 
g in the overall car market. Since the outside good yields zero utility by assumption, Jo 
is 0 and Dq is 1.
The predicted market share for product j  can then be inverted to obtain an analytic 
expression for the mean utifity level Sj as a function of demand parameters and dis­
tributional parameter tr: InMSj — (rlnMSj\g — InMSo =  Sj{MS,(r) = XjP — ap + ^j. 
Rearranging that equation yields the estimating equation for demand:
InMSj — InMSo — XjP — ap-\- crlnMSj\g +  (j (4.4)
where MSj is the observed market share of product version j , M Sq is the observed 
market share of the outside good, and MSj\g is the observed market share of product 
j  within its market segment g, and represents characteristics of each model version j  
that are valued by consumers but are unobserved. While the interest here is on obtaining
Since £ij is an extreme value random variable, n j  is an extreme value random variable [Berry (1994)].
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estimates for the product attributes (i.e. the Xj^s, which include advertising expendi­
tures) in order to derive quality metrics, as will be spelt out below, two features of the 
model warrant discussion. First, the model includes an ‘outside good’, which in this case 
is the number of households in the UK. By doing so the model incorporates the fact 
that most households do not buy a car in any given year and instead take an alternative 
option (such as pubhc transport, buying a second hand car, or using their existing car). 
Second, compared to the simple logit model the NML model captures the possibility that 
consumers within each segment group g have differing utility than consumers in other 
segments. Intuitively, the utility of households that purchase a Ford Fiesta will be less 
affected by the introduction a new version of the Mercedes SLK sports car than by the 
launching of a upgraded version of the VW Polo. These within-segment substitutions 
between products are determined through the substitution parameter a.
Supply and Mark-ups
On the supply side, in keeping with research on car markets generally, the base-line 
model assumes Bertrand (or price based) competitive behaviour.^^
Consistent estimates of product demand can be made without assuming the mode of 
competition among the firms. However, in order to calculate mark-ups, a specific form of 
firm conduct needs to be assumed. Each multi-product firm, /  maximises its profits each 
period (omitting time subscripts) that are given by,
7T/ =  ^  PjSj(p)M -  ^  Cj(sj{p)M), (4.5)
where M  is total market size, Cj is cost of producing product j ,  and all other notation 
follows from that used above. The profit function accounts for the important fact that car 
makers are multi-product firms. Thus, when a car maker considers lowering the price of 
one of its products, this will not only reduce the market share of other rivals’ products, but 
might also undercut the sales of its own other products. Hence a car manufacturer might 
then lower its prices less than in a situation when it only sells one product. Marginal 
costs are calculated as
mcj = Wj (4.6)
where wj is a vector of observable cost shifters (in this case wages and exchange rates) 
and ifj is a vector of unknown parameters. While the European market is the world’s
^^The choice of competitive behaviour, or conduct, is thus assumed. Previous research, using the same data set emplqyed 
here tested alternative assumptions on conduct (such as Cournot) and illustrated the resulting estimates to be relatively 
insensitive to the choice of behavioural assumptions [see Chapter 6].
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largest, the UK car market is relatively small in global terms implying that marginal 
costs can be assumed as constant. The constant cost assumption is common in the lit­
erature, and previous research on European car markets, including the UK, using global 
model sales found some evidence of scale effects [Goldberg and Verboven (2001)]. The 
same authors did not find that their key results are affected by scale economies. There is 
compelling evidence that the UK car market is oHgopolistic [Cubbin and Cowling (1975); 
Geroski and Murfin (1991b)]. Direct evidence of oHgopolistic behaviour is found in an on­
going series of investigations by UK government agencies involved with anti-competitive 
practices. In particular, two separate studies by the MonopoHes and Mergers Committee 
legally investigated whether collusive behaviour occurred in market and found that this 
was the case [MonopoHes and Mergers Commission (1984) and MonopoHes and Mergers 
Commission (1992)], with a further investigation leading to Volvo’s admission of price fix­
ing [Wood (09/07/99)].^^ How such oHgopolistic pricing is modeled is an issue that is less 
clear. The theoretical Hterature has utilised a number of assumptions concerning market 
conduct. The assumptions used to determine the effects of market conduct are more than 
a technical fine point since theoretical work applying different conduct assumptions can 
produce quaHtatively divergent outcomes. Since the seminal study of Bresnahan (1981) 
the empirical Hterature has typically taken a more pragmatic approach by arguing that 
car markets are characterised by Bertrand competition, where firms are Nash in prices 
and thus set prices and let the market determine quantities.^ Assuming that firms com­
pete in prices, first-order conditions for profit maximising firm /  with respect to product 
j  yield: ^ k e F f iP k ^ ) ^  +  To derive a pricing equation for each product j  using 
vector notation let p denote a J  x 1 price vector, c a J  x 1 vector of marginal costs, s a 
J  X  1 vector of market shares of all products offered at time t (note time subscripts are 
once again omitted to simplify the notation) and Ü a. J  x J  matrix whose element in row 
j  and column k equals ^  if car j  and k are produced by the same firm and 0 otherwise. 
The first order profit maximising conditions can then be rewritten in vector form as:
p =  c+D~^s(p) (4.7)
Volvo was not financially sanctioned by the Restrictive Practices Court since that body only had the power to order 
Volvo not to repeat the infraction [Wood (09/07/99)]. The inability to prosecute Volvo reflected its low market share in 
what had become a highly fragmented UK market (in particular no single car manufacturer has obtained 25% since the 
early 1980s). Earlier fin d in g s ty  the Monopoly and Mergers Commission under the Competitions Act prior to 2000 also did 
not lead to court proceedings. However the MMC’s fin d in g s  motivated the European Commission’s collection of car price 
data across the EU to monitor potential breaches [Department of Trade and Industry Committee (1998)].
^Bresnahan’s view was based on interviews with US producers and this evidence would seem to be casually confirmed 
the substantial volatility in car production. Meetings between the author and market anrdysts at Global Insight Ltd 
(who kindly provided some of the new registration data used in this Thesis: see Appendix A for details) in the UK concur 
with the view that market conduct in the UK is of the Bertrand form. That said, effects of different conduct assumptions 
in calibrated work typically lead to a reduction in the impact of the policy under the Cournot assumption, but rarely alter 
qualitative effects of the analysis [e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999)].
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In Equation 4.7 marginal costs are given by mcj =  Wj +  z/j, where Wj is a vector of 
observable cost shifters (in this case wages, exchange rates, and advertising costs) and Uj 
is a vector of unknown parameters.
4.3.4 Estimation
The two-equation system to be estimated consists of the demand (Equation 4.3) and the 
pricing equation (Equation 4.7). There are a number of econometric pitfalls associated 
with estimating the system since the unobserved demand and cost characteristics are 
correlated, the two parameters (a and a) appear in both equations, and some of the 
parameters appear nonlinearly. These considerations suggest that the appropriate method 
of estimating the full system of equations to capture the mark-up margin over price (^Ç^) 
for each product j  is via the General Method of Moments.^®
There are two econometric issues that need to be addressed in estimating the system. 
First, although the researcher does not observe car model quahty ((j) car makers set the 
price of product j  to reflect each product’s quality. Car prices are therefore likely to 
be correlated with unobserved quality. Second, the within-group market shares MSj\g 
are also likely correlated with fj. Those two variables therefore need to be instrumented 
for. Two types of instruments are used: cost-shifters (manufacturing wages in source 
country and exchange rate), and the characteristics of the rival cars averaged over the 
entire market or averaged over products within each market segment. Intuitively, cost 
shifters aflect product prices, but are uncorrelated with product j 's  unobserved quality. 
Similarly, rival products’ characteristics influence the market share and prices of rival cars, 
and through strategic interaction, also aflect the pricing decisions and market shares of 
the product j  in question. However, they are not econometrically correlated with product 
j ’s unobserved quality fj. The key identifying assumption is that product attributes x-j 
are not correlated with . This is arguably a questionable assumption, but the validity 
of these instruments in the estimation can be tested. The demand equation is linear in 
all parameters and the error term, while the a and a parameters appear non-linearly.
Table 4.6 provides results from the pooled structural model. The estimation utilises the 
full set of product attributes detailed in the data section. Given the substantial number 
of attributes only a subset of those attribute variables are presented in order to provide 
a flavour of the results.^® The attribute variables are positively signed illustrating that 
attributes (other than the high costs associated with higher fuel consumption per mile)
^^The GMM software package is written by Lars P. Hansen, John C. Heaton and Masao Ogaki. See Hansen and Singleton 
(1982) for a discussion of the estimators theoretical foundations. Previous work ly  Goldberg and Verboven (2001) has taken 
a two-step approach. The preference for a one step estimation is that it enhances efficiency and since a key interest of the 
paper is on simulating welfare effects, which Goldberg and Verboven (2001) did not, efficiency is a more important concern.
^^The full set of results is available on request.
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provide additional utility to the buyer. Table 4.6 shows that attributes that would be 
expected to provide greater utility, such as power assisted steering (PAS) or an automatic 
brake system (ABS), are more important factors than more trivial features such as cup 
holders. Furthermore, superior substitutes, such as having a twin rather than a single 
driver’s airbag, also provide greater consumer satisfaction. Diagnostically the model also 
performs well with tests of over-identifying restrictions failing to reject the model at con­
ventional significance levels (t-statistics of over 30 for the pooled regression and between 
9 and 14 for cross-sectional estimations).
Table 4.6: Demand and Pricing Equations (Selected Coefficients: N=ll,750)
Demand Equation Pricing Equation
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
attributes power 0.022 (9.88) 0.003 (11.56)
size 0.272 (2.27) 0.113 (3.46)
economy -0.121 (4.78) -0.050 (3.83)
injection 0.124 (2.62) 0.052 (2.27)
non-diesel turbo 0.179 (1.72) 0.056 (1.16)
diesel w/o turbo 0.295 (3.31) 0.123 (2.78)
diesel w/ turbo 0.397 (4.89) 0.165 (3.92)
alrcon 0.087 (2.11) 0.036 (2.01)
ABS 0.143 (2.12) 0.060 (1.99)
PAS 0.344 (4.68) 0.143 (2.38)
airbag (drivers) 0.208 (3.53) 0.087 (2.18)
airbag (twin) 0.251 (2.11) 0.105 (1.97)
cupholder 0.001 (0.43) 0.001 (1.16)
advertising (expend) 0.102 (4.49)
advertising (price) 0.089 (1.78)
wage 0.310 (4.72)
exchange rate 0.070 (3:27)
Constant -9.346 (6.41)
Parameters a -0.055 (14.71)
(both equations) a 0.530 (20.70)
GMM OBJ 25.1
The estimates obtained are similar to those obtained in earfier studies [e.g. Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)]. Since producers configure their products with attributes 
in order to obtain profit from the ‘bundle of characteristics’ that constitute a product 
there is a differential between the coefficients in the demand equation and the pricing
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equation when these are expressed in the same units.^^ It is this differential between the 
cost of each attribute and the profit obtained from it that constitutes a pure measure of 
‘quality’ and that is used to derive the quality of each model version. More specifically, 
the quality of each model version, u, is determined by the difference in the weighted sum 
of its attributes ( J) (the sum of the PjXjv) less the cost of incorporating these attributes 
into each model version {'yjmcjv). Having expressed these in the same unit:
J J
9» =  S  ^  (4-8)
j = l  j = l
The index is a valid approximation of quality if the product characteristics are sep­
arable, i.e. if the change in one characteristic does not affect the impact of the other 
characteristics on quality.
Having derived markups for each product version’s attribute a series of indices, de­
signed to map to the three hypotheses identified in Section 4.3.1, are determined. In 
measuring each effect annual variation in the data is exploited to calculate those indices.^^
Own and Rival Product Dififerentiation: Hypotheses lb  and 2b
A distance measure for each variant with respect to other rivals’ variants in the segment 
but excluding own firms models is constructed.
distance'^'^ =
N k c t- i
(4.9)
where qkst-\ ^  the rivals’ variant k in segment s at time t — 1 (the year before the 
introduction of the new model), and N  is the number of rivals’ variants. Since each model 
typically have multiple variants, a model-level differentiation index is constructed equal 
to the mean of the distance indices of its variants when the model first enters the market,
diffeTrivaia =  mean[d^^°^^) (4.10)
The construction of the within-firm differentiation variable proceeds in a similar fashion 
to its model-level equivalent. A distance measure with respect to other firms’ own model 
variants is calculated as.
is worth noting that earlier work using discrete choice models has been interested in calculating the markups of 
products rather the explicitly using attribute differences to derive the quality measures as is done here.
^^The measures are in a similar spirit to those developed by Stavins (1995). However, unlike Stavins’ distance measure 
that uses the hedonic coefficients that conflate both the supply and demand influences [Pakes (2004)], costs and markups 
are analysed separately. Second, included all model versions rather than using the sub-sample of new entrants models, since 
this paper analyses in the order of exit, rather than entry.
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distance^ = (4.11)
jVifecÉ-1
where Qikst-i is a variant i of firm /  in segment class c at time t — 1 (the year before the 
introduction of the new model), and N  is the number of firms’ variants in the correspond­
ing segment. Since a model can have multiple variants, a within-firm differentiation index 
as the mean of the distance indices of its variants when the model first enters the market 
is constructed as diffeVovm =  7nean(d^). Note that the measure, as with the firm-level 
differentiation measure, is time invariant. The time invariant nature of the measure cap­
tures the point where the model is initially differentiated from its rivals and the firm’s 
own offerings when it enters the market, as is highlighted in the theoretical models of 
product differentiation. Subsequent development of the car model occurs through variant 
release and innovation and is captured via the measure of quality upgrading.
Own and Rival Product Dispersion (Hypotheses Ic  and 2c)
To measure both dispersion effects cross-section variation in the quality index in each 
year is exploited. To do so, a model dispersion index is first calculated as,
(4.12)
where is the average quality index of models m, , and Vmt is the number of
variants of model m  at time t. Next the model relative dispersion index {DispersioUmodei) 
is calculated, which is obtained after normalising cTmt by the segment dispersion index,
<Td =  (4.13)
to obtain,
Dispersiorimodd =  —  (4.14)Cet
Intuitively, the index captures the degree to which the quality spectrum firms covered 
with their models in relation to their rivals.
The firm relative dispersion index is derived in a similar fashion by comparing the 
within-firm quality dispersion to the total dispersion of variants competing in each seg­
ment,
(4.15)
Vfct
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nwhere qj^ is the average quality index of models m, , and Vft is the number of
variants of model m at time t. Next the model relative dispersion index {Dispersionfirm) 
is calculated, which is obtained after normalising Umt by the segment dispersion index,
Dispersiorimodei =  —  (4.16)^ct
using the definition of in the denominator again. Thus, for each firm, the relative 
dispersion index encapsulates the dispersion of their own models in a particular segment.
Quality upgrading
A dynamic distance metric of innovativeness reflects the abifity of the firm to enhance 
each of its products between periods is first defined by:
mmi.upgrade^,^ =  (4.17)
*vmfc,t 1
where: Vt and Vt-i =  the number of versions, v, marketed under model, m, in segment 
class c, in year t and t — 1 respectively;
Qvmfct = quality of model version, v, of model, m, of firm / ,  in segment class c, in 
year t;
Çvmfc,t-i =  quality of model version, v, of model, m, of firm / ,  in segment class c, year 
t — 1;
Since the data is taken from the version level, but the survival analysis is at the 
model level, the ‘typical’ model is derived as being the average of the model’s underlying 
versions. Hence the nominal upgrade measure determines the average difference between 
the weighted sum of versions making up the model, using model version sales as the 
weight. While upgrading is a one-way process with larger proportions of “high quality” 
features being embodied over time raising the profitability of products where the cost 
of embodying attributes is outweighed by the returns to their incorporation, a model’s 
success in the market is based not only on a firm’s ability to upgrade each model but on 
its rivals’ ability to embody new features. So, while upgrading within a model is always 
upward, this need not be the case relative to the market as the quality of models that 
constitute it evolve over time. To capture this, the upgrading rate of models is normalised 
against the degree of standardisation within the market. Hence,
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■= spNt-l
standardarisatiorimt =  — (4.18)
JVt -iVf_i
where: Nt and Nt-i =  the total number of versions, in year t and t — 1 respectively;
qn,t and qn,t-i =  the markup of model version all versions in the sample, in year t and 
t — 1 respectively.
If upgrading prolongs the life of models, those models that survive should be those that 
he above the standard, while those below the standard are effectively being under-invested 
in and are more likely to exit the market. So upgrading is defined as:
upgrademt =  nomjupgrademfct — standardarisatiorimt (4.19)
The measure being linear with each version having two immediate neighbours, the 
random pricing component is likely to be affected by competitors beyond their immediate 
neighbourhood.
The final data set analysed contains 602 models, over 28 year ‘spells’, amounting to 
3,227 model-spell observations. Firms that exit the market are excluded since their mod­
els automatically exit with them creating a potential endogeneity problem. Correlations 
between the dependent variable and the key independent variables related to the hypothe­
ses to be tested are provided in Table 4.7.
4.3.5 Analysing the  ‘Product-Led Decline’
To investigate to what extent ‘product-led decline’ affected the products of British Leyland 
relative to those of other market participants a survival analysis is undertaken. Survival 
- in this case the number of periods that a car survives in the market - is modeled as 
a variable t and that is an observation of a random variable T. The random variable is 
assumed to have a density function, /(t), and a distribution function, F(t), which defines 
the survival function, <S'(t) =  1 — F(t). The survival function shows the probabihty that 
the car model survives at least t  periods. Prom the survival function the probability of exit 
each period, commonly termed the hazard function, can be defined as h{t) — , which
is the rate at which a spell is completed after duration t  conditional that it has survived 
until t. In this formulation the hazard function is simply a function of time, however 
it is reasonable to assume that the hazard rate is a function of PLD, as well as model 
specific factors such as the age of the car model, the segment where it is marketed, the
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Table 4.7: Correlation of Key Variables with Model Exit
Survival
BL
Crowding 0.047
Cannibalisation 0.087
Renewal -0.091
Differentiation_brand -0.014
Differentiation_model -0.039
Dispersion_model -0.029
Dispersion_brand -0.043
Upgrade -0.019
Crowding 0.058
Cannibalisation 0.034
Renewal -0.019
Differentiation_brand -0.006
Differentiation_model -0.004
Dispersion_model -0.014
Dispersion_brand -0.022
Upgrade -0.006
period when the car was first developed. The model estimated is the piecewise constant 
exponential model,
h{t\x) =  exp{P'x) (4.20)
where the hazard at time t of a model with a vector of characteristics x is denoted 
as h{t\x). The preference for using the piecewise constant exponential model reflects the 
flexibility of that model, and because its coefficients can be easily interpreted qualitar 
tively.^^
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model are reported in Table 4.8. The initial 
specification explores aspects of market structure before turning to the central issues of 
competition and quality upgrading associated to the PLD hypothesis. Specification 1 
incorporates age, cohort, firm entry, and segment effects.^ ®
The age effects, which are referenced by models that have been launched for less than
2^The piecewise constant exponential model avoids making (strong) assumptions concerning the shape of the hazard by 
allowing the baseline hazard to vary over time intervals, in this case years, but constrains covariates to shift the hazard ly  
the same rate within each interval. Since the baseline hazard function equals the hazard function for X  — 0, the effect of 
a unit change in a covariate is to produce a constant proportional change in the hazard rate so the effects of each variable 
on model exit are easily determined. See Kiefer (1988) for a sound introduction to duration analysis.
^°Studies of the evolution of firms have consistently found that firm age is an important determinant of firms’ survival 
since it conditions the cumulative technological expertise of the firm [e.g. Klepper and Simons (2000)]. A firm age variable 
was experimented with but had no explanatory power. Given the mature nature of the market and the long lived nature of 
its participants this f in d in g  is not surprising.
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one year, follow a non-linear pattern. There are three rationales for the age of models 
affecting their survival. First, there are significant sunk costs associated with developing 
and launching a new model that may induce firms to maintain an unsuccessful car in 
the market for the first few years after launch. Second, the establishment of a models’ 
reputation may take some time to achieve. Third, the “newness” of a new model may 
induce early sales.
A set of dummy variables for year of introduction, grouped into four-year œhorts, are 
also included. The car industry witnessed considerable shifts in demand conditions and 
production methods over the window of observation that could have led to differences in 
the survival of car produced within time periods. Such effects may refiect major exogenous 
shifts in the economic environment related to events like accession to the EEC in 1973, the 
1973 and 1979 Oil Crises, and to the potential pro-competitive effects of the completion 
of the market EC initiative in 1992. On the supply side, the development of robotics 
from the early 1970s and the 1980s and the shift towards Just-in-Time production meth­
ods may have affected particular cohorts of models [Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990)]. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the introduction of new technologies within cohorts has 
a positive impact on innovating models then these will be picked up by cohort effects. 
Although the coefficients suggest that the product-life-cycle of cars was shortening over 
time, they are not statistically significant.
Specification 1 also examines segmentation effects taking the mini/super-mini segment 
as the omitted reference group. The coefficients on the established segments (small family, 
executive, luxury and sports), with the exception small family cars, are positive and 
significant with the coefficients particularly at the upper end sub-markets (executive, 
luxury and sports) being large. The two ‘new’ segments - 4-by-4s and personal carriers 
- behaved similarly to mini cars with the hazard estimates bemg insignificantly different 
from zero at any conventional levels. This implies that new segment model turnover was 
higher than for established sub-markets. That finding is consistent with the effects model 
of reputation and recouping sunk cost associated with new product development being 
dominated by a greater turnover of new products to meet the greater “taste for variety” 
of new good purchasers.
Specifications 2-4 assess the relative impact of the PLD’s three dimensions on the sur­
vival of models at BL relative to the market as a whole. Specification 2 begins by probing 
the competitiveness effects associated with crowding, and cannibalisation. To encompass 
the degree of competition within market segments a series of market niche Herfindahl 
indices are calculated. The “crowding” variable measures the relative inequality of model 
m’s rivals in segment classification, c, at time, t, and is given by Hmct — EjlLiWmcfAct)^
148
Table 4.8: Determinants of Model Survival: Results from the Piecewise Constant E:q)onential Propor­
tional Hazard
SPEC. 1 SPEC. 2 SPEC. 3 SPEC. 4
HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES . HYPOTHESIS
la  & 2a 1b&2b 3
AGE. CROWDING, COUNTER FORCES UPGRADING
SEGMENT. AND OF EFFECT
FIRM ENTRY. CANNIBAL, CROWDING
EFFECTS EFFECTS CANNIBAL
age effects 1 and 2 2.12 (3.47) 3.46 (3.83) 3.65 (3.93) 3.53 (3.70)
age between years 2 and 3 2.50 (4.14) 3.86 (4.32) 4.06 (4.42) 3.87 (4.08)
relative to between 3 and 4 2.85 (4.75) 4.21 (4.74) 4.43 (4.84) 4.23 (4.49)
0 and 1 year 4 and 5 2.43 (3.91) 3.77 (4.19) 4.02 (4.33) 3.95 (4.14)
5 and 6 3.12 (5.18) 4.44 (5.00) 4.88 (5.11) 4.68 (4.98)
6 and 7 3.29 (5.44) 4.60 (5.17) 4.88 (5.31) 4.82 (5.12)
7 and 8 3.39 (5.57) 4.69 (5.26) 4.99 (5.42) 4.83 (5.08)
8 and 9 3.24 (5.23) 4.61 (5.12) 4.90 (5.29) 4.90 (5.15)
9 and 10 3.55 (5.76) 4.90 (5.46) 5.20 (5.62) 5.27 (5.54)
10 and 11 3.49 (5.54) 4.83 (5.34) 5.12 (5.49) 5.26 (5.51)
11 and 12 3.62 (5.72) 4.99 (5.50) 5.31 (5.69) 5.34 (5.52)
12 and 13 3.44 (5.25) 4.81 (5.22) 5.12 (5.40) 5.26 (5.39)
13 and 14 2.97 (4.04) 4.37 (4.45) 4.72 (4.69) 5.08 (4.92)
14 and 15 3.31 (4.67) 4.71 (4.90) 5.04 (5.09) 5.40 (5.34)
15 and 16 3.86 (5.79) 5.27 (5.65) 5.81 (5.85) 5.74 (5.76)
16 and 17 3.70 (5.22) 5.11 (5.35) 5.40 (5.51) 5.79 (5.75)
17 and 18 2.38 (2.05) 3.90 (2.93) 4.26 (3.17) 4.78 (3.47)
<18 2.39 (3.06) 3.87 (3.81) 4.32 (4.13) 4.81 (4.30)
cohort effects 1975-78 -0.28 (1.49) •0.20 (1.40) -0.28 (1.48) ■0.28 (1.47)
(ref. 1971-1974) 1979-82 -0.06 (0.29) -0.09 (0.43) -0.03 (0.16) 0.07 (0.30)
1983-86 -0.17 (0.92) -0.12 (0.65) -0.04 (0.23) 0.21 (1.07)
1987-90 0.04 (0.17) 0.14 (0.62) 0.27 (1.21) 0.69 (2.86)
1991-94 0.10 (0.42) 0.11 (0.49) 0.30 (1.21) 0.54 (1.66)
1995-98 0.41 (1.27) 0.37 (1.12) 0.52 (1.64) 0.91 (2.31)
segment effects small 0.42 (1.93) 0.25 (1.05) 0.36 (1.38) 0.51 (1.66)
(ref. mini) medium 0.60 (2.76) 0.18 (0.57) 0.21 (0.62) 0.54 (1.36)
executive 0.49 (2.15) 0.33 (1.38) 0.40 (1.59) 1.04 (2.93)
luxury 0.56 (2.12) 0.69 (2.17) 0.57 (1.66) 1.53 (3.35)
sports 0.75 (3.33) 0.45 (1.72) 0.40 (1.46) 0.67 (1.72)
4-by-4 ■0.24 (0.63) -0.14 (0.36) -0.30 (0.75) 0.04 (0.07)
minivan -0.31 (0.64) 0.01 (0.03) -0.33 (0.64) 0.04 (0.05)
Entrant firms -0.15 (0.75) -0.02 (0.07)
competiton effects Crowding 0.04 (1.98) 0.06 (2.13) 0.06 (2.01)
(Market) Cannibalisation 0.22 (4.95) 0.17 (2.28) 0.17 (2.05)
competiton effects Crowding 0.08 (2.85) 0.08 (2.85) 0.07 (2.19)
(British Leyiand) Cannibalisation 0.02 (1.32) 0.02 (1.39) 0.02 (1.16)
competitive Differeniiation_model -0.34 (0.94) -0.39 (1.69)
counter forces Differentiation_firm -0.43 (1.90) -0.27 (0.63)
(Market)
Dispersion_model -0.97 (3.96) -1.01 (4.09)
Dispersion_firm -0.82 (4.88) -0.82 (4.41)
Upgrade -0.91 (3.13)
competitive Differentiation_model -0.23 (0.35) -0.13 (0.47)
counter forces Differentiation_firm -0.01 (0.69) -0.01 (0.98)
(British Leyiand)
Dispersion_model ■0.62 (2.43) -0.59 (2.12)
Dispersion_firm -0.06 (1.79) -0.05 (1.49)
Upgrade -0.30 (2.03)
N 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227
Degrees of freedom 38 44 52 54
Log-likelihood -422.86 ■411.78 -398.53 -308.53
Chi square 131.65 149 181.46 202.03 241.85
Notes: 1. t-statisUcs in partenthesis
where n is the number of models in the segment, and rs represents the market share of 
each models’ rivals in the segment, with the sales of the model being excluded from each 
calculation. The resulting coefficients on the model level crowding variable are correctly 
signed, since competition is expected to reduce the survival of firm’s products. Cannibal­
isation, C, is defined as the number of models that a firm, / ,  has operating in a segment 
classification, c, at time t, hence Cfct = 2 /= i  îTm/ct- Furthermore, cannibalisation, mear 
sured at the firm-segment level, has a well determined effect of promoting exit.
While a useful first step, the inclusion of the competitive variables is quite ad hoc 
in relation to theoretical notions of how competition operates in differentiated product 
markets. Specification 3 tests the effects of the counter-forces to competition in the 
form of how well BL and other market participants differentiated their individual models 
{differentiation model) and model ranges {differentiation firm) when the first appeared 
in the market, and the degree to which each model and model range was differentiated 
over time {dispersion model and dispersion firm). The PLD hypothesis suggests that 
BL failed to both differentiate or disperse its products well in relation to the market. 
The results suggest that initial differentiation was not an important factor in determining 
model survival at BL. Nor do the results indicate that the initial degree of differentiation 
was important in the market more generally. The results indicate that dispersion was 
however an important factor and that model dispersion was the more important of the 
two dispersion measures. Firm dispersion aided BL in extending the life of its models 
but to a far lesser degree than for market participants in general, while a lack of model 
dispersion meant that it was not a significant factor. Specification 4 examines Hypothesis 
S', that BL’s models failed to keep pace with the market in terms of innovativeness over 
time. Wffiile upgrading at BL had the effect of enhancing the life of models the impact 
was considerably lower than that observed in the market in general.
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the results obtained in the preferred specification 
(Specification 4) the impact of a change of the main exogenous variables on the multiplier 
of the hazard of exit is summarised in Table 4.9. Since the estimated survival model 
is multiplicative, this is calculated by taking the exponential of the difference in the 
exogenous variable times the coefficient. For example, the estimates show that a model 
between 5 and 6 years old was three times as likely to fail as one that was between one 
and two years old, and it was about nine times more likely to exit for models between 15 
and 16 years of age. But a model with more than 18 years in the market was three times 
as likely to fail as one between one and two years old, suggesting that the effects of age 
decreased sharply for “classic” models.
When the competition forces are analysed, it can be seen that a model sold in a
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Tkble 4.9: Effect of a Change in the Independent Variable on the Multipher of the Rate of Model Exit
Change from between 1 and 2 years to 2 and 3 years 1.41
between 1 and 2 years to 5 and 6 years 3.17
beWeen 1 and 2 years to B and 9 years 3.95
between 1 and 2 years to 12 and 13 years 5.64
between 1 and 2 years to 15 and 16 years 9.15
between 1 and 2 years to than 18 years 3.62
Change from cohort 71-74 to cohort 75-78 0.75
cohort 71-74 to cohort 79-82 1.07
cohort 71-74 to cohort 83-86 1.24
cohort 71-74 to cohort 87-90 1.99
cohort 71-74 to cohort 91-94 1.71
cohort 71-74 to cohort 95-98 2.48
Change from Mini to small 1.66
Mini to medium 1.72
Mini to large 2.83
Mini to luxury 4.64
Mini to sports 1.95
Mini to 4-by-4 1.04
Mini to mlnlvan 1.04
Control
Variables
Competition 
Hypothesla: la
Hypothesis: 2a
Counter-Competitive 
Hypothesis: 1b
Hypothesis: 2b
Hypothesis: 3
Age
Cohort
Segment
Competition
(market)
Competition 
(British Leyiand)
Cannibal
(market)
Cannibal 
(British Leyiand)
Differentiation 
at model level 
(market)
Differentiation 
at firm level 
(market) 
Differentiation 
at model level 
(British Leyiand)
Differentiation 
at firm level 
(British Leyiand)
Dispersion 
at model level 
(market) 
Dispersion 
at firm level 
(market)
Dispersion 
at model level 
(British Leyiand)
Dispersion 
at firm level 
(British Leyiand)
Upgrading
(market)
Upgrading 
(British Leyiand)
Change from 
Change from 
Change from 
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from
Change from 
Change from
Results using preferred especification (Model 4)
8 to 18 1.86
8 to 24 3.07
8 to 48 19.91
8 to 18 2.09
8 to 24 3.77
8 to 48 34.37
0 to i 1.19
0 to2 2.38
0 to4 3.57
0 to 1 1.02
0 to2 2.04
0 to4 3.05
0 to 0.75 1.34
0 to 1.5 1.80
0 to 0.25 0.94
0 to 0.50 1.14
0 to 0.75 1.10
0 to 1.5 1.22
0 to 0.25 1.00
0 to 0.50 1.00
0 to 1 2.75
0 to2 7.55
0 to 1 2.27
0 to2 5.14
0 to 1 1.81
0 to2 3.27
Ot o l 1.05
0 to2 1.09
0 to 1 2.50
0 to2 6.23
0 to i 1.35
0 to2 1.82
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market segment with 24 rival models was more than three times as likely to fail as one 
with only 8 rival models, and was nearly nineteen times more likely to exit where a model 
was competing against 48 models. Competitive forces had a more profound eEect on 
British Leyland’s products with the rates of exit being 18% higher when 24 rivals were in 
the market segment rising to being 68% greater when a BL model competed against 48 
models. The rate of exit of a model more than doubled in the presence of another model 
marketed by the same firm (i.e cannibalisation occurred). The findings for BL are lower, 
but it should be stressed that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the 
estimation.
The impact of strategic location on a new model in the year that it is launched (mear 
sured by the model and firm dispersions variables) seems to have had a limited impact 
on the likelihood of the survival both on the market as a whole and at BL in particular. 
As with BL’s cannibalisation coefficient, it should be noted that neither coefficient is sig­
nificant in the estimation so the marginal effects of these variables should be viewed with 
caution. No such caveat is required where the model and firm dispersion results are con­
sidered at the market level. Of the two dispersion effects, being well dispersed from rival 
products, or firm d^persion, was quantitatively more important than model dispersion. 
The results indicate that models whose dispersion was one standard deviation greater 
than the mean survived twice as long as models with a mean level of firm dispersion, and 
seven times longer when the model was two deviations greater than the mean. The abihty 
of firms to disperse their own products from each other, what was termed firm dispersion, 
while less important than model dispersion was still substantive. Models marketed within 
well dispersed product ranges, at two standard deviations from the mean, had five times 
higher chance of remaining in the market than a model with a mean level firm dispersion. 
In BL’s case only within firm dispersion of its own models {dispersion firm) influenced 
its product’s survival, and even then BL’s within-firm dispersion effect was considerably 
lower than the market average. Finally, a model that was upgraded above the market 
average was twice as likely to survive as one that upgraded in line with the market. But, 
in line with the anecdotal account presented above, the lack of quality upgrading at BL 
meant that the beneficial effects of product innovation were severely blunted.
To ensure that the resulting coefficients are not determined by the defined time intervals 
of the piecewise constant exponential model, the preferred specification (Specification 4) 
was re-estimated using a WeibuU model (the parametric baseline hazard) and a Cox model 
(which allows for a non-parametric baseline hazard). Table 4.10 displays the results. In 
the first column, a parametric test indicates a monotonically increasing hazard rate: as 
is reflected in the p (= 1/rho) coefficient in the Weibull model being significantly larger
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than one. In the second column, a mis-specification test, based on the Cox model using 
the predicted hazard and its squared value as explanatory variables, is performed. Under 
the null hypothesis of no omission of relevant variables, the coefficient of the predicted 
hazard takes the value of 1 and the coefficient of the square value takes the value of 
zero. The test suggests that the model is correctly specified. The conclusion is that the 
implementation of alternative estimation strategies does not alter the findings.
A possible objection to the firidings presented thus far is that firms may have decided 
to remove products from the market place of their own accord and thus did not have 
their products ejected from the market due to competition. In order to control for this 
possibility I use an indicator variable that designates when a firm is still actively promoting 
a product in the market, but where that product exits the market regardless. The logical 
candidate is advertising since it is unlikely that firms continued to advertise products 
that they were planning to withdraw from the market. I thus use the model-specific 
advertising data to generate a binary indicator variable that indicates whether a model 
was advertised either during the year the product exited the market or the year before 
exit. In no cases were British Leyiand models not advertised up to the death suggesting 
that their models were ejected from the market by competition, however the advertising 
test criteria applies to other market participants.
Of the 348 models that exited the market over the period analysed, 212 of these 
were advertised in the year they exited or the year prior to exit. I assess the survival 
of products of the sub-sample of advertised products in Table 4.10 (columns 3, 4 and 
5). The first specification provides maximum likelihood estimates from the piecewise 
constant exponential model. Compared with the corresponding fuH sample specification 
estimation (Specification 4 in Table 4.8) the resulting coefficients are of similar magnitudes 
to earlier estimates and are consistently signed. The central difference being that the 
estimates indicated that competition had greater effect on the survival of a model, with 
the coefficient being about 12% and 25% greater than when the full sample was analysed, 
depending on where the model competes with 18 or 24 models (rather than 8 product rivals 
models) respectively. I then re-estimated the sub-sample of models that are positively 
advertised using the Weibull and Cox models with results being located in Columns 4 
and 5. The results reiterate those obtained in the full sample estimations, but again 
suggest that competition had a greater impact on exiting models that were advertised in 
the last two years of their lives.
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Table 4.10: Effect of a Change in the Independent Variable on the Multiplier of the Rate of Model Exit
Full Sample Positive Advertising In Year t or Year (t-1)
Weibull Cox Piecewise Weibull Cox
age effects 1 and 2 3.360 (3.64)
age between years 2 and 3 3.655 (3.99)
relative to between 3 and 4 3.978 (4.38)
Oand 1 year 4and 5 3.652 (3.97)
Sarxi6 4.373 (4.83)
6and7 4.488 (4.95)
7and6 4.432 (4.84)
Band 9 4.521 (4.94)
9 and 10 4.862 (5.32)
10 and 11 4.895 (5.32)
11 and 12 4.883 (523)
12 and 13 4.807 (5.11)
13 and 14 4.532 (4.55)
14 and 15 4.881 (5.02)
15 and 16 5.196 (5.41)
16 and 17 5.195 (5.37)
17 and 18 4.120 (3.06)
>18 3.950 (3.67)
cotrort effects 1975-78 0.011 (0.06) 0.862 (0.81) -0.370 (1.97) 0.002 (0.01) •0.169 (0.74)
(ref. 1971-1974) 1979-82 0.383 (1.71) 1.184(0.89) -0.181 (0.88) 0.353 (1.37) 0.128 (0.55)
1983-86 0.438 (1.93) 1.158 (0.73) -0.107 (0.59) 0.405 (1.55) 0.091 (028)
1987-90 0.618 (2.49) 1.249 (0.97) 0.328 (1.48) 0.380 (121) -0.039 (0.13)
1991-94 1.114 (4.44) 1.883 (268) -0.031 (0.11) 1.067 (3.55) 0.559 (1.92)
1995-96 0.843 (3.09) 1.306(2.01) 0249 (0.68) 0.697 (2.13) 0.115 (0.35)
segment effects small 0.401 (1.81) 1^89 (1.52) 0211 (0.84) 0.437 (1.58) 0.346 (129)
(ref. mini) medium 0.189 (0.76) 1.143(0.56) 0.118 (0.35) 0248 (0.82) 0.161 (025)
large 0.458 (1.77) 1 JOB (1.07) 0.458 (1.84) 0.715 (226) 0.495 (1.62)
luxury -0.596 (1.38) 0.670 (1.93) 1.034 (1.91) -0241 (0.62) •0.178 (0.33)
sports 0.307(1.07) 1.142(0.49) 0.121 (0.42) 0.399 (1.12) 0.203 (0.60)
4-bM -0.886 (0.54) 0.422 (0.53) -0225 (0.43) -0.926 (1.99) •0.862 (1.93)
minivan -0.777 (1.87) 0.502 (1.63) -0209 (0.28) -1.599 (224) -1.526 (218)
competiton effects Crowding 0.073 (4.43) 0.071 (2.19) 0.0862 (2.65) 0.082 (4.62) 0.080 (2.47)
(market) Cannibalisation 0.378 (3.41) 0.323 (264) 0.1206 (2.13) 0.1454 (251) 0.1399 (2.03)
competiton effects Crowding 0.096 (2.19) 0.099 (2.54)
(British Leyiand) Cannibalisation 0.016 (1.16) 0J19 (1.33)
quality effects Differentiation model •0.141 (0.41) -0J08 (1.47) -0.4672 (1.11) -0.4475 (0.91) -0.5741 (129)
(market) Differentiation fimt -0.030 (0.32) -0.949 (0.19) -0.5929 (1.69) -0.4218 (1.62) -0.4633 (1.66)
Dispersion model -0.609 (2.67) -0.649 (2.10) •0.8956 (4.00) •0.9353 (422) -0.9141 (329)
Dispersion firm -1.004 (6.91) -0J21 (7.09) -0.5276 (2.01) •0.7193 (259) •0.5530 (1.88)
Upgrading -1.503 (4.46) -1.014 (3.17) -0.8839 (3.21) -0.6534 (3.76) -02384 (2.97)
quality effects Differentiation model -0.250 (0.78) -0.195 (1.07)
(British Leyiand) Différentiation firm •0.017 (0.99) •0.020 (1.48)
Dispersion model -0.040 (1.78) -0.047 (1.63)
Dispersion firm -0.897 (2.63) -0.882 (282)
Upgrading •0.304 (2.03) •0.399 (203)
rho 0.646 (14.88) 0.607 (12.97)
Misspedflcation test (CPHM)
s 1.151 (10.26) 1.067 (7.00)
s2 0.201 (1J5) 0.076 (0.61)
N 3,227 3227 3,227 3,227 3227
Failures 367 367 212 212 212
Degrees of freedom 28 28 41 23 23
Log-iikelihood -497.3 -1944.3 •420.5 -417.4 -12742
Chi square 112.72 98J2 1312 100.96 84.62
Notes: 1. trstatisUcs in parenthesis; 2. Test for duration dependence: p=1/rho>1 implies a monotonically increasing hazard rate (WeitxjII); 3. Test of 
misspacification: s2=0 (Cox): Null hypottiesis: s=1 and s 2 ^  if null is not reject the specification is accepted. Tire test Is based on the Cox model using the 
predicted hazards and its square value as explanatory varlatries.
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4.4 Concluding Discussion
The decline of the once dominant car maker British Leyiand has been blamed on its failure 
to innovate. The extent to which the three dimensions of what the Central Policy Review 
termed ‘product-led decline’ affected the survival of British Leyland’s products relative 
to its competitors in the market place between 1971-1998 are assessed. In particular: 
(1) the extent of rival competition had a role in the market and at British Leyiand; (2) 
whether BL’s products were unable to fill the domestic market place with a range of 
products differentiated in ways that reflected consumers’ taste and demand patterns, and 
(3) that BL’s cars were outdated and that BL, unlike its foreign owned counterparts, 
neglected to regularly upgrade its product ranges to embody technological advances is 
examined in the context of the survival of the firm’s products. While it is plausible that 
these factors were important, the previous Hterature has been based on assertion rather 
than on rigourous empirical testing that attempts to rule out alternative possibilities. 
Specifically I argue that, other than a lack of management acumen, it is unlikely that 
the mainstream arguments concerning the fate of British Leyiand had a direct role in the 
product creation and strategic location processes. In particular, although the disruption 
of labour disputes would have influenced the costs of producing cars, they were confined 
to the shop-fioor and so did not influence the departments involved with designing the 
products themselves. Nor was the government involved in the day-to-day decision making 
or decisions concerning products.
The empirical findings of Section 4.2 Affirm the importance of product quality in under­
mining the performance of British Leyiand. The firm proved unable to adjust its product 
strategy swiftly and during the time spent developing a narrowed product range, able to 
compete in the increasingly competitive UK car market, it witnessed its market share 
shrink from over 40% in 1970 to 12% of the UK car market by 1988. The qualitative 
discussion suggests that 1). the mass-segment brands of BL and CUK performed badly, 
perhaps with the exception of Rover, compared to Vauxhall, Ford and imports between 
1971-1979; 2). it is expected AR cars to be more highly valued from the 1980s due to 
product improvements, and 3). over the full period, the performance of the surviving 
brand. Rover, should improve reflecting quality improvements over the period. The em­
pirical findings provide strong support to the first two hypotheses and some support for 
the third. To date this work explicitly captures only the quality upgrading aspect of qual­
ity renewal, with the random effects in the panel estimations encompassing the second 
aspect of product quality identified in this study, build quality. In subsequent work I plan 
to capture the enhanced rehability associated with better build quality into the analysis
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more directly.
Section 4.3 confirms the validity of ‘product-led decline’ as a root cause of British 
Leyland’s decline. Without a viable product range to satisfy an increasingly discerning 
market, BL’s ability to compete with the ever expanding product ranges of its rivals, 
even in its home market where it should have been most competitive, was limited. De­
spite competitive pressure BL attempted to maintain its product range but was unable 
to obviate competitive effects through dispersing and differentiating its products. In a 
market where rival’s increasingly used product cannibalisation and dispersed their models 
and model ranges to avoid the brunt of competition BL’s product strategy bucked the 
trend. Finally, a lack of quality upgrading of BL’s products, relative to its competitors, 
meant that its product’s survival was halved, leading to costly renewal of products. In 
an industry where the sunk costs of products are measured in hundreds of millions of 
pounds, the ability of BL to maintain its profitability and market dominance was severely 
constrained.
Ultimately, the features and style of models and model versions is determined in the 
design and development phases through the interaction of design, engineering, and mar­
keting department of a car firm with oversight and resources directed by management, 
while the on-going quality of products themselves is determined on the shop floor and 
is overseen by quality auditing and control methods. The analysis has shown that a de­
sign team equipped to develop new competitive products or upgrade existing products 
was not apparent at BL. In a mature industry characterised by product differentiation 
and quality upgrading, the limitations of BL’s products proved near fatal to an industry 
that was considered to be destined to revive Britain’s former manufacturing industry by 
government commentators at the beginning of the post-war period.
While reluctant to generalise the results across markets and in differing industries that 
suffered the ‘British Disease’ there is no compelling reason why the mechanisms quantified 
here should not be apparent in other mature UK differentiated product industries. This 
research also makes two methodological contributions to the literature by: (1) combining 
the relevant aspects of two disparate methodological approaches; and (2) quantifying 
the static (product differentiation and dispersion) and dynamic effects of quality change 
(quality upgrading). It is hoped that by providing a clear methodological setting to 
analyse the issue of ‘product-led decline’, as well as providing evidence that it was an 
important factor in the UK car market, that future research will be extended to other 
new sectors that had grown out of the technological advances of the Second Industrial 
Revolution, and also witnessed decline. More generally a more rigourous empirical micro­
based approach to Britain’s post-war industrial fortunes would deepen our understanding
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of the mechanisms influencing Britain’s manufacturing decline.
Appendix A: Calculating Cross-Price Elasticities
To address the substitutabflity of products more formally, the estimates for the coefficient 
on prices a and substitutability parameter a from Table 6.2 are used to recover the own 
and cross-price elasticities of demand derived from market share equation 4.3:
%  =  = -o f jm s j  +  a p j ( j^  -
= -a p k m s^ iîj  ^  fc.fc ^ g ,j  € g
=  =  -°V k m S k  +  + 1)
where rjjj is product f s  own-price elasticity of demand, Tjjk is the cross-price elasticity 
between product j  and fc, and differs depending upon whether the products belong to the 
same market segment.
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Chapter 5
Advertising and the Evolution of 
Market Structure in the UK Car 
Market
5.1 Introduction
There is an acknowledgement in the economic history literature that advertising assisted 
importers in their assault on the UK market and may also have affected the profitability of 
British Leyiand and other large incumbents [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995, 
227)]. However, the extent to which BL’s advertising costs and the loss of sales associated 
with rival advertising affected BL’s profit margins is left unaccounted for, as is the degree 
to which those factors affected BL’s rivals. The reason that a connection between the 
decline in the market share of British Leyiand, and the rise of predominantly European 
manufacturers on the one hand, and the rise in advertising expenditures on the other 
hand has been made is that these shifts both occurred simultaneously, gathering strength 
from the early 1970s. Indeed, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, of the many explanations 
advanced for the decline at British Leyiand, none also account for the substantive rise in 
advertising that occurred at the same time as that firm’s decline. Between 1957 and 1968 
motor companies’ advertising adopted a ‘rule-of-thumb’ to spend a certain proportion of 
sales revenue on advertising. There is anecdotal evidence that the extent of advertising 
outlays were determined by collusion. For instance, Henry (1986) points to an agreement 
between the four major players - Ford UK, GM Vauxhall, Chrysler UK and BL - not to 
engage in TV advertising campaigns.^ Cubbin and Cowling (1972) argue that the rationale 
for creating a level playing field, where advertising expenditures were concerned, reflecting
 ^These four firms captured 85% of sales in the UK car market in 1968.
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an appreciation that increased advertising was likely to be at least matched by their rivals 
mitigating the beneficial effects to the firm. In essence rival advertising would have (at 
least) partly offset any sales their advertising generated, so they held their expenditures 
below levels that would have been profitable for a monopolist [Bhaskar (1979, 340)].
Any cosy relationship limiting the advertising expenditures of firms broke down with 
an assault on the UK market by European and Japanese manufacturers from the early 
1970s. From 1971 a spectacular rise in advertising expenditure occurred which continued 
unabated until the end of the 1990s.
Seen through the light of economic theory, the resulting effect of advertising on the 
structure of the market is quite counterintuitive. It is typically perceived that markets 
that exhibit high levels of sunk cost, such as the car industry, should also exhibit greater 
levels of concentration [Sutton (1991)]. However, as has been illustrated in Chapter 3, the 
car market had grown more fragmented over time. The reason for this may be related to 
the oligopolistic nature of the market. As low levels of advertising were eroded advertising 
was used by firms as a means to induce switching behaviour by consumers.
The broader historical literature concerning UK advertising to date is descriptive being 
interested in outlining how advertising developed [Nevett (1986); Elliott (1986)]. It has 
also taken on a more social historical viewpoint [e.g. O’Sullivan and David (1998)], 
and is thus only tangentially concerned with the impact of advertising rivalry on firm 
performance. In contrast, advertising rivalry has been an issue of great interest in the 
economic, marketing and strategic management literatures that have analysed a diverse 
range of products. More pertinent to this research, a number of papers examined the 
car industry. However, research on advertising rivalry in the UK car market is more 
scarce being limited to Geroski and Murfin (1991b). That study was not able to discern 
the effects of firm rivalry since the analysis was conducted using aggregate, segment- 
level data between 1958 and 1983. Interestingly, the paper provides some evidence that 
sales were affected by advertising, but does not examine what the causes underlying the 
escalation of advertising were.
The purposes of this chapter are two-fold. First, it aims to determine what caused 
the substantive rise in the level of advertising expenditure in the UK market, focusing 
on whether the large dominant incumbent firms, and British Leyiand in particular, were 
drawn into the sharp escalation of advertising by European firms who were at the begin­
ning of the 1970s only bit players in the market. Second, having made some headway 
on understanding the cause of the advertising escalation, the question of whether rival 
advertising impacted on sales success is analysed, with the focus being on the most sub­
stantive loser, in terms of market share, British Leyiand. To analyse these questions a
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rich set of model level advertising expenditure was collated. Unlike previous work, the 
disaggregated nature of the data set developed and the substantive time span examined, 
allowing a more plausible exam ination of rivalry.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 exam ines development of advertising 
expendituresin_the UK market in the post-war period. Section 5.3 reviews the method­
ological literature looking at advertising rivalry before the advertising data and derived 
variables used in this study are explained in Section 5.4. Theoretical and empirical issues 
are detailed in Section 5.5. The analysis is contained in Section 5.6. That section assesses 
two central questions. First, to what extent did rival advertising lead to an escalation in 
the advertising expenditure at British Leyiand compared to other firms? Second, what 
were the combined impact on sales of the firm’s own and rival advertising on BL relative 
to its rivals? A brief concluding discussion is contained in Section 5.7.
5.2 Advertising Behaviour in the UK Car Market
A number of authors have pointed out that advertising expenditure was substantial in 
the UK car market [Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995)]. However, no author 
to date has examined the trends in advertising behaviour over the full period analysed 
in this chapter, let alone the expenditure levels of the central firm of interest, British 
Leyiand, or any other players in that market. Figure 5.1 plots advertising expenditure 
indices for the UK in general, and for the car industry in particular, in real terms (deflated 
by the advertising prices) Figure 5.1 depicts the considerable divergence in the growth of 
advertising expenditure within the market. UK wide advertising expenditures witnessed 
a precipitous rise in real terms such that expenditures nearly doubled between 1970 and 
2002. Advertising by car makers was considerably more spectacular in exhibiting an 
eleven-fold rise. Indeed, while no car manufacturer was in the top twenty UK advertisers 
in 1970, four of the top ten spots were taken by car manufacturers in 1998 [Advertising 
Association (2003)].  ^ Part of the explanation for the expansion is no doubt linked to 
the oligopolistic bargain to contain cars flrms’ advertising levels at the beginning of the 
period. However, such an explanation does not provide a rationale for the sustained 
expansion witnessed in the industry over the period as a whole. The rapid growth in 
advertising expenditures suggests that a sustained advertising war occurred in the market 
with expenditures rising in real terms in twenty-nine of the thirty-two years examined.
The sharp escalation in industry advertising also dates from the early 1970s, and it 
occurred because both domestic and foreign owned firms increased their advertising (the
^The companies being Fbrd UK, Renault, Toyota and GM Vauxhall.
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Figure 5.1: Real Advertising Indices for the UK Car Market and UK Market (1971-2002: Index=100 in 
1970)
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correlation between the advertising of these two groups of firms is .84). The basic story is 
played out in Figure 5.2. Both foreign and domestic firms had low advertising intensities 
in 1970, but from 1975 foreign firms intensified advertising. At the beginning of the 
period, the collective market share of domestic firms was above 75%, but by the end of 
the period it had fallen below 34%. Foreign producers began making inroads into the 
collective share of domestic players in the 1960s. By 1970, their share of the market was 
23%, and it rose steadily to about 65% at the end of the sample period.
It is, of course, possible that the apparent correlation between concentration and ad­
vertising shown on Figure 5.2 is spurious. One obvious possibihty is that market size 
might have increased during the period, making increases in advertising profitable for 
firms. However, although there are substantial cychcal fiuctuations in demand, there is 
no discernible sharp upward or downward trend in total industry sales from the mid-1970s 
until the end of the period. The correlations between market size and the Herfindahl con-
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Figure 5.2: Advertising Shares of UK Based and Foreign Firms (1971-2002)
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Sources: SMMT (Sales); MEAL and AC Neilson (Advertising expenditure).
centration index is -0.61 while the correlation between total sales and total advertising 
is 0.13. What market growth has occurred is in line with growth in incomes. It is more 
likely that the events described on Figure 5.2 were caused by the expansion of ‘entrants’ 
who while having minor shares in the UK market in 1970, were already established players 
on the global stage.^ As has been emphasised, the post-1970 period saw foreign owned 
car makers substantially expand their presence in the UK market, making serious inroads 
into the share of two of the big four domestics producers - British Leyiand and Chrysler 
Europe.
To delve deeper into who was expending the most energy on adverting. Table 5.1 plots 
the advertising intensity (advertising divided by sales) of the largest firms operating in the 
market. The Table is made up of two different groups of firms; importers and UK based 
producers. As Table 5.1 illustrates, the expenditure levels of three of the four dominant 
UK based firms, with Chrysler excluded since the firm exited in 1979. Relative to the 
mean, the level of advertising per unit sold was typically lower than the market average
^The term entrant is not literally true in the sense that these firms were active in the market. However, the scale of the 
market penetration was extremely low.
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for each of these players. There were two exceptions. Between 1970 and 1980 when British 
Leyiand was more enthusiastic to advertise its waxes than the other UK production based 
firms. However from 1981, with the exception of the year prior to BMW selling the firm, 
1999, BL’s advertising intensity was below the market average. Similarly Ford had a 
greater than average advertising intensity in the 1980s. On the fiip side of the market the 
most substantive European based manufacturers - PSA, Renault, VAG and Fiat - had 
above average advertising intensities. The only Japanese firms to achieve a greater then 
five per cent market share in the UK at any point during the sample period, Nissan and 
Toyota, maintained relatively low levels of advertising expenditure until 2000. Given that 
Japanese manufacturers, as a group, were constrained in the share of the market they 
could obtain via Voluntary Export Restraints until December 1999 it is not surprising 
that these firms had lower levels of expenditure. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some Japanese firms focused their advertising on higher price models to encourage an 
expansion in more profitable models. For example, Mazda’s 1989 campaign to raise sales 
of its ‘medium’ segment 626 model coincided with reduced advertising of their ‘small 
family’ segment offering, the 323 [Cooper and Cash (1990)]. Despite lower advertising 
by Japanese manufacturers it is clear that the larger importing firms were the leading 
advertisers.
Table 5.1: Firm Advertising Intensity (Selected Firms: £s)
1971-1980 1980-1989 1989-1999 2000-200:
UK Based
British Leyiand 28 39 105 93
Ford 16 57 115 106
GM 18 33 126 108
Importers
PSA 51 92 193 106
Renault 21 89 190 153
VAG 36 63 195 144
Flat 31 79 182 104
Nissan 9 23 119 238
Toyota 21 33 105 124
Average 25 54 150 129
Sources: SMMT (Sales); MEAL and AC Nielsen (Advertising Expenditure)
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5.3 A Critical Review of the Methodological Literature
Given the commercial relevance of understanding the impact of advertising rivalry, it is 
not surprising that the issue has been of great interest across a range of business literatures 
that have analysed a diverse range of products.^ Of principal interest, given the industry 
focus of this work, there are a number of papers examining advertising rivalry in the 
auto industry both in the US and UK contexts. Before summarising the findings of 
that industry specific research, a wider context to the issue is provided via a brief critical 
literature review of the two distinct methodological paths developed to empirically analyse 
advertising rivalry.
One body of literature has focused on empirical estimation of advertising on sales 
(or market share), [Tremblay (1985); Nelson, Siegfried, and Howell (1992); Slade (1995); 
Thomas (1999); Clarke (1973), Carpenter, Cooper, Hanssens, and Midgley (1988)]. The 
second path consists of using dynamic differential games to examine the equilibrium time 
paths of advertising expenditures in a competitive setting via optimal control methods 
[e.g. Erickson (1992); Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1992); Chintagunta and Jain (1992)]. 
The complexity of these quasi-empirical models has had three implications. First, appli­
cations to date have examined duopoly rather than oligopolistic behaviour. Second, that 
literature takes no direct account of price or quality differentials concentrating purely on 
the relationship between advertising expenditure and market share, while the relevant 
econometric literature has emphasised that such factors are important influences on sales 
(or market shares). Finally, the results of the literature appear quite fragile to speci- 
flcation. For example, even within the context of the same industry, researchers have 
obtained conflicting results under differing closed-loop duopoly spedflcations [Erickson 
(1992); Chintagunta and Jain (1992)].®
Three papers have analysed the US car market over differing time periods. Two of these 
studies used firm-level data [Ceroski and Mazzucato (2001a); Creuger, Kamerschen, and 
Klein (2000)] and a third used model-level data [Kwoka (1993)]. Creuger, Kamerschen, 
and Klein (2000) took a sample of firm level accounting data from the three largest US 
flrms - Chrysler, Ford and CM over the 1970-92 period - and were able to show that in 
two of the three cases that rival advertising reduced profitabihty of CM, while Chrysler 
and Ford were unaffected. These results stand in stark contrast to those of the other 
studies. Kwoka (1993) found that rivalry increased own firm sales using the same sample
^For example: beer - "Dremblay (1985); coffee - Nelson, Siegfried, and Howell (1992); soft drinks - Chintagunta and 
Vilcassim (1992); saltine crackers - Slade (1995); ready-to-eat cereals - Thomas (1999).
^Both Erickson (1992) and Chintagunta and Jain (1992) examine the market shares and advertising behaviour of two 
firms operating in the US beer market. Miller and Anheurser between 1971-1988 and 1974-1989 respectively. Erickson 
(1992) found that Miller was a more effective advertiser then Anheuser while Chintagunta and Jain (1992) found the firms 
to be equally effective.
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of u s  firms analysed by Greuger, Kamerschen, and Klein (2000), despite using a richer 
model-level data set between 1970-82. Geroski and Mazzucato (2001a), who took the 
longest time horizon of the three US studies in examining the 1954-1996 period, found no 
evidence that advertising rivalry has occurred. Those authors reasonably argue that high 
correlations (of over 85%) between the groups of firms analysed made obtaining precise 
results unlikely. The lesson of Geroski and Mazzucato (2001a) is that considerably more 
disaggregated data is needed to analyse advertising rivalry with any degree of credibihty. 
Research on advertising rivalry in the UK car market is limited to Geroski and Murfin 
(1991b). However, that study was not able to discern the effects of firm rivalry since 
the analysis was conducted using quite aggregate, segment level, data between 1958 and 
1983. It is worth noting that the paper provides some evidence that sales were affected 
by advertising, but it does not examine what were the causes underlying the escalation 
of advertising.
5.4 Data and Explanatory Variables
5.4.1 Data
The data set employed in this study incorporates a complete sample of new registrations, 
car prices, matching the attributes of model and model versions marketed in the UK car 
market between 1971 and 2002 used in earfier chapters.
These data are matched to model-level advertising data that are recorded by industry 
for the UK by MEAL, and from 1997 by AC Nielsen Media Research following their 
acquisition of MEAL. The same data were also utilised in Chapter 4.3.® Since the product 
data set is at the product version-level, while the advertising data is model-specific the 
data needs to be aggregated to the model level, and deflated to provide real advertising 
costs.^ Two secondary data issues related to deflating the advertising series and to brand 
and firm generic advertising are taken up in detail in Appendix 1.
^Tbe data is not publicly available and Philip Spike at the British Advertising Association is gratefully thanked for 
allowing access to hard copies of the data to be used for strictly academic research. The data for the motor industry 
was recorded identically by MEAL and subsequently by AC Nielsen so there are no consistency problems between the two 
sources.
^In rare instances, model version-specific advertising is recorded. The version breakdown is not comparable with the 
version level product data set that is merged with the advertising data for the analysis as it does not record version 
expenditures consistently by year leading to considerable gaps in the data. The inconsistency springs from particular 
campaign’s titles being associated to specific versions of a model that are exceptionally recorded. Indeed, such version- 
specific campaigns are rare.
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5.4.2 Quality and Price
To capture the effects of prices and quality in the market a quality-adjusted price (QAP) 
variable is derived from the data. To do so, a simple hedonic methodology that has 
been widely adopted as a means to calculate QAPs is used [e.g. Cubbin and Cowling 
(1975) and Murray and Sarantis (1999)]. The hedonic method has also been utilised in 
Chapter 2 although in that case the coefficient values rather then the residual was used 
to measure ‘quality’. A correctly estimated hedonic function provides an a priori method 
to distinguish the value placed on attribute features of cars, and a means to establish the 
importance of brand premium effects and of the value of attributes contributing to the 
value of each model version. The analysis uses an identical set of semi-log specifications 
as that used in Chapter 2.
K
== O!o +  ^  +  i^t (5-1)
k=l
where the price of a model version, i, marketed at time t, is determined by the char­
acteristics Xik{t) of each version, z, and a constant, oo- The error term, £«, is assumed to 
be independent, and identically distributed. The coefficients associated with attributes, 
1  i, represent the marginal value that consumers and producers place on the at­
tribute. Dropping to the time subscripts to simplify the explanatory variables classified 
under /? CHAR  can be summarised as - P{CHAR) = (3{attrih), ^ {segment), P(age), 
P(brand) - where, attrib contains a complete set of one hundred and thirty product 
characteristics, segment refers to the sub-market the version is marketed in (i.e. mini, 
medium and so on), model and model version age entry are included , i.e. P(model) and 
(model version age), and a full set of brand dummies.
Prom Equation 5.1 the qualify-adjusted price of each version is calculated as,
i
QAP^ = InP^ +  (5.2)
i=l
The QAPyt can take on both positive and negative values. A positive value indicates 
that the actual price is greater then the expected price, given the bundle of attributes 
incorporated into the model. The version is therefore better value for m on^ in quality- 
adjusted price terms. A negative QAP^t indicates the version is over-priced (in quality 
terms).
The advertising data is merged with the product level data set described above. How­
ever, since advertising data is available at the model, rather than the model version level.
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the data is aggregated to the model level with version specific variables being derived 
as weighted averages of each attribute with the distribution of sales of a model in any 
given year being used as the weight. Table 5.2 provides a summary and descriptive statis­
tics - means, standard deviations and minimal and maximal values - for the full set of 
non-binary car attribute variables that are used in the analysis. To aid the reader in the 
analysis that follows the expected sign of each variable as well as that of the variables used 
as the reference where groups of dummy variables are examined is provided. Explanations 
as to the intuition for the expected signs is detailed during the analysis in Section 5.2
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics and Expected Signs of Variables (N=5,757)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Advertising
(Sign)
Sales
(Sign)
advertising (£'000) 154.1 295.3 0 2337.2 +
price (£'000) 14.2 16.6 0.6 199.8 + -
rival advertising (£'000) 22,600.0 27,600.0 0 139,000.0 + -
advertising (£*000) (t-1) 164.5 300.8 0 2267.9 + +
year 87.7 9.2 1971 2001 na na
Note: (1) Price in constant 1998 pounds.
5.5 Modelling Advertising Strategy
5.5.1 Theoretical Considerations
To investigate whether firms have adopted optimal advertising strategies requires a coun- 
terfactual that allows firms’ behaviour to be identified. To do so, a stylised ofigopolistic 
model developed by Schmalensee (1972) is used to bring out key relations to be tested 
in the data. The marketing model embodies limitations in that it assumes that price 
competition does not occur. Hence all firms charge the same price for their product. The 
assumption that price competition does not occur can be rationalised in markets where 
competitors utilise product differentiation and advertising competition as their strategic 
weapons in the market. Previous researchers have certainly argued that price competition 
was not a prevalent strategy [Geroski and Murfin (1991a); Cubbin and Cowling (1975)]. 
The theoretical model thus provides a stylised view of advertising relations which ab­
stracts from price and quality effects. The empirical analysis departs from the model in
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explicitly considering price and quality relations, and hence accounts for these essential 
elements.
In the Schmalensee (1972) model sales of each firm, g, are a function of own advertising 
outlays, rivals’ advertising, and price. Firm profits are given by,
TTj =  P.qi{Ai, A-i, P)  — Ci{qi,Ai^A-i^P) — Ai (5.3)
where the first term on the right hand side of the equation represents revenues that are 
a function of the advertising expenditure of the firm Ai, the advertising expenditure of 
rival firms and price, P. Firm’s costs, C, refiected in the second term, are a function 
of sales, g,, own and rival advertising, and sunk advertising costs enter as an additional 
cost factor. Setting the first derivative with respect to advertising equal to zero provides 
the profit maximisation condition,
where is the conjectural reaction of competitors to an increase in firm i's advertis­
ing outlays. Transforming the expression in terms of elasticities gives the Dorfman-Steiner 
condition (1954) in an oligopoly setting,
^  = Li{r}i-\- fiiTj-i) (5.5)P.qi
where the first term is the optimal advertising-sales ratio which is set against the 
firm’s Lemer index of monopoly power that is a function of its price elasticity of demand 
via its advertising effectiveness elasticity {rji =  ^  > 0 ), and the effectiveness of rivals’ 
advertising (r/_i =  ^ . ^ )  multiphed by the /i» =
The optimality conditions nest two tests of advertising. Where firms behave as monop­
olists there is no retaliation in the face of rival advertising (i.e. rj-i and/or /i* = 0). The 
monopoly case being the text book Dorfman-Steiner condition: ^  =  ^ .  If the monopoly 
model captures the elasticities derived empirically for the market it should satisfy the op­
timality condition. However, where strategic interaction occurs between advertising firms 
the elasticities will under-estimate the degree of advertising. Intuitively, in the absence of 
rival advertising the monopolist does not need to advertise to the same extent to ensure 
that marginal revenue product is equal to the price elasticity of demand. Hence where 
the firm faces competition from rivals, it needs to raise its advertising levels. Sub-optimal 
advertising by the monopolist is thus explained by the lack of recognition of strategic 
inter-dependence between firms and the possibihty of reaching a non-competitive equihb-
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riuin, which takes into account retaliatory effects. If firms’ interdependence is recognised, 
and allowing for strategic behaviour, then advertising is predatory (7/_i < 0). Advertising 
is a strategic substitute (/Zj < 0) and Li =  — ^  where Sf is the firm’s market share.
5.5.2 Empirical Considerations
To derive the price elasticity of demand and own and rival advertising elasticities requires 
modeling of the advertising sales relation. Empirically modeling the two-way relation­
ship is complicated by the interaction between the two variables since advertising affects 
sales, and in turn sales revenues fund advertising. Furthermore, both advertising and 
unit sales are co-determined by quality and prices. Indeed, advertising, quality and prices 
are choice variables for firms, who are able to compete for increased market share by 
raising advertising or quality, or by reducing prices. Before turning to the analysis, po­
tentially important statistical pitfalls identified in the hterature need to be addressed. 
Not accounting for endogeneity is known to lead to biased and inconsistent estimates 
[Schmalensee (1972, 98-100)]. One or more of these potential endogeneity problems has 
been recognised in the hterature. The approach taken below is to derive estimates from 
sales and advertising equations separately to overcome the endogeneity issue. Alternative 
frameworks are available as weU. The most common approach in the hterature has been 
to estimate simultaneous equation systems using instrumental variable OLS regression 
[Kwoka (1993), Greuger, Kamerschen, and Klein (2000), Nelson, Siegfried, and HoweU 
(1992)]. A more sophisticated approach has been to employ discrete choice modelling 
[Slade (1995); Goeree (2003)].
A second modelling consideration is whether to model the advertising-sales relationship 
in a static or dynamic setting. Whether there are advantages to accounting for ‘long- 
lasting’ affects to advertising is an empirical question. Earher work indicates that there is 
no long-lasting effect of advertising on sales after controlling for individual-specific effects 
[Thomas (1989), Landes and Rosenfield (1994) and Baton (2002)]. While prior research 
provides some guidance, differences in aggregation as weU as potential industry-specific 
differences mean that simply using such work as a definitive guide would lack rigour.
Those two modelling considerations are accounted for in this Chapter by the use of 
the dynamic general method of moments (GMM) estimator introduced by Arellano and 
Bond (1991).
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5.5.3 Empirical Models
There are four endogenous variables to examine in analysing sales-advertising relations in 
the form of sales, advertising, price and quality. These relations are captured in estimating 
sales via the following reduced form equation,
Qit =  ^0 — ^iPit — p2Q-^Pit +  +  PbQst (5-6)
where sales of a model i at time t  are determined by its nominal price pu, its quality- 
adjusted price QAPit and own and rival advertising {An and A-n  respectively) and the 
segment market share. The derivation of QAPs was detailed above. The motivation 
of separating price and quality-adjusted price is to provide a better understanding of 
how competition operates in the UK market since the empirical set up allows us to test 
whether firms compete in prices or in quality-adjusted prices. The following relationships 
are predicted. First, higher prices, all else being equal, reduce product sales. Second, a 
positive QAP for model i indicates that a car’s actual price is greater then it’s expected 
price. Hence the QAP is negatively related to sales. Third, higher own advertising 
stimulates sales while higher rival advertising depresses own product sales, as consumers 
switch to the rival product. Finally, the size of each market segment (Qat) is expected to 
stimulate advertising levels since larger segments offer potentially higher sales levels to 
firms. In summary the following signs are anticipated: /?i < 0, /?2 < 0, /S3 > 0, P\ < 0, 
Pb > O '
A further generalisation of Equation 5.6 is to take it into a dynamic setting. Where 
advertising has long lasting effects it cumulatively molds consumer’s behaviour. If this 
is the case previous advertising expenditure will influence current sales. More formally 
assuming a distributed lag model as has been common in the literature qn = /?o +  Pi-^t +
/^AAit H- PsXAit-i +  P^\^Ait-i + .... ). In this dynamic setting the estimating Equation
5.6 can be reformulated as,
Qit =  (1 — A)/?o +  P iP it +  P i Q - ^ i t  +  P s ^ t  +  PaA - h +  PhQst (5.7)
Advertising is affected by sales, prices and quality, but also by rival’s advertising. These 
factors are incorporated into the following reduced form advertising equation.
= O!o + O il— —2 ~ ~ ~  ~  ^2{Q ü + Q it- i ) — Oi^Pit + a 4 Q A P i t  +  a 5 A - n  (5.8)
There are a number of ways firms formulate their advertising expenditure decisions. 
The first is simply to follow a ‘rule of thumb’ where advertising is proportional to sales.
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The evidence where advertising was constrained through tacit agreement indicates that 
such an approach was utihsed in the industry during the early period and Schmalensee 
(1972) points to simple rule based advertising expenditure decisions as being common 
place in a number of US industries. A second possibility is that firms compensate for a 
reduction in product sales by intensifying their advertising activity.
Prices can been seen as a strategic substitute since firms can choose to raise advertising 
to induce sales or reduce prices. Of most interest, firms can react to rival advertising. 
They may react in one of two ways. If advertising is a strategic substitute, then if one 
firm raises its advertising then firms appreciate it will take market share away from rivals 
so therefore it may induce rivals to lower their advertising levels. Alternatively, firms 
can react aggressively to rival advertising in order to protect their market share at the 
expensive of profit margins (due to raised advertising costs). In this case advertising is 
a strategic complement. A priori the descriptive account suggests that rival advertising 
leads to an aggressive response by firms that brought about an escalation in advertising 
expenditures, in other words advertising rivalry acts as a strategic complement. Therefore 
the expected signs on the coefiScients are ai > 0 , 0:2 < 0 , as < 0 , 0:4 < 0  and as > 0 .
To incorporate sales dynamics Equation 5.8 can be restated as Ait =  70 +  + 7 iÇit + 
72ftt-i -  73Ptt+ 'TaQAPu +  7 5A_it, where 71 =  ^  +  0 2 , 71 =  ^  -  Q2 and 73 -  75 equate to 
ct3 —as. To incorporate dynamics on the advertising side it is assumed that a one-period 
lag occurs between making and implementing advertising decisions. Then advertising 
decisions take the form p(A*t — Au-i).
Ait =  O!o +  a i—— — Oi2{Qit +  Qit-i) — OisPit +  a^QAPit +  asA-a (5.9)
The same sort of dynamics underlie both the sales and the advertising equation. 
Analysing the sales-advertising relation, both a static (Equations 5.6 and 5.8) and dy­
namic setting are taken into account (Equations 5.7 and 5.9).
To over come the consistency issues related to endogeneity. Equations 5.7 and 5.9 are 
transformed to first differences and instrumental variables are used for the first difference 
of the lagged dependent variable, and then are estimated using a general method of 
moments estimation approach. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that, in the absence of 
serial correlation, the most efficient set of instruments are found using the lagged values 
of Qit and Ait from t — 2 and hence these are the instruments adopted.
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5.6 Analysis of Advertising and Sales
As was illustrated in Section 5.2 there are differences in advertising behaviour between 
different producer groups. The central concern of the paper relates to the effects of rival 
advertising on the advertising behaviour of British Leyiand. However, in order to gauge 
whether rival advertising had a more severe impact on BL, the resulting point estimates are 
compared against those of other firms and the market in general. The sample is therefore 
split between three strategic groups for the purposes of analysis: British Leyiand, UK 
production based MNEs and imports.® The results for the British Leyiand sample of 
models are presented in Table 5.3. Three specifications are provided to testify to the 
sensitivity of the results to omitted variables and the general robustness of the findings.
The results in Table 5.3 provide estimates for the (log) advertising equation (Equation 
3). Reassuringly, the Sargan test accepts the validity of the instruments and the null of no 
serial autocorrelation of the residuals is accepted in all specifications.® The sign of the sales 
variables confirms the rule-of-thumb behaviour of advertising but there is weak evidence of 
compensating behaviour as lagged sales do not have a well defined impact on advertising 
expenditure. The third specification contains the core result: rival advertising has a well 
defined positive impact on BL’s advertising expenditure. In addition, lower quality models 
receive less advertising expenditure. However the finHinga are imprecisely estimated. 
Specification 3 also shows, in keeping with an earlier literature on price competition in 
the UK car market, that the market has not been characterised by price competition as 
is reflected in the price variable having no discernable impact on advertising expenditures 
where QAPs are incorporated into the analysis - a result that carries over across firm 
groups.
The two key lessons to be taken from the upper panel of Table 5.3 are that escalating 
rival advertising led to increased advertising at British Leyiand but product quality was 
not well determined. Those findings are juxtaposed with a series of alternative benchmarks 
in Table 5.4 whose top panel summarises estimations for the MNEs and those related to 
imports. In both cases rival advertising is shown to have an important role in determining 
advertising expenditure. However, unlike at BL product quality, refiected in the coefficient 
on quality-adjusted prices, was an important factor in determining firms’ advertising 
spend.
^Japanese cars manufactured in the UK by Nissan, Honda and Toyota are included as imports since the aim is to 
distinguish between the effects of advertising entrants on those incumbents that were dominant at the beginning of the 
period.
^The Sargan test’s the null that the instruments are valid. It is distributed as x^(r) where r is the number of over- 
identifying restrictions. The tests for serial correlation are distributed asymptotically as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. Details of both tests can be found in Arellano and Bond (1991).
^ I^n order to make comparisons the final preferred specification is used. The underlying estimations for MNE and the 
full sample (excluding BL and UK based MNEs)is found in an appendix to the chapter.
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Table 5.3: Estimated Coefficients Determining Advertising and Sales at British Ley land (N=506)
Dep. var.rLog advertising (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.147 -0.147 -0.137
(3.52) (3.13) (2.15)
log advertising (-1) -0.175 -0.188 -0.347
(1.52) (1.47) (2.72)
log sales 1.026 1.027 0.965
(6.02) (5.92) (5.70)
log quality-adjusted price -1.039 -1.044 -1.082
(1.14) (1.35) (1.29)
log price 0.025 -0.089 0.052
(0.42) (0.78) (0.20)
log sales (-1) 0.054 0.119
(1.60) (1.69)
log rival advertising 0.252
(2.83)
Sargan test 20.1 (0.45) 18.7(0.54) 36.1 (0.07)
2"*' order serial correlation -0.67 -2.12 -1.66
Wald test 37.8 (2) 39.8 (3) 51.1 (4)
Dep. var.:Log sales (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.0872 -0.088 -0.145
(1.96) (2.50) (6.90)
log sales (-1) 0.036 0.036 0.035
(1.52) (1.50) (1.57)
log quality-adjusted price -6.731 -6.7444 -6.692
(2.14) (3.29) (2.39)
log price -0.11 0.19 -0.67
(1.36) (0.98) (0.30)
log advertising 0.243 0.211 0.227
(6.17) (6.72) (5.36)
log advertising (-1) 0.144
(1.80)
log rival advertising -0.0502
(2.59)
log segment sales 0.344 0.601 0.810
(1.89) (1.29) (1.36)
Sargan test 18.23 (0.44) 20.25 (0.57) 20.37 (0.56)
2"*' order serial correlation 0.12 -1.12 -1.21
Wald test 59.7 (4) 62.4 (5) 65.8 (6)
Notes: All models estimated in fîrst-diffierences by instrumental variables (GMM). 
The instrument used are (t-2) back on sales and advertising. All results are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. T-statistic are shown in parentiiesis).
Test for instruments validity (Sargan) and for 2°^  order serial correlation are described 
in Arellano and Bond (1991). They are distributed respectively as Chi-squared 
(p-values parenthesis reported under the null hypothesis of valid instruments).
Wald tests are for jointly significant coefficients of variables excluded constant term.
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The impact on British Leyland’s sales of price, and own and rival advertising are 
contained in the second Panel of Table 5.3. The findings strongly support the hypothesis 
that advertising had a positive influence on unit sales but also that rivalry mitigated 
those gains. To examine whether there are discernable diSerences in the effects of rival 
advertising on established UK and foreign manufacturers the sample is once again split 
into the three respective producer groups of interest: British Leyland, other UK based 
producers, and foreign firms. The results of running an analogous set of regressions for 
each group to those regressions analysing the determinants of BL’s sales are contained in 
Table 5.4. As with the analysis of advertising escalation the focus is once again restrained 
to the key variables of interest: quality-adjusted price and own and rival advertising, 
omitting the full tables of results’ for reasons of clarity.
Table 5.4: Summary of Elasticities, Mark-up and Rivalry Effects at BL, US UK-based MNEs and Other 
Firms
British
Leyland
UK based 
MNEs
Other
Firms
N=506 N=1,058 N=2,756
Advertising equation
Rule-of thumb behaviour 2.247 2.358 2294
Compensating behaviour 0.438 0.432 0.448
Rivai advertising effect 0261 0.593 0275
Saies equation
Elasticity sales-price -6.935 -6.056 -2.967
Elasticity saies -own advertising 0.235 0.249 0.409
Elasticity sales - rival advertising -0.052 -0.031 -0.011
Mark-ups (%) 14.42 16.51 33.70
Revenue/advertising (pounds) 42.7 61.2 34.4
Market share (%) 15.9 30.6 53.5
Advertising spend (mn £) 407 2,060 2,047
Rivairy effects (mn £)
Advertising induced revenues 96 513 837
Rival advertising revenue (losses) 214 76 28
Net Impact -118 437 809
The estimates are quite stable across specifications and show that British Leyland’s 
return on own advertising was lower than its rivals importers, but was not much different 
to that obtained by UK production based MNEs. The key difference between BL and 
its rivals was that the firm was considerably more sensitive to rival advertising. Since 
the variable coefficients are reported in log form they can be meaningfully interpreted. It 
is evident that BL and UK MNE’s products were considerably more price elastic, which
^^The results of the full regressions are quite similar to the full sample finH ings  and thus add little to the analysis. Those 
results are located as an appendix to this chapter.
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translated into foreign produced manufacturers obtaining considerably greater mark-ups. 
By employing the estimated elasticities and deriving the advertising expenditures of each 
group the impact of rival and own advertising is then calculated. The results indicate 
that, while the BL suffered a substantial loss associated with advertising of £118million, 
UK based MNEs and importers both obtained positive profits of £437 million and £809 
million, respectively. Taken in the context of a firm that recorded a pre-profit in eight of 
the 32 years examined it would appear that the lower return of advertising undermined 
the firm’s viability.
5.7 Conclusions
The strategic response to rival advertising on the advertising and sales of car makera in the 
UK was analysed over the period between 1970 and 2002. The period is one of particular 
interest since there was considerable advertising activity - a substantive, eleven-fold, rise 
in real advertising expenditure. This rise coincided with a period when British Leyland 
and other UK based MNEs were challenged by a group of European and Japanese firms. 
The chapter first examined the effect of advertising on firms in the UK market employing 
disaggregate model-level data.
It was shown that: (1) advertising wars were apparent in the UK car market with 
British Leyland and other UK production based MNEs (Ford, GM Vauxhall and Chrysler 
UK) reacting to the advertising expansion of importers; and (2 ) the positive expansion in 
British Leyland’s sales through its own advertising were canceled out by rival advertising. 
Since advertising represented a substantial cost to the firm (£118 million) the majority of 
these expenditures translated directly into financial losses. Other domestic firms were less 
sensitive to rival advertising and did benefit from advertising while foreign (principally 
European and Japanese car manufacturers) obtained substantive returns.
Appendix A: Data Issues
The data source records the amount of model-specific advertising expenditure as well as 
brand and firm’s generic advertising between 1970 and 2002. There is a question of how 
or whether to incorporate generic brand and firm level advertising into the analysis. How­
ever, since the lion-share of advertising expenditure is model specific (74%), with brand 
and firm advertising making up 22% and 4% of the total respectively, the issue is not a 
crucial one but requires some justification. One approach would be to assume that when 
a firm or brand advertises, the effect will be evenly associated to each model (i.e. which
175
suggests one can divide brand and firm advertising by the number of models and allocate 
this amount to the model specific expenditure). Allocating brand and firm advertising in 
such a way however assumes that consumers perceive advertising equally across a manu­
facturers’ model range, which appears unlikely. In effect, such an approach would inflate 
the advertising on marginal models and hence would not only be arbitrary but would 
potentially bias the analysis. A second approach is to include separate brand and firm 
advertising variables and to assess their effects separately from model specific expendi­
ture. This approach is however problematic since firm, brand and model advertising are 
highly correlated. Therefore, including such variables reduces the precision of the analysis 
and disallows anything other than tentative conclusions to be draw. After experimenting 
with the three advertising variables and finding that firm and brand generic advertising 
effects could not be well determined, the approach adopted was to use only model-specific 
advertising.
A second issue relates to the fact that, as pointed out in the seminal thesis of Schmalensee 
(1972), ideally advertising should measure ‘quantity’, not an ‘expenditure’, which reflects 
both quantity and the price of advertising. An increase in the price of advertising, for 
example, can increase advertising expenditures without increasing the number of “mes­
sages” conveyed to consumers. To account for this possibihty the nominal advertising 
expenditure series were deflated using price indices for advertising costs. Cost indices are 
recorded by type of media (Press, TV, Radio and so on) and are reported in Advertising 
Association (Various Y e a rs ) .T he  price indices for the two principal advertising medi­
ums, press and TV, and a weighted average of these medium’s expenditure is provided 
in Figure 5.3. The graphic illustrates that there was considerable growth in advertising 
expenditures in the UK. Indeed, the advertising deflator has grown at a slightly faster 
rate than the overall rate of inflation (the consumer price index) in the UK (0.5% p.a.).^  ^
In an earfier period, the growth in the cost of advertising has been faster than in the US. 
Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) found in the US that, over the 1956-75 period, 
the advertising deflator grew at 2 .2 % per year, while the GNP deflator increased by 3.5%.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that the TV and press cost indices trended similarly, but it also 
indicates that the indices differ in two respects. First, the TV advertising cost index tends 
to exhibit higher growth rates than press rates. Second, TV advertising costs have also 
been more cychcal than press rates, with downward shifts corresponding to down-tums in
^^The Office for National Statistics (the UK’s statistical department) does not provide official indices of prices hence the 
use of industry derived indices.
Costs are calculated ty  the Advertising Association as follows. Press rates are based on all the national daily and 
Sunday newspapers and their colour supplements. The standard rate is weighted by the changes in circulation. TV costs 
are based on the cost of advertising on television weighted by viewers. A summary index capturing the weighted average 
of expenditure on press and TV is calculated using the expenditures on each medium as weights [Advertising Association 
(Various Years)].
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Figure 5.3: Advertising Association Media Cost Indices
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Source: Advertising Statistics Yearbook (Various Years)
the business cycle from the late 1980s and, more severely, between 2000 and 2002. These 
differences are problematic for this study since the model-specific advertising data is not 
disaggregated between types of media. Table 5.5 summarises the proportion of advertising 
expenditure allocated between press and TV and other forms of advertising (such as 
outdoor and radio advertisements) over the three periods where data disaggregated into 
different media is available. At the beginning of the period TV advertising played a minor 
role in the advertising expenditure of car manufacturers. Examining the advertising data 
shows that only two niche European manufacturers, BMW and Mercedes, advertised 
their products on TV in 1971. That three domestic mass producers in the market did 
not advertise on TV implies that the firms had a tacit agreement to limit advertising 
expenditure in the UK market. The following year British Leyland, Chrysler UK and 
Ford UK each launched television advertising campaigns with GM Vauxhall using the 
medium from 1972. From there being no television advertising in 1968, the ten firms 
who captured over 85% of sales were engaging in TV campaigns by 1974. Between 1985 
and 1991 the proportion of car advertising expenditure associated with TV was three 
times greater than in the early 1970s period. Relative to total advertising, television was
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given a less prominent role than press advertising prior to 1985, but a more important 
role by car manufacturers for much of the period thereafter. The data suggests that the 
advertising-mix of car manufacturers is more sensitive to sales down-tums than is the 
norm. In particular, the exceptional fails in TV advertising in 1985 and 1991 are both 
years which coincide with negative demand shocks in car sales.
Table 5.5: Distribution of Advertising Expenditure by Media
TV Press Other
1971 2 98 0
1972 8 92 0
1973 14 86 0
1974 13 87 0
aver 10 90 0
1985 19 81 0
1986 43 55 2
1987 43 55 2
1988 38 60 2
1989 27 64 9
1990 32 67 1
1991 22 76 2
aver 32 65 3
1997 41 50 9
1998 42 49 9
1999 40 48 12
2000 37 53 10
2001 53 33 14
2001 54 32 14
aver 45 44 11
Sources: MEAL and AC Neiison
Note: aver are the arithmetic averages of the group of years 
reported directly above them.
'Other* includes non-TV and Press advertising (e.g. bill board and cinen
In order for the cost index to better reflect the relative differences between advertising 
in the media, a car specific index is created using the available data, spht between the 
advertising media used (for the 1971-74, 1985-91, 1997-2002 periods). For the periods 
for which data is not available there is no way of knowing the exact shares and so data 
was interpolated between the 1975-84 and 1992-96 periods. A problem with interpolating 
between the first of these periods, however, is that the year in which disaggregated data 
becomes available, 1985, appears to have been an abnormally low TV advertising com­
pared to subsequent years. Rather then taking that year as the base and extrapolating
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forward the average of the two subsequent periods is taken (i.e 1985 and 1986).^  ^ The 
fact that the 1970s and early 1980s period was one of great economic upheaval, the in­
terpolations are matched with those for the UK market as a whole, using the consumer 
price index growth rates, rather than taking simple linear interpolations.
A final and more generic pair of problems that are associated with using advertising 
expenditure data is conceiving how well such expenditures proxy for advertising effec­
tiveness. Not all advertising campaigns are equally effective with some novel campaigns 
having a greater impact on consumers and some ads reaching wider audiences. The theo­
retical hterature on advertising circumvents the second problem by appealing to the notion 
of “advertising messages”. In this way, they abstract from the various forms of market­
ing, advertising instruments and external information informing consumers of products. 
While a good deal of information is generated by marketing research companies, which 
attempts to quantify the number of people exposed to advertising campaigns and their 
awareness of advertising, such information remains commercially sensitive and such work 
is not conducted on a continuous b a s i s .T h a t  said the bulk of research considers and 
uses advertising expenditure as a proxy for advertising effectiveness, as will be done here.
the analysis that follows both a cost index using 1985 as the link year and one that uses the averaged level are used 
in separate analyses. The results are not qualitatively effected by the choice of index but since it is suspected that TV 
advertising was unusually low in 1985 the results pertain to the two year averaged interpolation.
i^Some recent research has been able to use consumer information. Fbr example, a recent paper, Ackerberg (2001), 
analyses yogurt advertising in Sioux Fhlls (South Dalcota) and Springfield (Missouri) between 1986*88. However in the rare 
instances where such information is available, and it is typically only for short periods, in limited geographic areas, and 
access to such data remains strictly limited. In the context of a long run study such as this no sources either proprietary 
or publicly available, that link consumers to products appear to be available.
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Appendix B: Additional Estimates
Table 5.6: Estimated CoeflBicients Determining Advertising and Sales at US UK-based MNEs
Dep. var.:Log advertising (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.167 -0.177 -0.13
(4.52) (4.13) (2.50)
log advertising (-1) -0.185 -0.398 -0.27
(1.52) (2.45) (3.27)
log sales 1.026 1.027 0.965
(6.02) (5.92) (5.70)
log quality-adjusted price -1.439 -1.444 -1.282
(3.14) (3.29) (3.19)
log price 0.01 0.04 0.10
(0.49) (0.34) (0.28)
log sales (-1) 0.157 0.149
(1.77) (1.91)
log rival advertising 0.560
(3.18)
Sargan test 20.1 (0.45) 18.7 (0.54) 36.1 (0.07)
2"^  order serial correlation -1.01 -1.17 -1.09
Wald test 41.5(2) 43.1 (4) 51.1 (5)
Dep. var.iLog sales (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.091 -0.067 -0.105
(1.46) (1.08) (8.90)
log sales (-1) 0.044 0.044 0.055
(1.42) (1.05) (1.17)
log quality-adjusted price -5.611 -5.714 -5.723
(2.17) (1.98) (2.11)
log price 0.037 0.057 0.076
(0.03) (0.90) (0.58)
log advertising 0.314 0.313 0.282
(6.17) (6.72) (5.36)
log advertising (-1) 0.198
(1.68)
log rival advertising -0.0291
(2.50)
log segment sales 0.384 0.611 0.810
(1.83) (1.21) (1.31)
Sargan test 20.23 (0.44) 18.25 (0.57) 18.37 (0.56)
2"" order serial correlation 0.18 -1.15 -0.71
Wald test 59.7(4) 62.4 (5) 65.8 (6)
See the "notes" associated to Table 5.3 for details of the estimation and tests.
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Table 5.7: Estimated Coefficients Determining Advertising and Sales at Other Firms
Dep. var.:Log advertising (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.144 -0.169 -0.16
(5.09) (4.98) (3.47)
log advertising (-1) -0.195 -0.28 -0.26
(4.21) (4.14) (5.73)
log saies 1.026 1.027 0.965
(6.02) (5.92) . (5.70)
log quality-adjusted price -1.439 -1.444 -1.282
(3.14) (3.29) (3.19)
log price 0.05 -0.71 0.083
(0.18) (0.01) (0.33)
log saies (-1) 0.054 0.119
(1.60) (1.69)
log rival advertising 0.260
(5.25)
Sargan test 18.9 (0.67) 20.7 (0.94) 30.9 (0.04)
2"*' order serial correlation -0.97 -1.33 -1.06
Wald test 42.7 (2) 45.1 (4) 55.1 (5)
Dep. var.zLog sales (1) (2) (3)
constant -0.176 -0.118 -0.135
(2.19) (2.32) (6.79)
log sales (-1) 0.047 0.044 0.049
(1.84) (1.67) (2.17)
log quality-adjusted price -2.431 -2.4444 -2.822
(2.14) (3.29) (2.39)
log price 0.08 0.72 0.0487
(0.29) (0.90) (0.79)
log advertising 0.364 0.393 0.389
(5.28) (6.37) (6.18)
log advertising (-1) 0.044
(1.43)
log rival advertising -0.0109
(4.27)
log segment sales 0.384 0.611 0.810
(1.58) (1.37) (0.93)
Sargan test 22.91 (0.93) 18.25(0.97) 18.37 (0.73)
2"** order serial correlation -0.57 -0.98 -0.90
Wald test 61.6(4) 64.9 (5) 69.4 (6)
See the "notes" associated to Table 5.3 for details of the estimation and tests.
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Chapter 6
Evaluating the Effects of Voluntary 
Export Restraints between Britain 
and Japan
6.1 Introduction
The rise of “new trade protectionism” is commonly seen as arising from the constrained 
ability of governments to use traditional tariff barriers under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.^ In Britain’s case, the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation were 
accelerated by its accession into the European Economic Community in 1973. Integra­
tion with the EEC led to a sharp rise in import penetration in the UK car market by 
European producers from 21.6% in 1971 to 34.1% by 1980. In addition to the expanding 
share of European car manufacturers in the market, there was a sharp rise in Japanese 
imports, mirroring a global expansionary export trend by Japanese manufacturers.^ As 
will be detailed below, the Japanese expansion was considered a threat to Britain’s do­
mestic car industry, which was already struggling under the increased competition within 
its core domestic market. The government’s interest in the fate of the ailing motor indus­
try received a new impetus in 1975 when Britain’s last mass car manufacturer, British 
Leyland, was nationalised. The government thus took on the role of rescuing a firm that 
came to symbolise Britain’s industrial decline [Broadberry (2004)]. While the UK gov­
ernment could do little to stem the inflow of fellow EEC members’ cars, it was capable of
^Britain had used non-voluntary forms of import quotas extensively during the post-war reconstruction period [Milward 
and Brennan (1996)]. However Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) were first introduced to protect the UK and US textile 
industries that later formed the basis of the Multi-Fibre Agreement [see Silberston (1989) and Meier (1973) for accounts of 
the UK and US agreements respectively].
^For example, Japanese exports to the largest world market for cars outside Europe, the US, rose from 5.7% in 1971 to 
19.1% of new registration in the US market in 1980 [Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999, Table 3, p414)].
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influencing Japanese car imports. Japanese industry representatives advocated Voluntary 
Export Restraints (VERs) with negotiations with the UK commencing in 1975. Those 
agreements were implemented in 1977 and, although they were initially negotiated for 
a flve year period, they were to remain in place until December 1999. The agreements 
influenced British Leyland through their effects on competitive conditions in the market, 
but also by providing an impetus for Honda to form a strategic alliance with the firm 
in 1979. That alliance was to prove invaluable to BL as Honda suppHed the firm with 
designs for what were to become its most successful products prior to its acquisition by 
BMW in 1992. Furthermore, the contribution of Honda, combined with that of Nissan 
and Toyota, to UK production effectively revitalised the UK’s role as a car producer.^
6.2 VERs between the UK and Japan - Background to the 
Trade Policy
In the mid-1970s the global car industry came under considerable pressure in the form 
of Japanese exports against a trend of reduced demand for cars in the wake of the 1973 
oil crisis. In response to the Japanese expansion, allegations of dumping and subsequent 
representations were made in attempts to persuade Japanese manufacturers themselves 
to limit their export volumes to a number of European countries, including Britain [Dun- 
nett (1980)]. While the allegations were never legally tested, and it is unclear whether 
the success of Japanese exporters was “a tribute to the quality of their cars and to the 
effectiveness of their international marketing” or overt dumping, contemporary observers 
pointed out that Japanese marketing strategies would have had to take account of the 
growing clamour for protection which Japanese exporters were facing around the world. 
Prom the Japanese manufacturers’ perspective, as the commentators emphasise, they were 
“known to be extremely worried over the possibility of direct action at the government 
level” and of “suffering the possible long term consequences of protection.” [EIU (1975b, 
5-8)].
On the face of it, the case for protecting against Japanese imports was weak, with 
the trade balance being in the UK’s favour. However the government had clear pressure 
to protect what were termed ‘sensitive sectors’ of the UK industry. The main industry 
to fall under the ‘sensitive sector’ umbrella was the car industry with motor vehicles 
representing about 25% of UK imports from Japan at that time [Central Statistical Office 
(1975)]. Industry pressure was clearly apparent when in 1974 the then President of the
^The UK shared the highest European growth rates with Spain during the 1990s. [Sources; UK - Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and TVaders; Spain - Agrupacion Nacional de fh,bicantes des Automobiles y Camions].
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Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), Sir Ray Brookes, approached 
the government for assistance to protect the domestic industry from intensifying import 
penetration from all car manufacturing countries, but particularly Japan. As a result, 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson undertook and obtained a limitation on imports to Britain 
[Dunnett (1980)]. Later in the year, the Secretary of State for Trade, Peter Shore, when 
questioned on the results of inter-governmental discussions in Japan, stated that he had
“indicated both to the Japanese government and to their industry, that in the 
British government’s view, the rapid build up in Japanese car exports to the 
United Kingdom was unacceptable. For their part, the Japanese government 
predicted that during the remainder of the year, their exports of cars to the 
United Kingdom would decline, and indicated that Japanese cars should be 
exported in an orderly way during 1976.” [Parliamentary question: Mr Alf Bates 
(Bebbington and Ellesmere Port) asked the Secretary of State for Trade what 
discussions he had had on the problems facing the British motor car industry 
on his recent visit to Japan [Department of Trade and Industry (31/10/1975)].
Shore and Wilson’s efforts and the Japanese government’s ‘prediction’ were not actu- 
alised with new registrations of Japanese cars in the UK increasing 31%, year-on-year, 
in 1976.  ^ A fuller appreciation of the threat to Britain’s nationalised producer, British 
Leyland, from Japan exports resulted from bilateral visits of engineers between Japan and 
the UK. On the impetus of a Japanese consortium made up of Nissan, Mitsubishi, Honda 
and Kansai Paint, BL engineers visited Japanese facilities in the sununer of 1975. The 
tour was the first since the British Motor Corporation, the largest firm in the formation 
of British Leyland in the 1967 merger, had provided model designs, equipment, and advi­
sors to Nissan in 1950 [Cusumano (1991, 88-108)]. The detailed engineers’ report, which 
was derived from the exchange, reflected the shifting fortunes of the two national indus­
tries over that twenty-five year period. The report catalogued the institutional virtues of 
Japanese manufacturers and the advanced productivity of the Japanese plants relative to 
their British counterparts and was disseminated along with specific recommendations to 
various BL departments, the firm’s board, and to the Government through its links to 
the company [British Leyland (06-07/1975)].
Formal discussions between the industries had begun that year with the UK manu­
facturers being represented by the SMMT, while the Japanese Car Manufacturers’ Asso­
ciation (JAMA) acted on behalf of Japanese firms’ interests. Discussions took place on 
a bi-annual basis thereafter covering, inter alia, a review of motor vehicle markets, the
^This figure and derivations of new registrations use data collated by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Trader. 
See Section 6.5 for a complete set of data sources used in this study.
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current and future economic and industrial outlook in Japan and the UK [Parlimentary 
Papers (1980-81, 661-3)]. The industry agreement limited Japanese new car registrations 
to a range between 9-11% of total registrations for five years.^ Although it is difficult 
to uncover the extent of direct government involvement in industry-to-industry discus­
sions, there are a number of reasons to consider it to be quite active. First, there was 
a pre-emptive announcement by the Department of Trade and Industry of their active 
role in the bilateral agreements, which was the cause of some embarrassment for JAMA.® 
Second, the government had the role of enforcing breaches in restriction levels, and ac­
knowledged in 1978 that they had intervened in inter-industry discussions due to import 
levels breaches [Department of Trade and Industry (1980-81)]. Third, as the government 
had ownership of one of the members of SMMT it was also indirectly involved in the 
bilateral negotiation process.
At the end of 1982 the form of the bilateral agreements was altered, with the European 
Community taking a coordinating role in the use of quantitative barriers with Japan. 
As Uindley (1982) pointed out, the Commission of the European Community had been 
preoccupied with the question of retaining its grip on trade policy prior to undertaking 
a coordinating role.^ However, the change in the negotiating body did not mean that 
negotiations for agreements would refiect the European Community as a whole rather than 
member countries’ industrial priorities. Unlike the common European tariff, individual 
countries maintained their abihty to determine their preferred restriction rates. For their 
part the Japanese agreed to exercise moderation over the three years (1983-85 inclusive), 
in their export of certain products, the most important of which being cars. The Japanese 
restraint levels remained at the previously, industry-to-industry, determined levels.®
This status quo remained until the signing of the EC-Japan understandings and sub­
sequent agreements, the so-called ‘Elements of Consensus’ (EOC), in July 1991.® The 
EOC provided an on-going means of partially insulating the industry over a transitional 
period, and country specific levels of VERs were applied. The EOC gave block exemp­
tions to cars, thus acting in clear violation of the Treaty of Rome and the Single Market
^National registration requirements enabled the monitoring of Japanese sales. The national registration system, in 
combination with article 115 of the Tkaty of Rome, enabled member states to take protective measures against indirect 
(parallel) imports, which had been on average below 50,000 units, or 0.25% of total new registrations, over the 1980-93 
period.
^Brian Bindley is thanked for highlighting this incident.
^The Commission’s involvement in coordinating quantitative restrictions extended to industries outside the motor in­
dustry with the European Commission exacting agreements through negotiations with the Japanese Ministry of Industry 
and lYade (MITI) on video recorders restrictions in February 1983 [Greenaway and Bindley (1985, Ch.2.)].
^Details of the products covered in 1983 are contained in the Commission of the European Communities (1983) where 
respective surveillance was formalised. FVom 1985 the distribution of cars fell under EC Regulation 123/85, in effect 
legislatively entrenching an exemption from Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome from what was prior to this a set of informal 
bilateral agreements. The following discussion of the EOC’s interpretation and implementation benefited substantially from 
discussions with an EC representative whose willingness to provide firank information proved invaluable.
^An official explication of the ElOC can be found at Commission of the European Communities (1993).
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Programme, but its adoption provided a carrot for countries with constrained car markets 
to sign up to Single Market Programme in 1992. The VER phase out represented a prag­
matic means to meet the Commission’s objective of insulating the European industry, 
so that it could restructure itself to be able to compete with Japanese manufacturers, 
whilst providing a clear date for VERs to cease. In keeping with the EOC, the phase out 
of VERs was finally completed in December 1999. Apphcation of the EOC also meant 
a shift from the bilateral maintenance of quotas set as fixed proportions of market size 
to a more complex formulation based on demand forecasts, provided to the Commission 
through industry analysts. Taking these demand forecasts the Commission set Japanese 
imports at a decreasing rate of total market growth each year for the EU as a whole, as 
was indicated by Point 11 of the EOC that European manufacturers should enjoy ade­
quate benefit of market growth. The term adequate translated into a lower proportion 
of reductions in market share being taken by Japanese firms during periods of market 
expansion and a higher proportion of reductions in market share during downturns: thus, 
providing latitude for the European industry to adjust under Point 10 of the EOS. The 
published forecasts were adhered too by the Commission, indicating that the ability of 
industry or member states to infiuence the managed removal of the restrictions in their 
own markets was no longer effectual.
Details of how VERs were dismantled was the subject of debate with different authors 
embracing divergent interpretations of the details of the agreements. The three areas of 
debate surrounded: (1 ) what types of vehicles were included in the EOC; (2 ) which coun­
tries were involved; and (3) whether or not foreign direct investment (FDI) was excluded 
from the negotiated restrictions. In terms of vehicles included, Turrini (1999) argued 
that 4-by-4 vehicles were excluded from 1986. Authors have tended to argue that Prance, 
Italy and the UK certainly had VERs, while the issue of whether Portugal and Spain 
had restrictions has typically been ignored. It remains unclear whether Germany also 
apphed constraints since the industry-to-industry agreements were to an extent outside
^^Discussions with Commission representatives revealed that the inability of the European industry to lobby in large part 
reflected the fact that the forecasts used to determine monitoring levels were always below the actual growth in demand, 
which translated into the Japanese bearing their share of the burden of restructuring, leaving the industry with little room 
for objection. That is not to say that constrained countries did not lobby. France and Italy were the most vocal advocates 
against the free trade in the European market prior to the Completion of the Market initiatives, and signing of the EXJC, on 
the grounds that transplanting of cars produced by Honda, Nissan and Tcyota in the UK did not constitute a “European 
car” because the European content of vehicles was below the EC définition. An example of such public lobbying comes 
from the Managing Director of Fiat in 1990 who denounced Nissan on the grounds that a study of the Nissan Bluebird 
(which was subsequently replaced by the UK manufactured Primera) ty  Fiat revealed that only 20% of its parts were 
clearly of European production, 32% of the parts could not be identified ly  location of production but the remaining 48% 
were produced outside the EU [The Times (10/12/89)]. Indeed, the issue of local content was not a basis of legal objection 
for the EU since this would contravene the GAIT. It is noteworthy however that there is no clear agreement that cars 
meeting such requirement could be sold outside the VER limit. Furthermore, in 1989 the French, having refused to accept 
Nissan products manufactured in the UK, were forced by the Commission to accept these imports as ‘European’ [Easton 
(18/04/89)].
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the public domain. Prom 1993 the EU published the list of countries along with the 
types of vehicles included (vehicles less then five tonnes) with the constrained markets 
being the UK, Prance, Italy, Portugal and Spain (including the Canary Islands).
The issue of whether or not PDI was excluded has proved more contentious, no doubt 
reflecting the fact that official documentation in the EOC does not explicitly include 
the production of Japanese transplants (that predominantly occurred in the UK), both 
prior to the EEC’s involvement in 1983 or thereafter. A direct means to determine 
whether PDI featured in the UK VERs is to compare the market share of Japanese 
manufacturers in the UK with and without FDI. Figure 6.1 shows that when Japanese 
cars produced in the UK are accounted for, Japanese (import) market penetration drops 
below the threshold 9% in the two years following the commencement of UK production 
by Nissan in 1986, and similarly drops further in the two years following Toyota’s entry 
into UK-based production. Figure 6.1 provides evidence that Japanese transplants were 
included as part of the effective UK VER. Some previous researchers have argued that 
transplants were included, and in effect that Voluntary Export Restraints negotiated 
with the Commission were strictly “export” restraints by name and not by nature [Mason 
(1995); Turrini (1999)]. Mason (1995) points out that the Commission’s negotiators of 
the 1991 agreement explicitly stated that they did take into account expected sales from 
transplants when defining import limits. In contrast. Flam (1994) takes the alternative 
interpretation that imports were to be constrained but that transplants were not. In 
order to solve this puzzle discussions with the Commission were conducted that confirmed 
that transplants were not included as part of the EC-MITI negotiated agreements, but 
that there was considerable pressure to expand Japanese market share in the UK due to 
demand outstripping the restraint limit throughout the EOC period.
How is it that VERs where binding, as the Commission observed, despite the large 
proportion of UK transplants sold by Japanese firms? If Japanese firms were free to 
market their UK manufactured products should they not have simply switched to local 
production to alleviate any constraint level? The fact that Japanese firms were still con­
strained by the official, Commission-MITI negotiated, agreements can only mean that 
they were also constrained in the sales of their UK manufactured transplants. For its 
part, the UK government had two stated objectives. First, and the initial impetus to 
apply VERs, was that the government wanted to insulate the domestic market to pro­
tect the then nationalised UK car industry and safeguard employment. Second, the UK
^^Nomura Research Institute (1988) were the only source to point to Spain and Portugal effectively prohibiting Japanese 
imports in 1987.
Again representatives of the Commission are sincerely thanked for frankly providing this information, and corroborating 
the interpretation of the EOC taken in this paper.
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Figure 6.1: Market Share of Japanese Manufacturers in the UK (1971-2002)
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government encouraged FDI in order to create sustainable employment and efficiency, 
which constituted the lynch pins of the Thatcher government economic reform agenda 
[Thatcher (1993)]. Real politick meant that both objectives needed to be maintained. 
The best option for the UK was to disallow Japanese transplants from competing with 
domestic products (by including them as part of the restraint), while obtaining the em­
ployment benefits of FDI associated with UK production. While this was the best possible 
outcome for the UK the same cannot be said for Japanese investors who would wish to 
profit by being able to sell their UK produced wares in the UK. The UK was however able 
to provide further sweeteners for the deal in the form of financial and other inducements 
to reduce the sunk cost of FDI, and crucially, by endorsing access to other constrained 
European markets. Such action was possible since the Commission took the view that 
whatever was agreed upon by the UK Government/ industry was their affair [Rhys (1990, 
33))."
The explanation that Japanese firms were enticed to invest in the UK despite being 
denied access to the UK market appears to fit their observed sales patterns. However,
^^The discussion of incentives to jointly utilise FDI and VERs has been analysed theoretically by Flam (1994). Flam’s 
model is quite specific in that he examines a three-stage game where: (1) firms choose between constraints or not; (2) 
Japanese firms choose between investing or only exporting; and (3) Non-car producing countries choose between allowing 
or prohibiting FDI in the third stage. He shows that under a policy regime where a restrictive VER is combined with FDI 
the welfare consequences difltered considerably when FDI and VERs occurred jointly than where each policy is considered 
individually. In his model Japanese firms opt to locate production in the UK following the EOC signed in 1991. However, 
the location decision in his result is based on there being no initial domestic production in the UK. This however was not 
the case as the UK was a producer of cars being home to Ford UK (whose production commenced in the UK in 1929), GM 
Vauxhall (1926), and British Leyland (since the early 1900s).
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without providing a concrete rationale for such Japanese investment, despite being faced 
with the disincentive of being constrained in its UK sales, it remains an assertion without 
a sound explanatory foundation. To put some flesh on the argument a deeper look into 
the FDI behaviour of Japanese motor manufacturers in the UK and elsewhere needs to 
be taken.
6.3 The Advent and Political Economy of Japanese UK Auto 
Production as Part of a Global FDI Expansion
An influential MIT study argued that by the 1980s the productivity levels of Japanese car 
manufacturers had eclipsed those of both US and European car makers. In addition to 
arguing that Japanese manufacturers were more efficient, the study also emphasised three 
factors that had contributed to their productive efficiency: (1 ) the deliberate restraint 
on the value of the yen; (2) the lack of barriers to Japanese imports, and (3) the strong 
state support from MITI for Japanese cars seeking overseas markets [Altshuler, Anderson, 
Jones, Roos, and Womack (1984, 155-162)].
Two of these advantages were eroded during the late 1970s and 1980s. First, following 
the series of European bilateral agreements previously described, VERs were placed on 
Japanese exports to the US in May 1981. Coupled with this, the yen saw a consider­
able appreciation following a currency realignment via the Plaza Agreement instigated 
in September 1985 by the Group of Five and the Louvre Accord by the Group of Seven 
[Sakiya (1989, 9)]. Japanese flrms reacted assertively to the changing trading environment 
by transplanting production outside Japan. The expansion of FDI by Japanese producers 
saw an enormous rise over the 1980s, with an investment of $4bn in 1982, growing to $4bn 
per month by 1990 [Japan External Trade Organisation (1992)].
The ‘First Wave’ of FDI from Japanese manufacturers was directed at the US market 
[Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, 240-242)]. The central reasons for the concentration of 
resources on the US market were based on relatively more open access to that market and 
an ability to develop the fastest growing and least exploited segments of the US market - 
the mini and small family segments [Ibid., 253-55]. However, the ability of Japanese firms 
to eflFectively dominate these segments in the neighbouring, unprotected European mar­
kets indicates that Japanese manufacturers were also capable of expanding their market 
shares in constrained European markets. By 1980 Japanese manufacturers had already 
achieved considerable success in the US market having already secured a 2 2 % market share 
compared with an average market share of 11% in the European market [Berry, Levin-
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sohn, and PaJces (1999, Table 3, p414)].^  ^ Finally and most importantly, the US explicitly 
did not include transplant production in its restraint [Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, 
253-55)], while, as has been established above, there are clear indications that bilateral 
agreements with European countries did. Japanese companies reallocated resources to the 
US through a series of joint ventures and transplants encouraged by regional grants, sub­
sidies and tax concessions with the seven major Japanese firms commencing production 
during the 1980s.
Honda was the first Japanese firm to have its cars built in the UK, as had been the case 
in the US. Honda’s entry into UK production was indirect, however, through the formation 
of a relationship with Austin-Rover (as British Leyland had been renamed in 1979).^ ® BL 
required a partner to provide it with product designs and assistance to fill the gaps in its 
product range that had resulted from a lack of product development. After failing to come 
to agreements with European manufacturers the erstwhile Chairman, Michael Edwardes, 
negotiated an agreement with Honda [Edwardes (1983)]. Honda had advantages as a 
business partner from BL’s perspective in that it was a medium size Japanese firm, and 
was the only firm other then BL to use traverse-mounted engines with front wheel drive 
[Mair (1994, 229)]. From Honda’s perspective, the agreement provided access to the UK 
market in the same year that VERs became effectively enforced, giving it an ally within 
the walls of Europe.
The relationship was to prove an enduring one and involved five projects between 
the firms. The first of these projects was a simple ‘screw-driver’ assembly deal where 
BL assembled and sold CKD kits of the Honda Ballade, re-badged the Acclaim, under 
licence [Edwardes (1983)]. The Acclaim was a success by Austin-Rover standards with 
about 100,000 being registered between 1981 and 1984, an amount greater then Honda’s 
observed quota allocation of 70,000 vehicles over the same period.
Following the lack of success in a second project to jointly develop an executive model, 
the Sterling, the firms returned to the less ambitious venture of redeveloping the Honda 
Ballade. The new version of the Ballade was renamed as the Rover 200 and was produced 
under an agreement between Honda and BL. Rover agreed not to sell its 200 Series in 
Japan, while Honda was prohibited from selling its similar 4-door Civic in the European 
market. Of greater benefit to Honda, the firm was able to manufacture the Honda Bal-
^^The market shares in the unconstrained European markets in 1988 were as follows: Irish Republic, 43.6%; Finland, 
41.4%; Norway, 39.3%; Greece, 38.9%; Denmark, 32.8%; Austria, 33.1%; Switzerland, 31.1%; Bel^um and Luxembourg, 
21% [Source: EIU (1989)].
^^The firms being: Honda (1982), Nissan (1983), Mazda (1987), Mitsubishi (1988), Toyota (1988), and a Subaru and 
Isuzu joint venture (1989). See Mair and Kenney (1988), for a review of Japanese investment expenditure and location 
determinants in the US.
^^The firm was later renamed Rover. However to avoid confusion the original name of the firm is maintained in the text 
that follows.
^^Figures derived using SMMT new registrations data.
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lade at Rover’s Longbridge plant under the Rover badge, allowing it to circumvent VERs 
without needing to invest directly, and while also allowing Honda to directly assess the 
quality levels of the vehicles. In terms of sales the project was not significant with produc­
tion being low, but the substantial gain to Honda was that it was able to acquire a plant 
facility in Swindon, which was later to become its manufacturing complex for the UK and 
led to the establishment of Honda UK Manufacturing Ltd.^ ® The plant was developed 
in three stages, used initially as a testing station for cars imported from Japan and for 
Honda Ballades built at Longbridge. The next stage was to build engines for the Rover 
equivalent of the Honda Concerto, the new Rover 200 and 400 series. The models were to 
become Rover’s most successful products with Honda benefiting from engine sales of the 
models, which was sold both in the UK and in other European markets [Mair (1994)].^ ®
The final project, the development of the Synchro, gave Honda its first car specifi­
cally designed for Europe, utilising the Swindon plant that had been fully converted into 
a production plant from 1989, with Rover producing its analogous 600 Series at Cow­
ley. While observers speculated that Honda UK would divest its relationship with Rover 
having successfully achieved its aim of establishing European plant facilities, the project 
augured in the first formalisation of the relationship between the firms sealed through a 
20% exchange in equity and one board seat in 1990 [Cornelius (18/04/1989)]. The newly 
formalised relationship however collapsed two years later following the break down of 
negotiations between Honda with British Aerospace to purchase Rover. Rover was then 
purchased by BMW in 1994 [The Economist (03/03/1994)].
Honda’s longstanding relationship with Rover bestowed upon the firm a number of 
benefits including the establishment of its Swindon plant facilities, a detailed knowledge 
of business and labour practices, sales experience in Europe in advance of Japanese com­
petitors, and access to the part suppliers that were used by Rover. On the other hand, 
Honda’s cautious approach to the European market through kit-set sales and parts supply 
was inconsistent with their highly successful transplant expansion into US production, and 
their close association with what was widely considered to be world’s weakest car manu­
facturers [Mair (1994, 240)]. Indeed, had it been a viable option to produce cars directly 
in Europe, Honda’s strategy of effectively entering the market in a piece-meal fashion is 
difficult to fathom.
It was Nissan, not Honda, who became the first Japanese firm to set-up a plant in 
Europe in 1986, building what was reputed to be the most efficient production plant in
^^8,898 Austin-Rover ‘badged* Honda Ballades were registered in the UK between 1986-1990 [derived using SMMT sales 
data],
^^The Rover 200 and 400 Series models became the most successful models in Rover’s range with sales of 560,000 models 
in the UK car market between 1987-1992, which included the production of 30,000 Honda Concertos per annum ty  Rover 
from 1989 [derived using SMMT sales data).
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Europe and amongst the most efficient in the world [The Economist (3/10/1992)]. Where 
Honda’s opportunity to forge linTcs with the British industry had reflected the govern­
ment’s desire to aid the nationalised car industry in the late 1970s, Nissan’s opportunity 
for direct investment reflected an antithetical government strategy to reduce assistance 
to nationalised industries, in favour of overseas investment.
The New Right policy of rolling back the frontiers of the state, at least as far as direct 
subsidies for manufacturing capital were concerned, had its counterpart in the opening- 
up of the domestic economy to more direct international investment [Thatcher (1993)]. 
Furthermore, as Cutler (1988) argued, regional policy in the 1980s and the 1990s was 
becoming increasingly influenced by the Completion of the European Market Program. 
The official stance of the Thatcher government was to virtually eliminate the Regional 
Development Grant, favoured by previous administrations, in favour of Selective Finan­
cial Assistance with a shift in emphasis towards small enterprises. However, while the 
rhetoric was the promotion of an enterprise culture based on market forces, commentators 
noted that overseas investors were given special treatment at the expense of nationalised 
industries which were privatised where possible [Balchin (1990), Garrahan and Stewart 
(1992)].20
In January 1981 Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, announced 
that Nissan had selected the UK for its European expansion programme. On 24 July 1982 
Nissan’s own announcement seemed to put the project on hold, indicating that because 
of uncertainty in the world car industry, the company was postponing making a flnal 
decision. It would be two years before Tebbit would be able to conflrm that Nissan would 
be investing in Sunderland, with Nissan investment being greater than the total stock of 
Japanese FDI in the UK in 1983 [Dicken (1983)].
In keeping with the Conservative government’s preference for FDI over domestic sub­
sidies, the shipyards in Sunderland, which were part of the nationalised industry, were 
refused financial support and were closed resulting in 2,000 job losses. Nissan received a 
direct subsidy of £ 1 1 2  million for the first part of the project, which was estimated at 
£350 million, with the overall cost coming to £670 miUion.^  ^ In return the government 
was guaranteed that the plant would employ 3,500 employees [Garrahan and Stewart 
(1992)]. Over a decade after bail out of Chrysler UK and nationalisation of BL in 1975 
the government was once again underwriting overseas producers. Only the origin of the
^*^Japanese FDI of any significant scale and accompanying ‘investment assistance’ first occurred in the electronics industry 
rather than the car industry [Oliver and Wilkinson (1988)]. In 1980 the value of Japemese direct investment was $186 million, 
but by 1989 this had risen to $3,956 m illio n . The cumulative total of Japanese direct investment in Europe between 1951- 
1988 stood at $30,164 m illio n , and fully one-third of this entered the UK [Data obtained from Ministry of Finance, Tokyo].
^^Information concerning the North Eastern Shipbuilders is taken firom Stone (1988), while details concerning Nissan 
subsidies come from the Trade and Industry Committee of the House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence, 15 January 1986.
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investment had changed. In addition to the direct subsidy, Nissan was able to benefit 
from access to a substantial tract of development land (930 acres in all) sufficiently large 
to serve both its own factory requirements and to enable the firm to lease considerable 
tracts of the land to sub-contracting firms thereby allowing Nissan to operate Just-in- 
Time (JIT) production methods.^^ Finally, a plentiful labour supply was available in 
the de-industrialised North of England, which had lost 230,000 jobs between 1975 and 
1985 [Office of National Statistics, opt cite Stone (1988)]. Nissan also benefited from the 
declining role of the union movement and was able to utilise a single union agreement 
that was secured before employees were hired with membership being overseen by the 
Personnel Department of Nissan Motor Manufacturing UK (NMUK).^^
Figure 6.2: Intra-Japanese Firm Allocation of the VER Quota (includes UK manufacturers)
Nissan
Honda
NT- KT-
Source: Enumerated using SMIMT data
In addition to the inducements provided by local and central governments, Nissan had 
two further strategic reasons for entering into UK production. First, as Figure 6.2 depicts, 
Nissan had a longstanding interest in the UK market where it was the dominant Japanese
^^The initial parcel of land sold to Nissan was classified as derelict with the cost of that land being met by local government. 
Nissan then took its option to purchase an additional block of 436 acres at agricultural land prices which were substantially 
below market rates (£1,800 per acre rather than the valued price of £20,000). See Garrahan and Stewart (1992, 40-44) for 
details.
^^The ability of NMUK to circumvent industrial disturbances was in keeping with the Nissan Way which was developed 
in the 1950s [see Wickens (1987)].
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producer prior to the enforcement of VERs in 1977. Second, Nissan was struggling both in 
the US and Japanese markets, providing an impetus to expand into the European market 
[Mair and Kenney (1988, 355-56)]. Figure 6.2 also indicates that the initial allocation of 
VERs between Japanese manufacturers was based on a simple rule whereby the market 
shares were maintained with minor reductions to allow new entrants to gain a foothold 
in the market, until Nissan began production in 1988.^  ^ The VER allocation in effect 
insulated Nissan as Japan’s dominant firm in the UK car market. Notably, Nissan’s 
market share actually declined from 1990, while the share of other Japanese manufacturers 
increased across the board. This finding provides further evidence that transplants were 
included in VER arrangements negotiated through the consensus of other nation states 
under the auspices of the EU, since given Nissan’s of high productivity and location 
advantages within the UK market associated with its Sunderland operations, its ability 
to rapidly expand its market share prior to the imposition of VERs, and its success in 
unprotected European markets, it is implausible that Nissan could not have met its UK 
quota.
Toyota became the third Japanese car maker to enter into the UK with the construction 
of facilities in Derbyshire, East Midlands commencing in 1989 and production beginning 
in 1993. The location and labour requirements of Toyota emulated those of Nissan,
Vyith ToÿôfâTdëvelopihg a Greaifiel^Tsite with regional land subsidies and a single union 
labour pool [The Guardian (28/02/1989)]. In addition Toyota, as the firm credited as the 
originator of JIT lean production methods, naturally developed its UK operations along 
similar fines [Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, 55)]. Toyota was also the beneficiary of 
subsidies firom the public purse of £44 million [Kurylko (04/04/94)], which triggered a 
European Commission investigation [Wendt (05/08/91)]. As Figure 6.2 shows, consistent 
with Nissan, Toyota did not expand its market share in the UK, which fell mildly the 
years following commencement of UK production. Honda UK was the exception, in that 
it saw a rise in its VER allocation. There are three plausible explanations for Honda 
being given special treatment. First, Honda’s commencement in local production had 
allowed it to obtain sympathy from both UK and Japanese officials. Second, the firm had 
achieved great success in other markets which made the initial allocation unreflective. 
Finally, unlike Nissan and Toyota, Honda’s plant did not receive funding by local and 
central government.
While the VER fixed the sales of Japanese products to national limits they allowed 
Japanese producers to decide on the amount of sales that they could sell within each
^A n examination of US data suggests that a similar intra-Japanese manu&cturer allocation rule was applied. This 
coincided with anecdotal evidence from the popular press [Lohr (27/09/1983)].
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market. Thus, if Nissan voluntarily reduced its sales in the UK market, other Japanese 
manufacturers would be allocated the quota and it could potentially negotiate to obtain 
quota elsewhere. As has been argued there were considerable incentives to produce in the 
UK regardless of whether the vehicles were considered as imports. However, it does not 
seem likely that Nissan, and later Honda and Toyota, would want to reduce its share of 
sales in other European markets. To examine whether these firms were able to obtain 
increased quota in the other constrained European markets - Italy, France Spain and 
Portugal - data on fiirm sales in those markets was obtained.^^ These data, which are 
summarised in Figure 6.3 illustrate that each of the three UK based producers raised 
their market share via transplant production in the constrained markets.^® Prior to the 
French VER being announced in 1977 there was some growth in the French market, 
driving a rise in combined import penetration. Growth in Japanese market share in the 
constrained European markets effectively ended with the commencement of UK transplant 
production 1988. The spectacular growth in Nissan’s market share of the constrained 
Continental European markets is highly evident from 1989 onwards. The expansion in 
Nissan continental sales in other constrained European market occurs at precisely the same 
time as its share of the UK market fell. Toyota also witnessed an expansion following its 
entry into production, with Honda’s expansion being less pronounced as is to be expected- 
"sincê thë'firm had been selling its wares under the Rover badge since 1987.
In effect the same cars that were not considered to be ‘European’ in the UK, and hence 
were not included in the quota, were considered ‘European’ in continental markets. It 
appears that Britain was playing outside the ‘rules of the game’ in order to simultane­
ously protect its nationalised local producer, British Leyland, whilst reaping the benefits 
of direct foreign investment. In effect the regime was Aiming to protect its own “Fortress 
Britain” at the expense of relaxing Japan’s barriers to enter “Fortress (Continental) Eu­
rope”. These findings are consistent with Honda’s uncharacteristically cautious entry 
into UK production, Nissan’s (and to a lesser extent Toyota’s) sales strategies, and the 
unchanging market shares of nations applying VERs, adding considerable weight to the 
view that Japanese production investments in UK were determined by a host of benefits 
that did not include evading UK export restrictions.
6.4 Literature Review
A considerable and controversial theoretical hterature concerning the effects of quantitar 
tive restraints in particular, and strategic trade poficy in general, developed firom the late
These data are available at Comité des Constructeurs Françias d’Automobile in Paris.
^^Since imports were known to be reduced through the EC-MITI negotiations, all growth is transplant related.
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Figure 6.3: Combined Market Shares of Japanese Firms Producing Cars in the UK in other VER Con­
strained Markets (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain)
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Source: Comité des Constnicteurs Français d'Automot>iie (CCFA)
1970s. Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez (1979) provide early examples analysing VERs with 
more recent contributions being referenced in Turrini (1999) while Irwin (1996), provides 
a survey of the backlash against strategic trade policy by academic economists.
There is also a body of empirical analysis on VERs that falls under three methodological 
headings. The first is a series of hedonic studies and includes work on two European 
markets [de Melo and Messerlin (1988) (France and Germany)], and on the US market 
[Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988), Feenstra (1985) and Feenstra (1988)]. In most cases 
VERs were shown to have been binding: in France in 1984 and 1985 but not in Germany 
[de Melo and Messerlin (1988)]; in the US by infiuencing European import prices to US 
consumers [Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988)] and by raising the price of Japanese cars 
1980-1984 [Feenstra (1985); Feenstra (1988)].
A second body of quasi-empirical research has been based on the parameterised simu­
lation of simple theoretical models. There are a number of examples of research using this 
methodological approach to examine European car markets [Venables and Smith (1991), 
Laussel, Montet, and Peguin-FeissoUe (1988), Smith (1994), Turrini (1999)]. However, 
the plausibility of such studies are undermined by: (1 ) the large possible set of theo­
retical possibilities leading simulation models to use a number of assumptions that are
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not appealing in examining the car industry (such as symmetric firms producing a single 
good where there is a constant elasticity of demand between products); and (2 ) the ten­
dency to employ parameters that are estimated elsewhere, so that even if those inputs are 
well estimated the simulated outputs often have large standard errors maldng appraisal 
ambiguous [Levinsohn (1994)].
Since the mid-1990s, mirroring developments in the empirical industrial organisation 
literature, researchers have argued in favour of the use of structural modelling adopt­
ing discrete choice methodologies. Specifically, Goldberg (1995) estimated a structural 
oligopoly model for the US car market applying a nested-logit model to consumer data 
between 1983-87, while Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) use a random effects model 
to quantify both their impacts and their effects on firms, consumers and foregone tariff 
revenues associated with the US-Japanese VER between 1986 and 1990. Both papers find 
that VERs were binding in the US and had substantive impacts, albeit in different years. 
Furthermore, both papers examine the effects of a counterfactual tariff and on firm prof­
its. The work of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) is unique in that they also calculate 
consumer welfare effects directly. Prom a policy perspective Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1999) finding that the substantive losses to US consumers were of the same order as the 
implied loss in tariff revenue. The estimated effects on firm’s profits were insufficiently 
well defined to make any concrete statement about the strategic importance of VERs to 
domestic and Japanese players. In the European context, Verboven (1996) examines five 
markets (Belgium, Prance, Italy, Germany and the UK) for a single cross-section in 1990 
finding evidence of binding constraints for Prance and Italy, but not in Germany or the 
UK. Goldberg and Verboven (2001), who use an extended version of the Verboven (1996) 
data set that encapsulated the 1980-93 period, find binding constraints applied to France, 
Italy and the UK. However, the emphasis of both Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and 
Verboven (2001) is on price differentials in five European markets and not on trade policy 
per se and they make no attempt to analyse the policy effects of VERs.
6.5 Data and Descriptives
A number of elements of the data used in this study make it applicable to examining 
the VER trade policy so it is worth spending a few extra lines to make these advantages 
expHcit to the reader. The two key novelties of the data set are that it uses the model 
version as the unit of analysis, and includes an exceptionally rich array of explanatory 
variables. The central advantage of the finer degree of aggregation associated with the 
data set is that it allows for the accounting of model and model version life-cycle effects
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and the considerable heterogeneity in the attributes of differing model versions, that have 
been shown to be important in previous work [Requenas-Silvente and Walker (2005)]. The 
incorporation of a complete set of about one hundred and twenty product attributes is of 
particular importance in evaluating VERs. A critical aspect of VERs, which was appre­
ciated by contemporary analysts across a wide variety of industries affected by restraints 
and which influenced theoretical research in the area, is that VERs are synonymous with 
quality upgrading.^^ In addition, the finHings of prior studies, which used data sets that 
include only a spartan set of, typically, performance-based product attributes, indicate 
that upgrading effects are empirically important phenomena [e.g. Feenstra (1988)]. Rear 
sonably capturing the multiple dimensions of quality upgrading for a product as complex 
as a car is a challenging undertaking. As described previously, in contrast to previous 
research that has typically attempted to capture embodied attribute upgrading (if at all) 
through crude counts of luxury features, the data set contains a far richer set of observable 
characteristics, whose descriptive statistics along with their year of introduction are listed 
in Table D.1.28
To illustrate that quality upgrading occurred in Japanese cars two dimensions of the 
upgrading process are examined in turn, namely: (1 ) adjustments to the product-mix; 
and (2 ) technology upgrading of car models via the embodiment of new technologies.
An important aspect in quality upgrading was the adjustment of the product-mix of 
Japanese cars.^  ^ The allocations of new registrations between market segments over the 
period, for both non-Japanese manufacturers (in Panel A) and Japanese flrms (in Panel 
B), are summarised in Figure 6.4. Trade publications identify eight market segments. In 
order to simplify the graphic the segments are combined into four groups: small (mini and 
small family), medium, niche (executive, luxury, and sports), and ‘new’ (Multi-purpose 
Vehicles, or Personal Carriers as they are termed in the UK, and 4-by-4s).
A number of noteworthy shifts are captured in Figure 6.4(a). First, between the late 
1970s and the mid-1980s there was a shift towards small cars, reflecting the effects of 
the Oil Crises of the 1970s. Subsequently, the proportion of small cars fell. The falling 
share of small cars coincided with a second, and more dramatic, shift from the mid-1980s 
following the development of the ‘new’ segments that went from accounting for 1% of 
new registrations in 1983 to about 18% of non-Japanese manufacturers sales in 2002.
^^That Voluntary Agreements led to quality upgrading was appreciated in the earlier applications of VERs to the textile 
and steel industries. Fbr example, Meier (1973, 149) argued that "Whereas the United States prefers export restrictions 
by value the Japanese have insisted on restrictions on a quantity basis saying that this is the only way they can encourage 
producers to shift costs from low-profit items to sophisticated high-profit items especially in the man-made fibre field”. 
Concerning the US steel industry, [MacPhee (1974, 81)] observed that "the voluntary limitations on steel exports to the 
United States (that) began in 1969 were not as restrictive as would appear, one reason being that exporters compensated 
for tonnage limits by shipping higher price steel products.”
^^Note that Chapter 2 dates the brand adopting each technology.
^^Indeed, Goldberg (1995) defines upgrading as a movement toward market segments that include more expensive cars.
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Figure 6.4: Segment Market Shares of ‘Other’ and Japanese Manufacturers
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Panel B depicts the shifting product-mix of Japanese manufactured vehicles. Following 
the implementation of VERs in 1977 there is a discernable shift away from small toward 
medium cars with the ratio of Japanese to non-Japanese medium segment sales rising from 
.6 6  to a peak of 1.14 in 1981. After 1981 the ratio feU back as Japanese manufacturers
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concentrated their sales in the ‘new’ segments with the initial expansion occurring in the 
4-by-4 segment that was monopolised by the Land Rover until arrival of the Toyota Land 
Cruiser in 1981 and Suzuki’s SJ410 in 1982. Japanese products effectively dominated the 
MPV segment that was established by the launch of Toyota’s Space Cruiser in 1983. A 
previous analysis on new goods and PC by Petrin (2 0 0 2 ) shows that such products provide 
manufacturers with higher mark-ups. It was therefore quite natural that constrained 
Japanese manufacturers concentrated their energies on developing their products for these 
market segments. Indeed, Japanese manufacturers have dominated early sales of personal 
carriers and by 2 0 0 2  their product-mix included over twice as many ‘new’ segment sales 
then the mean product-mix of other producers.
To provide an initial indication of whether or not quality within-model attribute up­
grading was systematically greater in Japanese cars, trends in the embodiment of binary 
product characteristics (see Table D.l) and engine size (measured in cubic centimetres) 
of Japanese and ‘other’ manufacturers are examined in Figure 6.5.
The top panel in Figure 6.5 (Panel A) depicts the difference between the mean pro­
portions of binary features of Japanese cars relative to non-Japanese manufacturers - 
calculated as the sum of the (sales weighted) mean embodiment of binary features of 
Japanese manufacturers as a ratio of the mean incorporation of those same attributes by 
non-Japanese producers.^® The Figure dramatically emphasises the rapid embodiment of 
features by Japanese manufacturers relative to non-Japanese manufacturers in the wake 
of the VER agreanent enforcement in 1977 relative to the 1973-1976 period when they 
had been less well equipped.^^ It was not until the 1990s that the market converges on 
the level of feature embodiment of Japanese manufacturers. Nevertheless, on average, 
Japanese products were still better equipped by the end of the period examined. In con­
trast, the expansion towards larger engine cars was slower no doubt reflecting the time 
required to develop larger model varieties and engines, which were not a Japanese manu­
facturers’ speciality. Japanese car engine size eclipsed that of non-Japanese manufacturers 
in 1991 before falling below the average size of other manufacturers in 1997. Subsequent to 
the removal of VERs, Japanese manufacturers sold vehicles with small engines as Japanese 
flrms have concentrated their marketing energy on the growing Personal Carrier market. 
Overall the descriptive analysis suggests that Japanese manufacturers flrst reacted to the 
restrictions by upping the equipment embodied in their cars and then by shifting into 
more profitable areas of the market.
full array of comparative graphs of the sales weighted means of all the 120 features and attributes in the sample is 
available on request.
While it is popularly conceived that Japanese manufacturers market some of the most well equipped in cars, as the 
data illustrates, this was not the case prior to the implementation of VERs when Japanese cars were marketed on the basis 
of their price and reliability.
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Figure 6.5: Relative Difference between Mean Average Embodiment of New Attributes and Engine Size 
(cc) of Japanese and ‘Other’ Manufacturers
Panel A: Relative mean Incorporation of product attributes
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Before developing a structural model of the UK market, in keeping with previous 
work a more simplistic hedonic regression exercise is undertaken. The formidable set
Chapter 4.2 provides a somewhat more detailed specification and a considerably more detailed hedonic analysis con­
centrated on British Ley land. The purpose here is to illustrate the consistency of the findings concerning VERs and to
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of observable product attributes available coupled with the fact that there are multiple 
model versions for each model allow for model fixed effects to be used to capture time 
invariant unobservable characteristics. The data is thus well suited to hedonic analysis. 
Table 6.1 provides the results of the following estimation,
i
InPyjf =  oùQ +  ^ ] CHARt +  tpEXCHfgt +  XVERt -f- (j)DOMt +  I'j +  +  v^jtj (6.1)
i= l
the price of a product i at time t is determined by its characteristics, P{CHAR), that 
consist of the full set of product attributes found in Table D.l, as well as the set of time 
variant characteristics (power, size and economy), which are jointly termed attributes. 
In addition, a set of segment dummies segment^ model and variant age effects (agcmod 
and agsvar) and model-specific fixed effects, that capture time invariant unobservable 
characteristics associated with each model as reliability and reputation are included in the 
specification. It is important to note that since every model is also associated with a single 
brand and firm, each model fixed-effect also incorporates the brand/firm prestige effects 
associated with that model. In line with previous studies [e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1999); Goldberg (1995)] the specification is completed with a full set of time dummies, Wt, 
that are included to capture year specific macroeconomic shocks, and bilateral exchange 
rates, EXCHkf, by each versions production location, fe, to capture the impact of exchange 
rate pass-through. The coeflSdents on the year specific VER dummies, the As, and the 
domestic production dummies DOM  (that exclude Japanese transplants), the ÿs, are the 
key variables of interest. Additional dummies are provided for the year following the VER 
being curtailed as a common sense test that VER effects are what the dummies are truly 
capturing. The inclusion of these additional Japan specific dummies follows the logic 
that if Japanese firms are no longer constrained it should be expected that the dummy 
variables in the years following their abolition wiU not be significant.
The resulting estimation is provided in Table 6.1. Given the interest is in providing 
some preliminary evidence that VERs had important impacts on the market, only a sub­
set of the full set of 213 estimated coefficients that make up Equation 6.1 are reported.
To give the reader a flavour of the attribute findings, the results for the time varying char­
acteristics, made up of a set of key performance characteristics as well as the model and 
version age effects are provided.^ The coefficients are typically well identified and ‘appro-
evaluate the wel&re impacts on British In land  as is done later in the chapter.
^^The full set of results is available on request.
^W ith respect to the sign of the coefficients of the 123 attributes, more than half have a priori expected positive 
sign, and many of them are statistically significant. However, the hedonic coefficients contain both production costs and 
consumer valuations of product characteristics. Therefore, supply and demand side factors cannot be distinguished between.
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T^ble 6.1: Hedonic Estimate of VER Impacts in the UK Car Market (Incorporates Model Fixed-Efiects)
attributes
Exdiange rates 
Domestic Firms
N observations
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
power 0.0043 (61.57) injection 0.0106 (3.70)
size 0.0025 (1.32) non-diesel turbo •0.0120 (1.19)
economy -0.0008 (10.58) diesel w/o turbo 0.1215 (16.77)
age_mod -0.0001 (7.90) diesel w/ turbo 0.1287 (15.02)
age.var •0.0003 (12.75)
exch -5.0E-05 (3.60)
1977 0.0046 (0.41) VER 1977 -0.049 (0.80)
1978 0.0065 (0.87) 1978 -0.051 (0.98)
1979 -0.0155 (0.09) 1979 -0.071 (2.33)
1980 -0.0216 (1.69) 1980 -0.067 (1.38)
1981 0.0023 (2.90) 1981 -0.079 (0.27)
1982 0.0249 (2.16) 1982 -0.001 (0.44)
1983 -0.0062 (1.27) 1983 0.045 (2.19)
1984 -0.0112 (0.87) 1984 0.038 (3.01)
1985 0.0001 (1.02) 1985 0.035 (3.80)
1986 -0.0121 (0.68) 1986 0.064 (5.07)
1987 -0.0232 (1.15) 1987 0.071 (4.58)
1988 -0.0212 (0.68) 1988 0.073 (4.24)
1989 -0.0105 (0.62) 1989 0.066 (4.31)
1990 -0.0270 (0.49) 1990 0.047 (3.33)
1991 0.0179 (1.23) 1991 0.003 (1.44)
1992 0.0033 (0.44) 1992 0.011 (2.41)
1993 -0.0017 (0.45) 1993 0.083 (4.05)
1994 0.0214 (2.21) 1994 0.074 (5.10)
1995 0.0230 (2.75) 1995 0.056 (4.75)
1996 -0.0075 (1.51) 1996 0.074 (4.47)
1997 0.0140 (1.95) 1997 0.047 (3.96)
1998 -0.0257 (1.19) 1998 0.038 (3.13)
1999 0.0497 (3.65) 1999 0.042 (5.43)
2000 •0.0508 (2.57) 2000 0.002 (1.51)
2001 ■0.0355 (0.62) 2001 0.019 (1.46)
2002 •0.0398 (1.32) 2002 0.019 (1.08)
0.935 No. groups (models) 680
14,401 No. extra attributes 129
Positive coefficients 76
Significant + coeff. 43
Note: Estimation also includes a full set of year and segment effects.
priately’ signed with models with engines that were more powerful, included fuel injection, 
or were diesel-fueled (with and without turbo charging) receiving a price premium, while 
petrol-fueled diesel models receive no price premium. Older models and model variants 
were discounted. Of the one hundred and twenty nine dummy attribute variables included 
the majority were positively signed, and of these ‘correctly’ signed variables over half had 
coefficients that were statistically significant. Year and segment effects (not reported) 
were typically individually significant and were jointly so. The bilateral exchange rate 
variable also suggests exchange rates played a role.®® The key findings relate to VER and 
domestic firm dummies. The results strongly suggest that VERs, with the exception of
Furthermore, there is a certain degree of substitutability and/or complementarities between some attributes in the data set, 
thus the sign of all the coefficients of new attributes cannot be expected to be positive [Pakes (2004)].
^^The extent that pricing-to-market behaviour occurs is not examined here by disaggregation of the exchange rate variable 
into separate bilateral exchange rate variables since the focus is on the VER trade policy. Future work which examines 
more rigorously the exchange rate pass through phenomena is being undertalcen.
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1991, were binding from the early 1980s until they were revoked in December 1999. It is 
not surprising that the VERs did not bind in 1991 due to a recession in that year. Nor 
is it too surprising that VERs appear to bind the year following their removal since pent 
up demand is likely to have remained unfulfilled in the market and by 2 0 0 1  there are 
no trace effects of the trade policy. It is perhaps more surprising that the VERs do not 
appear to bind and are indeed negative until 1982, although only significantly so in 1979. 
Overall, the estimates indicate that, on average, VERs added a 5% price premium to 
Japanese cars in each of the sixteen years they were binding. Also of interest, the policy 
does not seem to have had a marked effect on the prices of domestic firms’ products with 
significant price effects being well determined in only six of the twenty-two years the VER 
was operational.
Overall, the hedonic results strongly indicate that the pohcy had well determined price 
effects, as should be expected, but hedonic analysis disallows the researcher from quanti­
fying the effects the policy had different players (firms and consumers) in the market. To 
do so a structural model of the market is needed: the derivation and estimation of which 
is now turned to.
6.6 Estimating the Effects of VERs on Sales, Market Share, and 
Welfare
The UK car market is modeled as an oligopolistic market in which N  multi-product 
firms compete in prices. The methodology adopted is similar to that developed by Berry
(1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and was used amongst others by Verboven 
(1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) who generated a structural model of demand 
and supply applying a nested logit model.^ ® The demand side of the model is identical to 
that used in Chapter 4.3 so the reader is directed to Section 4.3.3. However, the supply 
side differs in that it is where VERs are modeled via the supply function.
To briefiy reiterate, consistent estimates of product demand can be made without 
assuming the mode of competition among the firms. However, in order to calculate mark­
ups a specific form of firm conduct needs to be assumed. Each multi-product firm, /
While additional generality in the structure of the demand structures is possible [e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995)] the specification provides a compromise between functional form and computational tractability- The later point 
is of great importance due to the considerable dimensions of the data set and the need to test the appropriateness of the 
results against differing specifications. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) take a similar approach despite their considerably 
smaller dimensions (in terms of both observations and explanatory variables) of their cross-country analysis of European 
auto markets. That said, on-going research is being undertaken to obtain ‘better’ demand side estimates using random 
coefficients models. Initial finHinga from more general estimation strategies give no indication that qualitative findings 
contained in the paper should be in any way altered. The complex inter-temporal demand issue relating to the fact that 
cars are durable goods is also not addressed here. However it is worth noting that, since the model includes an “outside 
good”, consumers may either postpone their purchase if they consider that prices will fall in the future or by buying a used 
car [Goldberg and Verboven (2001)].
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maximises its profits each period (omitting time subscripts) that are given by,
-  E  (6.2)
jÇ.Ff j^Ff
where M  is total market size, Cj is cost of producing product j ,  and all other notation 
follows from that used above. The profit function accounts for the important fact that car 
makers are multi-product firms. Thus, when a car maker considers lowering the price of 
one of its products, this will not only reduce the market share of other rivals’ products, but 
might also undercut the sales of its own other products. Hence car manufacturers might 
then lower its prices less than in a situation when it only sells one product. Marginal 
costs are calculated as
mcj — Wj + Uj — XV ER, (6.3)
where Wj is a vector of observable cost shifters (in this case wages and exchange rates) 
and i/j is a vector of unknown parameters. Voluntary Export Restraints are modeled on 
the cost side as a specific tariflF that, where binding, raises prices by an amount exceeding 
cost plus mark-up. Note that the time subscripts are suppressed to simplify the expression 
with VERs being captured via location and year-Specific dummies for each of the twenty- 
two years that the restraints were applied.^^
The observable allocation of the quota and associated discussion in Section 6.3 implied 
that Japanese firms’ acted in concert which implies that Japanese firms set quantities 
and other firms set prices (a mixed Nash strategy). Assuming that firms compete in 
prices, first-order conditions for profit maximising firm /  with respect to product j  yield: 
4- Sj. To derive a pricing equation for each product j  using vector 
notation let p denote a J  x 1 price vector, c is a J  x 1 vector of marginal costs, and s 
is a J  X 1 vector of market shares of all products offered at time t (note time subscripts 
are once again omitted to simplify the notation) and is a J  x J  matrix whose element 
in row j  and column k equals ^  if car j  and k are produced by the same firm and 0  
otherwise. The first order profit maximising conditions can then be rewritten in vector 
form as:
p =  c+n~^s(p) (6.4)
The GMM estimation methodology is identical to that applied in Chapter 4.3.
is worth noting that the way VERs are modeled here is a practical one, and was also adopted by Berry, Levinsohn, 
and Pakes (1999) by no means the only way. An alternative is to specify VERs constraints and to explicitly solve for the 
constrained maximisation problem [as was done in Goldberg (1995)]. The later is currently being experimented with.
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6.6.1 Empirical Results
The estimation strategy is identical to that used in Chapter 6  where a two-equation system 
consisting of the demand and the pricing equation is estimated using a General Method of 
Moments estimator with instrumental variables being used for the price and within-group 
market shares.^®
Table 6.2 provides estimates from the structural model. The attribute variables are 
positively signed illustrating that attributes (other than the high costs associated higher 
fuel consumption per mile) provide additional utility to the buyer. The estimation utilises 
the full set of product attributes. Given the substantial number of attributes only a 
subset of those attribute variables are presented. However, unlike the hedonic estimates, 
the attribute variables are consistently positively signed.®® Diagnostically the model also 
performs well with tests of over-identifying restrictions failing to reject the model at 
conventional significance levels (a t-statistic of over 33). Of central interest, the key 
results relating to the VER variables in the pricing equation are positive and statistically 
significant for 16 of the 22 years that the policy was in place. There are two exceptions. 
First it appears that during the first few years the policy was introduced, the policy did 
not have a binding impact on Japanese manufacturers. Also, during the market downturn 
in 1991 the VERs do not appear to have been binding. The findings are reassuring in 
that they map qualitatively to those obtained in the reduced form hedonic analysis. Since 
VERs enter the cost equation in the form of a specific tariff the positive coefficient indicates 
the level of tax that would generate equilibrium prices which equate to those observed 
under the restraints in the years where the VERs bind.^ ®
Recall that the price of a car can be decomposed into its marginal cost and mark-up 
components. The differences in elasticities translate into differences in mark-ups for the 
groups of firms active in the market. For analytical purposes four groups of “players of 
interest” are identified. The first group is made up of a single firm, British Leyland. Since 
the policy was initially designed to aid the nationalised firm, the effects of the poficy on 
its profits and prices are of key interest. The second group, UK MNEs, is made up of the 
two multinational firms - Ford UK and GM Vauxhall - whose production was based in the 
UK. The third group comprises European manufacturers, with the impact on Japanese 
firms making up the fourth contingent. Furthermore, substitution patterns differ between 
segments of the market. Indeed if this was not the case, then a simple (non-nested)
Details of the instruments and rationale for the estimation method are located in Chapter 6.
^^The full set of results is available on request.
^T he results are estimated under the Bertrand assumption. Two alternative conduct assumptions were also examined: 
Cournot and Collusion. The outcomes were qualitatively equivalent to those derived using the Bertrand conduct assumption. 
Hence, the results are robust under alternative static equilibrium concepts. These estimations are available on request.
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Table 6.2: GMM Estimated Parameters from the Demand and Pricing Equations (Selected Coefficients: 
N=14,401)
Demand Equation Pricing Equation
Coefficient t-statlstic Coefficient t-statistic
attributes power 0.020 (9.88) 0.003 (11.56)
size 0.270 (2.27) 0.113 (3.46)
economy -0.120 (4.78) -0.050 (3.83)
injection 0.122 (2.62) 0.051 (2.27)
non-diesel turbo 0.170 (1.72) 0.053 (1.16)
diesel w/o turbo 0.298 (3.31) 0.124 (2.78)
diesel w/ turbo 0.401 (4.89) 0.167 (3.92)
aircon 0.087 (2.11) 0.036 (2.01)
ABS 0.134 (2.12) 0.056 (1.99)
PAS 0.345 (4.68) 0.144 (2.38)
airbag 0.207 (3.53) 0.086 (2.18)
wage 0.310 (4.72)
exchange rate 0.070 (3.27)
VER 1977 -0.070 (1.14)
1978 0.090 (1.46)
1979 -0.130 (1.98)
1980 0.064 (1.11)
1981 0.240 (0.98)
1982 0.370 (1.29)
1983 0.510 (3.09)
1984 0.480 (4.27)
1985 0.540 (4.41)
1986 1.040 (5.08)
1987 0.950 (6.27)
1988 0.920 (3.80)
1989 0.901 (4.29)
1990 0.640 (4.07)
1991 0.270 (1.48)
1992 0.510 (3.81)
1993 0.890 (4.79)
1994 1.070 (6.89)
1995 0.930 (6.02)
1996 0.890 (5.12)
1997 0.850 (4.75)
1998 0.790 (4.06)
1999 1.012 (4.27)
Constant -9.329 (6.41)
Parameters a -0.056 (14.88)
(both equations) a 0.527 (21.72)
GMM OBJ 25.8
multinomial logit model would suJffice. An intuitive means to evaluate the magnitude 
of the utility and cost parameters is to decompose own and cross-price elasticities and
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to examine the price over marginal cost mark-ups. These patterns are investigated over 
the period that VERs were in place in Table 6.3 [the analytic expressions used to derive 
them being provided in Appendix A]. In terms of the firm groups analysed, US multi­
nationals have the lowest own-price elasticity. This result is consistent with a bias of 
UK consumers towards British goods. At the other end of the spectrum are British 
Leyland’s products, followed by European and Japanese products falling somewhere in 
the middle. AU those estimates are precisely determined in a statistical sense. It may 
appear surprising that Japanese models have a lower price elasticity than European models 
for those unacquainted with European car markets. There are two reasons for this. First, 
unlike the US market European producers service the fuU range of products and are not 
always associated with price premiums (e.g. whUe Mercedes’ cars do receive premiums 
Fiat’s cars do not but both seU in significant quantities in the market). The second 
reason relates to the nature of product sales. In particular, as was iUustrated previously, 
Japanese manufacturers are the key players in the ‘new’ segments where, as the lower 
panel of Table 6.3 iUustrates, mark-ups were highest. FinaUy, the cross-price elasticities 
reasonably indicate that products in the same segment are closer substitutes for each 
other than they are for products across segments. This is indicated by the considerably 
higher ‘same segment’ cross-price elasticities relative to the ‘between segment’ cross-price 
elasticities.^^
Table 6.3: Estimated Price Elasticities and Mark-up Margins (1977-1999)
groups Japanese UK(BL) UK (MNEs) European
own price -4.27 (4.37) -5.11 (3.22) -4.01 (3.92) -4.43 (4.85)
cross-price 
same segment 
between segments
0.20
0.03
(2.97)
(2.02)
0.33
0.05
(3.05)
(1.99)
0.29
0.05
(3.56)
(2.43)
0.27
0.04
(4.13)
(3.11)
markup 0.22 (3.26) 0.08 (2.98) 0.15 (3.07) 0.18 (3.92)
segments Mini Medium Niche "New"
own price -7.71 (5.17) -7.32 (5.31) -3.14 (6.17) -1.99 (5.07)
cross-price 
same segment 
between segments
0.36
0.06
(3.59)
(2.07)
0.32
0.05
(3.39)
(2.02)
0.25
0.04
(3.98)
(2.07)
0.22
0.04
(4.07)
(3.42)
markup 0.13 (5.39) 0.14 (4.29) 0.27 (5.55) 0.42 (5.24)
Notes: 1. Analytical expressions for own price, and cross price elasticities (within and tietween market segments) are provided 
in Appendix A; 2. Reported elasticities are period averages; S.Test-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
full set of mark-ups for the 14,401 model versions is available on request.
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6.7 Simulating the Effects of the UK-Japanese VERs
To analyse the implications of the trade policy on profits and consumer welfare in the UK 
car market it is necessary to provide a plausible counterfactual against which to juxtapose 
the results. The logical candidate being that a free trade regime occurred rather than one 
where VERs were implemented, i.e. an equilibrium where the coefficient on the impficit 
tax, A, is set to zero. The effects of the poficy affected producer through affecting the 
profit margins of firms operating in the market and consumers by raising the prices of 
Japanese and other manufacturer’s products for the years studied the export restraints 
had a binding impact. The effects of the policies on these two sets of players are now 
examined.^
6.7.1 Profit Shifting
The effects of the export restraint on prices and profits of key manufacturers, as implied 
by the model simulations, are summarised in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The decline in imports 
associated with VER did not enable all producers to raise prices substantially. Table 6.4 
shows that the price effects of the VERs varied over time, but that they also followed 
a reassuringly consistent pattern. Of the four producer groups Japanese firms had the 
highest price differences (£2,523) followed by the UK based MNEs - Ford UK and GM 
Vauxhall - (£848), European manufacturers (£445) and the domestic ‘champion’ (£98).
BL saw little profit gains, while US multinationals achieved substantive windfall prof­
its. These MNEs did not expand sales substantively, however, with those gains reflecting 
the increased mark-ups earned by these firms. Manufacturers from Continental European 
countries also exacted considerable gains. This effect reflects the substitution away from 
Japanese manufacturers to European manufacturers. Such effects have been highlighted 
theoretically by Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1989) and have been shown to have empirical 
content in the findings of Goldberg (1995) and Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988). In partic­
ular, Goldberg (1995) finds that only 54% of the sales gains derived from the VER were 
captured by US firms, while Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988) find that European firms 
were able expand their prices by about one third. Gains to European manufacturers were 
greater in the UK than in the US, in part due to the weakness of British Leyland, but 
also since European manufacturers had a larger combined market share.
Japanese firms increased their prices significantly under the export restraint and did 
not witness a fall in profits. The ability of the Japanese to maintain their profits reflected 
relatively inelastic demand for Japanese products and the ability of Japanese firms to
^ N o comparison of what would have occurred had a general tariff been used is provided as this was not feasible under 
the GATT.
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Table 6.4: VER Effects on Average Prices Strategic Groups (£1,000)
With VER No VER Difference With VER Without VER Difference
1983 Japanese 11.0 10.2 0.8 1992 Japanese 15.0 12.4 2.5
UK(BL) 12.1 12.0 0.1 UK (BL) 14.8 14.7 0.0
UK (MNEs) 11.6 10.9 0.7 UK (MNEs) 13.6 13.2 0.4
European 13.0 12.6 0.4 European 15.3 14.9 0.5
1984 Japanese 11.2 9.9 1.3 1993 Japanese 16.1 12.6 3.5
UK(BL) 12.4 12.3 0.1 UK (BL) 15.8 15.7 0.1
UK (MNEs) 11.6 10.9 0.7 UK (MNEs) 13.2 12.5 0.7
European 13.2 12.8 0.4 European 14.4 13.9 0.4
1985 Japanese 11.7 10.1 1.6 1994 Japanese 14.6 10.9 3.6
UK(BL) 14.6 14.5 0.1 UK(BL) 16.6 16.5 0.1
UK (MNEs) 12.0 11.3 0.7 UK (MNEs) 13.3 12.7 0.6
European 13.5 13.1 0.4 European 14.9 14.5 0.4
1985 Japanese 12.5 10.1 2.4 1995 Japanese 14.7 11.8 2.9
UK(BL) 13.3 13.2 0.1 UK(BL) 16.8 16.7 0.1
UK (MNEs) 12.1 11.5 0.6 UK (MNEs) 14.0 12.7 1.3
European 13.8 13.4 0.4 European 14.7 14.3 0.4
1987 Japanese 13.6 10.9 2.7 1996 Japanese 15.1 12.4 2.7
UK(BL) 13.9 13.8 0.1 UK(BL) 16.2 16.0 0.1
UK (MNEs) 12.9 12.3 0.6 UK (MNEs) 14.3 13.0 1.3
European 14.8 14.3 0.4 European 15.3 14.9 0.5
1988 Japanese 14.4 11.3 3.0 1997 Japanese 15.5 12.8 2.6
UK(BL) 13.8 13.7 0.0 UK(BL) 15.9 15.9 0.1
UK (MNEs) 13.5 12.9 0.6 UK (MNEs) 15.3 13.9 1.4
European 15.6 15.1 0.5 European 15.6 15.1 0.5
1989 Japanese 15.1 11.6 3.5 1998 Japanese 15.4 13.1 2.3
UK(BL) 14.7 14.6 0.1 UK(BL) 16.3 16.2 0.1
UK (MNEs) 13.8 132 0.6 UK (MNEs) 15.1 13.8 1.4
European 16.2 15.8 0.5 European 15.8 15.3 0.5
1990 Japanese 15.5 12.3 3.3 1999 Japanese 14.2 12.8 1.4
UK(BL) 14.9 14.8 0.1 UK(BL) 16.6 16.6 0.0
UK (MNEs) 14.1 132 0.8 UK (MNEs) 14.7 13.3 1.3
European 16.6 16.1 0.5 European 15.7 152 0.5
Notes: 1. Average prices are sales weighted. 2. UK MNEs Include Ford and GM products. 3. 'European' Includes cars 
manufactured by manufacturers In the UK with the exception of BL products during the period of BMWs ownership.
4. All resulting estimates are precisely determined (at the 5% or better).
capture the revenue associated with VERs as opposed to tariff poHcies. The success of 
Japanese manufacturers also reflected the change in their product-mix towards higher end 
models, with the most dramatic example being Toyota’s development of the Lexus, but 
the more common result being that those manufacturers concentrated on selling ‘new’ 
rather then small family and mini cars.
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Table 6.5: VER Effects on Total Profits of Strategic Groups (£mns)
With VER No VER Difference With VER No VER Difference
1983 Japanese 942 921 21 1992 Japanese 695 680 15
UK(BL) 42 37 6 UK(BL) 42 37 6
UK (MNEs) 1,086 977 109 UK (MNEs) 1,534 1,381 153
European 378 340 38 European 499 449 50
1984 Japanese 959 938 21 1993 Japanese 814 796 18
UK(BL) 43 37 6 UK(BL) 45 39 6
UK (MNEs) 1,088 979 109 UK (MNEs) 1,582 1,424 158
European 391 352 39 European 607 546 61
1985 Japanese 832 813 18 1994 Japanese 869 850 19
UK(BL) 45 39 6 UK(BL) 48 42 6
UK (MNEs) 1,220 1,098 122 UK (MNEs) 1,888 1,699 189
European 419 377 42 European 587 528 59
1986 Japanese 669 654 15 1995 Japanese 884 865 19
UK(BL) 47 40 6 UK(BL) 54 46 7
UK (MNEs) 1,368 1,231 137 UK (MNEs) 1,798 1,618 180
European 468 421 47 European 632 569 63
1987 Japanese 739 723 16 1996 Japanese 781 764 17
UK(BL) 52 45 7 UK(BL) 56 48 7
UK (MNEs) 1,612 1,451 161 UK (MNEs) 2,200 1,980 220
European 540 486 54 European 655 590 66
1988 Japanese 799 781 18 1997 Japanese 748 732 16
UK(BL) 58 50 8 UK(BL) 60 51 8
UK (MNEs) 2,000 1,800 200 UK (MNEs) 2,720 2,448 272
European 617 556 62 European 747 672 75
1989 Japanese 823 805 18 1998 Japanese 682 667 15
UK(BL) 65 56 9 UK(BL) 62 53 8
UK (MNEs) 2,180 1,962 218 UK (MNEs) 2,760 2,484 276
European 679 611 68 European 846 761 85
1990 Japanese 836 818 18 1999 Japanese 521 510 11
UK(BL) 58 50 8 UK(BL) 58 50 8
UK (MNEs) 1,884 1,696 188 UK (MNEs) 2,420 2,178 242
European 646 582 65 European 835 752 84
Notes: 1. Average prices are sales weighted. 2. UK MNEs include Ford and GM products. 3. 'European' includes cars 
manufactured by manufacturers in the UK with the exception of BL products during the period of BMWs ownership.
4. All resulting estimates are precisely determined (at the 5% or better).
6.7.2 Consumer Welfare
A compensating variation measure is used to derive the VER’s impacts on consumer 
welfare that would leave the consumer indifferent to a situation where the VER was 
implemented compared to when it was not. Assuming that the marginal utility of income 
is fixed, McFadden (1981) and Small and Rosen (1981) show that the compensating 
variation of each household i is given by,
W  = (6.5)
where is the price coefificient for each household and and are computed
211
using the VER/no VER estimates. Aggregation over i and multiplying by the market 
size allows the total compensating variation.
Table 6.6: Net Change: Consumer Welfare vs. Domestic Profits (£nms)
Consumer Welfare Change in Domestic Profit* Net Change
1983 176.2 166.3 -10.0
1984 184.8 168.0 -16.8
1985 215.3 182.5 -32.8
1986 249.9 199.9 -50.0
1987 303.3 233.3 -70.0
1988 385.6 281.5 -104.1
1989 403.6 306.9 -96.7
1990 319.8 273.3 -46.5
1992 252.3 219.4 -32.9
1993 279.9 237.2 -42.7
1994 344.4 267.0 -77.4
1995 362.7 263.5 -99.2
1996 406.7 304.7 -101.9
1997 468.4 366.0 -102.5
1998 455.0 379.1 -75.8
1999 399.1 341.1 -58.0
TOTAL 5,207.0 4,189.7 -1,017.3
* Net profits the sum of UK MNEs and British Leyland (See Table 4).
Table 6 .6  shows that consumers paid a heavy burden for the policies amounting to 
about £5.2bn. Losses in consumer welfare also follow a cyclical pattern reasonably sug­
gesting that the ability of firms to extract surplus from consumers fell during downturns 
in demand. This amount is equivalent to 70% of the burden paid by US consumers ac­
cording to the work of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), despite the UK economy being 
about one-seventh the size of the US, reflecting the considerably longer period that the 
restrictions were in place in the UK.
6.8 Concluding Discussion of the Findings
The advent of Japan-UK VERs and FDI in the UK car market is analysed from their 
implementation in 1977 until they were removed in December 1999 using an exhaustive 
version level data set that covers the 1971-2002 period. Determining the success of any 
policy depends on the extent to which it meets the objectives it was designed to achieve. 
VERs had two objectives that mirrored Britain’s changing political climate over the pe-
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riod. The policy’s initial and primary role was as a means to protect nationalised domestic 
industry in the form of Britain’s last remained mass producing company, British Leyland. 
The shift from nationalisation to privatisation under the Thatcher regime signalled a move 
away from government protection of domestic industry more generally. But this was not 
the case in the car industry which received special status due to its size as an employer 
and its symboUc role. While the protection of domestic industry remain the key objec­
tive, under the Thatcher regime VERs where actively conceived as a means to encourage 
efficient Japanese manufacturers to set up their production in the UK to provide jobs. 
Overall the results concerning the effects of VERs on affected groups, over the period 
when VERs were binding, leads to the following conclusions:
1. British Consumers: The main welfare losses associated with the VER were felt by 
British consumers amounting to £5.21bn.
2. ‘British’ Industry: Despite the generally acknowledged role of trade policy as a 
means to protect ‘domestic’ industry the adoption of VERs had little impact on Britain’s 
domestic champion, BL, who obtained £112 million in profits from the poficy.
3. UK Industry (non-Japanese): Domestic Producers managed to obtain significant 
benefits from the poficy amounted to £2.93bn.
4. Japanese Industry: Japanese firms gained at three levels benefiting from: (a) being 
able to derive enhanced profits net of the cost of upgrading the products (£277mn); (b) 
subsidised plants approximately £430mn; (c) being able to sell transplants within the EU 
(not measurable with only UK data).
Thus, the results show that the poficy had mixed success in meeting its objectives. 
VERs demonstratively failed to provide any significant protection for the domestically 
owned British Leyland. British Leyland was simply not competitive enough to acquire 
the share of the market left by constrained Japanese manufacturers and it gained only a 
minor wind-fall in profits. A more important contribution was a by-product of the policy 
in the form of BL’s association with Honda. Honda-designed models, that were initially 
conceived as a stop-gap measure for the technologically lagging BL, made up 60% of BL 
UK sales in the year prior to the firm being acquired by BMW (in 1993). The principal 
gains of the poficy were obtained by unintended beneficiaries who were third parties to the 
arrangements - US-owned UK-based MNEs and European manufacturers. The UK-based 
MNEs being the happiest with the restrictions of the two groups in obtaining windfall 
profits about £3bn -  more than twenty-six times larger than BL could achieve. European 
manufacturers obtained a smaller profit gain of about £lbn -  still more then eight times
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that of BL.
The second objective of job creation associated with Japanese FDI in the UK was 
achieved with the UK playing key host to Japanese investment in Europe. In order 
not to undermine the primary objective of protecting UK industry, at the expense of 
various forms of investment assistance, the UK was able to entice Japanese investment 
while continuing to constrain Japanese firm’s sales in the UK but not other constrained 
European markets. By 2002 Japanese manufacturers accounted for over 40% of UK auto 
production, with Japanese firms continuing to expand their production base in the UK. 
They were the key contributors to a doubling of UK production from its trough of 887,000 
units in 1982 to 1.63 million units in 2002, despite Ford UK withdrawing from production 
of its Ford badged cars that same year. While the creation of 10,500 jobs in the UK plants 
of Honda, Nissan and Toyota can be viewed as a successful policy outcome, the results 
suggest that these jobs came at a considerable cost. The precision of the findings for both 
consumers and firms illustrate that these jobs came at a high price, providing the first 
concrete example of the failure of a strategic trade policy.
It is worth putting the results in context of the wider objective of the VER as a means 
to restructure European car makers under the gamut of the European Commission’s El­
ements of Consensus. The restructuring process appears to have been largely successful 
with major European conglomerates on the whole being competitive with Japanese man­
ufacturers. Such success is reflected in the ending of VERs not leading to a substantial 
expansion in the UK or elsewhere, with Japanese manufacturers capturing 11.5% of the 
Western European market in 1999 and 13.5% in the first six months of 2004.^  ^ Whether 
Japanese firms wiU be able to make further inroads into the European market remains 
to be seen. However examining the welfare effects of the policy in other constrained 
European markets provides a stimulating question for future research.
^ D ata  obtained from Association Auxiliaire de l’Automobile [http ; f  fwxvw.acea.befACEAfautodata.htm[\.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In order to contribute to academic research, scholars can either explore new topics or 
re-address issues that still require satisfactory answers in innovative ways. This thesis 
examines an important and intensively studied industry - the British car industry - from 
1971 until 2002. During that period the dominant indigenous car manufacturer, British 
Leyland (BL), underwent a substantial decline. Since the car industry is one of the 
most debated in the post-war historical literature the thesis addresses an old topic but is 
innovative in that it focuses on a series of factors underlying the decline of BL that have not 
been subjected to scrutiny ty  economic historians at the micro-level. Methodologically, 
as Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay (1995, 89) have pointed out, given the rich set 
of potential explanations for the decline of the UK industry the literature has taken two 
approaches. The first is to list all the plausible ‘factors’ that have infiuenced the industry 
and in some cases to attribute a causal relation between them. The second is to take a 
more ambitious line of picking a single explanation and gathering a selection of evidence 
consistent with it. The second method is limited in that the scope of the explanation is 
constrained to the particular facet of the literature. From an empirical perspective this 
literature provides a series of anecdotally derived conjectures which a priori are quite 
compelling, but as has been shown in the introductory chapter, the contribution of their 
argument is difficult to assess.
This thesis adopts an alternative approach that makes a considerably more rigourous 
attempt to address a set of questions. The issues examined have had some attention in 
the literature to date. The thesis is framed by two dramatic shifts in UK car production 
between 1971 and 2002: the declining fortune of British Leyland and the rise of UK based 
Japanese manufacturing. While the rise of Japanese production in the UK necessitates 
accounting for the determinants of Japanese investment, the emphasis of the thesis is 
squarely on explaining the ailing fortunes of British Leyland. As it turns out these two
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stories are linked through government sanctioned industry-to-industry export restriction 
agreements between the British and the Japanese that influenced British Leyland and 
other flrms operating in the UK market. Since all flrms operating in the UK market also 
marketed their waxes in other markets it is imphcitly assumed that the factors influencing 
the sales success of BL in the UK market are representative across other markets. This is 
an important assumption requiring justiflcation. Production of BL cars was exclusively 
centred on the UK with all products marketed by the flrm being sold in the domestic 
market having similar attributes to those marketed elsewhere. Furthermore, as Chapter 1 
illustrated, BL’s sales trends in the domestic market despite being poor, were still better 
than in the international market place. Combining these two points it is clear that the UK 
car market provides a representative view of the indigenous flrm’s products. If anything 
a ‘home market’ preference of domestic consumers for BL’s products means that the UK 
market provides a base line to measure BL’s models and model versions’ product quality 
against. The same cannot be said for the three UK based Japanese manufacturers - 
Honda, Nissan and Toyota - who sold the bulk of their UK production in Continental 
European markets. However, since the primary interest of the thesis concerns British 
Leyland, the UK market is the most appropriate market to examine since it was there 
that competition flrom Japanese flrms had the greatest impact on the flrm. In addition, 
there are also some advantages of examining a single market, particularly given that a 
signiflcant role is placed on the availability and nature of model variants and detailed 
product attributes play in this research. Even if such detailed information was available 
elsewhere, in examining multiple markets it would not be possible to match variants 
between countries since, as Verboven (1996) pointed out, the same model of cars differ 
in terms of its embodied characteristics between the UK and neighbouring European 
markets. In addition, the consumers of particular markets are likely to have differed in 
the nature of the cars demanded. By concentrating on a single market such comphcating 
dimensions are ameliorated.
Chapter 1 reviews the substantive literature concerning the demise of British Leyland 
surveying a long list of factors that have been identifled as being influential in the de­
cline of the flrm. Factors that affect supply and demand were surveyed separately. The 
review points to the fact that the most popular reasons cited for the flrm’s decline, con­
cerning the production process and labour relations, influenced flrm costs rather than 
the demand side. The conceptual split between factors influencing demand and supply 
can therefore be used to highlight the information required to test hypotheses concerning 
the demise of BL after controlling for factors influencing flrm cost. Furthermore, break­
ing down the arguments into those affecting demand and supply provides a third, and
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alternative approach, to those that have been taken by the literature to date, one that 
combines a rigourous examination of specific issues while controlling for other plausible 
‘factors’ that have infiuenced the industry using empirical techniques. Doing so requires 
partitioning out supply side infiuences that affect costs and then analysing the effects on 
mark-ups (unit profits) determined by product characteristic preferences on the demand 
side. Methodologically, estimates are derived via discrete choice econometrics models that 
have seen considerable application and refinement in the economics literature but have 
not been present in the cliometric literature to date. In particular, the thesis examines 
three substantial issues in the form of ‘product-led decline’, advertising rivalry and the 
effects of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), testing whether these factors infiuenced 
BL’s performance. However, the introductory chapter also identified two further rele­
vant issues that need to be addressed. First, the historical literature points to the firm’s 
dwindling technological capacities prior to the 1970s when this study begins, and second 
the business literature alludes to a significant shift in the market environment that BL 
operated within. Both these issues are taken up in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
An acknowledged limitation of this thesis is that, due to the availability of data, the 
investigation begins in 1971. As was emphasised in Chapter 1 there are a number of 
arguments that point to British Leyland having a weaker technological capability set to 
its rivals even before 1971. The review identified two factors that may have infiuenced 
the technological development of BL in the form of the insulation of the market prior to 
accession into the EEC and the potentially destabilising influence of stop-go policies. In 
order to investigate whether these factors, or other unidentified factors influencing British 
Leyland’s capabilities, led to the firm being disadvantaged the firm’s capabilities, relative 
to rivals, are quantified. Chapter 2  points out that firm capabilities are jointly reflected in 
the nature and location of new products launched. The chapter overcomes pitfalls in the 
previous literature that did not isolate firm capabilities from the spatial location decisions 
of firms, and did not attempt to decompose resource differences from firm capabilities. 
Strategic location decisions and capabilities are distinguished by arguing that firms are 
able to alter the position of products within sub-markets (segments) in the car market 
in the short term by differentiating and upgrading product attributes. However, prior 
to the development stage firms cannot know the precise position of rival products and 
play to their core capacities. Distinguishing between capabilities and resources requires 
an ability to quantify firm resources. To do so, a complementary firm level data set was 
constructed that incorporates a near complete set of firm balance sheet and profit and loss 
information over the 1970-2002 period. Separating out alternative resource and strategic 
location effects allows indices of firm capabilities to be constructed and to illustrate two
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important aspects of their evolution.
To control for firm resource effects, a firm-level accounts based data set is employed. 
Separating out alternative resource and strategic location effects allows firm-specific ca­
pabilities indices to be constructed and to show that: (1). firm capabilities vary over 
the longer term - a finding that conflicts with deterministic path dependency view but 
is consistent with Mokyr’s argument that the embodiment of product innovations lead 
to deviations in technological trajectories, but (2). British Leyland was the exception, 
with capabilities that were substantially lower than key rivals and the market as a whole 
throughout the sample period.
The methodology developed in Chapter 2 is unable to distinguish between what caused 
the divergence between BL and other firm’s operating in the UK market’s products. 
However the findings do suggest that further analysis of the period prior to the 1970s, 
which is outside the scope of thesis, is needed with the two policy factors highlighted 
above providing logical starting places.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing a rigourous account of the changing 
structure of the market and the participants operating within it. In particular, as Chapter 
1 highlighted, a potentially significant discontinuity in the structure of the market since the 
early 1970s, related to alterations in the nature of demand coupled with a preponderance 
of product technologies and flexible production methods. The literature to date has 
speculated that these trends were at work but there has been a lack of systematic evidence 
provided to support a shift of paradigm of firm success based on process innovation, that is 
closely associated to the product-life-cycle (PLC) model, to a mode determined by product 
differentiation and tailored car production. Detailing whether such a fundamental shift 
has occurred is of interest in itself, however since the change in market environment 
implies different firm strategies would potentially be required to achieve sales success 
such a change has important implications for firms operating within it, most especially 
British Leyland. Chapter 3 examines the degree to which the UK car market provides 
evidence consistent with the PLC paradigm. No evidence is found justifying that the 
central tenet underlying the PLC, standardisation, was evident, rather it is shown that 
there has been considerable, innovation induced, product differentiation leading to market 
fragmentation. British Leyland was not part of the product differentiation trend, being 
unique in pruning its product lines. It is also shown that the majority of new product 
innovations were introduced by indigenous British firms, in stark contrast to the earlier 
post-war period. The lack of product innovation at BL in a market that was becoming 
increasingly oriented toward product innovation provides initial clues that inferior product 
quality was a potentially crucial factor in determining the firm’s poor performance in the
218
market place.
Informed by the finding in Chapter 3 that British Leyland was not an innovator, and 
Chapter 2 that BL’s had a relatively lower capacity set than its rivals are quantified in 
Chapter 4. The concept of ‘product-led decline’ encapsulated three distinct dimensions 
and was widely cross-referenced by contemporary studies. The first dimension was that 
BL’s cars were over-priced relative to imports and cars produced by UK based subsidiaries 
of multinational manufacturers in the “product package” they provided. Second, that BL 
was unable to fill the domestic market place with a range of products differentiated in ways 
that were able to capture consumers’ taste and demand patterns. Third, that BL’s cars 
were outdated and that BL, unlike its foreign owned counterparts, neglected to regularly 
upgrade its product ranges to embody technological advances.
Chapter 4.2 examines whether BL’s products were “over-priced” relative to rivals as 
suggested by an assessment of the views of consumer advocate groups and reviews of 
British Leyland and its rival’s products, and an analysis of the product strategies of BL 
and its principal market adversaries. Consumers’ and industry reviewers’ perceptions of 
quality and the corporate response at the model and firm levels of the four dominant firms 
- British Leyland, Chrysler UK, Ford UK and GM Vauxhall - are set out, complementing 
a broader survey of firm activities provided in Chapter 1. Each of the four firms, but BL 
and Chrysler UK in particular were routinely criticised for the build quality, spartan level 
of embodied car attributes, and dependability of domestic models, ranking these at below 
average levels. The clear message to domestic car manufacturers in the early 1970s was 
that they would need to produce more compelling products in order to compete against 
European and the then small, but rapidly growing, Japanese presence in the market. 
Two of the multinational firms. Ford UK and GM Vauxhall, responded to the threat of 
competition by either upgrading existing models (Ford UK) or by providing new offerings 
(GM Vauxhall) to enhance the quality of their product ranges. Both managed to recover 
market share after initial reductions. British Leyland and Chrysler UK, which folded 
in 1979, were unable to raise their product quality and saw their market shares decline 
dramatically as a result. Using panel techniques to exploit the within and between model 
differences it is shown that British Leyland provided products that were indeed “over­
priced” , compared to their rivals, thus confirming the first aspect of ‘product-led decline’ 
to be well founded.
In Chapter 4.3 the ability of BL to extend the life of it products through both static 
(product differentiation and dispersion) and dynamic (quality upgrading) dimensions was 
examined. Determining whether BL’s products were “over-priced” does not require one 
to distinguish between cost and demand side considerations. Since differentiating and
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upgrading products is costly what motivate these strategies is an ability to profit from 
them by obtaining higher unit markups over costs. It is shown that the inability of BL to 
differentiate and upgrade its product range reduced the survival potential of its products. 
In an industry where the cost of developing new models involves a substantive sunk cost, 
the on-going need to launch new models provided a substantial drain on BL resources 
thus contributing to its financial malaise.
Taken together Sections 4 and 4.3 point to inferior product features and design of 
models and model versions as being a root cause of the declining fortunes of BL. It 
is difficult to conceive how industrial relations problems, which were localised to the 
production process, could have infiuenced the design and development phases. Nor is 
it plausible to argue that government interference was directly at fault since even when 
the government nationalised the firm it did not play a part in daily operations. While 
it is possible that government played an indirect role through influencing the supply of 
engineers Chapter 1 points out that an inability to retain engineers was a more serious 
problem to the firm than their supply. The findings show that an inability to produce 
new products or versions of goods was a central factor underlying the indigenous firm’s 
decline. Ultimately the ability to produce a range of innovative products to meet market 
requirements rests on technical capabilities and engineering expertise being nurtured and 
directed to manufacture products for profitable product locations through a measured 
marketing and incisive managerial strategies. BL failed on both counts which leaves open 
the interesting counterfactual, that had the firm been able to raise it capabilities and 
provide an appropriate marketing strategy, it may have stood a chance of attaining an 
ever anticipated product-led recovery.
Chapter 5 examines BL’s strategic response to rival advertising between 1970 and 2002 
using model level advertising information. Prior to 1968, partly due to the television not 
being a major advertising medium and, more importantly, due to a tacit agreement limit­
ing advertising expenditures between firms, advertising was low and had a minor impact 
on firm costs. Prom the 1970s this was increasingly not the case with real advertising 
expenditure rising eleven-fold by 2002. The purpose of advertising from a firm’s perspec­
tive is to raise, or to protect, market share. However, in BL’s case positive expansion in 
the firm’s own sales through advertising were canceled out by the success of rival adver­
tising. Since advertising represented a substantial cost to the firm, £118 million, these 
expenditures translated directly into financial losses. To put the financial importance 
of advertising for the firm in perspective, the estimated losses account for the total net 
profits of the firm over the period analysed. Other multinational UK based producers 
were less sensitive to rival advertising and did benefit from advertising while foreign firms
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(principally European and Japanese car manufacturers) obtained substantive returns. A 
limitation of analysing advertising effects using advertising expenditure relates to an old 
debate as to whether advertising is informative or is used as a means to ‘persuade’ con­
sumers that a firm’s products are better. In the latter case advertising can in itself be 
viewed as a form of product differentiation. Across a wide selection of industries the eco­
nomics literature has pointed to the informative content of advertising being the dominant 
factor. If this is indeed the case then it implies that a low return to advertising reflected 
product inferiority and so is consistent with the findings of the previous two chapters that 
showed BL to be suffering a product-led decline.
Chapter 6 examines an important trade policy, the Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) 
between the UK and Japan. The rise of trade policies associated with “new trade pro­
tectionism”, of which VERs are a key example, is commonly seen as arising from the 
constrained ability of governments to use traditional tariff barriers under the General 
Agreement on Tarifik and Trade. In the mid-1970s the global car industry came under 
considerable pressure in the form of Japanese exports against a trend of reduced demand 
for cars in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. While the UK government could do Httle to 
stem the inflow of EEC members’ cars, having joined that regional block that year, it 
was capable of influencing the inflow of Japanese goods. Indeed, there is a wider interest 
in the policy since the UK was not alone in applying VERs to cars and other consumer 
goods with a number of its Continental European neighbours and the US following suite. 
The initial motivation for the policy reflected the government’s interest in the fate of the 
ailing motor industry, which received a new impetus in 1975 when British Leyland was 
nationalised. The election success of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 altered the rationale for 
maintaining the policy which remained partially as a means to protect BL, but also em­
phasised the opening up of the domestic economy to more direct international investment 
as a means to enhance the efficiency and generate employment as the 1980s unfolded. 
Where the car industry was concerned, Thatcher’s desire to raise foreign investment was 
ultimately fuffiUed. Indeed, the rise of UK based Japanese manufacturing effectively re­
versed a trend of absolute decline in the UK’s industry. An important by-product of 
VERs is that they alter market structure as the constrained party upgrades the quality of 
its product. It is shown that the policy did effectively constrain Japanese manufacturers 
leading them to adjust their product mix, upgrading into more profitable parts of the 
market. BL was unable to take up the slack m the constrained market with UK based 
multi-national enterprises, and European and Japanese firms being the principal bene­
ficiaries of the policy. At the end of the day British consumers bore the burden of the 
restraints suffering an estimated welfare loss amounting to £4.89bn.
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The demand forces affecting the car industry that are highlighted in this thesis do not 
apply in equal and balanced measure to every manufacturing industry associated with 
UK manufacturing decline. For example, the technical complexity of the product and 
its potential for wide degrees of quality differentiation, and fact that VERs were placed 
on a range, but not all complex manufactured goods, means that the industry differs to 
varying degrees other UK manufacturing industries. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that 
many industries do share aspects of the car industry, and the more they do, the more the 
specific findings about UK car industry will have relevance to them. Identifying significant 
factors apphcable to the UK industry thus provides only an initial step, and while the 
details may at times be industry specific, the conceptual framework is not. The author 
sincerely hopes that the ‘declinist’ and the more recent ‘optimistic’ reappraisal of Britain’s 
manufacturing performance will move beyond the important tasks of dating turning points 
in the UK’s manufacturing performance, and providing broad based accounts consistent 
with these shifts, to adopting more detailed micro-historical accounts of the mechanisms 
underlying Britain’s performance.
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Appendix A
D ata Sources and Locations
Dala Years Source Provider
Registrations 1967-70 Society of Motor Manufactures and Traders National Library of Scotland (Edinburgh)
1971-80 Renault UK (Fraser Davidson)
1980-2002 Nigel Griffith (Global Incite Ltd.)
Prices 1970-1993 Motorists Guide to New and Used Car Prices British Library (Ixndon)
1993-2002 Pariter's Guide to New and Used Car Prices
Attributes 1971-1990 Car Companies Price guides
1990-1999 Augurtech Ltd.
1999-2002 Price guides
Firm Accounts 1970-1992 Company Baiance Sheets AWKnowiedge (Jonathan Storey)
1992-2002 and Profit and Loss Statements Comité des Constructeurs Français d'Automobiie
Advertising 1970-1997 MEAL Philip Spike (British Advertising Association)
1998-2002 AC Nielsen Media Research
Patents 1970-2001 National Patent Officies European Patents Office (httpV/gb.espaoeneLcom/)
R&D 1973-1996 OECD (ABERD) Steve Machin
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Appendix B
Evolution of Market Structure: Firm 
and Brand Merger and Exit
Sources: The sources for merger activity of brands and firms active in the UK car came 
from three sources. Prior to the 1990s secondary Hterature sources cross-referred by the 
corporate history synopses recorded by companies official were used. Towards the end of 
the period the EU merger activity is presented on the web by NACE category European 
Commission (Directorate Automotive Division). The specific links for each merger is 
provided below along with background information. Sources by country where mergers 
occurred are provided below with a list of car web sites compiled by the author provided 
in a second table.
Table B.l: Evolution of Market Structure (British Leyland and its Subsequent Incarnations)
M ergers and splits of B ritish Leyland (UK)^
1961 Leyland merge Standard and THumph
1967 Leyland merge Rover and Land Rover
1968 Leyland merge BMC^ [Austin-Morris; Jaguar]
renamed to B ritish Leyland (1968) then to Austin-Rover (1979)
1986 B ritish  Leyland divested Jaguar
1988 B ritish  Aerospace acquired British Leyland
1991 B ritish  Aerospace divested Ford (PM G) acquired Jaguar
1994 B ritish  Aerospace divested BM W acquired Austin-Rover
2001 BM W spht Phoenix Consortium acquired Rover Group
2000 BM W split Ford (PM G ) acquired Land Rover
[IjBoldface names are the ones after the merger or split.
[2]Rootes (UK) included the Hillman, Humber, Singer, Sunbeam and Talbot marques.
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Table B.2: Evolution of Market Structure (The Formation of PSA Peugeot Citroën)
PSA
1963 Chrysler Europe acquired Simca (FR)
1967 Chrysler Europe acquired Rootes (UK)^
1967 PSA acquired Chrysler Europe
1976 PSA acquired Citroën (FR)
Table B.3: Evolution of Market Structure (Others)
ASIA N. AM ERICA EU RO PE EU ROPE (Con’t)
Japan USA Britain Germany (East)
Toyota General M otors Jenson (19XX) Wartberg
Lexus (1989) Vauxhall (UK: 1926) Morgan
Daihatsu (1968) Opel (WG: 1929) Italy
Cadillac (US: 1908) France Fiat
Honda Chevolet (US: 1917) Renault Lancia (IT: 1969)
Isuzu Oldsmobile (US: 1908) Zavasta (YUG: 1969)
Nissan Pontiac (US: 1926) W  Germany Maserati (IT:1988)
Mitsubishi Saab (SW: 1992) VAG
Subaru Daewoo (ROK: 1998) Audi/NSU (WG: 1967) Sweden
Ssangyong (US: 1998) Skoda (CZ: 1991) DAF (1975)
Republic of Korea FSO (POL: 1908) Seat (ESP: 1986)
Hyundai OTHER
Kia (ROK: 1999) Ford BM W USSR
Mazda (JAP: 1996) Rolls Royce (UK: 2001) Lada (19XX)
M alaysia Premier Motor Group Moskovich (19XX)
Pro ton Aston Martin (UK: 1987) Daimler-Chrysler (1998)
Lotus (UK: 1996) Jaguar (UK: 1991) Porsche South Africa
Volvo (SW: 1999) Sao (1993)
Land Rover (UK: 2001)
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Table B.4: Company Webpages of Firms Active in the UK Car Market
Manufacturer Site
Alfa Romeo http://www.aifaromeo.com
Aston Martin http://www.astonmartin.com
Audi http://www.audi.co.uk
BMW (GB) http://www.bmw.co.uk
Chrysler http://www.chrysier.co.uk
Citroën UK Ltd http://www.citroen.co.uk
Daewoo http://www.daewoo-cars.co.uk
DaimierChrysierUK Ltd http://www.daimierchrysler.co.uk
Fiat http://www.fiat.co.uk
Ford http://www.ford.co.uk
Honda http://www.honda.co.uk
Hyundai Car (UK) Ltd http://www.hyundai-car.co.uk
isuzu UK Ltd http://www.isuzu.co.uk
Jaguar http://www.jaguar.com
Kia UK http://www.kia.co.uk
Land Rover http://www.iandrover.co.uk
Lexus http://www.iexus.co.uk
Lotus http://www.iotuscars.co.uk
Mazda http://www.mazda.co.uk
Mercedes Benz http://www.mercedes-benz.co.uk
MG Cars (Rover Group Ltd) http://www.mgcars.co.uk
Mini (BMW) http://www.mini.co.uk
Mitsubishi Motors UK httpV/www.mitsubishi-cars.co.uk
Morgan Motor Company Ltd http://www.morgan-motor.co.uk
Nissan http://www.nissan.co.uk
Peugeot Motor Company pic http://www.peugeot.co.uk
Porsche htt|D://www.porsche.co.uk
Proton http://www.proton.co.uk
Renault http://www.renauit.co.uk
Rolls Royce Motor Cars http://www.roiis-roycemotorcars.com
Rover Cars http://www.rovercars.com
Saab http://www.saab.co.uk
Seat UK http://www.seat.co.uk
Skoda htt|]://www.skoda.co.uk
Subaru http://www.subaru.co.uk
Suzuki http://www.suzuki.co.uk
Toyota http://www.toyota.co.uk
GM Vauxhaii http://www.vauxhaii.co.uk
Volkswagen http://www.voikswagen.co.uk
Volvo http://www.voivocars.com
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Appendix C
D ata
An important contribution of the thesis, which has allowed for a coherent analysis of 
issues related to product ‘quality’ has been the derivation of a substantial set of product 
attributes. The purpose of this appendix is to define the product characteristics and 
to briefly provide some background to their incorporation in products active in the UK 
car market. To provide structure, product attributes are divided into two groups; time 
variant and discrete variables.
C .l Time Varying Characteristics
A number of the time varying variables contained in the data set have been commonly 
utilised in studies and therefore require only a succinct introduction. The time variant 
variables used in this work include a set of continuous variables [engine size or displace­
ment (measured in cubic centimetres or CCs), maximum speed, acceleration, and power, 
miles per £(MPP) and size], and the discrete non-binary features [the number of doors, 
cylinders, and the total number of valves]. Of these variables only the derivation MPP 
require detailed definition, however before doing so the trends in the quantity weighted 
means in each of variable over time depicted diagrammatically looking at each variable 
in turn.
The mean number of doors increased over the 1970s and 1980s but stabilises from 
1988. The number of doors is highly correlated with the type of vehicle (saloon, hatch 
back sports cars and so on), which has been examined above. Hence not surprisingly 
the main increase in the mean number of doors occurs in the early 1980s which coincides 
with the growing popularity of the hatch back. Vehicle size, measured as length times 
width, has generally risen, with a minor fall during the mid-1970s coinciding with the 
first oil crisis. The second size related variable, boot size, saw upward growth until 1986
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Figure C.l: Physical Dimensions: New Registration Weighted Means
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but has subsequently stabilised. Unfortunately, data on boot size is not available for all 
the models in the data set and excluded in the analysis and is included here only for 
completeness.
In contrast to the other time variant variables, miles per pound, recorded at three 
distinct speeds (urban, 56mph, and 75mph), witnessed a significant fail from 1974 and 
then in 1980. The timing of these shifts coincides with, and likely refiects, a change in 
demand patterns due to the OPEC driven Oil Crises (1973, and 1979). MPP remained 
quite stable until 1990 from which time they trended downward at a steady rate.
Six of the time variant attribute variables listed above relate to the engine performance 
of the car: power, which is conventionally defined as the brake horse power (BHP) divided 
by weight, displacement [cubic centimetres of the engine (cc)], cylinders and the total 
number of values (cylinders multiphed by valves), maximum speed (in miles per hour), 
and acceleration (0  to 60mph in seconds).
Information on BHP is not entirely complete since RoUs Royce and Bentley did not 
release plausible BHP information. Rather than disregard these brands other power re­
lated characteristics of similar models [displacement, weight, acceleration and maximum 
speed] are used to derive BHP. It should be noted that there has been a general increase 
in the mean power of vehicles, with a mild fall in 1975 and 1976, until 1992 when the 
subsequently fell before recovering the 1992 level four years later. The fall was driven 
by a rise in the dominator (weight) with BHP maintaining an upward trend. Mean ve­
hicle displacement (CCs) exhibited the same general trend as the power variable but 
show considerably more responsiveness to the 1970s oil crises. The cylinder variable is 
the noisiest of the non-binary exhibiting sharp variations over the period. By contrast, 
the total number of valves per cylinder is relatively stable. Generally speaking, from a 
technical perspective, enhancing the number of valves per cylinder allows a car to obtain
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Figure C.2: Miles per Pound at Three Speeds: New Registration Weighted Means (in 1998 Pence)
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higher performance levels, and is therefore a close substitute for higher cylinder engines. 
The data set indicates that manufacturers adopted differing cyHnder by similar valve per 
cyhnder incorporation with the number of total number of valves of each vehicle being 
highly stable until the early 1990s with enhancements of valve technology allowed for the 
expansion in valves per cylinder in mass-produced four cylinder cars.
In summary, with the exceptions of MPP and acceleration, the majority of the variables 
exhibit definitive upward trends over time punctuate by a fall following the oil crises in 
1973 and 1979. The most important lesson learned from Tables A1-A3 is that each of the 
variables exhibits significant trends and this needs to be accounted for in the empirical 
work.
C.1.1 Miles per Pound
MPP is made up of two factors being defined as the number of miles per gallon that each 
car utilises (converted into fitres) multiphed by the price of each fuel type. The examina­
tion of the trend of MPP showed that it saw a considerable fall over the period. In order 
to obtain a greater understanding of what is driving these reductions in fuel prices and 
the fuel utilisation rates of each variant are disentangled.
Miles Per Gallon
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Figure C.3: Performance Attributes: New Registration Weighted Means
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Under the Passenger Car Fuel Consumption Order (1977) amendment to the Car Energy 
Act (1976) from the 1st of April 1978 new cars on display in show rooms and on forecourts 
need to advertise the official fuel consumption figures for every car model. ^  Manufacturers 
were required to provide information on fuel consumption at three speeds (urban, 56mph, 
and 75mph). These data are recorded from two price guides (i.e. Parkers’ Guide to New 
and Used Car Prices and the Motorists’ Guide to New and used Car Prices).
Prior to 1978 fuel consumption information was obtained from unofficial testing con­
tained in the two aforementioned price guides. The data obtained from these sources 
were determined at the same, or very similar, speeds to those recorded later. Confidence 
that the data prior to 1978 is consistent with information provided by the Passenger Car 
Fuel Consumption Order (1977) refiects two factors. First, comparing the consumption 
rates for particular models there is consistentsy between the officially recorded data and 
those provided earlier. A likely reason for this is that price guide used both information 
provided by manufacturers on fuel consumption as well as individual car testing in ob­
taining fuel consumption estimates. Second, there is an overlap of models where data is 
recorded for the same model variant (prior to Official statistics being provided) and price 
guide assessed estimates, and these are either identical or are within a narrow MPC range 
from the official estimates. A further difficulty presented by the pre-1978 estimates is that 
they do not always provide estimates of fuel consumption at all three speeds. The most 
common case is where information is provided on urban and MPG at 75mph, but not at 
56mph. In order to obtain estimates of these figures I take advantage of the knowledge 
that fuel consumption for one group can be approximated as a ratio of other fuel rates, 
as is refiect high correlation rates in the order of 95% as recorded between any particular 
recorded speed. The ratio of the available fuel type for the sample is taken year by year 
since it would expect fuel consumption rates to be changing over time, and observe this 
is the case post-1978. The ratios are then used to calculate missing information.
A variety of means of calculating the estimates were examined. Specifically, annual 
and segment specific ratios were calculated to generate missing observations. It was found 
that the segment specific ratios differed marginally, but that the effects were small. The 
likely reason being the individual consumption rates for the ratios are more important 
in driving the estimates than the derived ratio. It is appreciated that using averaging 
ratios to calculate the missing values will reduce the heterogeneity in the sample between 
the three fuel consumption speeds, but the fact that model specific data is used for each 
calculation provides time variation in the data. However there is still a high degree of
^The information in this subsection is derived from The Motorist’s Guide to New and Used Car Prices (1971-93) and a 
review article by the Department of IVade and Industry [Williamson and Taylor (1999)].
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coUineaxity between the three measure so for much of the analysis use the a single measure 
(56mph) based on its greater explanatory power.
Fuel Prices
Fuel data is obtained from the Department of Trade and Industry [Sourx^ e: Department 
of Trade and Industry: Energy Division (Various Years)]. There has been a considerable 
shift in fuels used in petrol vehicles over the period. In the 1970s 4-Star petrol was 
dominant with Unleaded Fuel growing in popularity over the period. By 1992 Unleaded 
Fuels had come to dominate the market. The shift partly reflected the requirement 
that new cars reach minimum emission standards that also led to sharp rise in cars 
incorporating catalytic converters. Since catalytic converters require unleaded fuel the 
proportion of new cars using 4-Star petrol has declined dramatically. Different fuels types 
differ in price, so in order to take this into account information on the fuel type for all 
cars in the sample was collected.
The fuel price estimates of are based on information provided by oil companies from 
1977 until 1994, with data from super/hypermarket chains have been included from Jan­
uary 1995 and are collated by the Department of Trade and Industry [Department of 
Trade and Industry: Energy Division (Various Years)].
Our sample also contains a growing number of diesel fuel cars over the period examined. 
Prior to 1994 diesel was cheaper than Premium Unleaded petrol by as much as 3 pence 
per litre in some months so diesel prices are used in calculating the Mile per pound rates 
for diesel cars. In 1994 duty rates were first equalised, in monetary terms, and then raised 
more for diesel than unleaded in the March 1998 Budget. In this period the differential in 
prices fluctuated but the position in 1996 to 1998 was typically one of diesel being around 
a penny per litre more expensive.
Figure C.4 the shows the shift in fuel prices of the period for petrol (with sales weights 
being used to derive mean petrol prices since these include 4-Star and Unleaded fuels) 
and diesel fuels. Examining Figure C.4 it can be seen that the fuel prices remain stable 
following the 1973 oil crisis. This reflected direct pohcy intervention by the government 
with maximum retail prices imposed by Order during the period 15 December 1973 to 20 
December 1974 [Williamson and Taylor (1999)]. Thereafter, prices rise sharply rising by 
50% from 17.5 to 26.4 pence per litre between 1979 and 1980 with prices peaking in 1986 
at 44 pence per htre. 1987 saw an abatement in the surge of the pump of petrol, which 
fell by about 12% between 1987-88. From 1989 until 1998 prices have increase steadily 
6.5% per annum.
232
Figure C.4: Retail Price of Fuels as at 1 January (Pence per litre - includes taxes)
# -  Petrol
—  Diesel
C.2 Binary Attribute Definitions and Background
The bulk of the attributes analysed axe binary in nature. In the following Appendix D 
details the rationale underlying the classification of the attributes into functional groups 
that are used in 4. Furthermore, the classification scheme following the same lay out as 
is provided in Appendix D to ease cross-referencing. The dating of attributes that were 
incorporated before 1971 required the author to conduct a tedious search through copies 
of the Motorist Guide to New and Used Car Prices stretching back to the 1950s.
C.2 . 1  Interior Features
CLIMATE F l  Climate (Quality VPD) The climate classification relates two vari­
ables affecting the passenger compartment environment of the car. Air conditioning has 
been available since the being of the sample period being first incorporated into a car by 
Packard in 1939. The first car incorporating air conditioning in the UK was the Rolls 
Royce Bentley in 1957. Climate control first appeared in the UK car market in the Saab 
9.3 in 1997. Climate control is an inteUigent form of air conditioning, which maintains 
the car interior at a constant temperature determined by the occupants.
COM PU TER ASSISTED INFORMATION (QuaHty VPD)
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F 2  Com puter Assisted Information A ttributes (Quality VPD)
The inclusion of computer assistant information features first occurred in May 1982 by 
BMW (635 Series), and was swiftly followed by a few months later by VW (Golf GTI), 
in the form of the On Board Computer. An important role of on board computers is to 
give diagnostic information of the cars engine and to warn drivers of potential problems 
with the engine.
The Voice Synthesiser was introduced in 1989 in the Austin (Maestro), but is more 
commonly associated with Renault who included the feature in a number of their models. 
Voice synthesisers typically provides similar diagnostic warning to the driver than an on 
board computer, but rather than include warnings as part of a computer display, the voice 
synthesiser warns the driver audibly as the name suggests.
Unclassified A ttribute: Traffic Navigation System
A more recent development in computer assisted driver information has been the em­
bodiment of traffic navigation systems. Car-navigation systems were first introduced to 
the market in Renault’s executive model, the Safrane, in 1996. In common with all the 
cars in the sample the Renault Safrane utilises the U.S.-launched Global Positioning Sys­
tem (GPS) satellites, which have became the market standard. By picking up radio waves 
from the satellites, the system can plot the car’s location and show it on the display map. 
The route to the destination is then indicated with arrows and spoken cues. While car- 
navigation systems provide computer-assisted information, the type of information differs 
from that provided by the on-board computer and voice synthesiser, and hence is not 
combined with those attributes.
MUSIC F3 Music (Quality VPD) The data set contains information on a variety 
of audio systems embodied in the cars in the sample. Two systems were available at the 
beginning of the sample period: the fitted radio, and the radio cassette. In 1989 CD tech­
nology first appears in the sample with a radio-CD being featured in the Aston Martin 
Virage Coupe. CD players, with a separate non-integrated radios or tape decks, appeared 
Rolls Royce the previous year. Finally multi-player CDs, that contain a number of CDs 
for the occupants to choose between, were incorporated into the Opel Senator in 1989.
Unclassified A ttribute: Electric Aerial The first car in the sample to incorporate 
an electric aerial was Daimler Jaguar in 1972. Electric aerials have remained a luxury 
feature at the end of the sample period being found predominantly in luxury and niche 
models.
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SEATS F4 Seat Adjustm ent (Quality VPD) Manual seat height adjustment, that 
allows the seat to be raised and lowered, was available in 0.5% of the sample in 1971. Elec­
tric seat adjustment entered the market 1978 being incorporated into the Porsche 928. 
Electric memory seats record a drivers seat adjustment but also can be adjusted for new 
drivers whilst recording the previous drivers seat height preference. Electric memory seats 
first appeared in the BMW 635 CSi coupe in 1982.
Unclassified A ttribute: Drivers Lumbar Support Found in the luxury BMW 
3.0 series and in the Rolls-Royce Bentley in 1971 drivers lumbar support was contained 
in 25% of new cars registered in 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Split Rear Seats Split rear seats have the virtue of al­
lowing access to the boot from inside the car and hence allow for extended boot storage. 
Synonymous with hatchbacks, split rear seat first appeared in the market in 1972 in the 
Fiat 127.
Unclassified A ttribute: Sports Seats Sporting-style seats difiPer from conventional 
seating that they provide additional contoured support for the driver. Sports seats are 
dominantly found in sports models, but are not synonymous with them, with sports cars 
account for about half the cars in the sample incorporating sport seats. The medium car 
segment is the next most significant incorporator of sport seats (25%).
Unclassified A ttribute: H eated Front Seat The Swedish manufacturers, Volvo 
and Saab, were the first to introduce heated seats (in 1978 and 1979 respectively), and re­
mained the only manufacture to incorporate the feature until GM Opel Senator in 1983. 
Seventeen manufacturers included the feature by 2002 only 5% of cars registered have 
heated front seats.
Unclassified A ttribute: Child Seat Child seats became available as standard fea­
tures in 1989 in the Renault 25 with Volvo incorporating the feature in 1990 into its 940 
and 960 models. Child seats are incorporated into around 1% of cars registered in 2 0 0 2 .
SEAT BELTS
F7 Rear Seat Belts (Quality VPD) Originally invented by Nils Bohin in 1959, 
the three-point seat belts was first included ly  Volvo with Volvo models incorporating the
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feature being exported to the UK by 1963. By 1971 four brands incorporated rear seat 
belts on selected models accounting 7% of the sample. There was a steady increase in 
incorporation with rear seat belts until they became mandatory in April 1987.
The majority of cars in the sample are only fitted with two three-point seat belts and 
one middle lap belt, however, starting with the BMW 600 series, a third three-point was 
incorporated. From a safety perspective lap belts are inferior three-point seat belts since, 
while the prevent occupants from being thrown outside the vehicle, they do not prevent 
occupants from whiplash or from coUiding into the front passenger seat.
F 8  Front Seat Belts (Quantity and Quality VD) Seat belts that are height 
adjustable provide the advantage over belts that simply can be tightened since, if used 
correctly, they are better able to restrain passengers, and have the added virtue of being 
more comfortable to wear. Seat belt height adjustment was a novel feature in 1971 being 
incorporated into about 13% of models, but by 2002 about half of the new cars registered 
in the UK incorporate seat belt adjustment. Examining the share of models incorporating 
the feature shows that there is a large shift in uptake in the late 1980s. A likely reason for 
the increase in incorporation of the features is that it became compulsory to wear front 
seat belts in 1986, leading to more demand by car buyers for comfortable seat belts.
The pre-tension front seat belt is a device that physically e^glodes when a substantial 
impact occurs, similar to an airbag. In conventional daily use, when the tensioner is 
activated it pulls the tension onto the seat belt taking up the slack between the belt and 
the occupant. Pre-tension belts were first introduced to the UK car market in 1980 by 
Daimler-Jaguar in the Daimler Double-Six, and became widely incorporated to cars in 
the 1990s. Pre-tension belts also are more comfortable than conventional belts (with or 
without seat adjustment).
A third technological development in front seat belt, electric seat belts, became avail­
able in Audi and Mercedes 4-by-4 models (the S8  and MLC respectively) in 1997. Electric 
seat belts incorporate height adjustment and pre-tension, and hence are a superior sub­
stitute to those features.
SUNBLINDS (QuaHty VPD)
F9 Sunblind Rear sunblinds are an uncommon feature of cars in the UK car market, 
with manual sun blinds introduced as a standard attribute in 1972 (Jaguar Daimler) while 
electric sun blinds first appeared in 1982 (in the GM Opel Monza). Both features are 
found exclusively in niche segments.
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AIRBAGS
FIO Airbags (Quantity VPD) three locations for airbag variables in the sample 
are used: the drivers airbag^  which is typically situated in the drivers steering wheel; twin 
airbags where in addition to the drivers airbag a second airbag for the front passenger 
is also included; and front-side air bags which are designed to inflate in a severe side- 
impact collision. Cars that have airbags on the side of the car are less common and are 
always accompanied by a front airbag (typically duel airbags), and hence are a superior 
combination to simply having a front air bag system.
Airbag technology was initially taken from aviation industry, with Ford being the flrst 
firm to build an experimental car with an airbag in 1971. However, the flrst model to 
feature an air bag was the Mercedes 500S in 1988, with Mercedes having been the first 
company to publicly present airbag and belt tensioner technologies as important passive 
safety elements at the Geneva International Motor Show in March 1981. Front duel bags 
appear one year later in the Porsche 911 Carerra, and side airbag being found in the 
Mercedes 280.
RESTS (Quantity VPD)
F31 Rests The sample records two types of rests, head and arm, and whether these 
features are included in the front or the back of the car. While armrests are purely a 
comfort feature, headrests, if properly adjusted, are an important safety feature. 5% of 
new registered cars had a least one of these features in 1971, but 99% did so by 2002.
INTERIO R TRIM  (Quality VPD)
F22 Upholstery and Trim Interior trim is classified into seven types in ascending 
order of luxury: 1 Nylon; 2 Vinyl; 3 Cloth; 4 Velour; 5 Walnut (with cloth surround); 6  
Half Leather (also with cloth surround) and 7 Leather. The flrst variety is the residual of 
the later six, where for the 1970s at least nylon is most often mentioned as the residual 
trim. The only trim that was not found before 1971 was half leather trim that was flrst 
found in the Fiat X (1/9).
Unclassified A ttribute: Leather Coated Steering W heel Once an exclusive fear 
ture of luxury, executive, sports niche segments leathar coated steering wheels were fitted 
to raced-up models in the mini segment models such as the upbeat version of the Seat 
Arosa and the Suzuki Alto by 2002.
DRIVERS DISPLAY (Q uantity VPD)
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F24 Drivers Display A number of features are included under the driver’s display 
feature, which refers to features located in the display area of the car. A number of 
features in this category were available in 1971 but had become standard by 2002, namely 
(where the figures in brackets give the market share of cars with the features included in 
1971 and 2002 respectively); rev œunter (11%, 76.7%), time clock (6.7%, 96%), cigarette 
lighter (17%, 95%), and trip counter (1%, 95%).
The digital odometer, or digital mileage counter, first appeared in the market in 1975 in 
the Mercedes 200, and it was not until 1983 until the feature was incorporated by another 
brand. Jaguar. Digital odometers are found in growing minority of cars (about 30% in 
2002).
The trip computer, which is a digital version of the trip counter, was first found in 
the BMW 600 series in 1980. Trip computers remain rare being found in only about 2% 
of cars registered in 1998. The fitted external temperature gauge indicates the outside 
temperature to the driver and first became available in the UK market in 1985 in the 
BMW 600 series.
The GSM mobile is included in a small number of luxury models being introduced by 
Audi in their V8  4rby-4 model in 1992. The device allows passengers to converse on their 
mobile phone, which is fixed to the device, via this hands free system.
The most recent inclusion to the display area in the sample is the 12-volt accessory 
power point that was introduced by manufacturers Honda, Subaru and Daimler-Jaguar 
in 1997.
STORAGE Unclassified A ttributes: Front side bins and Cup holders Two
useful storage devices are captured in the sample. Front side bins, which were found 
in less than 5% of new registered cars in 1971 had become a standard feature by 2002 
(96%). Cup holders, while popular in the US, are a less common feature in the UK, first 
appeared in a US imported model, GM Jeep’s Grand Cherokee, in 1993. In 2 0 0 2  5% of 
new registered cars had cup holds.
IN TER IO R LIGHTS Unclassified A ttribute: Rear Reading Lights Rear read­
ing lights, which are normally spothghts, first appeared in 1987 in the BMW 800 series, 
and were included in about 4% of registered cars in 2002.
C .2 . 2  Exterior Features 
LOCKING
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F i l  Central locking (Quality VPD) Central locking had been available for a mi­
nority of models since 1971 but has become a relatively standard feature, being included 
in over 30% of models, by 2002. Remote central locking offers convenience and safety 
over key operated central locking and was first introduced by Mercedes in 1988, with the 
proportion of models including remote central locking surpassing manual central locking 
in 1997.
F24 O ther Locks (Q uantity VPD) A variety of small locking devices are included, 
other than those associated to car entry (i.e. manual and remote central locking). These 
include deadlocks  ^ child locks, and locking wheel nuts.
Child locks prevent the rear door from being opened from inside the car, and were 
included by two manufacturers, Citroën and Toyota in 1971, but have become common 
in most cars (over 65% of cars registered in 2002 had child locks).
Locking wheel nuts have been available since 1971, being introduced by Volvo to prevent 
wheel theft. The feature is not common as refiected in the steady growth in the share of 
cars including the feature reaching only about 4% by 2002.
Deadlocks were introduced in 1979 by BMW in their 800 series, but it was not until 
seven years later that another manufacturer (Opel) also sold a model including the fea­
ture. About 13% of newly registered cars included the feature in 2 0 0 2 .
OPENING ROOF MECHANISMS
F29 Opening Roof (Quality and Quantity VPD) There are a number of means 
of opening the up roof of the car that are included in the sample. Manual methods are 
grouped {the sunroof, the higher quality factory fitted sunroof, and the removable hard 
and soft top) together. Cars that include T~bar roves, which include a bar between the 
open spaces on both sides of the car, and twin sunroofs are combined within the feature. 
The T-bar roof offers superior strength to the standard manual methods, while the twin 
sunroof offers two sunroofs. Since both these features offer more access to the ‘great 
outdoors’ than other manual methods they are ranked higher the other manual sunroofs 
(Quantity VPD). Both methods are rare: when combined, never exceeding more that 1% 
of cars in the sample. The third classification group (Quality VPD ranked above man­
ual methods) combines electrically operated roof opening systems {the electric sunroof, 
electric soft top and power hood). Of these attributes only one, the manual sunroof were 
available in the market in 1971.
Unclassified A ttribute: Roof Rails Roof rails first appeared on the Mazda 323
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in 1979, but are more commonly associated with the 4-by-4 and PC segments. In 2002 
about 70% of personal carriers, and 22% of 4-by-4, had roof rails as standard features.
LIGHTS
F12 Lights (Quality VPD) Halogen headlights, which are basically a bulb which 
has electric power passed through a tungsten wire attached to two electrodes, became 
available in the UK in the mid-1960s. The electrodes and wire are encapsulated within a 
glass bulb filled with halogen gas. Halogen lights offer a more powerful fight source than 
conventional bulbs. At the beginning of the sample period only about 3% cars marketed, 
but by the 1990s they were included in all models with the exception of a small number 
of Audi models that incorporated Xenon fighting. Xenon lighting is superior to halogen 
bulb in that the fighting system provides two to three times more the fight and, due of 
the lower power consumption of the bulb, has a longer lifespan.
Unclassified A ttribute: Pop up headlights Pops up headlights have been a com­
mon feature in sports cars since the 1960s. The feature reached a peak of popularity in 
the 1988 with almost half of registered sports cars incorporating the attribute. However, 
since then pop up headlights have became a less fashionable attribute being incorporated 
into 15% of sports cars (or 1% of total registrations) in 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Fog Lamps F itted  Introduced in the 1960s fog lamps 
were largely concentrated in the sports segment, with fog laps diffusing into other market 
segments in the late 1970s. The 1980s saw a fall in the proportion of cars with the feature, 
with the number of new car registrations with fog lamps climbing from a low in 1983 to 
about 2 0 % by 2 0 0 2 .
Unclassified A ttribute: Courtesy Light Display A modem safety feature the 
courtesy light display was introduced in first in Mercedes’ SL sports model in 1995.
W IPER S
F13 Headlamp W ipers (Quality VPD) Headlamp wash involves a high-pressure 
jet of water with detergent being directed at the headlight lens. The wash jet is located 
in front and generally just below the headlight. Some are fitted inside the car using the 
water pressure to place them in the appropriate wash position and then retract them out 
of sight when not in use. Headlamp wash was first appeared in the UK car market with 
the introduction of Mercedes SLC series in 1971.
240
Headlamp wipe-wash, which combines headlamp wash with a wiper, and was more 
elective in keeping the lens clean, first appeared in 1975. The feature is most useful in 
severe weather conditions allowing the headlamps be cleared while the driver remains in 
the car. Volvo and Saab were the most prominent car manufacturers to use this feature, 
due to Sweden’s climate. The first car introduced to the UK car market with headlamp 
wash wipe was the Volvo (245) in 1974.
Both headlamp wash with and without wipes have never been a standard feature in 
the market reaching a peak market share of models in the market in 1987 at 12% and 
falling to about 5% in 2002.
F14 ; W indshield W ipers (Quantity VPD) Other than independent suspension, 
multi-speed intermittent windshield were the most common optionally embodied feature 
in the data set in 1971 being included in 20% of cars sold in the market. By the 1990s 
almost every car sold in the market included three-speed intermittent wipers. In addition, 
cars that also included rear wash wipers, since they were first introduced to the market in 
1974 by Ford in the Capri GHIA, have become an increasingly common attribute in new 
cars registered in the UK (67% in 2002).
MIRRORS
F15 M irror Adjustm ent (Quality VPD) Adjustable mirrors are exterior mirrors 
that can be adjusted from the interior of the car for the drivers’ comfort. Two Volvo 
models (the 144 and 145) included in 1971 had adjustable mirrors. Jaguar, in the DS420, 
introduced electric mirrors in 1976 and by 1998 over 90% of cars had mirror adjustment 
with 49% being manually and 43% electrically operated. A recent innovation introduced 
by Peugeot into its 806 personal carrier range is the electric folding mirror that automat­
ically retracts when the ignition is disengaged.
Unclassified A ttribute: H eated M irrors Initially a luxury feature introduced in 
1973 in the Mercedes 230, electric mirrors were found in over 40% of new registered mod­
els by 2 0 0 2 .
Unclassified A ttribute: Height Adjustable Headlight Aim Multilevel headlight 
aim (i.e. over and above beam and normal) was first introduced in 1973 by BMW in the 
600 series, and was included in 40% of new car registrations in 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Electro Chrom atic Rear View m irror The electro chro­
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matic rear view mirror  ^ as BMW termed it, is a rear view mirror which is electrically 
powered to react to hght. The first cars incorporating the feature in the sample were the 
Rolls Royce Silver Spur and Phantom in 1990, Only about 4% of newly registered models 
had incorporated the feature by 2002,
W INDOW S
F16 Electric Windows (Quantity VPD) Electric windows were first introduced 
to the UK by Daimler in 1948. Two electric window variables are included in the sample, 
capturing whether a car has electric front windows or whether electric windows in both 
the front and rear of the car are included.
F17 W indow Heating (Quantity VPD) Rear window heating was not uncommon 
at the beginning of 1971 being first introduced to the UK car market in the 1960s but 
having become standard, being included in 97% of cars marketed by 1998, A less com­
mon feature is the heated front window with front windows being demisted by air control 
units (air conditioning or through air ventilation are excluded), however an installed front 
window heater is the more effective alternative.
Unclassified A ttribute: T inted Windows Though curved windshields appeared 
as early as 1934, it was not until after World War II that many cars had them. By 1957, 
nearly all U. S. cars had windshields that curved four ways—not only at the sides but at 
the top and bottom as well. In the early 1960’s curved side windows began to appear. 
With them it became possible to include more interior room in car body design. Stylists 
were able to mold smoother, more continuous body lines. Fabricating techniques were 
developed to permit the drilling of holes in side windows for anchoring and lifting mech­
anisms. More styling flexibifity, and the opportunity to add more built-in safety features 
resulted - such as tinted glass. Tinted windows were rare in 1971, being reflected in about 
5% of new registered cars, but had become a common element of cars by 2002, being 
embodied in about 85%.
WHEELS
Unclassified A ttribute: Alloy Wheels Once the exclusive domain of the sports 
segment, the proportion of cars with alloy wheels has grown from less than two percent 
in 1971 to around 20% by 2002.
F18 Interior Remote Features (Quantity VPD) Two features are included in
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this category remote boot release and remote petrol cap release. Both features became 
available in the market in 1977, with three Japanese manufacturers, Honda, Nissan, and 
Subaru, including the features in their premium medium models (the Accord, Bluebird, 
and Leone respectively).
F23 Spoiler (Quantity VPD) The sample discriminates between carsincorporating 
Jront and rear spoilers. Spoilers are found predominantly in the sports car segment. 
Spoilers potentially can provide performance enhancement, although there is a trade off 
between lift (which the spoiler reduces) and the added drag associated with the greater 
wind surface area of the car. For most practical purposes the gains associated with spoilers 
are minor, and so they are often merely cosmetic.
Spoilers reached their peak in popularity in the sports segment in the 1980s peaking in 
1986 of being attached to 68% of sports cars. In 1998 only 19% of sports cars registered 
had a spoiler.
F25 Stylistic (Quantity VPD) Three types of features add little to the function of 
the car but contribute to its aesthetic appeal: the inclusion of exterior chrome (trim, or 
grill), colour coded molding (bumpers and mirrors), and side steps.
Chrome was a common feature in 1971 however colour coded bumpers and mirrors first 
appeared in the Mercedes 230 in 1973. Colour coded bumpers have become a standard 
feature with 70% of new registrations including them in 2002. Colour coded moldings are 
less common being included in 30% of new car registrations.
Side steps, a popular pre-war feature, are only included in the Toyota Landcruiser 
(1988-1993).
BRAKES
F19 Brakes (Quantity VPD) Disc brakes are not a new device, in fact Fred Lan­
caster designed and patented a disc brake design in the early 1900’s before drums became 
the de facto standard. It was not until the 1950’s that disc brakes became popular, first 
in racing applications, of which the D-type Jaguar was an early adopter. The first road 
car marketed in the UK to incorporate disc brakes was the E-type Jaguar in 1963. By 
1971 over half the cars on the market incorporated disc brakes. However, despite the 
braking virtues of having both front and rear discs the majority of cars incorporating disk 
brakes only had them fitted to the front of the car due to the dUfficulty and extra cost of
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axranging a parking brake. By the end of the period 99% of cars had disc brakes either 
on the front or the rear of the car but only about 25% had both front and rear disc brakes.
Unclassified A ttribute: Anti-Lock Braking (ABS)
The major innovation in braking systems during the sample period was the devel­
opment of Anti-Lock Braking for road cars. ABS originated in airplanes where it was 
developed in order to shorten the distance necessary for landing. They did not appear in 
road cars until 1966, when Jenson installed a system developed by Dunlop. That system, 
called Maxaret, did not employ computers as well as wheel speed sensors as modem ABS 
does, only employing electronic sensors to avoid locking the disc brakes. BMW were the 
first firm to incorporate ABS in the UK car market in their 700 series range. The third 
generation anti-loddng system (ABS) jointly developed by Mercedes-Benz and Borsch was 
presented to the press in Untertiirkheim and it was initially available in S-class limousines 
(Series 116).
While ABS does not make for shorter broking distances it is designed to give the driver 
steering control of the car whilst braking hard, as would be the case in an emergency, and 
hence complements the existing braking system. By 1998 a third of new cars registered 
in the UK had ABS.
SUSPENSION
F20 Suspension (Quality VPD) Suspension has the duel roles of enhancing pas­
senger ride and handling by allowing the wheels to move with respect to the car body, 
and dampening the impact of uneven road surfaces.
Independent suspension was first introduced by Chevrolet in 1934. The data sources 
allow us to capture whether a car has independent suspension or not. However, there are 
a variety of types of independent suspension used by different manufacturers that cannot 
be captured in the analysis due to a lack of available data.
The major suspension advance during the period examined was the advent of active 
suspension that appeared in the Alfa Romeo 33 in 1988. Originally developed for motor 
racing, active suspension allows the suspension to adjust to different driving conditions 
enhancing ride and handling of cars with independent suspension. All models that include 
active suspension in the sample also have independent suspension.
D RIV ER MANEUVERABILITY AIDS (Unclassified A ttributes) The sam­
ple contains four features that aid the driver in maneuvering the car, two relating to
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steering [Power Assisted Steering (PAS) and Automatic Stability Control)], and two to 
assist in a comfortable drive (adjustable steering column and cruise control).
PAS was invented in the 1920s by Francis W. Davis who was chief engineer of the truck 
division of the Pierce Arrow Motor Car Company, which he left to develop a hydrauhc 
power steering system that led to power steering. Power steering became commercially 
available in 1951 appearing in the UK in Rolls Royce Bentley T.
The adjustable steer column assists driver comfort and hence the drivers ability to steer 
and have become quite a standard feature in new registered cars (65% in 1998).
By controlling the car’s speed, cruise control allows the driver to concentrate on steer­
ing, and first appeared in 1976 in the UK in the Rolls Royce Bentley. Cruise control was 
still predominantly found at the high price end of the market in 2002 with around 3% of 
new registered cars incorporating the attribute.
ENVIRONM ENT
Unclassified A ttribute: Catalytic Converter The three-way catalytic converter 
and oxygen sensor (Lambdasond) was a world first firom Volvo in 1976. Introduced primar­
ily to meet the strict emission control standards in force in California, the system reduced 
hazardous emissions by about 90%. However, it was not until 1988, when Peugeot in­
troduced the 309 model, that the catalytic converter first appeared in a new registered 
UK car. Adoption of the technology was initially quite slow, but the pace of diffusion 
rose swiftly following the January 1992 announcement that all new cars had to meet EC 
emission standards, as set out in EC Directive 91/441, and since January 1998 for all new 
vehicles (i.e. both cars and 4-by-4s) must meet the standards set out in Directive 94/12. 
These directives, commonly known as EURO I and EURO II, have resulted in the fitting 
of catalytic converters to new petrol cars (with diesel cars being exempt).
Unclassified A ttribute: Pollen filter The pollen filter itself is basically an air filter 
element similar to the normal engine air filter, and filters dust rather than pollen per se. 
The first pollen filters appeared in the BMW 800 series in 1987, but were found in 80% 
of models registered in 1998.
OTHER SAFETY AND SECURITY SAFETY
Unclaissified A ttribute: High Level Brake Lights Introduced by Volvo in 1985
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in their 700 series model, the high level brake light has achieved considerable success at 
reducing nose-to-tail accidents, it was included in more than 46% of new cars by 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Side Im pact P rotection System (SIPS) The first ve­
hicle to introduce side impact protection was Mitsubishi’s Pajero in 1983. The technology 
was introduced to contain damage to the area outside of the passenger compartment (the 
front or rear bodywork and even the doors) so that the occupants face a reduced risk of 
being exposed to the impact of an accident. Side impact protection is now a standard 
feature being included in about 90% of newly registered cars in 2002.
SECURITY Unclassified A ttribute: Alarm  The first model to include an alarm 
was the Ford Scorpio GHIA. Car alarms were found in about 35% of newly registered 
models by 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Engine Immobilisers Porsche and Peugeot introduced 
engine immobilisers into the UK in 1989. The engine immobiliser requires the owner to 
either enter a code or a coded chip that allows the engine to start, and acts as an interior 
lock: as such engine immobilisers are a second line of defence from theft.
Unclassified A ttribute: Visible Identification Num ber (YIN) VINs involve 
the chassis number of the car being etched into some part/parts of the car, typically the 
windows, which lessen its value to car thieves, by making the job of changing its identity 
more difficult. VINs first appeared in the BMW 500 series in 1991, and were found in 
about a quarter of the new registered cars in 2002.
TRACTION
In order to over come difficult off road conditions, 4-by-4 vehicles incorporate a number 
of features that are typically uncommonly found in passenger cars. These traction related 
features can be classified into three groups. The first includes features directly related 
to the 4WDs, namely and part-time WD, and a feature that is unique to part 
time 4WDs: free wheel front hubs. The second combines features that are designed to aid 
traction at low speeds and in difficult terrain, and is therefore associated with off-road 
driving {two-speed transfer box and diff lock). The third relates to traction features that 
provide increased traction at higher speeds, and are found in both 4WD vehicles and cars 
{limited slip differential, automatic stability control, and traction control).
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F28: 4 W heel Drive Four wheels occurs in two forms: where all wheels axe driven all 
of the time (permanent or full-time), or just some of the time (part-time), depending on 
when the system is active (e.g. engaged automatically when the wheels have no traction or 
when selected manually). The part-time four wheel drive option has the clear advantage 
of flexibility since full time activated 4-wheel drive is not always necessary and is not fuel 
eflicient. Part-time 4-wheel drive was flrst introduced in 1982 in the innovative Suzuki 
SJ410 and has become more widely used than conventional full-time four-wheel drive.
Free wheel front hubs are found on part-time 4-wheel drive vehicles. In the interests of 
economy, many 4-by-4’s can run on the road in two-wheel drive mode pushing only the 
rear wheels. This is not wholly efficient though as the front wheels are still connected 
to the drive shafts and front differential. Free wheeling hubs disconnect the wheels from 
the drive shafts, so saving on friction, and are clearly superior to part-time 4-wheel drive 
without free wheel front hubs.
F32 TRACTION: LOW SPEED (Quantity VPD) The two-speed transfer box 
and Diff lock were flrst introduced to the UK market by Land Rover in 1948.
A two-speed transfer box provides a pair of intermediate gears, one high and one very 
low, which allows the vehicle to travel at low speeds and maintain engine power so that 
the vehicle is propelled rather than sliding when traveling on step gradient.
Diff lock allows four-wheel drive vehicles to be propelled on one or two wheels, since 
4-wheel drive vehicles the wheels are not locked together. In effect, Diff lock allows a 
4-by-4 to operate as a 4-by-l. Of the traction methods described diff lock is the only 
feature that is exclusively found in 4-by-4 vehicles.
F33 TRACTION: NON-LOW SPEED (Quantity VPD) Limited slip differential 
(LSD) locks up the drive shafts whenever tyre shp occurs, avoiding skidding. When a 
wheel loses traction, a normal differential will transfer nearly all the driving torque to 
that wheel. This problem occurs in all kinds of car, regardless of whether they are 2- 
wheel drive or 4WD, but it is relatively more important to 4WD vehicle because 4WD 
cars are designed to run on worse roads. A LSD locks up both drive shafts whenever 
tyre slip occurs, thus assisting the driver to get out of trouble quickly. The result is 
enhanced stability and even higher cornering limits. LSD first became a standard feature 
in Rolls Royce models and luxury sports cars in 1970, having been an optional extra since 
the 1960s. In 1971 Alfa Romeo, Aston Martin, Jaguar, Mercedes, and Rolls Royce also 
included LSD in their high performance models.
Automatic Stability Control (or Electronic Stability Control as it is otherwise know)
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first appeared in 1990. ASC was pioneered by Borsch, assisted by its first client, Mercedes- 
Benz, when they tested the ESC-eqnipped 600 SEC coupe extensively in snow. The 
objective of ASC is to correct extreme under-steering and over-steering when the car 
comers too fast or on slippery surfaces. In other words, it ensures cornering stability. 
Automatic stability has become a well-known feature due the publicity surrounding the 
roll-over of a Mercedes A-Class. The feature remains uncommon being included in one 
percent of cars.
Traction Control prevents wheel spin by lowering engine output or even applying brakes 
to the spinning wheels. All these actions are tightly monitored by microprocessors. Trac­
tion control first appeared in the Audi V8. The feature is uncommon being included in 
one percent of cars.
While each of these attributes has the same purpose each uses differing methods to 
allow the driver to maintain control over the vehicle, and none is ’better’ at maintain­
ing traction per se in dangerous circumstances hence the features can be grouped as a 
Quantity VPD.
C.2.3 Performance
Unclassified A ttribute: Fuel injection Fuel Injection was first introduced to the UK 
in the Mercedes 320 SE Coupe in 1954. In 1971 fuel injection was rare being incorporated 
into selected models by four manufacturers (Mercedes, Rolls Roy ce, Toyota and VW) 
accounting for less than one percent of cars registrations. Fuel injection was found in over 
80% of cars registered in 2002.
Unclassified A ttribute: Turbo The turbocharger was developed by Dr. Alfred J. 
Buchi between 1909 and 1911. The first application of turbo charging was oh aircraft 
in World War 1. Turbo charging increases engine power by redirecting thermal energy 
through the exhaust, delivering greater power, at the cost of some unevenness in ride 
before the turbo engages (known as turbo lag). It was not until Porsche developed tech­
nology to overcome excessive ‘turbo lag’ that the first road cars were introduced. The first 
car marketed in the UK to include a turbo was the Saab 99 ESM Turbo in 1978. Turbo 
technology has differential effects dependent on engine types with petrol engines obtaining 
relatively less gains compared to diesel engines due to the higher level of power embodied 
in petrol engines. Therefore petrol cars with turbo and diesel models that embody turbo 
charging are differentiated between in the data.
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C.3 Macro Economic Data
Macroeconomic data provides cost-shifters that are used to examine the supply-side of 
the UK car market. Two variables are used in the analysis: wages and exchange rates for 
the cars produced in 19 countries. Nominal manufacturing wages and the respective price 
deflators are both taken from ILO Annual Statistics (1979-2004).^ Obtaining exchange 
rates proved a more complex undertaking. Data published by international financial insti­
tutions [International Monetary Fund (1970-1998); OECD (1970-1998)] for all countries 
with the exception of the former Soviet Union are used. Commercial exchange rates rather 
than oflScial exchange rates, which were set as gold parities, are employed since oflBcial 
rates “were arbitrary notional rates with little economic content or practical significance” 
[Havlik and Levick (1985)]. The exchange rates prior to the break up of the Soviet Union 
were obtained from van Barbant and Marer (1985).
^Wages in ILO publications are provided in monthly, daily and hours rates for different countries. The number of hours 
worked in the manufacturing industry per week are used to calculate the hourly rates. In addition, transport wages (Standard 
Industrial Classification 34) were experimented with, however, changes in the classification structure of manufacturing and 
missing data for some countries meant that it is not possible to provided consistent coverage for all the countries where cars 
sold in the UK are manufactured. Rather than using inconsistent wage definitions across countries the more aggregated 
manufactured wages were employed. It is of note that wages in the transport sector are generally higher than national 
wages but that the two wage series are highly correlated (90% pair wise correlation). Wage series are expressed in real 
terms being defiated ty  domestic prices.
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Appendix D
Attribute Classification M ethods
An important contribution of the thesis, given the emphasis on issues concerning product 
quality at British Leyland, has been the collation of a substantive data set of over 130 
product attributes included in some 15,010 model versions active in the market between 
1971-2002. A significant proportion of these attribute data were obtained by Augur Tech 
Ltd. (an internet design consultancy for the motor industry) whose data is provided 
directly from all car manufacturers operating in the UK. Attributes recorded by Augur 
Tech are also recorded in the major trade publications. However, there are significant 
gaps in the Augur Tech data set which is complete only for the 1990s. Trade publicar 
tions were thus used to complete the data set. Samples of the data can be found at 
http://www.vkcar. œm.
The initial concern in generating the data set was to collect as complete a set of char­
acteristics as possible rather than make a prior assumptions concerning which attributes 
consumers preferred. When examining the effects of overpricing in Chapter 4 it was found 
that the brand effects were not well defined for a number of brands of interest. In order 
to obtain precise results a number of methods were examined to reduce the dimension of 
the attribute space that will now be detailed.
Three strategies were undertaken. Method I involves maximising the explanatory 
power of the model using the least number of regressors to do so, which is more conven­
tionally used variance decomposition. Methods II and III involve classifying attributes 
on the basis of their function: one in broad terms, such as comfort or luxury, and the 
second being specific to each attributes’ function, such interior climate or music, where 
attributes are weighted hierarchically. The selection criterion among these three options 
refiected a desire: (1) not to disregard information, particularly given an appreciation 
that each variable is highly correlated with the price of the cars in the sample; (2) to 
take account the interrelationships between the variables, and (3) to obtain reasonably
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Table D.l: Descriptive Statistics of Binary Product Attributes (1971-2002)
Jhswi ~Sid'Dèv~ staow
Post 1945 Centra Arm Rest Front 0.144 0.35 1976 Croisa Control 0.064 0244
Centre Ann Rest Rear 0.237 0.42 Electric Mirrors 0.373 0.483
Chrome Trim 0.053 022 1977 Removable Hard Top 0.003 0.055
Chrome Grille 0.081 027 Remote Boot Release 0.188 0291
Cigarette Lighter 0.783 0.41 Remote Petrol Cap Release 0.181 0.385
Cloth Trim 0.541 0.50 1978 Electric Height Adj. Seat 0.041 0.198
Drivers seat Lumbar Support 0.221 0.41 Heated Front Seats 0.048 0215
Exterior Side Mouldings 0.584 0.49 Part Time 4 Wheel Drive 0.030 0.172
Front Fog lamps fitted 0.254 0.44 Sunroof (Factory Fitted) 0.098 0298
Front Head Rest 0.508 0.50 Rear Load Cover 0.024 0.152
Front Spoiler 0.156 0.36 1979 Deadlocks 0.081 0273
Height Adjustable Drivers Seat 0.377 0.48 Removable Soft Top 0.003 0.057
Height Adjustatrle Seat Belts 0.367 0.48 T-Bar Roof 0.003 0.051
Independent Suspension 0.900 0.30 Roof Rails 0.036 0.187
Leatfier Upholsteiv 0.065 025 Pre-tensloned Belts (front) 
1980 Antilock Braking System '
0241 0.428
Leather Coated Steering Wheel 0.130 0.34 0281 0.450
Limited Slip Differential 0X29 0.17 Trip Computer 0.034 0.182
Rear Seat Belts 0.605 0.49 On Board Computer 0.052 0223
Rear Spoiler 0.112 0.31 1982 Electric Memory Seats 0.010 0.099
Rev Counter 0.641 0.48 Rear Sun Blind (electric) 0.002 0.048
Sports Front Seats 0.135 024 Radio Cass (remote) 0.056 0230
Sunroof 0.049 022 Half Leather Trim 0.108 0.311
Trip Counter 0.681 0.47 1983 Free Wheel Front Hubs 0.019 0.138
Time dock 0.750 0.43 Cup holders 0.035 0.184
Vinyl Trim 0.053 022 Twin Sun Roofs 0.005 0.072
Walnut Trim 0.111 0.31 Side Impact Protection 0261 0.480
-1945 Dlff Lock 0.016 0.13 Automatic Stability Control 0.013 0.113
Fid Tkne 4 Wheel Drive 0.027 0.16 1984 Three Rear 3 Point Seat Belts 0.087 0282
2 Speed TrBnsfsr Box 0.025 0.16 1985 Alarm 0.190 0293
1950s Air Conditioning 0.178 0.38 High level brake Light 0.111 0.315
Power Assisted Steering 0.561 0.50 Heated Front Windscreen 0.076 0265
Electric Windows (front) 0.341 0.47 External Temperature gauge 0.087 0281
Electric Windows (front & rear) 0.182 0.39 Electric Power Hood 0.009 0.093
1960s Pop-up Heedlights 0.024 0.15 1988 Pollen Filter 0202 0.402
Radio fitted 0.060 024 1987 Rear Reading Lights 0.018 0.135
Adjustable Steering Column 0.399 0.49 Drivers Alitwg 0.144 0.352
Disc Brake (front) 0.546 0.50 1988 Active Suspension 0.005 0.071
Disc Brakes (front & rear) 0.364 0.48 Catalytic Converter 0.396 0.489
Front Door Bins 0.691 0.46 Remote Central Locking 0.195 0.396
Intermittent Wash Wipe 0.828 0.38 Side Steps Fitted 0.002 0.049
Radio Cassette 0.645 0.48 Voice SyntfMslzer 0.002 0.042
Heated Rear Window 0.767 0.42 1989 Radio CD Player 0.022 0.146
Halogen Head Lights 0.762 0.43 MulUplay CD 0.023 0.151
1970 Adjustable Mirrors 0.227 0.42 Child Seat 0.009 0.096
Central Locking 0.347 0.48 Front Twin Alrtwgs 0.136 0.343
Velour trim 0.174 0.38 Engine Immotriliser 0.264 0.441
Tinted Windows 0.671 0.47 Compact Disc Player 0.008 0.090
1971 Locking Wheel Nuts 0.030 0.17 1990 Electro Chromatic Rear Mirror 0.030 0.170
Headlamp Wash 0.053 0.22 Traction Control 0.054 0225
Child locks 0.464 0.50 Visible Identification Number 0.103 0.304
1972 Electric Aerial 0.058 023 1991 Electric Front Seat Belts 0.001 0.028
Rear Sun Blind Fitted 0.009 0.09 1992 Front Side Air Bags 0.081 0272
Head Rests (front & rear) 0.220 0.41 GSM Mobile 0.002 0.046
Alloy Wheels 0.313 0.46 Xenon Headlights 0.002 0.040
1973 Split rear seats 0.374 0.46 Electric Operated Soft Top 0.003 0.055
Heated Mirrors 0253 0.44 1994 Courtesy Light Delay 0.006 0.074
Height Adj. Headlight Aim 0232 0.42 1995 Electric Folding Minors 0.003 0.052
Colour Coded Bumpers 0.413 0.49 Revolving Front Seats 0.002 0.043
Colour Coded Mirrors 0223 0.42 Traffic Navigation System 0.005 0.068
1974 Rear Wash Wipe 0.413 0.49 1996 CRmate Control 0.015 0.123
1975 Digital Odometer 0.160 0.37 1997 12 V Accessory Power Point 0.014 0.118
Survoof (electric) 0.187 0.39
Headlamp Wash Wipe 0.068 025
4 Wheel Steering 0.002 0.04
Source : 1. Enumerated by the authors from trade publications since 1950 (see data sources for the tHies). 2. ABS was originally used In the Jenson 
FF In 1966, however computer activated ABS was Introduced in 7-Seiies BMW in 1980.
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signed and robust set of coefficients. While three potential classification methods were 
experimented with only a functionally attributed classification, that groups attributes by 
the function they perform for the car occupant, meets these criteria and is supported by 
theoretical considerations.
It was found that while the first method reduces the number of regressors substantially, 
it fails all three of the selection criteria, by (criteria 1) disregarding a considerable num­
ber of explanatory variables and hence information; (criteria 2) providing a number of 
significantly negative coefficients on explanatory variables, typically on variables, which 
inferior substitutes for other attributes in the sample; and (criteria 3) by providing a 
highly counter-intuitive set of resulting variables.
To operationalise Method II, each attribute was broadly classified by making a priori 
assumptions about its nature. This method is similar to the approach taken by Murray 
and garantis (1999) which sums attributes together into a single group, but uses instead 
five groups. Specifically, cars are classified into five broad categories: comfort (23), luxury 
(33), safety and security (19), steering, suspension technical (26), and a residual group - 
‘general’ (24) -  where the numbers in brackets are the total number of attributes in each 
group. The rœulting classification for the simple aggregation count method (Method II) 
is found in Table D.2.
The simple classification method has three major drawbacks. First, crude counts take 
no account of the marginal valuation made by each consumer of a particular feature. In ef­
fect the count method entails wei^ting sophisticated, such as the on-board computer, and 
minor technologies, the cup holder for example, equally. A second draw back is drawing 
up a convincing schedule. It will be noted that in order to classify features meaningfully 
involves using a category entitled ‘general’, which is clearly an ad hoc mixture of disparate 
features. Although we have attempted to be as careful as possible, it is not obvious that 
the classification is appropriate in all cases and could be viewed as being a-historical. In 
particular, many features that were regarded as non-luxury features may well have been 
considered luxury features when they were first introduced. Furthermore, some features 
have dual purposes. For example, headrests serve a comfort function but also have a 
safety role in the case of an accident. Finally, a feature of the data that is illustrated 
in Appendix D is that it contains a number of features which are direct substitutes but 
differ in ‘quality’ such as climate control and air conditioning or having single or duel disk 
brakes. By allocating such features in this way effectively treats such attributes as being 
of equal importance which is not an appealing assumption.
The third method, a detail functionally attributed classification, is illustrated in Table 
D.2. Table D.2 shows that a number of the attributes satisfy particular functions to the
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Table D.2: Simple Attribute Classification Scheme
Comfort Saftv and Security Luxury
Vinyl Trim Alann Adjustable Mirrors
Adjustable Steering Column Antilock Braking System Air Conditioning
Centre Arm Rest Front Central Locking Cigarette Lighter
Centre Arm Rest Rear Child Locks Climate Control
Cloth Trim Child Seat Compact Disc Player
Drivers seat Lumbar Support Deadlocks Cruise Control
Electric Height Adjusting Drivers Seat Drivers Airbag Courtesy Light Delay
Electric Operated Seat Heated Front Windscreen Electric Front Seat Belts
Front Door Bins High level brake Light Electric Memory Seats
Front Head Rest Engine immobiliser Electric Mirrors
Head Rests (front & rear) Locking Wheel Nuts Electric Operated Soft Top
Heated Front Seats Pre Tensloned front Seat Belts Electric Power Hood
Height Adjustable Drivers Seat Rear Seat Belts Fitted Electric Windows (front & rear)
Height Adjustable Seat Belts Remote Central Locking Electric Windows front
Pollen Filter Front Side Air Bags Electro Chromatic Rear
Rear Reading Lights Side Impact Protection View Mirror
Remote Boot Release Front Twin Airtwgs Leather Upholstery
Remote Petrol Cap Release Visible Identification Number Half Leather Trim
Spilt rear seats Three Rear 3 Point Seat Belts Heated Mirrors
Sports Front Seats Leather Coated Steering Wheel
Velour Trim Steering, Suspension end Technical Multlplay CD
Time Clock 2 Speed Transfer Box Radio Cass Remote
Cup holders Active Suspension Radio Cassette
Alloy Wheeis Radio CD Piayer
General Automatic Stability Control Radio fitted
Side Steps Fitted Catalytic Converter Rear Sun Blind (Electric)
Electric Folding Mirrors Dlff Lock Sunroof
12 V Accessory Power Point Disc Brake (front) Sunroof (electric)
Chrome Grille Disc Brakes Front & Rear Sunroof (factory fitted)
Chrome Trim Extemal Temperature Gauge Fitted Trip Computer
Colour Coded Bumpers Free Wheel Front Hubs Trip Counter
Colour Coded Minors Front Fog lamps fitted Twin Sun Rook
Digital Odometer Front Spoiler Voice Synthesizer
Electric Aerial Full Time 4 Wheel Drive Walnut Trim
Exterior Side Mouldings Halogen Head Lights
Headlamp Wash Height Adjustable Headlight Aim
Headlamp Wash Wipe independent Suspension
Heated Rear Window intermittent Wash Wipe
On Board Computer Limited Slip Dlfferentiai
Pop-up Headlights Part Time 4 Wheel Drive
Rear Load Cover Power Assisted Steering
Rear Sun Blind Fitted Rear Spoiler
Rear Wash Wipe Rev Counter
Removable Hard Top Traction Control
Removable Soft Top Traffic Navigation System
Roof Ralls Wheel Covers
T-Bar Roof 
Tinted Windows 
GSM Mobile
Xenon Headlights
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purchaser, many of which complement or substitute for each other. For example, the radio 
and multi-play CD both provide the driver and passengers with music. I take advantage 
of the functional equivalence of many of the attributes contained in the data to derive a 
functional classification system informed by economic notions of product differentiation.
Specifically, Tables D.3 and D.4 divide the binary attributes into three groups: quality 
vertically differentiated, quantity vertically differentiated features, and a residual of binary 
attributes that cannot reasonably be functionally combined.^
The schema is based on two concepts of vertical product differentiation, where the ver­
tical product differentiated product space is conventionally defined over attributes that 
trade publications and MIRA consider to be preferred by consumers. The classification 
scheme aims to be conservative and therefore non-controversial. Two dimensions of ver­
tical product differentiation, which is generally defined as differentiating goods on the 
basis that “more is better” are developed.^ The first dimension reflects quality differences 
between attributes allowing us to classify features on the basis that the underlying binary 
attributes can be ranked in order of quality. For example, having a multi-play CD player is 
clearly preferable to having a car radio from an audio quality perspective. These features 
are termed quality based vertically differentiated features (Quality VDF). The second di­
mension interprets literally the notion of vertical product differentiation, i.e. that “more is 
better”, by summing attributes that have no obvious quality ranking associated to them, 
but there are ‘more’ of the attribute found in each car, into functional classifications. For 
example, having disc brakes front and rear is clearly better than having disc brakes only 
on the firont wheels of a car from a braking perspective. Those feature classifications are 
termed quantity based vertically differentiated features (Quantity VDF). The table below 
summarises the split between the two types of features in the sample.
As can be see, the classified features are split evenly between quality and quantity 
VPD with thirteen apiece, with two features combining the quality and quantity concepts 
leaving a total of 29 features containing 90 attributes. The weighting used for each VPD 
scheme is a logical, albeit simplistic one, incorporating two weighting methods. The 
method applied to features that have a clear vertical product differentiated hierarchy 
(Quality VPD) weights each feature linearly with each successively superior feature being 
given a higher weight. Second, where features are highly similar in function, but are 
differentiated by the quantity of the feature, total number of attributes is summed so 
that if a model version has more than one of the combined features then it receives higher 
weight.
^MIRA UK are thanked for their technical assistance in d e te rm in in g  the classification schedule. A more detailed, 
attribute-by-attribute, analysis of the attributes in the data set is located in Appendix D.
^Tirole (1997) provides a more detail discussion of concepts of product differentiation.
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Table D.3: Functionally Combined Binary Attributes
INTERIOR FEATURES Rank EXTERIOR FEATURES Rank
f1 CLIMATE
Air Conditioning 
Climate Control
f2 COMPUTER INFO
On Board Computer 
Voice Synthesizer 
Traffic Navigation System
f3 MUSIC
Radio fitted 
Radio Cassette 
Compact Disc Player 
Radio CD Piayer 
Multiplay CD 
EiecMc Aerial
SEATS
f6 Seat Adjustment
Height Adjustable Drivers Seat 
Electric Height Adjusting Drivers Seat 
Electric Memory Seats 
Drivers seat Lumbar Support 
Sports Front Seats 
Split rear seats 
Heated Front Seats 
Child Seat
SEATBELTS 
f7 Rear
Rear Seat Belts Fitted 
Three Rear 3 Point Seat Belts 
18 Front
Height Adjustable Seat Belts 
Pre Tensloned front Seat Belts 
Electric Front Seat Belts
f9 SUN BUND
Rear Sun Blind Fitted 
Rear Sun Blind (Electric)
flO AIRBAGS
Drivers Airt)ag 
Front Twin Airtwgs 
Front Side Air Bags
131 RESTS
Centre Arm Rest Front 
Centre Arm Rest Rear 
Head Rests (front & rear)
Front Head Rest
122 UPHOLSTERY
Vinyl Trim
Cloth Trim
Walnut Trim
Velour Trim
Half Leather Trim
Leather Upholstery
Leather Coated Steering Wheel
sum
sum
sum
sum
111 LOCKING
Central Locking 
Remote Central Locking
130 Other Locks
Deadlocks 
Child Locks 
Locking Wheel Nuts
129 ROOF OPENING MECHANISMS
Sunroof
Sunroof (Factory Fitted) 
Removable Hard Top 
Removable Soft Top 
T-Bar Roof 
Twin Sun Roofs 
Sunroof (electric)
Electric Operated Soft Top 
Electric Power Hood 
Roof Ralls
112 UGHTS
Halogen Head Lights 
Xenon Headlights 
Pop-up Headlights 
Front Fog lamps fitted 
Courtesy Light Delay
WIPERS
113 Headlamp 
Headlamp Wash 
Headlamp Wash Wipe
114 Windscreen 
Intermittent Wash Wipe 
Rear Wash Wipe
n  5 MIRROR ADJUSTMENT
Adjustable Mirrors 
Electric Mirrors 
Electric Folding Mirrors 
Heated Mirrors
Height Adjustable Headlight Aim 
Electro Chromatic Rear View mirror
WINDOW
116 Bectric Windows 
Electric Windows front 
Electric Windows (front &
117 Heated Windows 
Heated Rear Window 
Heated Front Windscreen 
Tinted Windows
WHEELS
Alloy Wheels
123 SPOILER 
Rear Spoiler 
Front Spoiler
1
2
sum
sum
sum
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
1
sum
sum
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Table D.4: Functionally Combined Binary Attributes (Con’t)
f24
fl9
fZO
DRIVERS DISPLAY f25 STYLISTIC
Rev Counter sum Chrome Trim sum
Time Clock sum Chrome Grille sum
Cigarette Lighter sum Exterior Side Mouldings sum
Trip Counter sum Colour Coded Bumpers sum
Digital Odometer sum Colour Coded Mirrors sum
Trip Computer sum Side Steps Fitted sum
Extemal Temperature Gauge Fitted sum
GSM Mobile sum fl8 REMOTE INTERIOR
12 V Accessory Power Point sum Remote Boot Release sum
Remote Petrol Cap Release sum
STORAGE
Front Door Bins 1 INTERIOR LIGHTS
Cup holders 1 Rear Reading Lights 1
BRAKES
Disc Brake (front) 1 TRACTION
Disc Brakes Front & Rear 2 f28 4WD
Antilock Braking System 1 Full Time 4 Wheel Drive 1
Part Time 4 Wheel Drive 2
SUSPENSION Free Wheel Front Hubs 3
Independent Suspension 1
Active Suspension 2 f32 LOW SPEED TRACTION
2 Speed Transfer Box sum
OTHER SAFETY & SECURITY Dlff Lock sum
Safety
Rear Load Cover 1 f33 TRACTION (AT SPEED)
Side Impact Protection 1 Limited Slip Differential sum
High level brake Light 1 Automatic Stability Control sum
Security Traction Control sum
Alarm 1
Engine Immobiliser 1 DRIVER MANUVERING AIDS
Visible Identification Number 1 Power Assisted Steering 1
Adjustabie Steering Column 1
PERFORMANCE Cruise Control 1
Fuel injection 1
Turbo 1 ENVIRONMENT
Diesel Engine 1 Catalytic Converter 1
Pollen Filter 1
There are clearly a number of assumptions associated with the classification schema. 
The assumption of linearity between upgraded features, while an improvement on the 
simple count, is simplistic. However it should be noted that the method is consistent 
with theoretical conceptions of new goods, or in this case new attributes, that are that 
new goods are generated through building new dimensions into existing products [Stokey 
(1988)]. In addition, the criticisms concerning classification of attributes is not entirely 
removed through the classification scheme, which given a little imagination is not the 
only available means of classifying attributes. However, I consider the scheme to be a 
considerable improvement on the simple five grouping classification system (Method I) 
and have experimented with shghtly differing categories but found the result did not differ
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significantly.
Table D.5: Features Classified by Quality and Quantity Product Difierentiation
VERTICAL PRODUCT Count VERTICAL PRODUCT Count
DIFFERENTIATION (QUALITY) DIFFERENTIATION (QUANTITY)
CLIMATE 1 AIRBAGS 1
COMPUTER ASSISTED INFORMATION 2 WHIPERS (Windscreen) 2
MUSIC 3 WINDOW (Electric Windows) 3
Seat Adjustment 4 WINDOWS (Heated Windows) 4
Seat Belts (Rear) 5 REMOTE FROM iNTERIOR FEATURES 5
SUN BLIND 6 BRAKES 6
LOCKING 7 SPOILER 7
LIGHTS 8 DRIVERS DISPLAY 8
WIPERS (Headlamp) 9 STYLISTIC 9
MIRRORS 10 OTHER LOCKS 10
SUSPENSION 11 RESTS 11
UPHOLSTERY 12 LOW SPEED TRACTION 12
4WD 13 NON LOW SPEED TRACTION 13
MIXTURE OF VERTICAL QUALITY AND QUANTITY
ROOF (1. Manual 2. Strength 1
3. More Is good 4 Electric)
Seat Belts (Front) 2
TOTAL COMBINED FEATURES 2&
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